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FO K \jr A R D 
This report of the Management Integration 
Panel of the Space Station Operations Task 
Force forms the basis for  some of the 
recommendations summarized in the SSOTF 
Summary Report  dated October 1987. Where 
ieconiniendations here differ f rom those in 
the Summary Report ,  the Summary 
R e c o ni m e n d  a t  io n s p r ecede  n c e .  
(Kecommendations of all panels were 
reviewed and debated by the Task Force and 
in some instances were changed). 
t a k e 
The official Space Station Operations Concept 
Lexicon is provided as an Appendix to the 
Summary Report .  Should the definition of a 
term in this Panel Report be interpreted by 
the reader to conflict with the corresponding 
definition in the Summary Report ,  the 
definition in the Summary Report will take 
precedence. 
Some of the papers prepared i n  the spring of 
1987 address topics which have undergone 
significant change in the Space Station 
Program since that time. These sections have 
not been updated except in the following 
respects: 
-use of current terminology to lessen 
confusion (e.g.  Level I and I1 rather 
than Level A and A’) 
-reorganization of material within and 
across sections to increase clarity 
-use of a relatively common format 
throughout the report 
- m i n o r  t e c h n i c a l  co r rec t ions , ’  
clarifications 
-occasional addition of an editor’s note 
where i t  seemed appropriate 
Any questions or  clarifications needed 
concern in g r eco ni me n da t io t i  s 
contained in this report  should be addressed 
to the Panel Chairman, Mr.  Granville Paules, 
Code SO, NASA Headquarters, Washington, 
de t a i Is or  
D.C. 20546, (?0?):453- 1 L@. 
Granville E.  Paules, 111 Date 
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PREFACE 
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Authorship of each section is noted in the 
text. Because of the function of this panel 
to integrate the work of the other panels, a 
number of panel members and consultants 
made significant contributions to the 
Summary Report  and other Task Force 
products. To  avoid duplication, these 
contributions do  not appear in this panel 
report, but  are  listed here: 
SSOTF Summary 
Report  
Operations Functions 
(Summary Report ,  
APP. B) 
User Integration 
Scenario (Summary 
Report ,  1II.D) 
Operations Scenarios/ 
Test Cases 
SSOTF Comments 
on RFPs 
SSOTF Comments 
on MOUs 
Dan Bland 
Marc Vaucher 
Bill Brooks 
James Kaidy 
Henry Pierce 
Rebecca Simmons 
Dan Bland 
Marc Vaucher 
Joe Joyce 
(coordinator) 
Greg Williams 
(coordinator) 
This report is an account of ideas developed 
during the Task Force. The  Task Force 
provided both the opportunity to develop 
these ideas and for  critique, generally of oral 
presentations of these ideas, both by 
members of one’s own Panel and the other 
panels. Panel members converted these ideas 
into papers at the end of the Task Force. 
From these raw contributions, Doug Lee and 
Gran Paules developed an  outline for  this 
report and Doug Lee converted these 
contributions into a first draft .  Doug Lee, 
Bill Pegram, and Gran Paules reviewed this 
draf t  and the original contributions to 
produce a draft  copy of this report which 
was circulated to all Panel members for  
review and comment.  Bill Pegram and Gran 
Paules dispositioned these comments and Bill  
Pegram edited and prepared the final panel 
report. 
All of these reviews deferred substantially to 
the original author as the panel member 
selected for  his/her expertise in the 
designated area. Ultimately, therefore the 
sections represent the viewpoint of the 
contributors and not the Panel was a whole. 
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1 .O EXECUTIVE SUhIMARY 
by Bill Pegram 
I 1.1 PANEL OVERVIEW 
Efforts of the Space Station Operations 
four  Panels: 
I Task Force (SSOTF) were organized into 
, 
I 
Panel 1 --gpace Operations and Support 
Systems 
Panel 2--Ground Operations and 
Support Systems 
Panel 3--User Development and 
Integration 
Panel 4--Management Integration 
Panel Four was chartered to provide a 
structure and ground rules for  integrating 
the efforts of the other three panels, and to 
address a number of cross-cutting issues 
that affected all areas of space station 
operations. 
Work of the panel consisted of (1)  
development of conceptual tools to assist 
other panels, and (2) examination of a 
number of cross-cutting special topics. 
1.2 REPORT OVERVIEW 
Chapter 2,  Operations Concept 
Implementation 
Underlying much of the Task Force effort  
was a realization that operations activities 
could usefully be analyzed as falling into one 
of three types of program management levels: 
strategic, tactical, and execution. Another 
major tenet was that a focus on users and 
their needs was essential to fully realize the 
potential of the Space Station. Section 2.1 
discusses the SSOTF focus on the user in 
terms of its strategic, tactical, and execution 
level implications. 
Central to the Task Force analysis of 
operations activities was to develop a 
comprehensive listing of operations- 
'\ 
utilization functions at  the strategic, tactical, 
and execution levels. Functions were defined 
not so much by their titles or a traditional 
definition, but by defining the explicit flows 
of information and products among the 
functions. This functions structure is 
separate from and independent of the NASA 
organizations that implement the various 
functions. The  Management Integration 
Panel developed this listing of function 
which is presented in Appendix B of the 
SSOTF Summary Report. Table 2-2 in this 
Panel Report provides a listing of Level I 
and I1 responsibilities consistent with this 
functional description. 
The focus of the Task Force effort  was on 
mature operations. However, the Task Force 
did address the functions and organizational 
responsibilities during the development phase, 
assembly, and evolution phase. This issue is 
discussed on p. 67-79 of the Summary 
Report. Section 2.2.3 of this Panel report 
discusses the application of the mature 
operations concept to the assembly phase. 
The Task Force was aware that success of 
the Space Station Program was critically 
dependent on other programs within NASA. 
Section 2.3.1 discusses the formation of 
intercode Steering Committees to facilitate 
this cooperation. 
The Management Integration Panel believed 
that program plans and requirements would 
be instrumental in managing the program. 
Proposed contents for  a number of program 
plans are discussed in Section 2.3.4. 
Fashioning of process requirements in areas 
such as logistics, including supportability, 
was seen as a way to counteract common 
biases in development programs. Section 
2.3.5 proposes requirements for  inclusion in 
the Program Requirements Document (PRD, 
the Level I-imposed requirements) and the 
Program Definition and Requirements 
Document (PDRD, the Level 11-imposed 
requirements). 
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Chapter 3,  Alternatives Development and 
Integration Process 
Much of the Task Force work was to develop 
a preferred alternative and then develop this 
alternative in considerable detail so that i t  
addressed most, i f  not all, of the questions 
that those presented with the alternative 
might raise. Other, inferior alternariver are 
not described in much detail in the 
documentation of the Task Force, partly 
because if time is limited. dwelling on 
inferior alternatives may have appeared to be 
less productive t h a n developing t 11 e prefer red 
alternative. Evaluation of alternatives was 
done in a subjective, qualitatativcs manner. 
Chapter 3 presents the case for  an  alternative 
approach in which a structured, "objrctive" 
process is used to develop and evaluate 
alternatives. This process has a number of 
componcnts, almost all of which have  u t i l i ty  
used either i n  isolation or  i n  conjunction 
with other parts of the process. AS is noted 
there, this process and its various components 
were used in varying degrees b y  the Task 
Force. An  example of application of some 
of the components is found i n  Section 5 of 
the Panel 1 report. Some members of the 
Panel believed strongly that grcater use of 
this process, or  some parts or variantt; of i t ,  
by the Task Force would have been 
desirable. However, even if one agrees that 
the proposed process is useful, i t  is of course 
inappropriate to judge the 'Task Force 
product in terms of the degree of adherence 
to this, or  any other approach. What matters 
is the quality of the product, not the process 
for getting there. 
Section 3.4 describes six scenarios and six 
text cases developed by the Panel lo serve as 
a catalyst for  discussion by the SSOTF. 
These scenarios and test cases were designed 
to illustrate the way the recommended 
operations concept would work and to test 
the ability of the concept to handle extreme 
situations. LJse of the test cases and 
scenarios by the Panels was limited, partly 
due to lack of time. The test cases and 
scenarios hopefully will be useful to the 
Program in the future--they are described in 
much greater detail in a two \,oluine report 
submitted to the Task Force.' The scenarios 
were operations planning, user integration, 
Station manifest, sust; ining engineering, 
flight crew integration, and operations 
transition. The test u s e s  were assembly 
operations, mature operations, co-orbiting 
platform operations, polar platform 
operations, evolutionar r' operations, and 
operations impact of a niajor program 
contingency. 'The user iritegration scenario is 
described in detail on p. 79-88 of the 
Summary Report and M'as the scenario/test 
case most used by the other panels. 
Seztion 3.5 describes a rlumber of operations 
options areas that were developed to aid the 
other panels in de.ieloping operations 
a I I e r 11 at i ves . 
Chapter 4,  Strategic Palicy Issues arid 
Opt ions 
Section 4 ,  Strategic Policy Issues and Options, 
describes a number of ,;trategic issues which 
received var l ing degrees of attention by the 
Task Force. 
Section 4.1, International Cooperation i n  
Space, deals with issiles also discussed i n  
Section 5.1 1 . 1  of this report, Space Station 
Partners h i p 0 p t io n s . 
Section 4.2, Transportation, addresses issues 
that while viewed by the SSOTF as very 
important, were judged to be outside of the 
SSOTF purview and therefore best left for  
other groups, and hence did not receive 
SSOTF attention commensurate with the 
perceived importance of the issue to NASA. 
Ijowever, discussion of transportation issues 
is also found in Section 5.1.5, 5.1.6, and 8.6 
of the Panel 1 report and Section 5 of the 
Panel 2 report. 
Section 4.3, Civilian Control, discusses the 
role of the  DOD in the Space Station 
program. Considerai ion elsewhere i n  the 
'Task Force was more related to whether the 
possible p m e n c e  of the DOD altered the 
re c o ni me n d e d concept . 
Section 4.4, Manned Spaceflight Program 
Directions, discusses possible mixes of 
manned and unmanned programs to achieve 
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objectives. 
Section 4.5, Resource Allocation and Subsidy 
Policy, was the subject of two different 
subpanels within Panel 3. The efforts of 
these subpanels constitute Section 2 and 4 of 
the Panel 3 report. 
Section 4.6, Initial User Mix, was dealt with 
somewhat by the Marketing subpanel of 
Panel 3 ,  and is described in Section 3.4 of 
the Panel 3 report. 
Section 4.7, Commercialization of Space 
Services, and Section 4.8, Commercial 
Markets and Spinoffs, discuss possible options 
in these areas. 
Chapter 5 ,  Program Management Emphasis 
Areas 
Much of the work of the panel was devoted 
to a number of special emphasis areas and 
this effor t  is described in Chapter 5 .  Each 
of the sections are described briefly below. 
Some applicable recommendations from the 
Summary Report  are  noted. 
Section 5.1, Operations Management 
Structure, describes a number of major 
strategic issues relating to the nature of the 
organization that would operate the Station, 
to STS/Station or Center consolidation, and 
to strategic management and control. The 
issue of Station/STS Operations Synergy is 
also addressed on p. 98-100 of the Summary 
Report .  
Section 5.2, Performance Assessment Process, 
provides background relating to the 
recommendation in the Summary Report (p .  
126) that NASA "Establish an operations 
performance assessment system available to 
each level of Program management which 
identifies symptoms of non-optimal 
performance as well as decision path 
alternatives which, if implemented, could 
improve ground and onboard operations 
effectiveness." 
Section 5.3, Operations Cost Management, 
and Section 5.4, Modeling Space Station 
Costs, describe the elements of a major Panel 
recommendation that NASA adopt life cycle 
cost as the relevant cost parameter in 
decision making. The  work of the Panel in 
this area led to the following Summary 
Report recommendation: 
"6. To facilitate Program operations life 
cycle cost projections: 
A. Conduct an operations costs 
e s t i m a t i o n  s t u d y  wi th  each  
participating operations organization 
using the center assignments, facility 
requirements and overall operations 
framework described in the Summary 
Report .  
B. Develop a process for  estimating 
annual operations costs which accounts 
for  all elements of the operational 
framework as described within this 
Summary Report." (p.  126) 
Section 5 .5 ,  Risk Management/Safety, 
discusses possible approaches to risk 
management, and applications to safety, cost, 
and performance risk. Although most of the 
Safety section of the Summary Report (p.  
100-103) was derived from the work of 
Panel I ,  the SSOTF conclusion "that there is 
a need to develop quantitative methodology 
for  performance of safety risk assessments. 
Such methodology would help to reduce the 
dependence on conservative assumptions 
which could unnecessarily reduce operations 
flexibility ..." was based on  work performed 
by this panel and discussed in Section 5.5.  
Section 5.6, Financial Management, 
recommends changes i n  the functional and 
organizational structure and in the 
management tools for  financial management. 
I t  discusses alternative planning and 
contracting mechanisms. 
Section 5.7, Information Management, lists a 
number of recommendations that emerged 
from developing two sections of the 
Summary Report: Space Station Information 
System (p.  113-120) and Space Station 
Management Information Systems (p.  120- 
124) .  SSOTF S u m m a r y  R e p o r t  
recommendations 7 ,  8, 16, 23, 24, 25, and 26 
are also directly relevant (p .  126-127). 
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Section 5.8, Hardware and Softwire Design 
Issues, documents the SSOTF's work  on the 
Phase C /D KFPs. Panel 4 integrated 
comments f r o m  the four  panels into a 
presentation to the Space Station Associate 
Ad m in  is t ra to r and comments to t ti e f i ve 
Source Evaluation Boards de\,eloping the 
RFPs. I n  addition to this effort ,  the SSOTF 
continued to address design issucc., and this 
usork is described i n  the second part of' this 
section. This discussion amplifies a number 
of recommendations i n  the Suinmnry Report 
(p .  125-128). 
Section 5.9, Automation nnd Robotics, and 
Section 5.10, Evolution, describe the SSOTF 
and Panel work i n  these areas. 
Section 5.1 1 .  Integration of Iriternational 
Partners in Operations and Utilization 
consists of three parts.  This fir \ t  is a h i g h  
level discussion of Space Station partnership 
options, the second a detailed discussion of 
international management issue.,, and the 
third a discussion of sharing operations costs 
E N D NOTES 
imong the partners. The latter relates to the 
Summary Report recommendation that the 
Program "De\ elop an equitable policy 
regarding sharing of operations costs among 
the partners. This policy must be 
straightforward and easily implemented and 
should consider indi\.idLtal partner resource 
a l l o c a t i o n s ,  s u s t a i n i n g  e n g i n e e r i n g  
res po n s i b i 1 i t  i e s . and o v e :.a 11 con t r i b u t ions to 
routine Station operations." (p .  126) 
Appendix A, is a descr ption of the Model 
for Estimating Space Station Operations C m t s  
(MESSOC), an operations cost model used 
within the Space Station Program and by the 
Task  Force. Append x B describes the 
application by the Panel of this model to the 
repair-on-orbit issue. 
1 .  Technical and Analytical Services in Support o r  a Space Station Operations Scenarios and Test 
Case Development Strateps, The Center for  Space Policy, Inc., January 29 and February 18, 1987, 
2 volumes. 
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2.0 OPERATIONS CONCEPT IhlPLEhlENTATION 
by Granville Paules 
This  chapter  begins with SSOTF 
recommendations reflecting Program focus on 
the user, then discusses program management 
mechanisms and concludes with a description 
of the implementation plan for  the 
recommended operations concept. 
2.1 PROGRAM FOCUS ON THE USER 
This section of the report is an attempt to 
summarize the SSOTF recommendations as 
they specifically impact and respond to user 
needs. Details can be found in the SSOTF 
Summary Report  and in the appropriate panel 
reports. The User Integration Scenario 
described in Section 1II.D. of the Summary 
Report  is especially useful to assist in 
understanding the step-by-step user 
involvement. Also an excellent background 
document is the report, Technical and 
Analytical Services in Supuort of Space 
Station Operations--Scenario and Test Case 
Development Strategy (in two parts). 
The  following is a summary of the key 
points resulting from the Task Force efforts 
with respect to user concerns. 
From its inception the Space Station 
Operations Task Force was to focus on the 
users and their needs. The predecessor 
guidance document,  the Level I Operations 
Management Concept, which evolved through 
considerable review within the NASA 
institutions and with the international 
partners, was strongly influenced by user 
needs in the Space Station era. 
As conceived the Station program is to 
provide a permanently manned orbital 
laboratory and unmanned platforms for  user 
research instruments. The facilities should 
provide an environment which enables 
"discovery" in its truest sense. In a relative 
sense NASA has taken only the smallest steps 
toward providing such capabilities during the 
past decade. The Station Program was 
envisioned to provide a cost-effective 
environment which supports not only the 
fundamental seminal research but the facility 
for  moving the research into a pilot 
production phase if appropriate. This 
evolutionary process would proceed through 
a prototypical learning phase to the point of 
having proved the concept for  a space-based 
production facility. The concept is necessary 
for  special research areas such as materials 
processing. It requires no stretch of the 
imagination to visualize the production 
facility migrating from the permanently 
manned base to a nearby man-tended 
platform. Given the variety of such 
scenarios the SSOTF took special efforts to 
involve the user community in its day-to-day 
activities and thus to arrive at  designs and 
operations techniques offering the potential 
to maximize the return to all users. 
From the outset a major SSOTF 
recommendation was that users would be 
represented, would personally participate, or  
would actually have the full decision-making 
responsibility for  the planning, management 
and execution of user experiments. The 
baselined operations concept highlights this 
user involvement. 
For the design and development phases the 
Program has made major commitments to the 
systematic consideration of long-term 
utilization and operations. That is, the 
Program will consider the life-cycle costs of 
development decisions as part of its design- 
to-cost process. A specific approach referred 
to as Logistics Support  Analysis (LSA) is 
strongly recommended by the SSOTF for  use 
during the Program's system engineering 
efforts. A potential example where these 
evaluative processes will provide insight is 
for  implementation options which consider 
the automation of certain operations 
functions and support  systems. Additionally, 
the operations concept has been structured to 
respond to productive opportunities based on 
experience obtained during the early years of 
Space Station operations. The  SSOTF 
recommends that the Program routinely assess 
the performance of the operations and 
utilization support  functions and provide 
guidance where technological or  procedural 
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enhancements could improve overall cost- 
effectiveness. 
A number of specific decision-support 
processes and management mechanisms are 
incorporated in the SSOTF operations 
concept. They are summarized here, grouped 
under the three primary Program 
management levels referred to ;is Strategic, 
Tactical, and Execution where each of the 
levels is related to the scope and magnitude 
of Program and user related decisions more 
than to time horizons. Following the three- 
level summary are recommendations which 
relate the operations concept to the manned 
base assembly phase and to organizational 
plans for  long-term operations. 
Strategic ImDlications 
As conceived by the SSOTF the allocation of 
U S .  Space Station resources and the initial 
commitment of these resources to specific 
uses or  discipline groups would be 
accomplished by a NASA chaired Space 
Station Users Board (SSUB). The United 
States SSUB would be made up of user 
organization representatives and would 
implement the agency established resource 
allocation policies. Similar approaches may 
be used by the international partners. The 
SSUB would also submit the selected payloads 
for  technical feasibility assessment and 
ultimate manifesting. User-oriented Program 
organizations would shepherd the payloads 
throughout the remainder of the planning 
and flight activities. In summary, the users 
always are  in control of the resources 
allocated for  use at  the Station; the Program 
provides technical assurances that i t  can 
deliver the services. 
The SSOTF concept of resource envelopes is 
recommended as the approach for  making 
commitments to individual users and groups 
of users. On-orbit  resources such as power 
and the crew-time would be allocated to 
specific users in specific timefrarnes perhaps 
years in the future.  Blocks of resources 
would go to the international partners for 
further allocation to their user community. 
Additional blocks could be set aside as user 
reserves for  the "quick response" payloads 
that might come along opportunistically close 
to launch. The package of resources would 
carry with i t  the nece 'mry launch capacity 
and network services. Commitment to 
specific launch vehicles and rack space in 
s p ec if ic o n -. orbit la t lo ra t o r ies cou Id be 
deferred until the last reasonable time to 
provide flexibility for  both the user and the 
Program to better guarantee a launch 
window, adequate time on board, and a 
scheduled return to Earth. 
The SSOTF recommends that a NASA-wide 
pricing and resource valuation process be 
established as soon as practical. The 
approach is essential if there is to be a 
ra t ional ,  implementable  policy f o r  
administering the scarce Space Station and 
other NASA resources. I t  will be essential 
for  establishing consistent approaches to 
bartering of resources for  use among the U.S. 
users and  between the partners. I t  will also 
provide a consistent mechanism for 
communicating to the users and operators 
what incentives they should consider in 
payload design, operation, maintenance, and 
servicing. 
The SSOTF recommends an integrated end- 
to-end approach to manifesting for  both user 
payloads and laboratory "housekeeping" 
support. The end-to-end approach includes 
the commitment of all essential resources as 
noted earlier. It includes all services such as 
transportation to space, communications and 
tracking needs, some data processing services, 
all Space Station related support  services, and 
all logistics support services. This includes 
both the trip to space and back. Thus, the 
user will be provided one well identified 
s 11 ppo rt path through the integrated process. 
The international partners will be part of this 
integrated process. Such an approach is 
critical since nearly half the United States 
sponsored users will likely be assigned to an 
international laboratory 
The SSOTF recommends that each manifested 
user be assigned a Paylfxid Accommodations 
Manager (PAM) who will follow and nurture 
the payload from the point of Space Station 
commitment until the time that a11 
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"contracted" payload support is complete. 
This includes payload return to Earth or a 
similarly recognized completion event. AS 
currently proposed the PAM will work for 
the Space Station Program and will be 
extremely knowledgeable about the Station's 
capabilities as well as the needs of the user 
discipline which she/he is most likely to 
represent. 
Tactical ImDlications 
The  SSOTF recommends the concept of 
Science and Technology Centers where 
experts in specific user disciplines provide 
critical design and technical integration 
support during the payload development and 
verification phase. The Centers would be 
Program certified and primarily responsible 
for  payload rack integration or the equivalent 
services required for  attached payloads. The 
Centers would be instituted and supported by 
the user organizations and would provide a 
variety of discipline-oriented services such as 
data archiving and engineering support 
analyses. 
Much of the strategic level manifest 
commitment and detailed follow-on user 
integrztion support  will be handed off to the 
Tactical level organization at the appropriate 
point in the payload life-cycle. Again the 
PAM remains with the payload to assure 
proper integration support and the key access 
back in to the formal remanifesting process 
were this may be required. 
As at  the Strategic planning level it is still 
presumed that users and groups of users are 
planning and working within their allotted 
resource envelopes. To the degree practical 
all data and information necessary for  
planning and managing operations and 
utilization will be automatically stored and 
retrieved. Paper documentation will be 
minimized. 
Activities a t  the Station are organized in 
increments of time delineated by manned 
launch vehicle arrivals. Major crew 
involvement and relatively time-critical 
events characterize the activities typically 
associated with the Shuttle arrival. This 
includes the Station crew changeout and the 
new load of experiments to be transferred to 
the Station. Completed experiments must 
also be off-loaded to the Shuttle during its 
short stay or loaded in a returnable 
Expendable Launch Vehicle canister. 
The Increment Change Manager (ICM) 
becomes the most important decision-maker 
of interest to the user at  this time. The ICM 
controls all the programmatic resources 
necessary to assure that the experiments in 
his increment receive the proper prelaunch 
(or pre-postlanding) attention to meet the 
launch and return schedules. The  ICM is 
also responsible for  assuring that any 
experiment logistics needs will be satisfied 
during the increment fo r  which he is 
accountable. The ICM will be strongly 
influential in seeing that users receive the 
proper support to stay on schedule prior to 
and during increments for  which he is 
responsible. 
Several ICMs might be involved with a single 
experiment if i t  is to be active onboard the 
Station over several increments. But note 
that only one will be involved with launch 
issues and one with return issues. Others 
over intervening increments will have little if 
any involvement in such a case. 
Thus, as complex as the user integration 
process might appear when viewed end-to- 
end, the SSOTF concept provides the user 
with two key advocates: the PAM who 
protects the individual user's interest and the 
ICM who protects the "corporate" interest of 
the group of users associated with his 
increment. 
Execution Implications 
The SSOTF recommends the use of a 
centralized Payload Operations Integration 
Center (POIC) to coordinate and plan for 
user requirements during the real-time 
execution phase. User Working Groups will 
work through the POIC to reconcile any 
conflicts over resources ( for  instance, where 
a particular user must exceed his peak power 
requirement to complete an experiment). 
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Discipline Operations Centers I DOC) are 
conceived to perform a similar function 
within a particular discipline. The DOC will 
bring to bear the knowledge of specialists to 
prepare plans for  a group of uc,ers during 
specific periods of time. Real-time resource 
demands and scheduling problcms which 
cannot be reconciled at  the DOC will be 
negotiated through the POIC support team. 
The POIC will integrate the individual 
requirements of each DOC or  individually 
sponsored user to assure proper support  
system configuration and support  team 
manpower scheduling. 
A major recommendation by the SSOTF is 
that users, as much as possible, be able to 
execute the specifics of their experiment 
from their normal work sites, not from a 
"control center" prescribed by the Program. 
This recommendation is based on historical 
experience with space programs in general. 
Laboratory science is best conducted in a 
laboratory environment.  This includes the 
environment envisioned for  Space-based 
research where the Earth-based Principal 
Investigator may be working a project that 
has Earth-based parallel efforts associated 
with that underway on-orbit .  Direct voice 
contact with the cooperating Station 
crewperson and direct control of up and 
downlink data f rom the Earth-based 
laboratory is essential. 
This recommendation is consistent with the 
resource planning and management concept 
embodied in the POIC and DOCS described 
above, i.e. decentralize to all degrees feasible 
the user activity to his normal work site. 
Note that the DOC can be identified as a 
normal work site but this should be a 
decision negotiated between the uSer and his 
sponsor--not one dictated by the Program. 
Consistent with the above discussion a major 
recommendation of the SSOTF is that the 
current Zone of Exclusion (ZOE) be closed. 
This is a ground-coverage gap between the 
currently planned TDRSS satellite locations. 
The routine accommodation of this gap for  
every orbit of the Earth for  thirty years 
carries with i t  an unacceptable opportunity 
cost. 
This becomes especially apparent when one 
considers the user-based concept of 
telescience. 'This conccbpt provides for  the 
transparent end-to-end ibility to "command, 
con t r o I, and co mm L! n ica t e" with the 
experimenter's payload or, for  instance, the 
system operator's robotic maintenance efforts. 
Mod ern g ro 11 M d co m rn 11 n i ca t i o n techno logy 
and that projected to be available on-orbit in 
the Space Station era should support the 
telescience concept. 
The SSOTF stresses th,it closing the ZOE 
must be studied fron; a life-cycle cost 
perspective and the most cost-effective 
approach found for  closure. 
Conceat for xlature Operations Consistent 
- with Assernlily Phace 
The SSOTF first developed an operations 
concept for  the mature phase to be in place 
following Station assembly and on-orbit 
verification. I t  then reviewed the concept 
for  feasibility during the assembly phase. 
The consensus was that the mature phase 
concept was completely rational for  the 
Station assembly arid that concept 
implementation should begin as soon as 
possible. The major benefit is that the 
mature phase support systems and ground- 
based facilities provide a highly rational 
approach to manifesting, remanifesting, 
payload integration and launch site 
processing. In general, the concept appeared 
to also provide the best process for  managing 
the assembly phase activities. A highly 
beneficial outcome will be that the Program 
and the user community can, in parallel with 
the mostly centralized Apollo-like assembly 
operations, develop and understand various 
approaches to the much more decentralized 
user operations. 
The SSOTF recommends that during the 
Ass e in b 1 y Phase the Uti  1 i za t i o n - 0 per at  ions 
organization be tightly integrated with the 
Space Station development program to better 
assure the long-term cclnsideration of user 
and operations concerns during the hardware 
development phase. See "Controlling" in  
Section 2.2.1 below for  fur ther  discussion. 
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2.2.1 Establish Program-level Decision- 
Support Processes 
L o n e - T e r m  U t i l i z a t i o n / O D e r a t i o n s  
Orpanizational Planning 
The SSOTF envisions that during the mature 
operations era that the Utilization/Operations 
organization will, in effect ,  become the 
dominant organization. Development 
activities will likely continue for a significant 
period after the Phase I (and 11) manned 
program has been completed. However, since 
actual utilization and operations activities will 
have been underway for a few years, the 
major operations sustaining engineering 
requirements and the utilization "market" 
analyses should dominate the Space Station 
Program engineering and development 
activities. The  Summary Report (p .  68-75) 
includes a recommended organizational 
approach for the mature era. 
Thus,  the SSOTF strongly recommends that 
as the Station moves into its mature 
operations phase, about a year after assembly, 
a much more accountable organization be put 
in place. Individual managers at each 
organizational level must be assigned the 
authority and responsibility for the 
acquisition and use of all operations and 
utilization resources. They must be 
accountable for  the performance, cost and 
risk management associated with their areas 
of functional responsibility. Positive use- 
oriented incentives must encourage them 
toward the most cost-effective use of their 
r e s o u r c e s .  I m p l e m e n t i n g  t h i s  
recommendation will clearly prescribe, a t  
least in part, several "new ways of doing 
business" fo r  NASA institutions. 
2 . 2  P R O G R A M  M A N A G E M E N T  
MECHANISMS 
The  SSOTF made several recommendations 
relative to program management with respect 
to operations and utilization. Several of the 
following recommendations elaborate on the 
recommendations summarized in the previous 
section. 
Program-level decision-support processes fall 
into two major functional grouping: planning 
and controlling. Both are summarized below. 
P l a n n i n g  
Planning processes are designed to establish 
measurable, time-based performance criteria 
and objectives for the specific plans or other 
products of the functional area covered by 
each process. Strategic and tactical 
operations planning, market research, and 
budget planning are examples. Several 
SSOTF recommendations resulted from 
efforts to define the processes. They are 
included in the Summary Report  as part of 
the Operations Framework. Others which are 
described below provide expanded detail 
about implementing the processes. 
Recommendation: 
As the Program moves to implement the 
operations concept it must clarify the various 
Program phases through which operations 
must transition. This is especially important 
since the funding mechanisms are quite 
different and the transition of major 
operations and utilization roles and 
responsibilities might be significant from 
phase-to-phase. The  Program should clarify 
Program Phase Definitions for: 
-Development--including Operations 
Capability Development. Specifically 
clarify those activities or developments 
funded under operations capability 
development but which require a major 
continuing investment as part of the 
actual conduct of operations such as 
sustaining engineering. 
- Assembly--including the transition 
through the full Assembly-Verification 
phase 
-Mature Operations--all operations after 
Assembly phase 
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-Evolution Operations Capability 
Development--this effort  is of key 
importance since technology evolution is 
the area having the most promise for  
increasing operational productivity both 
on the ground and on-orbit. 
Recommendation: 
The Program should formally adopt a number 
of specific utilization-operations goals: 
-Incorporate the goals stated in the 
SSOTF Summary Report  (p .  11 - 13) 
-Operate the Manned Base as an 
integrated complex 
-Provide for  cost-effective synergy 
between the Manned Base and Platforms 
-Make the most cost-effective use of all 
NASA operations resources 
-Allow for  the use of Commercial 
Services to support  operations which: 
meet operations safety and performance 
criteria, have acceptable management 
risk where an equivalent capability does 
not reside within NASA,  and, otherwise, 
are cost-effective from a life-cycle 
perspective. 
Recommendation: 
Utilization/Operations Functions. The 
Program should refine the functional areas 
summarized in the SSOTF recommended 
operations framework. The SSOTF, through 
the Panel Four efforts, developed a 
comprehensive set of operations-utilization 
functions. These were used: to stimulate 
SSOTF thinking about the whole of 
operations, to provide a framework for  
organizing the operations concept, and to 
provide end-to-end validation checks of the 
various panel efforts in order to reconcile 
functional overlaps and gaps. The complete 
set of functions and their descriptions is 
included as Appendix B to the SSOTF 
Summary Report .  The  Program should take 
the following steps to complete and formally 
adopt the functions approach for  use in 
implementing, the operations concept: 
-Comple te  the  de f in i t i on  and  
development of Space Station operations 
functions, functi2nal interfaces and 
product flows an-ong functional areas 
using a methodology similar to that 
initiated by the SSOTF. This must: 
cover all aspects of operations, define 
e n d  - t o  - e n d  r c s p o n s i  b i I i t y a n d  
accountability, identify all activities and 
products, and provide a basis for  
measuring management effectiveness. 
-The functions, functional interfaces 
and product flows, and the assignment 
of roles and responsibilities should be 
formally defined and placed under a 
TBD form of configuration control. 
Recommendation: 
?'he Program should provide a number of 
policies and capabilities which respond to the 
concerns of utilization and operations interest: 
-Level I Operations Management Concept 
(OMC). This document was developed by 
the Program as a early effort  to define the 
highest level concepts and to establish 
Program-wide agreement with its stated 
principles. The review included the 
international partners. The concept was used 
a point of departure for  the SSOTF to begin 
its deliberations. The OMC should be 
u p d a t e d  t o  r e f l e c t  t h e  S S O T F  
recommendations and be approved as a 
program a p p 1 ica ble document . 
-Joint Manifesting Process. The  Program 
s h a1 1 develop and implement man if es t i ng 
procedures that: 
* provide a "one-stop" concept for  users 
and systems operators including support 
f o r :  s e r v i c e s ;  
coni mu n ica t ion, tracking , and data 
services; Space Station Manned Base 
services 
t r a n s  p o I' t a t i o n 
* provides the most flexibility in 
assignment-reassilpment to launch 
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vehicles, and 
* provides the most flexibility in 
assignment-reassignment to earth-return 
vehicles. 
-Operations Planning Procedures. The 
Program shall incorporate planning 
procedures which: 
* assume when permanently manned, 
the Manned Base will be supported by 
a minimum of five Shuttle visits per 
year 
* assume for  manifesting purposes, an 
EQUIVALENT of five Shuttle arrivals 
per year 
* allow for  an annual mix of Shuttle 
and ELVs (specifics to be identified) 
and that ELVs may be used for any 
upload or download activity exclusive of 
routine crew delivery or transfer 
* assume an EQUIVALENT of two 
TDRSS channels for the Manned Base 
and one for  all platform operations. 
Recommendation: 
O p e r a t i o n s  C o n c e p t  R e v i e w  a n d  
Enhancement. The  SSOTF completed a 
significant effort  to describe an operations 
concept. Many steps are required to 
implement such a concept. The Program 
should undertake a comprehensive operations 
concept review and enhancement process as 
outlined below: 
-Define concept alternatives for each 
major functional area. The following 
options as defined in Section 3.5 of this 
Panel Report  should include utilization 
t h e m e s ,  o rgan iza t iona l  c o n t r o l ,  
implementat ion approaches,  and  
engineering design emphasis areas which 
includes the two subareas of use- 
oriented initiatives and system 
performance-oriented initiatives. 
-Synthesize operat ions concepts  
including definition of support systems, 
facilities, materials, and manpower 
required to carry out the functional 
area. This effort  should include a clear 
indication of what inputs are required 
from other functional areas, the 
products or outputs produced by the 
functional area, and a summary of the 
processes required to conduct the 
functions. 
-Develop scenarios and test cases to 
validate the concept by using Program 
baselined scenarios such as those 
developed by the SS0TF.I Two steps 
are involved. First, the scenarios should 
be developed, then configuration 
controlled for program use and should 
include at  a minimum the following. 
For both mature and transition ops, the 
reference cases should include end-to- 
end user integration and integrated 
operations planning. In the mature ops 
area, there should be a special focus on 
flight crew inf ; ration including 2 year 
rotation, stat: P I  manifesting, sustaining 
engineering, hnd integrated logistics 
support. For transition ops, the special 
focus should be on assembly- 
verification and man-tended operations. 
Second, the Program should develop and 
use operations test cases such as those 
developed by the SSOTF and described 
in the reference cited above. These 
ultimately should be configuration 
controlled since they provide a standard 
against which future  concept proposals 
may be evaluated. 
-Select integrated concept evaluation 
criteria. Consider especially: user 
friendliness,  feasibil i ty-flexibil i ty,  
resource allocation-utilization equity and 
management,  uti l ization/operations 
procedural efficiency, operations cost 
management (short and long term), 
international cooperation (accommod- 
ation of functional allocation concepts, 
resource allocation, operations cost 
sharing), and risk management. The 
criteria should incorporate measures of 
effectiveness, equity, and efficiency. 
Suggested pe r fo rmance  measures 
(stratified by user community and 
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partner) include: utilization/unit of 
resource availability, utilization-unit of 
resource house k ee p i n g / 
u t  i I i za t i o n con 5, u m p t io n , 
cost/unit of productivity, risk exposure 
vs. productive benefit, and o\,erall goal 
satisfaction/unit resource consumption. 
cons u me d , 
re sou r c e 
-Evaluate concept alternatives for the 
full integrated set of functional areas 
using the steps outlined in Table 2-1. 
Recommendation: 
Top - do w n Pro g r a m Process . 
The Program should create an Operations 
organization which has clear lines of 
responsibility and authority from the 
Strategic to the Tactical and down to the 
Execution level of the organization. The 
SSOTF studied a wide range of alternatives 
for  organizing operations and utiliza1ion and 
selected one combination which it 
recommends as the concept of operations for  
program implementation. I t  is outlined in 
the SSOTF Summary Report. 
hl a n a g e me n 1 
C o  11 t rol I i 11 g 
Controlling provides program assessment and 
redirecting functions including specific 
measurement of performance versus costs to 
carryout utilization and operations functions. 
Program budget versus costs tradeoffs are 
normally reconciled as part of a control 
process. Use of life-cycle cost methods 
during design is another example. 
Recommendations of importance i n  utilization 
and operations are  outlined below. 
Recommendation: 
Level I Operations Management Concept. 
The Program should update the Level I 
Operations Management Concept to 
incorporate the SSOTF strategic level 
recommendations, have the document widely 
reviewed and subsequently adopted as a 
Level I applicable document.  See earlier 
d is c u ss ion u n d e r PI n n n i n F:. 
Recommendation: 
Operations Prcrgrani Documentation. The 
Program should develop an Operations 
Program documentation process that is 
consistent with the Development Program. 
There should be a set of documents for 
Operations C:ipability Development and 
another for  actually conducting operations. 
Documents include thc following at  a 
m in i i n  u m: documents , 
international integration, user integration and 
support, resource allocation and tracking, 
planning processes, opeiational procedures, 
operational plans, mission rules, operations 
lexicon. 
in t e r f a c e c on t r o I 
I t  should devc:lop new, or  revise existing, 
p rogram doc u m e n t a t i o n  to  ref 1 ec t 
requirements both for  cjperations capability 
development and for  the actual conduct of 
operations. The documentation tree should 
reflect all interfaces with external institutions 
and programs which have formal space 
station support roles ;is defined by the 
baseline. These a p p 1 ic a b 1 e documents 
include: 
-An updated Program Approval 
Document (PAD) which including 
broadly defined crlteria with respect to 
the Station Configuration, top level 
roles-responsibil i t i~~s NMIs, top Level 
CoF requi rements ,  a program 
organizaf ion chart which establishes 
high-level roles-responsibilities and 
provides for  major milestones schedule 
control. 
-Level 1 0per:itions Management 
Concept 
-Top Level Operations Functions 
De f ini t i on 
-Level 11-111 Documentation Tree 
- I n t e r  C o d  e 
res pons i 1) i 1 i t  ies 
A g r e  e m e n t s  - - r o  1 es  - 
-Program Budget documents including 
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TABLE 2-1 
EVALUATION OF CONCEPT ALTERNATIVES 
-Select scenarios requiring evaluation according to major Space Station Program Phases and which 
consider major risk management decisions including a range of reasonable evolutionary paths for  
Station uses. 
-Provide an  end-to-end test of functional continuity using the reference and selected scenarios 
and test cases. 
-Verify resource availability, that is, confirm that the proposed Space Station elements support  the 
scenario. 
-Evaluate alternatives which pass screening 
Describe degree of responsiveness to various initiatives 
Test for  management effectiveness including: 
Clearly identified resource control responsibilities at each decision level 
Responsive (effective and efficient) but  minimal interactions within each major 
functional grouping and between decision levels 
Accountability vs. responsibility within and between functional groupings 
We 11 defined inform at ion management and control m ec h a n is m s 
Confirm international participation (if required) 
Perform cost analysis and develop cost management plan 
Prepare multiyear financial plan 
Conduct overall risk assessment 
-Identify impacts using the previously established criteria and summarize aspects of risk. 
-Rank alternatives within Functional Area. 
-Prepare evaluation summary in two parts: 
For each functional grouping, include the following: 
Title of Functional Area (e.g. Logistics Integration) 
Brief description of Functions covered 
Baseline Concept Definition and optional approaches 
Functions Groupings 
Integrated Functions Groupings chart 
Definition of Interfaces 
Inputs Required (from what other functions) 
Outputs Required (to what other functions) 
Outline of required documents: ICD, MOU, Schedules, etc. 
Requirements for  System-oriented concepts 
Description of required components which provide operations capabilities 
Support Systems 
Facilities including outfitting 
Manpower (NASA, Civil Service, contractor, other) 
Materials 
For the integrated set of functional areas, report: 
Comparison of optional approaches 
Responsiveness to Use-oriented concepts 
Implementation Proposal (including rationale) 
Proposed Organization charts reflecting NASA Center and international roles 
Organization Transit ion Plans 
Development Phase 
Assembly- Verif ication 
Mature Operations 
International considerations 
Other non-NASA arrangements 
Proposals on long-term operations cost management 
NASA NMIs for  Operations Organization 
Rationale for  option selection including 
Site recommendations 
Common Cost functions-groupings 
Annual cost profiles 
Outline of Operations plans for  each major functional area 
Development to mature operations transition considerations 
Open Issues 
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the Levels 11-111 and other closely 
related NASA Codes’ Budgets 
Recommendation: 
Key Databases. The  Program should identify 
key databases needed for  Program operations 
manage men t and execution. 
Recommendation: 
Operations Cost Management Process. The 
process (see details in Section 5.3 of this 
Panel Report)  shall require that life-cycle 
costs (LCC) be considered for  ALL 
engineering decisions. The process will: 
-Minimize LCC consistent with crew 
safety, system perforinance criteria, am3 
program budget, 
-Establish economic lives for  use in 
LCC decisions including: Data 
Man age men t S y s t e m : Co m mu n ica t io n s 
and tracking; SSIS major components; 
ECLSS; Power; and other considerations 
such as, the flight and ground crew 
profess io na 1 de ve I o p m e n t f o r 
specific classes of crew-types;  
opera t i o na I ground -support systems , e. E:. 
SSCC and POIC; and others as identified 
by the Program, 
cy c 1 e 
-Incorporate LCC envelopes or  
benchmarks which will be: developed 
and allocated to engineering managers 
for  all onorbit and ground systems, set 
at  Level I1 SE&I, set at  WP WBS level 
of accounting, 
-Use expected values for  LCC-based 
decisions with the range of uncertainty 
presented for  performance and cost, and 
-Incorporate the use of management 
incentives which promote LCC savings. 
Recommendation: 
Management Assessment. The Program 
should implement  program control 
mechanisms based on consistent, top-down 
processes. These mechanisms include: 
-Operations Performance Process. 
Establish an operations performance 
assessment system which provides key 
facts to all levels of management. 
-Develop hierarchically consistent 
operations performance indicators 
at  all organizational levels. Using 
such indicators a diagnosis is 
intended to determine the nature 
and extent of less-than-optimal 
condit:ons through a careful 
analysis of symptoms. The  idea is 
to pro\,ide a logical framework that 
will allow an operations manager to 
explort: systematically the full 
range of actions that might be 
taken, and to select those that are 
most suitable for  the particular 
c i rc u rri s t a nc es . 
-Use as a driver of evolution 
cons i d I: ra t i on s w 11 e re operation a1 
efficiency or  effectiveness can be 
improlied. 
-Deveiop incentives programs tied 
to performance-cost management. 
E s t a b l i s h  p e r f o r m a n c e - c o s t  
objectives for  key managers. 
-Resource Allocation Process. Establish 
a formal process for  allocating the Space 
Station rt:sources to appropriate 
organizations responsible for  planning 
and developing Station uses. The 
NASA-wide process would be supported 
b u t  not necessarily managed by the 
Office of Space Station. 
2.2 .2  
Organizational Approach 
Est ab  I is 11 Utili za t i on/Opera t i 011s 
I n t e g r a t e d  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  
utilization/operations will be accomplished 
through establishing the Level I / I l / I I I  
program organizarion, the NASA institutional, 
and the international partner roles and 
responsibilities. 
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Establish Integrated Management of 
Utilization/ODerations. 
Establish Institutional Roles/ResDonsibilities. 
Recommendation: 
Recommendation: 
The  Program should establish a top-down 
(project- oriented) organization control process 
for  the strategic and tactical level operations 
functions. Specifically the Program should 
provide a totally integrated program 
management structure including the following 
considerat ions: 
-Establish top-down organization control 
f rom strategic planning (project 
approach) to the execution level (matrix 
approach-if required) 
-Centralize the strategic-level policy 
making body and control the top level 
management functions at Level I 
-Integrate resource utilization planning 
with crew activity planning 
-Distribute on-orbit systems support and 
user operations 
-Tightly integrate the Level I1 Ops-Uti1 
organizat ion with the  Systems 
Development organization to assure 
appropriate attention to acquisition 
logistics, that is, supportability 
considerations. 
-Integrate international partners at  all 
levels of planning and control. 
Estab l i sh  Level 1 / 1 1  Roles  a n d  
Resgonsibilities. 
Level I organizational responsibilities are 
outlined in Table 2-2 to give a sense of the 
functions envisioned to be strategic in  nature. 
The essential implementing mechanisms are 
then listed and followed by a summary of the 
programmatic focus areas which are 
consistent with the Level I1 tactical 
organizational structure. 
The Program should implement the SSOTF 
proposed roles and responsibilities, verify 
these assignments as part of the SSOTF 
review cycle, and identify any agreements 
required for  implementation. 
This clarification includes the need to study 
and resolve international partner roles and 
responsibilities and to agree on each partner’s 
specific authority on operations boards and 
panels. Specifically, the Program must 
establish the formal mechanisms by which 
the international partners, the DoD, other 
Federal Agencies, and the commercial sector 
will be integrated into the utilization- 
operations planning processes. As part of the 
effort  it should be determined what 
operations roles may be accepted as exchange 
for  U S .  (or other partner) provided services. 
Concomitantly, within NASA the roles and 
responsibilities of other NASA codes, the 
NASA Field Centers, and other actual or 
potential program participants must be 
established as soon as possible. 
The processes should be established by clear, 
written lines of authority and responsibility 
for  all operations decision-making levels. 
Also, as the agreements are developed all 
participants should be appraised of the 
process by which operations a n d  utilization 
support costs will be determined and 
allocated. 
2.2.3 Emphasizes Use of the Concept During 
the De ve I o p m e n t / As se In b 1 y P h as e 
Transition Orpanization 
The SSOTF studied the issues of transition 
from the initial development through 
assembly to mature operations. The 
following outlines the SSOTF proposal for  
such a transition. 
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TAB1,E 2-2 
Ret:onimended Responsibilities for Level I and I1 
Leiel I specific responsibilities: 
De v e 1 o p operations i n c e n f i v es - p o 1 i c i e s 1 e ad i n g 
to “user - friend 1 y ” ope ra t io ns s u p po r t 
Create policies that minimize barriers to 
co m me r c i a I i ri 
long-term space station operations 
Develop and provide fo r  implementation of 
overall operations management concepts and’ 
required 01 ganizational policies leading to: 
-integrated space station resource 
planning and management support 
systems 
- integrated nian if es t i n g support s y s te ins 
-integrated logistics support systems 
-integrated data and information 
man age men t s ys t e Ins 
- in t e gr a t ed ope I at io 11 s cost - f i na tic ial 
man age men t a p p I oac hes 
o p p o r t u n i t i es - in vo 1 ve men t 
De  v e 1 o p 
acquisition policies for: 
o p e  r a t i  o n 3 - I e rj u i red serv ice  
-transportation to -from oreit  
- co m m u n ica t io ns a 11 d t rac h 1 n g support 
-data and information system support 
- o t 11 e r  
Assure that operations concepts and concerns 
are incorporated in Space Station Element 
DDT&E planning and programmatics 
including appropriate life-cycle cost 
considerations 
Contribute to development of policies 
required fo r  operating as an international 
partnership. The  complex of NASA internal 
operations agreements and international 
partner agreements should be established 
through this level of the organization. 
Establish programs and policies which 
identify opportunities and pi ovide incentives 
for  operations - re1 at ed advanced tech no logy 
development and ex p I o i t  at io n throughout a 11 
stages of Space Station Program evolution 
Integrate and reconcile all components of the 
a n n u a 1 o p e r a t i  o ns - re I at e d b u d get i n c I u d in g : 
-Space Station Program DDT&E 
-Construction of Facilities 
-R&PM fo r  Operations 
-Other reimbursable and non- 
reimbursable annual operations costs, 
direct and indirect for al l  services 
- Advanced d e  ve 1 o p me n I 
Other functions as described in the Strategic 
level operations functions appendix to the 
SSOTF Summary Report. 
Leiel I 1  specific responsibilities: 
Develop the following capabilities: 
- Space S y s t 3 ni s 0 p e r a t ions C a p a b i I i t  y 
De\ elopment 
-User Operations Support  Capability 
De v e 1 o p m e n t 
- F’ r e la u n c h - Post la lid i ng Opera t io n s 
C‘a pa b i I i t y P e  ve lo p men t 
-Integrated 1-ogistics Support Capability 
Dr>\ elopmen 
-User Pay lo: d Operations Requirements 
Integration 
-Space Staticn Element Design Input for  
the manned base and platforms 
Support of Level I Operations-litilization 
activities which include: 
- m a k in  g the in it ial coni in i t me n t of 
Space Statior resources 
allocntion to on-orbit systems 
operat ic4ns 
allocation to users 
as:unie that users will allocate 
an  1 manage the i r  dedicated 
re5ources 
-developing the support agreements 
required with appropriate NASA Offices 
cover all non-program controlled 
resources required by the Program 
to conduct opera t io ns 
transportation 
Communications, tracking, 
anti data services 
user interface support ,  e.g. 
Di: cipline Operations Centers 
-developing and managing the 
in t c g r a t ed Stat ion Pricing - rei ni  bu rse men t 
policies 
- p 1 :1 n n i n g , n I g o t i a t i  n g , and nian a g i n g 
the intern at i o n a1 operations support 
Development  of Operations 
Manage1 lent J’lan 
Pieparat ion and maintenance of the 
Consolid,ited Operations-Utilization 
Plan 
System Operations Panel 
Utilization Operations Panel 
Opera t i o ns cost s h a r i n g est i nia res 
and nian-igement 
-assessing the long-term operations- 
utilization performance-cost-risks which 
affect: 
other NASA offices 
International partner activities 
o t h e r external agreements 
new program development or 
operation s budget requ ire nie n t s 
-con d uc t i n g n \ar ke t research . 
Conduct tactical planning and integration 
functions and execution management 
functions as described in the SSOTF 
Summary Report. 
Recomrnenda tion: 
The  Operations Organization should manage 
the complex assembly and verification 
process for  the Development Organization 
and allows for  a special Program emphasis in 
areas where operations advocacy at  a visible 
organizational level is important during 
development. 
The  strategic functions for  the transition 
operations organization should include those 
outlined for  the mature operations 
organization program policy divisions, 
specifically: utilization and operations 
development, strategic policy, program 
management, and evolutionary planning. The 
existing division of operations and utilization 
functions should be retained since both 
functions at  the strategic level face 
significantly different policy drivers and 
constituent interfaces. Assignment of the 
above functions at  the policy and strategic 
planning level of the program retains the 
existing, essential synergy required between 
the hardware development and the early 
operations responsibilities. This complex of 
NASA internal operations agreements and 
international partner agreements should be 
established through the strategic level of the 
transition organization. 
Recommendation: 
Even during the development phase the 
operations organization will require the 
support  and direct the resources of many 
NASA institutions. Typically, the 
institutional operations support organizations 
are quite different  from the institutional 
development organizations. As envisioned in 
the recommended concept, most already have 
ongoing operations responsibilities. The 
institutional commitments to support 
operations will be no less significant than 
those required to support the hardware 
development work packages and will evolve 
for  a much longer time (20-30 years and 
more). 
Thus,  as a major responsibility, the 
operations organization should develop, as 
soon as possible, key operations agreements 
with each NASA institution, that is, with 
each Associate Administrator and,  as 
appropriate, each Center Director. As with 
the Space Station hardware development 
program, these agreements will be essential 
since the Program has no current authority 
over any of these critical institutional assets. 
Agreements should cover the significant 
institution a I manpower and the develop men t 
o r  enhancement of critical support  centers, 
facilities, and systems. Others should cover 
the major commitments by NASA’s 
transportation system providers and 
communications-data services organizations. 
In order to support the Space Station 
Program many of these institutions must 
make organizational realignments and 
budget a r y co m ni i t  m e n t s to pro v id e f a c i 1 i t y 
support. 
Recommend at ion: 
Over the long-term, major NASA funding 
commitments will be made to support the 
Station Program operations. Many will be 
outside the Program’s direct control. Thus, 
after considering the previously described 
evaluation criteria, the SSOTF strongly 
recommends that the organization under the 
Director, Utilization and Operations be a 
parallel structure with the Station DDT&E 
Organization during the Development Phase. 
Both would continue to work for  the AA for  
Space Station but  major policy and budgetary 
tradeoffs would be elevated to the AA level 
for  reconciliation. Consistent with this 
approach the SSOTF recommends that 
operations agreements should be separate 
f rom development agreements since different 
institutions or  parts of the institutions often 
provide the operations support  to a project 
after it has been developed. 
This IS NOT a recommendation that the 
operations capability development nor the 
management of assembly operations and 
initial user support operations be located 
outside the AA for  Space Station’s control. 
Quite the contrary, since the operability and 
maintainability aspects of the Station systems 
and facilities must be designed in concert 
with the capability to operate and use them. 
I t  IS a recommendation that development of 
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the capability to operate, Isupport, and use 
the Station be given equal weight and 
visibility during the development phase, 
especially since the Program must establish 
commitments of key NASA operational 
resources and clear lines of authority and 
responsibility throughout the NASA 
institutions early in the development phase of 
the Program. In summary, the SSOTF 
organization proposal facilitates a gradual 
"0 r g a n i za t io nal trans i t io n " to a s t r u c t u re 
independent of the development organization. 
ODe ra t i on s 
Durine Assembly Phase 
1LIa n a gem en t Res DO n s i b i I i ties 
The Operations Concept should be 
implemented as soon as practical. Early 
implementation will allow for  appropriate 
synergy to develop between the Shuttle 
operations processes and those which will 
evolve with t h e  Space Station. I t  is also 
essential that the proposed planning and 
manifest management procedures be 
developed and validated for  use i n  planning 
and executing the Space Station Assembly 
phase. 
0 nc e this ma I iage m e n t process were 
established the Program could conduct formal 
risk assessment studies for  all major 
milestones and assist in the establishment of 
cost-effective contingency procedures. 
Operational event:. and activities during the 
Assembly-Verification Phase operations will 
become the primary drivers for  when and 
what Space Station hardware should be 
delivered to the hunch  site and subsequent 
delivery to orbit. The  operations 
management process should allow for  greatest 
program control flexibility given the variety 
of launch phase uncertainties. It should 
permit the greatest schedule flexibility to 
remain with the Shuttle. Every effor t  should 
be made to simplify the launch vehicle 
interfaces. The  Pi ogram should be prepared 
for  significant remanifesting as a result of 
potential  or  unexpected operat ions 
contingencies. 
Recornmendation: 
The Program should provide second copies 
of critical elements as determined by 
vulnerability studies. 
Recommendation: 
Re  c o m ai e nd a t i o n: 
Establish the Space Station operations 
organization as having primary responsibility 
for  integrated assembly and checkout. 
One approach is to base a management 
mechanism such as the Engineering Master 
Schedule around the Assembly-Verification 
operations activities since the opportunity 
costs associated with hardu.are delivery 
schedule uncertainty will be greatly 
magnified when considering the thousands of 
activities involved with assembly payload 
man if es t i n g - re ma n i f es t in g , pa pload 
ground transportation scheduling, with final 
preflight checkout, and with cargo processing 
at the launch site. 
w i t h 
Establish the Operations Capabili ty 
Development and the Operations budgets as 
line items separate f rom the Space Station 
flight hardware development budget. 
Exchange of funds between the three budget 
lines should be permitted only with formal, 
Level I Control Board approval by the AA 
for  Space Station. 
Were this approach taken the proposed 
integrated operations control process would 
be appropriate for  accomplishing the 
assembly planning and execution. 
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2 . 3  O P E R A T I O N S  C O N C E P T  
1 hl P L E M E NT AT1 ON PLAN 
Note: The  following material was 
developed in outlirie f o r m  duririg 
the S S O T F  e f f o r t  arid was 
expanded in the summer of 1987 to 
provide A more coniplete arid 
relatively current portrayal of the 
Approach iiitertded by the S S O T F .  
I I 
Once the AA for  Space Station has reviewed 
the Space Station Operations Task Force 
proposal and has accepted its intent, the 
objective should be to incorporate the 
programmatic implications of the proposed 
concept, and those recommendations which 
are fully accepted, into the Space Station 
Program plans by the time of the Program 
Requirements Review in the spring of 1988. 
This section summarizes the recommended 
approach for  proceeding and involving the 
essent ia l  N A S A  organiza t ions  and  
international partners in this review and 
implementation process. 
I t  is important to establish program intent to 
adopt the concept and recommendations and 
to formally incorporate them i n  the program 
documentation as soon as possible. Top level 
requirements documents such as the Program 
Requirements Document (PRD) and the 
various configuration control documents 
should be updated. As expected, formal 
control board actions are implied for  many 
of the decisions. Others require the 
development of policy and procedural 
understandings or formal agreements with 
NASA institutions and field centers as well 
as with the international partners. 
In summary, there are a number of activities 
requiring joint  decisions. Examples include: 
agreement  on specif ic  roles and  
responsibilities in the planning, management, 
and execution of operations and utilization 
for  NASA’s various organizations and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p a r t n e r  o rgan iza t ions ;  
concomitantly, the identification of long- 
term institutional and field center resource 
commitments resulting from Space Station 
operations and utilization requirements; 
specification of major operations and 
u t i  1 i za  t i o n d e v e l o p  ni e n t 
requirements requiring joint  development 
effort; identification of manned base and 
platform hardware and software development 
requirements implying multiorganizational 
commitments; and identification-clarification 
of transportation system and communication, 
tracking, and data services requirements. 
c a pa  b i 1 i t  y 
There are many options and approaches 
which can be taken to completing the details 
of implementation. For instance, the recently 
completed Space Station Science Operations 
Management Concept is generally quite 
consistent with the SSOTF proposal. It 
refines, enhances, and in some cases, 
provides counter proposals to specifics of the 
SSOTF approach. Clearly, many of the 
recommendations and aspects of the overall 
framework itself require commitments by 
other NASA institutions, their field centers, 
and the international partners. Clarifying 
and reconciling the implied internal NASA 
and international partner roles and 
responsibilities is the next step in 
implementation. 
Operations participation and planning are 
occurring earlier and more intensively in the 
Space Station Program than in any other 
manned spaceflight program. It is vital that 
the foundation and momentum built by the 
SSOTF be carried forward. The next steps 
outlined do  just  that. 
2.3.1 Establish Strategic Level Steering 
Commit tees 
It is proposed that the Program should form 
two Level I steering committees to initiate 
and expedite the review and implementation 
process. One, composed of Codes S, M,  and 
T and the other, of Codes S, R, E,  and C. 
Through these c o m m i t  t ees represent a t i  ves 
f rom each Code can meet to establish the 
best approach for  coming to closure on the 
items of mutual interest and to identify or 
est a b 1 ish form a I i ni p le nie n t a t ion mec h a n isms . 
And,  though formal interface panels such as 
the International Operations Concepts 
Work ing  Group already exist, the 
international partners may participate as 
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appropriate in any of these new steering 
committee efforts to improve their own 
understanding of NASA's approach to 
implementing the operations concept. 
The intention is that most of the review, and 
then implementation, activities will be 
handled by existing line organizations, short- 
life task efforts, and by mutually accepted- 
established focused working groups. Thus,  
the two high - 1 eve 1 Steering Coin ni i t  t e e s w i 11 
act as initial clearinghouses for  a number of 
operations concept implementation activities. 
The committees will meet as required to 
assure that issues of common interest are 
being promptly dealt with and that 
information on overall progress toward 
implementation is synthesized fo r  top 
management in the participant organizations. 
The steering committee's major contribution 
will be that of integrating and expediting the 
implementation effor t .  These tasks should be 
completed by the Space Station PKR. 
The proposed Steering Committee objective 
is to implement the Operations Task Force 
concept and recommendations. The 
committee approach would provide a 
structured review of SSOTF Framework and 
recommendations, would identify and clarify 
issues, would assign to existing program or 
institutional organizations for  action and 
closure, would recommend program or  
institutional mechanisms fo r  implementation 
and execution and would dissolve by PRR. 
Its products would specifically focus on 
preparing agreements (Memoranda of 
Understanding?) among Codes to clarify 
implementing roles and responsibilities such 
as 
-Clarify specific implementation and 
execution roles and responsibilities 
-Commission policy studies 
-Identify Space Station requirements 
affecting other Codes and/or their 
respective Field Centers 
Facilities 
Procedures 
Manpower 
-Identify management mechanisms for  
i m ple mentation 
Control Boards 
Integration panels 
Documental ion 
-Prepare status reports to AA's on 
i ni ple me n t a t i o n j) rog ress 
Its interfaces with other organizations would 
be accomplished through working groups, 
which will interface :IS required to come to 
closure on issues of c immon  interest. Only 
major policy items an unreconcilable issues 
will be brought back to the Committee for 
tak ing to higher management. 
The Steering Committees initiated products 
would be scheduled to meet the PRR 
deadline for  identifying and committing to a 
co rice p t for  operations . 
Re c o ni me n d a t i o n: 
Two primary steering committees are 
proposed. 
Code S/hI/T 
To provide top-level, NASA-wide focus and 
closure on operations concept implementation 
requirements. This Committee will focus on 
requirements necessary to provide the 
complete package of resources to operate and 
utilize the Station manned base and 
platforms. The resources include the Station 
facilities; the transportation to and from 
space; the communications, tracking, and data 
services; and the crew. The Committee will 
include international pnrtners in this process 
of clarifying operations roles and 
responsibilities and of defining integrating 
o p e r a t i o n s  .- u t  i 1 i z a  t 1 o n  m a n a g e m e n t  
mechanisms. 
The following working groups are suggested. 
-Overall Planning Process Integration 
-Integrated Manifesting 
-Prelaunch-Postlanding Support 
- S p a c e Systems housekeeping 
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resource management 
-Integrated space transportation 
services requirements 
-User Integration Support 
-Communication, Tracking, and data 
services support  
-Systems opera t ions  procedures  
integration 
-Integrated training requirements 
-Assembly-ver i f ica t ion  operat ions 
management 
- O p e r a t i o n s  p e r f o r m a n c e - c o s t  
assessment 
-Platform operations planning and 
integration 
Code S/E/R/C 
To provide top-level, NASA-wide focus and 
closure on operations concept implementation 
requirements. This Committee will focus on 
requirements necessary to assure end-to-end 
integration and support  for  users of the 
Space Station manned base and platforms. 
All aspects of utilization will be covered 
from the perspective of the NASA 
insti tutional organizations, the U.S. 
commercial interests, and the international 
partners. The  Committee will assure that the 
Science Operations Management Concept and 
the Space Station Operations Task Force 
Concept are integrated and that any 
differences are reconciled. 
The following working groups are suggested: 
-User Planning Process integration 
-Integrated manifesting 
-Comm,Track and Data Services 
- M a n n e d  B a s e  r e s o u r c e  
management 
-User operations procedures integration 
-User facility support (e.g. DOC'S) 
-Payload training rqmts 
Committee Review Process 
The two committees should establish the 
following review responsibilities: 
First choice--existing line orgs 
Second--short-life task efforts 
Third--focused working groups 
The review should be coordinated and 
reviewed at appropriate organizational levels 
and if acceptable to involved parties, 
implementation may proceed without further 
Steering Committee review. The effort  
should bring only unreconcilable differences 
to next level of management. Finally, any 
actions requiring A A  attention may be 
communicated through the Steering 
Committees or normal organizational 
channels. 
Code S Level 1/11 will regularly brief the 
Steering Committee on the progress of 
concept implementation, to include: 
-Review all points implying resource 
commitment and schedule by non-Code 
S parties, 
-Identify issues and requirements for  
Steering Committee assignment to  WGs 
et  al, and 
-Code S will presume acceptance of all 
requirements which affect  and direct 
Code S-only resources. 
2.3.2 Conduct Review of SSOTF Concept 
The Program should resolve remaining OTF 
functional relationships including: 
-POIC relationship to SSSC which 
requires a more rigorous cost- 
effectiveness study 
-Centralized vs. distributed Sustaining 
engineering which requires developing 
a case-by-case transition plan 
-SS crew selection vs STS crew selection 
process which requires international 
involvement and should consider 
arguments presented by Dr.  J.L. 
Hunsucker to the Task Force.' 
-Centralized vs. distributed training 
concepts especially those related to 
multi-year ops costs and "user- 
friend 1 in e s s" con side r a t i o n s 
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2.3.3 Consider SSOTF Proposal in  Context 
of a NASA-wide  Operations Concept 
In any NASA-wide effor t  to organize for  
long-term operations the Agency should not 
attempt to identify the key organizations1 
roles before completing an end-to-end 
functional analysis of operations, especial: y 
operations as they relate to utilization of 
scarce NASA resources ... STS, manned base, 
Communica t ions -Track ing ,  da t a  and  
information resource management. 
The effort  should pay particular attention lo 
the long-range goals established for  the 
Agency as an R&D organization, that is, 
what NASA is all about 
criteria) for  selecting an ultimately 
recommended approach  to  all 
operations, i.e. focus on the uses of the 
NASA capabilities and on the long-term 
user support provided by operations. 
-Examine all significant operations 
policies as part of the effort .  Suggest 
consistent approaches to NASA-wide 
i:;sues such as "pricing", and operations 
cost "re c o v( ! r y I' 
-Endorse he SSOTF proposal as a 
starting point for  Code M-S-T and the 
C o d e  E - R - C  u s e - o r i e n t e d  
implementation during the interim and, 
at least, un:il Shuttle recovery. 
-conducting space research 
2.3.4 Develop Piogram Plans 
-providing access to space 
-providing facilities to use space 
-all related to the understanding and 
uses of space. 
Any NASA-wide effor t  to establish such a 
long-term approach to operations should: 
-Begin a more deliberate NASA-wide 
function a1 review of operations - - a 11 
operations, manned and unmanned 
-(Potentially) Establish a separate 
organization in Code M, S, or  T to 
conduct the functic.ina1 study. The 
organization s h o u 1 d 11 a v e: 
-permanent positions 
- support contract 0 r 
-Advisory panel experienced with 
long-term operations 
-formal interfaces with joirit 
Steering Committees described 
below which are supporting Space 
Station efforts i n  the interim 
-Use SSOTF approach as a niodel for 
the process. Use the SSOTF evaluation 
criteria (use, perfornimce, and cost 
Two levels o^' program planning are 
recommended. At the Strategic Level (I) ,  
Opera1 ions-Utilization Program Plans should 
include, at a minimum: 
-Periodic Level I review of Program 
Operations Requirements. This requires 
developing PRD update criteria and 
triggering mechanisms. 
-Level I review of Program's Annual 
Operations Budget including the Ops 
Capability Devel and Ops lines. 
-Prepare Operations Automation and 
Robotics Advocacy Plan 
-Prepare Assembly Planning and 
xecution Oversight Plan 
-Prepare Operations Performance-Cost- 
Risk Appraisal Plan 
Track key cost drivers 
Develop performance indicators 
Develop program-wide risk 
assessriient process 
Conduct studies 
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-Prepare Integrated Logistics Advocacy 
Plan 
- P r e p a r e  I n f o r m a t i o n  Resource  
Management Plan 
C&T Requirements 
Identify Key operations databases 
Es tab l i sh  P rogram- leve l  
guidance for  responsibility, 
use, and maintenance 
-Prepare Operations Cost Management 
Plan 
-Develop approach for  Strategic 
International Operations Planning 
I m p l e m e n t  S S O T F  
recommendations 
Draft  System Operations Panel 
Charter 
-Prepare Annual Construction of 
Facilities Plan 
-Support for  any OMB-Congressional 
special interest items 
A t  the Tactical Level ( I I ) ,  the 
1 Jtilization/Operations Program Plans should 
include, at  a minimum: 
-Annual Operations Plan reflecting: 
* major on-orbit payload ac t iv i ty  
* a summary manifest by launch 
vehicle for: 
System operations support 
User operations support  
* a summary of resources required 
to conduct operations: 
by the Program 
from each non-program 
controlled NASA institution 
* a summary of key performance- 
cost - risk ind icators 
to support  decisions on future  
development priorities 
to guide and justify non- 
program-controlled operations 
support 
to support  program position 
on future  payload selection 
and  operations support  
guidance 
* is submitted to Level I for  
CONCURRENCE 
- A n n u a l  Opera t ions  Capab i l i t y  
Enhancements Plan to include: 
proposed enhancements to all on- 
orbit and ground support systems 
those which will change the 
re la t i o ns 11 i p among cur rent 1 y 
projected performance, operations 
costs, and risks 
those which have a special focus 
on automation and robotics 
f o r  Phase I systems 
development 
fo r  Phase I1 systems 
development 
shall be performance and  
LCC-based 
shall include onorbit systems 
and ground-based support 
sys tems 
a special focus on integrated 
logistics management 
is submitted to Level I for 
CONCURRENCE in a format 
compatible for  inclusion in the 
Consolidated 0 - U  Plan 
- 0 p e r a t i 0 n s Cost M a nag em en t PI an . 
The Plan will be prepared as part of the 
annual budget cycle and will provide: 
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a description of the program's 
integrated approach for  operations 
cost management, 
a summary of planned and 
a c h i e v e d  o p e r a t i o n s  c o s t  
benchmarks including an estimate 
of the annual operations costs 
expected fo r  the next f ive (ten?) 
years and will provide details as 
follows: is presented by major 
ope ra t ions  func t iona l  area;  
identifies conimon costs to be 
shared with the international 
partners; provides estimates of cost 
reimbursements expect et1 from 
users; provides estimates of costs 
borne by other NASA offices 
based on projected operations; 
presents estimated values during 
the development phase, presents 
estimated vs actual values during 
the operations phase, and 
a summary of major LCC cost 
decisions that occurred in the past 
year and a summary of operations- 
utilization support  enhancements to 
be included in the next budget 
cycle. 
-Information Resources Management 
Plan which includes: 
identification of key program 
information sources, 
accountability and responsibility 
for  the program controlled 
information and databases that are 
essential for  operations and that 
indicate the assignment with end- 
to-end functional flows and 
management control points, 
provision of a process and 
schedule for  transferring or  
a d a p t i n g  p rogram-deve loped  
engineering databases to the 
organizations responsible for  
operations support ,  
identification of all non-program- 
con trolled datlbases, that is, those 
requiring program level agreements 
for  access and long-term support, 
and 
plans for  the I' k no w 1 edge - capture" 
essential to development of expert 
systems . 
is submitted to Level I not later 
than Progr lm Requirements  
Review and shall be updated 
annually as required. 
-Annual Program Budget. This will 
include: 
c l e a r  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  
Development budget that 
identifie; all WBS items 
required for  Operations 
Capabilir y Development 
id en t if i e<; 
budget 
the 0 p e ra t i o n s 
includes all WBS items 
(to WBS level--) 
required to actually 
prepare for  and conduct 
operations 
provides estimates of 
non-program controlled 
resources implied by the 
annual operations plan 
defines procedures and  decision 
authority for  moving funds 
between the Development and 
Operations Budget lines 
specifies all Construction of 
Facility requirements 
is submitted to Level I for  
A P I'R 0 V A L 
2.3.5 Prepare PRD/PDRD Requirements 
Th ro ugh the Program Re qu ire men ts 
Document (PRD) the Prcbgram shall formalize 
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the method for assuring that ops-uti1 
requirements are considered in systems 
development. This especially includes 
strengthening the logistics-supportability 
considerations and requires strengthening the 
ops-uti1 data systems function including 
incorporating a systematic effort  to educate 
all program participants and potential users 
about the SSIS-TMIS-DMS-SSE requirements 
dictated by the program. 
Recommendation: 
The  Program shall design and develop on- 
orbit and ground operations systems that 
include the following characteristics: 
-Provide an end-to-end concept of data 
and information management systems, 
the operation of which is, to the degree 
feasible, transparent to the users and 
system operators; which provides for 
continuous contact with ground-based 
users; and which permits the use of 
c o m m e r c i a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  
telecommunications services, 
-Allow for  the maximum cost-effective 
use of on-board and ground support 
resources by Station users, 
-Clearly identify costs to be borne by 
users as a result of program decisions, 
and, 
-Clearly identify "scars" and potential 
development plans for incorporating 
advanced technologies. 
Recommendation: 
Throughout the development phase the 
Program shall assure proper consideration of 
acquisition logistics which includes 
supportability. 
S u p p o r t a b i l i t y  h a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
characteristics: 
-is Acquisition related, that is, it affects 
module and primary subsystem 
hardware-software design from the 
outset and lays requirements on the 
DMS-SSIS-TMIS in t e r f aces  a n d  
capabilities. 
-is a systems engineering assignment 
since it relates module and subsystems 
independent design efforts to one 
another, and it includes hardware and 
software design and logistics support 
planning for criteria related to 
r e l i a b i l i t y ,  m a i n t a i n a b i l i t y ,  
serviceability, and operability, including 
the consumption of ground-based 
resources. 
-is the primary system engineering 
effort  which drives the design of 
operations support systems for space 
system operations, user support 
ope ra t ions ,  p re l aunch-pos t l and ing  
operations, and integrated logistics 
support. 
-has a life-cycle cost basis, i.e. is 
concerned with cost-effective operations 
over the long term. Specifically, 
supportability criteria and measures of 
success should be traded against life- 
cycle costs. Criteria include resource 
consumption and operations cost for 
non-user related activities and services, 
operational costs for  support  services 
provided to the user, and operational 
costs for  optional services which the 
user must buy or provide for  himself. 
The Supportability goals include: 
-establishing performance/cost measures 
which will be considered by the SSCB 
for  design decisions 
-granting few waivers f rom the general 
requirement for  commonality for  like 
systems 
-implementing supportability concepts 
in the flight hardware system 
engineering and the operations 
capability development organizations. 
Formal life-cycle based Logistics 
Support Analyses should be conducted 
for all hardware components and ground 
support systems. Hardware and 
2-21 
procedural commonality should be a 
design criteria waived only through a 
formal control board action. As part of 
the effort  designers should consider 
commonality vs proprietary (or 
independent) capability development 
(applies to internationals and US .  WPs) 
and study impact on U.S. users 
Design phase products as a result of concern 
for  supportability include: 
-Subsystem and space station module 
e ng i nee r i n g con f i g u ra t i on - ma nag em en t 
databases which transition to the 
Operations phase 
-Engineering test beds should be 
developed considering that they may be 
used in the operations phase 
-Assembly, verification, and long-term 
s us t a in in  g e ng i nee r in  g s u p po r t s ys t e rns 
which include: 
s u bs ys t e n7 d i n  g n os t i cs s c) f t w a r e 
common test equipment 
common EVA and IVA tools and 
workbenches 
common approaches to diagnostics 
common approaches to crisis 
management procedures 
common approaches to crew 
t r a i n i n g p r e v e n t a t i v e 
maintenance 
f o r 
integrated CAD-CAM-CAI support 
software and database management 
systems 
-A standardized, integrated parts 
i nve n t o r y cat a log i n g and man age me n t 
process 
-Common interfaces and support 
equipment to assure "user friendliness" 
-Cost-effective, Space Station-provided 
interface "black-bo ces", including: 
Generic hardurare 
Generic softw ire 
Co m ni u n ica t io n , tracking and other 
data interface support  systems 
Use r "train i n g and education" 
sup p 0 r t s y s t e nis 
-Long lead spare: --major subsystem 
components and unique ORUs 
R e c o m mend at i o n: 
During the operations phases the operations 
organization will be responsible for 
integrated logistics. Integrated Logistics 
Support has the following characteristics: 
-Is operations phasz related, that is, i t  
is t he  opera t ions  analog to 
Support ab i 1 i t  y d u r i 11 g the design phase 
and i t  affects and potentially interfaces 
with all operational support procedures 
and systems. 
-Requires a system engineering effort  
during the operations phase. 
-Is the basis for  long-term life-cycle 
support of system and subsystem 
operation. As such, it 
proLides for  and controls key 
databases related to system 
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  a n d  s u p p o r t  
i n cl u d i n g the engineer i n g d raw i ng s 
for  mod u 1 e s , systems , subsystems , 
and components, specifically for 
hardware and for software 
i n c I i i  ti i n g s y s t e ni embedded 
software and that required for  
operations support ,  such as ground 
systems and orbital and other 
airborne systems and complete 
part:, and suppliers lists 
provides for  c'verall requirements 
a n a 1 y s i s , coo r (I i nation , d a tab as e - 
related support and conduct (but 
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does not actually do  work) of 
sustaining engineering for  the 
entire station infrastructure as a 
resource consumer. 
-As an integrating function those 
responsible for  logistics support will 
ident i fy  areas fo r  coordinated 
improvements. Each partner will 
actually conduct his own work related 
to systems engineering. The  integrated 
logistics effort  provides for  coordinated 
depot maintenance capabilities. 
coordinates (but does not do)  all 
ground and orbital crew training 
re q u ire m e n t s and cap ab i 1 i t  i e s . The 
integrated effort  provides criteria 
and support  systems for  servicing 
and maintenance training, as well 
as coordinating and assuring 
maintenance of all training support 
databases and test beds, such as 
databases, documentation, and 
training aids and facilities. 
integrates all manifesting and 
logistics support  requirements as 
part of the integrated manifesting 
process including, US and 
Part ne r 's " h o us e k e e p i n g " 
requirements and users. 
s t a t io n 
coordinates and executes the 
tactical and execution related 
manifesting processes 
obtains all station-related support 
services especially 
transportation services to and 
from space via the NSTS and 
ELVs 
p o i n t - t o - p o i n t  g r o u n d  
transportation not related to 
very localized operations 
support  
c o ni mu n i c a t i  o ns and track i n g 
services for  all partners 
d a t a  a n d  i n f o r m a t i o n  
handling and management for  
systems support  and to key 
data system entry points for  
users. 
maintains the centralized parts 
inventory and supply support 
system and reorders spare parts 
through an integrated procurement 
activity. 
Recommendation: 
The Program should assure that the common 
content section of the Phase C - D  contracts is 
technically and logically consistent for  the 
Program Support Contract, the C-D 
Hardware procurements, and the Non-prime 
support  systems development contracts. 
Recommendation: 
The Program should provide contract and 
programmatic incentive concepts that are: 
vertically integrated within each system 
development effort ,  horizontally integrated 
across subsystems, modules, partners, 
operational procedures, and so on; a major 
driver in evolutionary thinking; and are a 
catalyst for  automation and robotics 
evolutionary concepts. 
Recommendation: 
Since system design synergy may exist 
between the Manned base and platform 
where common payloads are  possible, the 
Program should examine the benefits of 
ORU commonality between the Co-orbiting 
platform and the Manned base. 
Recommendation: 
Since there niay be opportunities for  
utilization and operational synergy among 
payload delivery systems and among the 
payload developers, the Program should 
strive for  standard interfaces, common utility 
connections, packaging, and handling 
procedures among the systems and should 
establish a formal systems design interface 
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with 
organizations, e.g. STS, ELVs, OMV, etc. 
the transport at i o n de  v e 1 o p me n t 
Recommendation: 
The Program should require the Work 
Package contractors to submit a plan under 
which the Program could negotiate the 
purchase of a second copy of any element, 
subsystem, or  long-lead component. The 
original RFPs made no provision for  
consideration of buying second or more 
copies of major components. The major 
concern is with the potential loss of key 
station components at  certain points during 
the assembly phase. Such a loss could 
jeopardize completion of the manned base 
resulting in total loss of the station and 
termination of the entire program. Such a 
loss at  that point would involve a major 
national investment having far  greater 
financial cost than any program N A S A  will 
have had to date. Additionally, the 
continued planning for  growth and evolution 
may indicate a need for  additional elements 
and/or  subsystems at  a point while the prime 
contracts are  still involved. 
Thus,  the program should require that the 
Phase C-D contractors propose contract 
language and negotiating strategies which will 
allow NASA to order second or more copies 
of major elements, subsystems, and long-lead 
components with an objective being to 
establish the optimal points during the 
contract for  ordering the components given 
certain program risk and planning 
assumptions. The language should reflect key 
milestones that, i f  exceeded, the negotiated 
cost m ig h t sign i f icn n t 1 y increase . 
Program provides such equipment as a 
service or  the user sponsors provides it as an 
optional service to its own community.  
2.3.6 Prepare Implementation Schedule and 
Program Resource Requiremerits 
I ni p 1 e me n tat io n act i.1 i t i  e s s h o u 1 d c o n s id e r the 
following schedule in order to have the 
desired impact as the Program accelerates its 
efforts to implenient the Operations Concept. 
R eco ni me n da t ion: 
Assign key utilization-operations functional 
area responsibilities- -not later than PRR.  At 
a minimum: 
-Update  Level I Operations Management 
Concept--late Nov 87 
-Agree on functional area definitions-- 
mid December 87 
- Agree on Code and Partner roles and 
res po nsi b i 1 i t  ies - - PRR 
- Establish management interfaces and 
configuration control mechanisms--PRR 
Recommendation: 
Identify major operations and utilization 
capabi l i ty  deve lopment  requi rements  
including: 
-Primary CoF  facility def - -PRR 
-Support systems--PRR 
-Operations procedures def--TBD 
Recommendation: 
R eco m m e n d a t i o n: 
Users will typically require a variety of 
general support  equipment on-orbit. 
Included is test equipment, maintenance 
tools, work benches,  and similar 
paraphernalia. The  Space Stat ion program 
must identify these requirements and 
establish which are  of general use and should 
be provided as commonly available to any 
user. It must also establish whether the 
Identify-clarify Space Station manned base 
and platform hardware requirements driven 
by utilization/operations requirements. 
-Update PRD 
-Update  PDRII, develop CRs to impact 
by F’RR 
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-Establish SS control board membership 
Recommendation: 
Identify-clarify space transportation and 
communica t ions / t r ack ing /da ta  systems 
hardware development requirements 
- Develop and coordinate joint CRs by 
PRR 
- Establish SS control board membership 
requirements 
- Specifics of requirements must meet 
key CoF deadlines 
- Prepare and transmit requirements to 
appropriate NASA offices 
Recommendation: 
Identify long-term NASA institutional and 
international resource requirements as soon as 
practical being certain to specify those 
requiring formal joint  or  multilateral 
agreements to commit the non-Program 
controlled resources. 
ENDNOTES 
1. See Technical and Analytical Services in Sutmort of a Space Station Operations Scenarios and 
Test Case DeveloDment Strategy, The Center for  Space Policy, Inc., Presented to Space Station 
Operations Task Force, January 29 and February 18, 1987 (2 volumes). 
2. "Side by Side Comparison: R&D to Ops.", Presentation by J.L. Hunsucker to SSOTF, October 
17, 1986. 
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3.0 ALTERNATIVES DEVELOPhlENT AND INTEGRATION PROCESS 
One of the primary areas of Panel activity 
was the development of a process for  
generating and evaluating alternatives that 
could be used by the other Panels. As noted 
in Chapter 1,  this process was used in 
varying degrees by the panels, but no panel, 
including this panel, adopted it throughout. 
This was partly due  to timing--this process 
was not fully developed early enough for  
complete use by the other Panels. Also, this 
approach is somewhat foreign to NASA; thus 
i t  required extra effort  to introduce and 
adopt it. The major goal of this chapter is 
therefore to bridge this "culture gap"--to 
explain why an alternatives evaluation 
approach is useful and to put forth the 
elements of such an approach. 
3.1 PUHPOSES IN EVALUATING 
ALTERNATIVES by Doug Lee 
In determining a course of action, whether i t  
results in tangible assets such as a space 
station, or  in a policy for  making best use of 
that station, i t  is necessary to consider and 
evaluate alternatives. Decisions, or  choices, 
can be grouped into topical categories 
referred to as option areas. The decisions 
can also be sorted as to the level in the 
program organization at  which the decisions 
should be made, and those reported here are 
primarily fo r  the strategic level, i.e. the level 
concerned primarily with estnblishing and 
coordinating policy and objectives. 
Several reasons can be offered as to why it is 
important to develop a range of alternatives 
in each option area, and evaluate them 
systematically. 
Documentation of Recoin mcnda t ions 
Even if the correct solution is well known 
and generally agreed upon, describing the 
alternatives and providing the rationale for 
choosing the preferred alternative has many 
benefits. Reasons can be subsequently 
reviewed and revised if conditions have 
changed, and justification is strengthened for  
the course of action recommended. 
HesDonsiveness to Constraints 
Resources are never adequate to accomplish 
all that would be desired, and fallback 
options must be considered even though it 
may be distasteful to shrink program 
expectations. Maintaining a range of options 
can also facilitate the expansion of scope 
when such opportunities occur. 
The topics addressed in this report concern 
issues that do  not have a unique resolution at 
this point in time. As discussion continues 
between NASA and Congress about the 
requirements and constraints that the Program 
will work under,  it is desirable to have 
anticipated as many contingencies as possible 
and to be able to offer  focused and timely 
responses. 
Improve Odds on hlaking the Best Choices 
An explicit process for  identifying areas 
where choices need to be made, and 
generating alternatives in each area, enhances 
the likelihood of making good decisions. 
Ideas are stimulated, and the basis for  choice 
is forced out in the open so that objective 
bases can be separated from preconceived 
preferences. 
3.2 OPTION A R E A S  by  Doug Lee 
The Task Force (SSOTF) considered over 
twenty different subject areas where choices 
regarding Station operations needed to be 
made. The Management Integration Panel 
cast its net somewhat more broadly than the 
Task Force as a whole, including any issue 
whose resolution might have a significant 
impact on Station operating procedures, costs, 
or performance. Attention is directed 
especially at continuing nianagenient and 
policy issues, as most of the operations issues 
have been covered i n  the SSOTF Summary 
Report  and the other panel reports. 
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Stra teeic vers 11s Tactical OPTION A REAS 
The option areas can be described with 
respect to several characteristics. The  exact 
line between tactical and strategic is hard to 
define precisely, and most important issues 
have components of both. Nonetheless, i t  is 
useful to consider the best level in the 
Program organization at  which decisions 
should be handled. Options th:it warrant 
attention at  the strategic level are those that 
affect  many operations functions at the 
strategic and tactical ievels. 
Internal versus External 
Another characteristic of each option area is 
the extent to which i t  is an internal niatter to 
the Program, or  to NASA, or a matter 
involving external decisions by Congress and 
t h e  Ad mi n is t ra t i o n . This d i mens io n para I le Is 
the tactical-strategic dimension, operations 
decisions being the most internal, 
management questions in the middle, and 
policy issues the most dependent upon factors 
external to the agency. 
The option areas discussed in this report are 
listed in summary form in the next column. 
They can be grouped into three areas: one,  
concerned with how the Station will be 
operated (Section 3.5); two, regarding public 
policv issues that impact on the Program 
(Chapter 4); and three, directed a1 strategic 
management questions (Chapter 5 ) ;  . Each of 
these option areas is covered in greater depth 
in the remainder of this report. 
Within each of the option areas, a range of 
alternatives can be designed that serve 
approximately the same ends, meaning that 
the alternatives are mutually euclusii e. Once 
one is selected, the others are dropped. All 
of the option areas are described below, 
whether or not an explicit choice has already 
been made. In essentially e \ e r )  option atea,  
major choices remain for  re\  iew and 
e v a  I ua t ion. 
Major Operations Alternatives (Section 3.5): 
User Autonomy 
Station Autonomy 
Risk Acceptance 
Payload Verification 
Operations Automation 
Functional Allocation 
Evolution 
Supportability 
Transportation 
In t e r na t ion a1 Part ne rs h i p 
Program Operations 
Station Utilization Them1:s 
Strategic Polic>/ Issues (Chapter 4): 
International Cooperation in Space 
7ra ns po r t a t i  o 11 
C i v i 1 ian Con t ro 1 
h? a n ned Space f 1 i g h t Program D i rec t io ns 
Resource Allocation and Subsidy Policy 
Initial User Mix 
Conimercializat ion of Space Services 
Commercial hlarkets and Spinoffs 
Strategic h?ana;ernent Questions (Chapter 5) :  
Operations h? a n n ge nie n t !; t r uc t u re 
Perform a n c e A s s e s s men t Process 
Operations Cost Managenient 
Modelling Space Station Costs 
R is k h/In nn ge me n t/ Sa f e t y 
Fin a nc i a 1 Man a ge me n t 
Info r m a t io n Man age men t 
Hardware & Software Systems Design Issues 
Automation a n d  Robotics 
Evolution 
I n t e r na t io n a 1 0 pe rat ions :I n d Cost S ha r i ng 
.3.3 SPACE STATION GOALS AND 
OBJECTI\ .ES  by Doug Lee' 
13ecnuse the space station is a public sector 
initiative, i t  is necessary to be explicit about 
the goals and objectibes the station is 
expected to serve. Goals  nay be political, as 
expressed by Congress, the President, or 
others, or goals niay be derived from 
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objective standards of reference. All that is 
expressed by a goal statement is that 
something is desirable; there is no inference 
that all goals will be served, or  served 
equally, or  that some goals are more 
important than others. 
Clearly there are tradeoffs among goals in 
their accomplishment, especially when some 
of the goals concern the reduction or control 
of costs. Most goals overlap to some degree, 
in that they are  part of the same overall goal 
(space research and development). The  goals 
listed below, however, are also partly 
independent, in that each goal requires some 
additional effor t  -- holding the achievement 
of all other goals constant - -  in order to 
obtain more progress toward that particular 
goal. 
The  following is an attempt to first define a 
set of groupings for  Space Station goals, and 
then to classify Space Station Program into 
these groups. The groups are as follows: 
-leadership in space 
-perm a ne n t man ne d e I em e n t 
-international cooperation 
-national research and development 
-access to space 
-return on investment 
-facilitate commercial applications 
-strong management structure 
Each of these groups contain many subgoals 
as shown in Table 3-1 .  
In addition to these goals, Table 3-2 presents 
a set of goals that embody a particular 
programmatic implementation. 
3.4 EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES 
by Richard O’Toole 
Before getting into the details of an 
evaluation process, it is worth discussing 
those attributes of the Space Station which 
make operations considerations so important 
to the program and to NASA as an 
organization. 
(1 )  The  space station is the largest 
NASA program in the foreseeable 
future  and will provide benefits and 
incur significant costs over a long 
duration. 
(2) The station’s success will be judged 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the services i t  provides. 
( 3 )  The operations environment will 
include multiple partners, varied user 
classes and multiple services. 
(4) The station will be in an almost 
constant state of evolution and growth 
over its lifetime. 
( 5 )  There is a considerable amount of 
uncertainty concerning both user and 
system demands for  services. 
(6) The cost of operating the space 
station over its lifetime, including 
transportation and communications, will 
be at  least as large as the development 
costs. 
Given the above considerations, i t  is difficult 
to design an efficient and effective 
operations system at this stage of the 
Program. As a generic strategy, the most 
promising approach is to recognize the 
inherent uncertainties, iteratively improve 
upon the baseline concept as additional 
information is obtained, and make the system 
flexible enough to permit changes at 
relatively low cost. 
The evaluation process outlined in this 
section is consistent with this generic 
approach in that it is designed to incorporate 
the concepts of recognition of uncertainty, 
improvement over time with new 
information, and flex i b i 1 it y . Eva 1 ua t i o n 
consists of choosing among alternatives 
according to a valuation of their impacts. 
Impacts are always described relative to 
something (e.g., a base alternative), so 
evaluation is necessarily relative, requiring at 
least two alternatives for  comparison. 
As the Space Station Program examines new 
operations issues during the development 
period, it will need to evaluate operations 
options on a continuous basis. New option 
TABLE 3-1 
SPACE, STATION GOALS 
1,eadership in  S m c e  c :I pa b i 1 i t  ie s 
- hlee t scientific , techno 1 o :; i c 31, and 
commercial objectives set by partners. 
-Contribute to US pride and prestige. 
-Catch up  with the USSR. 
- I n c l u d e  a l l  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
elements: 
Man ne d bas e. 
Co - o r b i t i n  g p In t f ( ) r  in s . 
Polar orbiting platforms. 
Orbj t i n  g nianeuve r ing vehicle 
Telerobotic servicer. 
Attached external payloads. 
-Provide a base for  future  growth and 
de ve I o pme n t . 
-Strengthen National security. 
Plan and design l'or evolution. 
-Establish US leadership i n  space in 
1990s and beyond. 
- Max i m i ze sc i e n t if i c a c c o m p 1 i s h me n t s . 
-Construct a viable station without 
c r o w d i n g  o u t  o t h e r  s c i e n t i f i c  
activities such as unmanned space 
exploration. 
-Promote  au tomat ion  and  robot ics  
tech no 1 og i es 'Te 1 e robotic 
System) 
(e. g . , F1 i g h t 
-Stimulate interest in science and 
engineering education. 
-Extend human presence and enterprise 
beyond earth into the solar system. 
-Advance scientific knowledge of the 
planet Earth,  the solar system, and 
the universe beyond. 
Permanent Manned Element 
Establish a perniunenlIy riicttined space 
elenzent, by 1994. 
-Incorporate a man-tended concept i n  
the baseline program. 
-Blend manned and unmanned systems and 
Continue exploring, prospecting, 
and  st.i:tling the :mlar system. 
1 11 t e r 11 at i o 11 ;I I Coon era & 
Proniote iritcrriatiotinl coopcratioii iri spmce 
research aiid techtio1o;:y. 
- C r e a t e  e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
part ne rs h i p . 
Give  US/NASA authori ty  and 
responsibility for  managing the 
station. 
- P r o v i d e  b e n e f i t s  t o  p a r t n e r s  
commensurate with their share of 
costs, and share costs equitably among 
partners. 
- A 11 ow sufficient among 
partners that they can develop their 
own space resources and capabilities. 
i n d e p e n d e n c e 
Canada: Mobile Servicing Center 
(MSC). 
Japan: Japanese Experiment Module 
(JEM).  
ESA: Four "Columbus" elements 
( l a b o r a t o r y  m o d u l e ,  r e s o u r c e  
node, co-orbiting platform, polar 
platform); permit ESA to conduct 
work in microgravity, telecommun- 
i c a t i o ns , and m e t e o r o 1 o g p . 
-Involve partners at all management 
levels. 
- M i n i m i z e  c a s h  t r a n s f e r s  a m o n g  
partners. 
-Design and operate space station to 
serve users. 
-Exploit unique capabilities of the 
station and the space environment. 
-Devise an  optimum man-machine mix. 
- E n h a n c e  ( capab i l i t i e s  f o r )  space  
science and applications. 
-Serve all or some of the following 
purposes: 
National Research and DeveloDment 
Promote  d o m e s t i c  coopcratlotr atid 
developnient i r i  peaceful u ~ e r  o f  .space. 
-Incorporate participation by several 
US space centers. 
- U t i l i z e  t h e  s h u t t l e  (STS) f o r  
transportation. 
-Opt imize  product iv i ty  of publ ic -  
pr ivate  par tnerships ,  including the 
NASA-industry partnership. 
- E s t a b l i s h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ( e . g . ,  
metric) standards for  compatibility. 
-Establish relationships with the DoD 
tha t  min imize  impacts  on o the r  
potential space station users. 
-Maintain a (primarily or  purely) 
civilian space program. 
-Control transfer of technology so as 
to  b e n e f i t  f a v o r e d  na t ions  a n d  
r e s t r i c t  t r a n s f e r  t o  u n f a v o r e d  
nations. 
- S t r e n g t h e n  a e r o n a u t i c s  R S t D  
technology. 
Access to %ace 
Make  routitie utilizatioti of thc space 
eiivironnzetit, provide low-cost accr.r.c to .space. 
aiid support evolvirig user activities irr user- 
f r iendly  fashiori. 
- E s t a b l i s h  s t a b l e  e v o l u t i o n a r y  
operations in space. 
Pe r m a n e n t 
in space. 
o bs e r va to r y / 1 a bora t o r y 
Manufacturing facility 
Servicing facility 
Transportation node. 
A s s e m b l y  f a c i l i t y / s t a g i n g  
base/storage depot. 
- R e d u c e / c o n s t r a i n  costs  of space  
operation. 
-Provide low-cost access to the space 
frontier, by minimizing the sum of 
user plus station costs, and by 
offering useful services at reasonable 
price to user. 
-Develop more than  one source of- 
t ransport  a ti o n p a y10 ad s 
and logistics support to and from the 
Station. 
f o r get t i  n g 
-Reduce the complexity of space 
operation. 
- A n t i c i p a t e  a n d  m i n i m i z e  s a f e t y  
hazards. 
-Incorporate human engineering factors 
i n  system design. 
-Design for  long run (life cycle) 
c o s t s ,  b y  c o n s i d e r i n g  i n i t i a l  
e n g i n e e  r i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
operat ion,  and  costs imposed on 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  s y s t e m s ,  a n d  b y  
b u i l d i n g  i n  m a i n t a i n a b i l i t y  a n d  
support a b i 1 i t  y . 
a n d 
Table 3-1 (cont.) 
-Create commonality and modularity to 
f a c i l i t a t e  e a s e  o f  r e p a i r  a n d  
replacement. 
-Maximize use of computers for  
information hand 1 i ng (doc  u men tat ion , 
paperwork) rather than manual records. 
-Assign responsibilities for full cost 
accountability. 
-Ensure that users perceii e the costs 
of the resources they utilize, and 
respond accordingly to ezonomize on 
them. 
-Eliminate excess or  reducible costs 
in decision processes and engineering 
design processes, as well as i n  
production and operations plinses. 
-Provide a user-friendly work-research 
en v i  ro n men t . 
- Perm it 
space station and users. 
flex i ble a r ran g e n'i e n t s bet ween 
-Provide a single point of contact for- 
every user. 
- M in i mi ze 
to use the station. 
spec i a 1 know I e d g e re q u i red 
-Maximize information t.xchange about 
users and payloads, while operating 
and on the ground. 
- Perm i t 
(telescience) f rom ground. 
re  m o t e con  t r o 1 ope  r a t io n 
-Mnxiniize user flexibility within a 
d c f i n ed en ve I ope. 
- A 11 oca te i ti ce ii t i \,e:, 
ra t her than coni nia 11 d a 11 d co t i  t 1'0 I 
processes. 
reso u rc e s t 11 rough 
- Coord in a t  e log is t i cs to ni i 11 i i i i  i ze cost 
and disruption. 
-Provide data  and  communicat ions 
systems to fiicilitatc user control a n d  
i n forma t i  o n 3 ccess . 
-Permit both propriet:iry (secure) and 
scientific usage. 
--Permit or stimulate a mix of uses: 
Space Manufacturing 
We at h e r ob s e r va t ion 
Earth o bse r va t io 1. 
Space Research 
Materials scienc.2 
Life science 
C h e m i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  i n  
m icr og ra v i t y e P vi ro n men t 
National defense 
Astronomy 
Physics  
-Incorporate a balanced range of 
users: 
Go \.e r nme n t 
U n i ve rs i t y 
Co 1-17 me rc i a I 
No n - p ro f i t 
Military 
Return on l n \ e s t i n m  
- R e q u l , e  that usage whose benefits are 
internal to the user pay its full 
costs. 
- D i s t r i b u t e  s u b s i d i e s  t o  u s e r s .  
sectors,  disciplines,  e tc . ,  so that 
Nation31 goals i n  science, technology, 
and commerce ai e enhanced. 
- E \  alunte government agencies (e.g.. 
DOD) i n  the sanie way as other users. 
-Obtain the best return on public 
invest men t i t i  the Stat ion. 
~ _ _ _ ~  ~ 
Table 3-1 (cont.) 
-Derive the best return on private 
investment  in user facil i t ies and 
equipment. 
-Provide for  safety (especially crew 
s a f e t y )  t h r o u g h  c r i t i ca l i t y  assess- 
men t ,  r edundancy ,  re l iabi l i ty ,  a n d  
quality assurance. 
-Maintain the security and integrity 
of the station through redundancy, 
spares, interchangeability, etc. 
-Plan resource allocation with margins 
for  reserve. 
Facilitate Commercial Annlicatioiis 
Crcate profit iriceiitivcs f o r  commercial use o f  
space, arid facilitate the Iraiisitiori f r o m  
rcscarch to comniercial applicalioii. 
-Stimulate space enterprises. 
-Encourage private sector investment 
and participation in space. 
- C o n s t r u c t  n e g o t i a t e d  a g r e e m e n t s  
between NASA and users. 
- P r o m  o t e 
zation of space. 
p r i v a t i  z n  t ion / c o m m e r  c i a 1 i - 
Expendable boosters (US DOT). 
Weather and remote sensing (Dept 
of Commerce). 
-Stimulate development of expendable 
rockets (ELVs). 
-Stimulate private industry spinoffs 
f rom space efforts. 
S t roil Man age m en t S t r u c t LI re 
-Establish with confidence the space 
s t a t i o n  c o s t ,  s c h e d u l e ,  a n d  
performance. 
-Produce and operate the station at  
the least cost that will provide for  
the intended performance. 
- E v a l u a t e  p r o g r a m  p r o g r e s s  a n d  
a l t e r n a t i v e  d i r e c t i o n s  s o  as t o  
achieve the best performance for  the 
resources expended. 
-Control program costs and ensure cost 
accountability. 
-Establish an organizational structure 
with clear lines of authority and 
funct ions across and between all 
management levels. 
-Create a science-oriented management 
structure. 
-Establish "normal" mode of operations 
from which "exceptions" can be focused 
upon. 
- C o n t r o l  i n f o r m a t i o n  f l o w s  a n d  
d a t a b a s e s  f o r  c o n s i s t e n c y  a n d  
elimination of duplication. 
-Shift control of space station from 
eng inee r ing  R & D  organ iza t ion  to  
operations management at  the earliest 
possible opportunity.  
-Delegate responsibility to the lowest 
levels cons is ten t  wi th  ma in ta in ing  
ni a nag e men t con t r o I and a c co u n tab i 1 i t  y . 
- P r o v i d e  c l e a r  d i r e c t i o n  a n d  
leadership. 
Put in  place a strong muriagemc~iit coiicept arid 
organizatioii that will erisure that resourccs 
are put to their most productive use, that 
duplicatiori arid waste arc niinimi=ed. arid that 
respoiisihle parties are held accouiitahle for 
per fornzaiice. 
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T A B L E  1-2 
SPACE STATION GOALS T H A T  EhllBODY A PROGIIAR.IM/\7’1C IR4PLEMENTATION 
-Accommodate user requirements from a 
broad  r ange  of users  i nc lud ing  
s c i e n c e ,  t e c h n o  1 o g J’ 
de ve 1 op me n t and co m n1 e r c ia I pa 1 7 1  on d s . 
a p p 1 i c a t i o n s , 
-Suppor t  pa r t  ic  i pa t  ion 
b y  a c c o m m o d a t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p a r t n e r s  i n t o  t h e  space  s t a t ion  
program as both providers and users of 
services. 
i n te r na t i o nal 
-Enhance U S .  aerospace productivity 
by developing new technology, which 
will have applications in non-space 
i n d us  t r ies . 
-Support of 
space  by  e n c o  u ragi ng coni m e rc  i n  1 
experimentation i n  new technologies 
and actively seeking opportunities for 
p r i v a t i z a t i o n  o f  s e l e c t e d  s p a c e  
station program services. 
c o ni i i i  e I C  i a I de L e lop m e n t 
-Suppor t  au tomat ion  a n d  robot ics  
technology development by searching 
for  applications of these technologies 
w h i c h  r e d u c e  c o s t ,  i n c r e a s e  
performance, or  increase safety. 
-Pro\ ide for e\rolution, by designing 
the station and  its operations concept 
to efficiently adnpt to changes i n  the 
user co inn1 11 n i t  y , the quantity of 
se  r v  ices off  e red,  i nd prod u c t iv i t  y 
en ha n c i n  g in v cs t me n t s . 
- P r o v i d e  f o r  c o m m o n a l i t y  a n d  
m a i n t a i n a b i l i t y  b y  d e s i g n i n g  t h e  
station and the opetations concept to 
take advan1:ige of these desirable 
properties for  low cost operations. 
-Opt imize  human product i1  i ty  by 
autom:iting those fllght and ground 
f LI nc t io ns t tin t i nc r e x  e perf or mance or 
reduce the life cycle costs of the 
program. 
- D e s i g n  t o  L i f e - C y c l e - C o s t  b y  
considering all program costs (DDTSrE, 
s ls teni  operations,  and government 
use r s )  in  m a k i n g  t r a d e - o f f s  in 
services pro v ided, investment costs 
and operations costs. 
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areas will be discovered, previous alternatives 
will get refined, and better information will 
become available. Thus, emphasis must be 
placed on developing a consistent and 
accurate evaluation process for  program 
tradeoff analysis, rather than attempting to 
make all important choices at the beginning 
and lock them in for  the duration of the 
Program. 
The evaluation process provides a mechanism 
for  guiding the program towards the selection 
of preferred options for  performing 
operations functions. I n  the case of the 
Space Station, however, the desirability of 
the operations system is inherently tied to the 
Station design and to user satisfaction, and 
hence must be concerned with more than just 
operating responsibilities. The process 
outlined below was used i n  the development 
of the SSOTF operations concept, and is 
presented in that context, but the general 
approach to evaluation is recommended for 
wider application to decisions at all levels i n  
the Space Station Program. 
Methods for  evaluation approach i t  from 
many perspectives, providing both confirming 
redundancy and deeper understanding. In  
order for these qualities to emerge, the 
various components of evaluation must be 
consistent with each other and mutually 
supportive. The  approaches described below 
range from the enumeration of goals without 
prejudging conflicts among them, to 
narrowly-focused rules that do  not explicitly 
acknowledge goals. In between are criteria, 
which provide a balance between breadth and 
practical application. 
The evaluation process is illustrated in Figure 
3-1, and the key components of this 
evaluation process are described below i n  
summary form . 
Co 11 si d era ti  o 11 s i 11 De I o p i 11 11 A I t e r 11 a t i vr s 
In constructing a range of alternatives for 
consideration, several key characteristics can 
be used to ensure that the range covers the 
relevant dimensions of variation. Some of 
these are generic--such as cost and capital 
investment -- and pertain to all option areas. 
Some can be derived from the goals of the 
Space Station Program, such as user 
friendliness and automation. Yet others are 
specific to the functions, hardware, and 
systems pertaining to each particular option 
area. 
Because of the multifaceted nature of Station 
resources and services offered to users, and 
the complex i n t e r re1 a t ions h ips among the m , 
a strategy for  the design of alternatives can 
be based on tradeoffs between competing 
objectives. Some of the many dimensions of 
variations among alternatives are contained in 
the following list: 
De v e 1 o p ni e n t Cost 
Maintenance Labor 
Replacement Feasibility and Cost 
Power Requirements 
Cons u ni a b 1 e s Requirements 
Capability for  Remote Operation 
Crew Skill and Time Requirements 
Level of Automation 
Is0 la t i  on/  Co n t a m in  at ion Require men t s 
External Communications Support 
Le ve 1 of Management I n vo 1 ve men t 
Institutional Incentives Generated 
Political Acceptability 
No single option area is likely to span more 
than a portion of these dimensions of 
tradeoffs, but this list or  an expanded one 
can serve as a check on relevant possible 
alternatives. 
Among the option areas and alternatives 
evaluated, several patterns can be described. 
In the operations areas, user friendliness, 
operations control, organizational respon- 
s ib i I i t ie s , part ne r operating pro ced u r es , and 
cost seem to dominate. In the management 
are as, coni mu n i ca t io ns a n d or ga n i za t i onal 
control receive the focus of attention. In  the 
policy arena, removal of ambiguity and 
con f 1 i c t i n g cons t r a i n t s (e s p e c i a 11 y those 
forcing costs upward) were objectives i n  the 
design of many of the alternatives. 
The panels in the O T F  were asked to 
consider a range of options for  performing 
the operations functions assigned to their 
panel. A consistent set of alternatives was 
given to each panel to stimulate their 
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Figure 3-1. Process for Evaluating Alternatives 
thinking on developing operations concepts. 
They i n  turn were not constrained to limit 
themselves to these alternatives or to pursue 
each one unless it looked like a promising 
approach. The 12 option areas presented by 
Panel 4 to t h e  other panels are described in 
Section 3.5. 
Fu 11 c t i o ii al An a 1 vs i s 
In order to ensure the completeness of the 
operations concept two types of functional 
analysis were conducted: ( I )  top-down 
functional descriptions and (2) end-to-end 
f u nc t io nal f 1 ow an a I ys is. First , f u n c t ion a1 
descriptions we re de ve 1 oped w h i c 11 i n c 1 u d e a 11 
the operations functions in the strategic, 
tactical and execution levels. The panels 
then developed their options for  performing 
each function. The alternatives i n  the 
previous section were considered where 
appropriate. As options were developed for  
each function or  group of functions within a 
panel they were evaluated using the 
evaluation criteria discussed below. Options 
were refined in the evaluation process given 
their interactions with other options within 
that panel. When the panel recommendations 
were essentially complete, an end-to-end 
functional f low analysis was conducted to 
verify that the functional flows and product 
flows between all parts of the operations 
concept were identified. Thus,  an operations 
concept consists of: descriptions of 
functions, functional relationships, product 
flows, and roles and responsibilities. 
Components of the Eyaluation Process2 
Evaluation results in a description of why the 
preferred alternative is better. Quantitative 
measures of impact and evaluation are 
preferable, but verbal assessments and 
ranking o r  scoring methods may serve a 
supporting o r  intermediate purpose. An 
example of the latter approach is to ask two 
questions: 
-What objectives must be fulfilled? 
-What properties or conditions will a 
good solution satisfy? 
There are a number of components of the 
evaluation process, which are described 
below. The components are listed i n  the 
approximate order in which they should be 
carried out so as to provide the basis for  the 
subsequent step, but all steps can be initiated 
independently and reconciled and refined 
subs e qu e n t 1 y . 
( 1 )  Goals. The goals of a program 
comprise all things that are good and may be 
affected i n  a positive or  negative way by the 
program. In a general sense, goals are the 
dimensions along which the output of the 
program can be evaluated. 
Goals niay be ordered, or prioritized, 
according to importance. They niay also be 
structured into a hierarchy, so that some 
goals are parts of larger goals. I t  does not 
matter much if statements of goals overlap, 
although the least amount of redundancy is 
desirable. It is more important that goals be 
enumerated exhaustively, so that all possible 
beneficial impacts are covered by at  least one 
goal. 
The most sign if i can t character is t ics a bse n t 
f rom goal statements is any assessment of 
tradeoffs and choices. More output and 
lower cost are both desirable, for  example, 
but goals provide no information for  
determining the point at  which additional 
output is no t  worth the cost. 
( 2 )  Obicct i \cs .  As goals become more 
specific, and thus necessarily more partial, 
statements of subgoals can be called 
objectives. There is no absolute or relative 
standard for  defining where this break 
occurs, and i t  does not matter whether there 
are goals, o r  objectives, or  both. If there are 
both, objectives refer to the group at the 
specific end of the scale. 
Greater specificity of goals and objectives 
should suggest measures and indicators that 
reflect actual versus planned performance, 
re c o g n i z i n g , h o we v e r , that me as u r e me n t does 
not necessarily improve the evaluation. It 
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can, but other characteristics must be present 
as well. 
(3)  Fu 11 c t i o 11 s an tl  S ti I) f t i  11 c t i on s . These 
are a description of what has to be done to 
do the task. The description can include 
activities, products, and connections. This 
information defines the units and terms for 
describing alternatives. An:ilysis of a n  issue 
involves determining where the issue fits in 
the functions structure. 
(4)  Alterriatiies. Alternatives are a 
description of possible Lvays of performing a 
function. The number of alternatives should 
be only as ninny as are needed to span a 
plausible range of options. The altei nati \es 
should be real choices, meaning that each 
alternative has some Iiheliliood or could be 
reasonably recommended; none are extrcme 
or  artificial cases. T h y  generation of 
alternatives leads to two questions: 
-Why is the issue unresolved? 
-What makes i t  d i f f ic u 1 t '? 
(5)  Orranization and Location. 
Description of where t h i n g s w i l l  ke located 
and where or how they will be housed 
organizationally. This information rnay be 
niinor or may  constitute the content of the 
alternative. Two aspects of this are: 
-What is the process by which decisions 
will be made? 
-What organizational units, teams, etc., 
are involved? 
( 6 )  P e r f o r m a n c e -  h l e a s u r e s .  
Quantitative measures or other indicators of 
final output,  intermediate output (used to 
produce final output,  e.g., housekeeping), and 
inputs, should be developed for  the purpose 
of observing and assessing performance. 
Good measures of perforninnce help to locate 
both s t re ng t lis and we :I k n esse:;. 
Measures may  be tabulated in absolute units, 
for  comparison over time, or as rates and 
ratios (e.g., unit costs of output).  Some 
measures rnay be called "effectiveness" 
measures. Some examples: 
- Act  u n  1 \IS. S :lied u led accomplish men t s 
-Resource ut lization rates 
-Services consumption rates 
-Actual versus Planned expenditures 
-Productivity and other input-output 
rates 
-Cost per unit of output indicators 
For nie as u res 
should be both exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive (non-o verlapping), as well as 
balanced i n  relati\ e importance at each level 
of detail. 
i n t e r p ret a t i o I I, perform a nc e 
( 7 )  Imnsrts. Impacts a re  a description 
of v,h:it d i f fewnce i t  makes whether 
something is done one way versus another. 
IMpacts include output,  cost, where things 
are done, who does them, and who bears the 
cost or other burden. Impacts lead to a focus 
on three question:: 
-What is at stake? 
- W h y  is it important? 
-What kind and level of effort  should 
be brought tO bear? 
(8') Criteria,. A criterion is a condition 
which, when applied to a suitably 
c o m p r e 11 ens i v e set of perform an c e nie as u r es , 
indicates when a group of tradeoffs is 
optimum . 
The broadest criterion is efficiency, which 
says that output should be expanded until 
marginal benefits just  equals marginal cost. 
The resulting output level will maximize net 
benefits,, or total benefits minus total costs, 
for  t h a t  type 0' output.  The practical 
approach for  ev,iluating efficiency is the 
comparison of incremental costs and benefits. 
Another primary criterion is equity, which is 
applicahle to the sharing of costs among 
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partners. There is no algorithm for 
determining when equity is optimum, but it 
is possible to reformulate various desirable 
characteristics of an equitable allocation as 
constraints, which can be imposed until an 
acceptable solution is narrowly bounded. 
(9)  Guidelines. Procedures or  methods 
for  achieving good performance or 
approximating optimal tradeoffs can be 
described in terms of guidelines. The 
application of the principles to the specific 
case is likely to leave considerable room for  
professional judgment,  but the process should 
tend toward more robust and complete 
evaluations. 
Statements in guideline form imply that at 
least some tradeoffs have been considered, 
and some conclusions reached (and have, 
therefore, progressed beyond the level of 
goals and objectives), or that the process for  
doing so can be described in moderately 
specific terms. 
(10)  Standards. Guidelines that take 
the form of specific quantitative constraints 
are often called standards. The  constraint 
may be exact (e.g., nuts and bolts, docking 
port)  o r  a threshold (minimum volume per 
person, maximum weight). 
The virtue of a standard is that it does not 
require a complete reevaluation (data 
collection and analysis) of optimality for  each 
small and repetitive decision. It is also a 
mechanism for  achieving commonality, i.e., 
standardization, without requiring that all 
participants debate and agree upon a common 
design element. The disad\.antage of 
imposing standards is that possible superior 
solutions are ruled out in some cases. 
( 1 1 )  Ground Rules. This is an informal 
term referring to common assumptions, 
guidelines, objectives, or other suggestions 
for  pursuing the evaluation of alternatives. 
The  purpose of ground rules is to orient a 
group of individuals to begin efforts in a 
consistent direction and with a common 
understanding. 
Srmce Station Evaluation Criteria 
The evaluation criteria suggested by the OTF 
cover the major areas of performance and 
cost associated with the Space Station 
Program. They are not shown in priority 
order since all these criteria are important to 
a desireable operations concept. 
( I )  Feasibilitv/Fle?tibilitv: An option 
is considered "feasible" if it is likely to work 
as planned in routine types of operations. 
Thus, to some degree it is a measure of 
confidence in the understanding of the 
concept . " F 1 ex i b i 1 i t  y " ref e r s to the cap ab i 1 it y 
of the concept to accommodate a wide 
variety of operating conditions. 
This first criteria is intended as a screening 
device to determine if the operations concept 
is workable in the judgement of the 
evaluators. A high : nking for  "feasibility" 
implies there a hi! * degree of confidence 
that the concept caii perform the needed 
functions in routine operating conditions. 
Similarly, "flexibility" of each concept is 
important because the station will have to 
respond to a wide range of conditions, and 
thus, concepts cannot be judged solely on 
how well they respond to baseline conditions. 
Given the time pressures of the OTF 
schedule this criteria was subjectively used to 
rank the alternatives, but in the longer run 
more rigorous methods could be adopted. 
(2) Cost Effectileness: An option or 
concept is cost effective if i t  produces a 
given set of benefits or  performance at  
ni i n i m u m 1 if e - c y c le - cos t (including DDT& E 
and operations cost). 
The cost effectiveness of an operations 
concept must be judged in the larger context 
of total program costs which includes any 
DDT&E or deployment costs, any 
transportation cost supporting operations, and 
station s y s t e ms ope rations costs . U 1 t i  mat e 1 y , 
all of these costs are supported by the U S .  
taxpayer and thus operations should be done 
in a manner which minimizes the total life- 
cycle costs consistent with a given level of 
3-13  
performance. 
The concept of cost effectiveness is more 
narrow than the concept of economic 
efficiency. In cost-effectiveness evaluations, 
the performance (and thus benefits to the 
user) is a given; in economic efficiency 
evaluations, the level of performance sought 
is that level where total benefits minus 
minimum cost to achieve that level of 
benefits is maximized. The cost- 
effectiveness criterion was more relevant to 
most of the SSOTF deliberations since the 
station size and performance lei.els were 
taken as given in deciding most issues. 
(3)  ODerations Performance: The term 
"performance" is used here in the broad sense 
pertaining to the overall service level of the 
station. Thus,  any concept which increases 
on-orbit user resource levels or throughput  of 
the ground support  system at a given or 
reduced I if e - cy c 1 e - cost is an i m p r o v e m e n t in 
the operations concept. 
It is desirable to encourage designs. policies, 
and practices which consume as little 
housekeeping resources as is possible, 
consistent with other goals. Some of these 
performance improvements may cost more, 
but  the tradeoff is not clear on whether they 
are beneficial or  not without further analysis. 
Ideally, as the tools become available for  
de  t a i 1 e d a n a 1 y t i c a 1 e va I u a t io n t h e s e t ra d eo f f s 
will be easier to make. In this example the 
life-cycle-costs of investments i n  greater 
housekeeping efficiency must be compared 
with the incremental cost of increasing the 
gross size of that resource. The tools 
necessary to perform this analysis were not 
available to the OTF necessitating a 
s u b j e c t i ve assess m e n t of perform a n ce 
impacts. 
(4) User Accommodation: A concept is 
considered superior in terms of user 
accommodation if i t  provides 1nech:misnis to 
give the user a combination of greater 
control over his payload with relative ease of 
accommodation, integration, ond access to 
information . 
'This criteria is intendcd to reflect the 
importance placed on niaking the user a 
driving force in designing a space station 
operations system. Some of the specific 
measures used in applying this criteria were: 
number of interface points for  users, 
s imp l i f i ed  documen ta t ion ,  ease of 
accommodation., ease of integration, ease of 
access to information, and greater user 
autonomy. In pvt icu lar ,  :in attempt must be 
made to have the system be responsive to 
user needs. 
( 5 )  Safety: An  option is considered 
safe if there is a high probability that its 
associated ground and/or  onboard operations 
functions can be executed without physical 
impairment or loss of life to equipment, 
operators or to personnel in proximity to the 
equipment or operation. 
Spaceflight ope1 ations and operations support 
safety assurance must involve both objective 
;in d me as u r c:s. 0 b j e c t i ve 1 y , 
hardware (or software) must be built to 
specific materials, reliabil~ty,  redundancy and 
opera b i 1 i t  y stand a r ds w h I C  h are technic a 11 y 
spec if ic , me as u ra ble , p redetermined, and 
standardized. On the other hand, any system 
is vulnerable to  both inadvertent or  covert 
operator error.  Decisions regarding 
alternative methods of operations should seek 
out those operational paths or  techniques 
which tend to minimize system vulnerability 
to such errors. These decisions may often be 
somewhat subjective and based on empirical 
experience or statistical data. Additionally, 
:my operation should be able to be conducted 
within an over;lll environment that is both 
p h y n i c a 1 I y coni p n t i b I e w i t  h the operating 
systems as be l l  as one that assures com- 
petency and friendliness with respect to 
system operators. Some specific measures in 
using this criteria are: enipirical system and 
c'o m po ne n t 1 1 i :i bili t y data, s t a tis t ical 
performance data, level of operational 
redundancy, level of operator exposure, level 
of operator task familiarity, level of operator 
motivation, and level of physical systems. 
s u b j ec t i VP 
(6) Rlanarremerit 1:ffectiveness: A 
management structure and process is 
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"effective" if i t  facilitates decision making at  
the lowest practical levels which promotes 
cost effectiveness, increased performance, 
safety and leads to greater user satisfaction. 
Management effectiveness is one indirect 
means to achieve the other goals of the 
program. It is kept as a distinct criteria in 
the evaluation process because i t  is not 
possible to anticipate all the uncertainties and 
consequent decisions which will have to be 
made to make this program fully successful 
over its lifetime. A well designed process 
for  management of operations will be able to 
deal with whatever problems arise in the 
future.  Key ingredients to effective 
management are availability of necessary 
information and incentives for all participants 
to be making decisions consistent with the 
program goals. Some of the specific 
measures which are useful in this evaluation 
are: decision making pushed to the 
a p p r o p r i a t e  l e v e l s ,  c o m m e n s u r a t e  
responsibility and accountability, elimination 
of unnecessary decision steps or interface 
requirements, built in incentives for decision 
makers a t  all levels of management to behave 
consistently with program goals, a well 
designed management information system, 
clear lines of authority, an effective cost 
management system, and an efficient resource 
allocation and utilization system. 
Scenarios and Test Cases 
Although the time pressures on the OTF 
precluded fully implementing this phase of 
the evaluation process it is worth 
documenting fo r  further operations concept 
a n a l y ~ i s . ~  A set of scenario guidelines and 
test cases for  the operations concept were 
developed to both illustrate the way the 
recommended concept would work under 
routine conditions and also a number of test 
cases to examine the ability of the concept to 
handle extreme situations. To this end, six 
general end-to-end scenario descriptions were 
defined to emphasize user accommodation, 
political, international and DOD related com- 
ponents, as well as other traditional 
operations issues. 
The scenario subjects recommended by the 
OTF are shown below with a brief 
description of the issue to be examined: 
- O p e r a t i o n s  P lann ing  Scenario:  
Describes the process of formulating a 
general operations plan for  the mature 
operations phase of Station activities, 
covering strategic, tactical and execute 
levels of the management process. 
-User Integration Scenario: Traces the 
end-to-end operational interfaces 
between a specific user and the Program 
beginning with the user's preliminary 
involvement in the Program, and 
continuing through the stages of 
requirements acquisition, manifesting of 
his payload, integration of his 
requirements, inflight execution of his 
payload operations, and any required 
post flight support. 
-Station Manifest Assessment Scenario: 
Describes the end-to-end operations 
assessment process that would be 
required prior to committing a specific 
complement of user payloads to a 
specific operation interval onboard the 
Station. 
-Sustaining Engineering Scenario: 
Describes the end-to-end process 
required to be in place as the Station 
and platform elements/systems become 
operational to assure that their 
operations support  performance is 
maintained a t  the highest level. 
-Flight Crew Integration Scenario: 
Describes the process for  integrating a 
specific flight crew into the end-to-end 
mission preparation process. 
-Operations Transi t ion Scenario: 
Applies the various mature Station and 
platforms operations concepts to the 
precursory assembly and operations 
verification program phases for  the 
purpose of performing a relevancy 
check. 
In addition, six operations concept test case 
situations were developed, each emphasizing 
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different key attributes of Station (operations 
and designed to evaluate specific operations 
situations. These test cases include: 
-Assembly Operations: An off-nominal 
operations situation which occurs during 
or  in support  of one of the manned base 
assembly flights; one which has the 
potential for  significant impact to 
operations plans and schedules at the 
strategic, tactical and execute levels. 
-Mature Operations: Using a given 
complement of Technology Development 
and Commercial payloads, describe how 
the various SSP operations support 
functions respond to real-time or  
e x e c u t e le ve 1 p e r t u r b a t i o n s to s t r a t e g i c 
and tactical level planning processes. 
-Co-Orbiting Platform C)perations: 
Using a given set of requirements for  
platform maintenance and servicing at  
the Station as well as a sequence of off-  
nominal events, describe how the 
ground and onboard operations 
associated with platform support are 
performed. 
-Polar Platform Operations: Using a 
given set of requirements for  platform 
maintenance and servicing by the NSTS 
as well as a sequence of off-nominal 
events, describe how the ground and 
onboard operations associated with 
platform support  are  performed. 
-Evolutionary Operations: Given a set 
of potential growth options and program 
goals as well as a hypothetical set of 
"lessons learned" from early Station 
operations, prioritize and schedule their 
implementation in a manner that allows 
for  safe, reliable and cost-effective 
evolution of operations capabilities. 
-Operations Impact of a Major Program 
Contingency: Given an operational 
Station and an  unanticipated SSP 
program contingency which significantly 
impacts strategic and tactical planning 
for  at  least one year, describe the 
ground and onboard operations likely to 
be most affected and determine a 
workaround strategy which preserves as 
much operational capability as possible. 
These scenarios and test cases would have 
been very useful in condL cting the feasibility 
and flexibility evaluations if time and 
resources had permitted such an analysis. 
Between now and the tinie operations begin, 
however, there will be numerous 
opportunities for  operations studies where 
these scenarios and tesi. cases will prove 
useful. 
The evaluation process described above was 
not applied i n  its entir2ty by the SSOTF 
because of time and resource constraints. I t  
is included i n  this doc1:ment as a way to 
preserve any ideas which might prove useful 
in the future.  The essence of the 
methodology is that :i wide range of 
alternatives must be evaluated i n  a consistent 
fashion. 
3.5 SUhlh lARY OF RIA.JOR OPERATIONS 
ALTERNATIVES by Doug Lee, Rich 
O'Toole, Gran Paules, and Bill Pegram4 
In January (of 1987, the Management 
Integration Panel presented 12 option areas, 
listed below, to the oiher panels of the 
SSOTF to provide a catalyst fo r  their work: 
-User Autonomy 
-Station Autonomy 
-Risk Acceptance 
-Payload Verification 
-Operations Automation 
-Functional Allocatkon 
-Evolution 
-Supportability 
-Transportation 
-International Partnership 
-Program Operations 
-Stat j on LJ t i 1 i za t io n Themes 
This section describes why the Panel selected 
each of these option areas for  presentation to 
the other panels and what i t  saw as the 
continuum of alternative:; in each area. The 
discussion below represents the first steps of 
an evaluation such as would be produced by 
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application of the methodology described in 
Section 3.4. Option areas are selected, the 
importance of each option area is analyzed, 
and alternatives are generated. However, 
subsequent steps are not described--selection 
of evaluation criteria, description of impacts 
of alternatives, recommendations, unresolved 
issues and recommendations for  next steps, 
and so forth.  
In addition to the descriptions below, user 
accommodation, cost reduction, and safety 
enhancement were major drivers in 
generation of alternatives. In user 
accommodation, a range of alternatives were 
considered to give the user greater control of 
payload operations, including: delegated 
re source pay 1 o a d 
operations, single point servicing, user 
responsibility in payload verification, and 
user autonomy. Cost reduction alternatives 
included s tandard versus integrated 
process i ng , c om ni o n a 1 it y , c o ns o 1 i dated s u p p or t 
operations, supportability, and operations 
automation. Safety enhancement included 
centralized versus distributed system 
management, integrated versus element crew 
concepts, and U S .  control of safety 
integration. 
a 1 loca t i on , d i s t r i b u t e d 
User Autonomy 
User autonomy represents the ability of users 
to conduct work with minimum interference, 
with maximum user discretion, and without 
special training in space station operations. 
The option area was chosen for  a number of 
reasons: 
-User autonomy is apparently highly 
valued by users, 
-Some members of the SSOTF felt that 
past NASA programs had been deficient 
in providing user autonomy, and 
-The degree of user autonomy could 
have a major effect  on station 
operations 
Two polar alternatives envisioned were as 
f 0 1 lows: 
-Provide each user with a minimum 
envelope and permit decentralized 
autonomy in operation. Users may 
exchange resources among each other. 
-Constrain users to predetermined 
timelines and schedules for  all activities, 
with centralized control of user 
commands. Users operate from or 
through NASA control centers. 
Station Autonomy 
Station autonomy represents the relationship 
of station crew and users to ground control, 
and the allocation of authority and 
responsibility. The area is important for  a 
number of reasons: 
Effec t  on Station Cost and 
Performance. Because of the continuous 
nature of Space Station operations, extensive 
ground supervision of all on-orbit activities 
may be very expensive. Additionally, the 
continuous nature of operations may make 
on-orbit resources less expensive than in past 
manned flights. For example, on Shuttle 
flights, the cost of a shuttle launch generally 
provides 5-7 days of crew time. For the 
Station, the same shuttle launch provides 
considerably more crew time (e.g. 45 days on 
the Station based on a 90 day crew stay time, 
with changeout of one-half the crew every 
45 days). This reduced cost of on-orbit  
resources decreases the optimal amount of 
p re - p 1 a n n i n g . 
Effect on Safety, Greater Station 
autonomy is \.iewed as less safe than ground, 
especially station operator, control. 
Effect on Astronaut hlorale ant1 
Performance. Station crew will generally 
prefer more station autonomy. 
The preferred degree of station autonomy 
may also depend on crew rotation and shift 
operations. Present crew rotation plans imply 
2 shifts on board: a "fresh" shift  and an 
"experienced" shif t .  Present plans for  
shifts are for  2 shifts and that these will be 
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the same as the crew rotation shifts because 
of the importance of working with the crew 
one has trained with. The  resulting degrees 
of experience and fatigue,/capability 
deterioration in the shift  running the station 
may imply the need for  changing degree of 
station autonomy each day or during the 
course of an increment. 
Alternatives envisioned by the Panel were as 
follows: 
-Ground monitoring and supervision of 
a11 on-orbit  activities to ensure 
compatibility and resource adequacy. 
-Crew discretion to adapt to 
contingencies and opportunities. 
Control by users was included as part of the 
latter option. However, since these users are 
on the g round ,  user control could also be 
classed with the first alternative as another 
form of ground control of the stzition. 
Risk AcceDtance 
Risk acceptance refers to the niensure and 
control of failure or other contingency so as 
to meet reliability and safety standards at  
minimum cost. The  importance of this to 
the Panel derived from the following 
assumptions: 
-The Challenger accident and recent 
Expendable Launch Vehicle failures 
have heightened the awareness within 
NASA and the SSOTF of the possibility 
of accidents. 
-The long-term, continuous nature of 
Station operations inci eases the 
possibility of mission failure or risks to 
safety and suggests the need for n 
framework to e\ aluate these against cost 
i ni pacts . 
Alternatives listed by the Panel jncluded the 
fol lowing: 
- A n t ic i pa te :I rid 
failures and provide alternati \e 
procedures or backup, 
al I con t i 11 gr: nc ies 
-Bui ld  in  subs t i tu tab i l i ty  and  
adaptability to minimize adverse impacts 
of contingencies, and 
-Determine allowable risk categories and 
accept the cost of possible faiIures in 
those categories 
Section 5.5 presents an expanded discussion 
and results of the limited analysis that the 
Panel was able to conduct in this area. 
- Pa yl o;i d \’e ri  f i ca t i 011 
The issue concerns the extent to which users 
are responsible for  verifying that their 
pag,loads are safe and working. The 
importance of the issue derives from the 
effect  on cost burdens of NASA and the 
user, the cost to society of verification, and 
the probability of mission success. 
___-- Coct Burden. The ultimate cost burden 
on NASA and the user is a function of the 
initial allocation of costs and how this initial 
allocation is affectcd by pricing policy. User 
responsibility for  verification was represented 
in January to the other Panels as involving 
high user cost and low NASA cost whereas 
NASA responsibility was depicted as 
implying low user cost and high NASA cost. 
I f  this mere the end of the story, one might 
wonder why uyers might want responsibility 
for  verification. One possibility of course is 
that, as mentioned before, pricing policy 
reallocates costs and lhus some costs that 
A’ASA incurs for  verification are  ultimately 
borne bq the user through prices. Another 
possibility I S  that the options may imply 
diffet ent efficiency in verification or  
diffeient objectives regarding the probability 
of niission success. 
Cos t  to Societv-of Verification. An 
important goal i n  this option area is to place 
the burden of verification on the party who 
can do  i t  i n  the most cost-effective manner. 
Proponents of NASA \ vrification could argue 
that N A S A  has a nilmber of advantages: 
learning economies from having done it many 
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times before, interaction economies through 
superior knowledge of the Station, Shuttle, 
and other payloads, and scale economies by 
performing verification for  a number of 
payloads at  the same time. Proponents of 
user verification could argue that the user’s 
superior knowledge of his own payloads 
outweighs NASA advantages, and that the 
user is in a better position to implicitly 
choose that level of verification that meets 
his performance and cost objectives. 
Probability of Rlission Success. The 
extent of payload verification affects the 
probability of mission success. A number of 
members of the SSOTF argued that the user 
should be able to choose this level, as long as 
the payload met safety standards. NASA’s 
view has been that it must have some control 
over mission success because, rightly or 
wrongly, the public will hold NASA 
responsible for  payload failures. However, 
the extent of this externality of perception 
could probably be changed by a deliberate 
policy. 
for  safety and performance. 
Value of On-Orbit Crew Time. There 
was a general consensus within the SSOTF 
that on-orbit crew time would probably be a 
very scarce and valuable resource. This 
argues for  maximizing operations automation. 
Value for Safety and Performance. 
Minimizing crew intervention reduces the 
chance of safety risks and saves crew energy 
for  tasks which benefit the most from hunian 
i n vo 1 v e m e n t . 
Options identified by the Panel included the 
following: 
-Use of automation, either on-orbit  or  
on the ground, for  routine monitoring 
and operation of the station 
-Monitoring and operations by ground 
personnel or  on-orbit  crew 
Section 5.9 presents fur ther  discussion of this 
topic. 
Options identified by the Panel included: 
-Ship and shoot policy, in which users 
take full responsibility for  ensuring 
proper functioning of their payloads, 
within NASA-defined standards and 
constraints. 
- M i x  o f  c o n t a i n e r i z a t i o n ,  
modularization, and customizing of 
payloads to match user requirements. 
-Thorough testing and verification of all 
payloads by NASA organizations before 
manifesting . 
Onerations Automation 
Operations automation reflects the degree to 
which operational decisions are reached 
through machines. This automation can 
occur on the ground or on-orbit. The 
importance of this option derived f rom the 
value of on-orbit crew time, and the value 
Fu 11 c t i  on a1 AI 1 oca ti  on 
Functional allocation represents the degree to 
which similar types of on-orbit  operations 
are clustered to maximize output and 
minimize contamination or  other adverse 
interactions. The  importance of this issue 
resulted f r o m  its effect  on station cost, 
international cooperation and dependency, 
and international competitive advantage. 
Station Cost. Functional allocation was 
generally regarded as being cheaper to build. 
The effect  on operations cost was unclear. 
1 n t e r 11 a t i  on a l  Cooper  a t  i 011 an d 
Dcaendencv. Functional allocation results in 
the international partners being more 
dependent on each other. 
I n t e r 11 a t i on a 1 Co m ne ti t i  ve Ad va 11 t a pe . 
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The most important factor is the possible 
effect  on internationnl competitive advantage. 
The advantage could accrue i n  two ways: 
(1) Supplying a particular capability 
(e.g. building a lab for  microgravity research) 
may result in technological knowhow apart 
from that gained from using the lab. Under 
functional allocation, use is open to all, but 
only one partner will supply the lab. 
(2) Supplying a particular capability 
may give particular ad \  antnge to that 
partner’s users. This could result if partners 
faced different costs of integration into that 
facility (e.g. taking payload to that country 
for  integration, or necessity to adapt to that 
partner’s conventions on a host of matters- 
e.g. electrical, computer, etc.). 
The alternatives identified by the Panel were 
as follows: 
- Pro v ide mod u 1 es , 
platforms, etc. where use of each is 
shared by all those desiring to utilize 
that special capability, and 
spec i a I ized la bs , 
-Provide generalized labs, modules, 
platforms, etc. in which a partner has 
complete and exclusive use. 
One can also envision a range of possibilities 
for  operation: 
(1 )  Narional Enclave. Ehch partner has 
full  use of facilities provided by that 
partner, including ground and onboard. 
(2) Integrated Onboard Operations, 
G r o u n d E n c lave. 
Onboard resources and facilities are 
jointly utilized, while ground control 
and communications centers are by 
separate partners. 
0 per at io n s b y 
( 3 )  Integrated Onboard Operations, 
Distributed Ground El erne n t Operations. 
Onboard resources jointly utilized, with 
ground control centers spatially 
distributed to con v e n ie n t 1 o c a t ions 
according to discipline o r  type of usage. 
(4) Integrated Onboard and Ground 
Operations, Centralized Safety-Critical 
Operations. 
( 5 )  Integrated Onbonrd and Ground 
Operations, Centralized Safety and 
Routine Ope1 ations Control. 
(6) Integratec and Centralized Onboard 
an cl G r o u n d (3p  e r a t i  o n s . 
( 7 )  Internaticnals Supply Hardware to 
US Space Sta:ion. 
The issuc of funct onal allocation has been a 
central i f sue  i n  the international negotiations 
which are discussecl in more detail in Section 
5.1 1 .  
Evolution represents the provision of scarring 
for  possrble growth alternatives. The area 
was selezted by the Panel because of the 
obvious importance of the area for  long-term 
performance and cost of the Station. 
Options presented by the Panel included the 
following: 
-Build i n  hardware components that 
permit future  growth in a wide range 
of possible directions. Preserve future  
options by scarring, to the extent that 
allou.ing for  uncertain alternatives is 
less costly than making future  
mod if ications. 
- C o n s i d e r  p o s s i b l e  g r o w t h  
configurations, but  acconimodate only 
those that appear very likely or  will be 
precluded by specific designs. 
-Adapt the :tation to growth as it 
occws.  
Section 5.10 presents an expanded discussion 
of this area. 
Su D DO r ta I I ~  
Supportability represents the design of 
elements and equipment to be easily 
maintained and supported at  reasonable cost. 
This option area was chosen because i t  
represents a new challenge for  NASA: 
previous spacecraft have either been built for  
no repair (unmanned satellites although now 
communications satellites could be built to 
facilitate repair by Shuttle crews) or  for 
repair upon return to earth (the Shuttle). 
Options presented by the Panel were 
d i f f e r e n t  m e c h a n i s m s  to  a c h i e v e  
supportability: 
need not be as robust. 
The three alternatives presented to the Panels 
were as follows: 
-STS is sole transportation vehicle 
-The Station will broker commercial 
ELVs for  users. 
-Users may provide their own 
transportation. 
-Design modular components with This option area is discussed further in 
common interfaces to facilitate isolation 
of problems and ease of replacement. 
Maintain stock of spares in resource 
nodes. 
Section 4.2. 
In  t e r ti a t i on a I Partners h i D Gro ti tid ru I es 
-Build in robustness and redundancy so International partnership groundrules are the 
as to minimize requirements for constraints on resource allocation and service 
maintenance. availability imposed by international 
This area was selected by the 
-Reduce on-orbit complexity so that Panel because of its importance to resource 
problems can be diagnosed and repaired 
as failures occur 
agreements. 
allocation. 
The options presented by the Panel wet-e: 
T r  a n snort a t  i o n -Pooled resources with joint  allocation. 
The transportation option area focuses on the 
extent of usage of Expendable Launch separate allocation. 
Vehicles (ELVs) for  carrying station and user 
payloads to and f rom the Station. The  issue This option area is fur ther  discussed in 
was selected because of its impact on Section 4.1, International Cooperation in 
operations complexity and flexibility. Space. 
-Off-the-top partition of resources with 
ODerations Compleuitv. Use of ELVs Propram Operations: Control 
may add a degree of complexity to Space 
Station operations. Prelaunch/postlanding Program operations control refers to the ways 
operations and user integration are affected, in which control over space station activities 
as well as rendezvous operations. In other and users is distributed and structured into a 
respects, use of ELVs may reduce h i  era r c h y of res p o ns i b i 1 it i e s . 
complexity--use of an ELV for  some 
purposes may be far  simpler than use of the Options presented by the Panel were the 
STS. f 01 lowing: 
-Direct NASA management 
-Separate National enclaves 
Operations Flexibility. Availability of 
alternatives to the Shuttle adds an important 
measure of flexibility in  Space Station 
operations. A more robust transportation -US private industry 
system means that other parts of the Station 
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- Q u as i - government organization 'The possible objectives presented by the 
Panel were: 
-Science/user institute 
-National lab in space 
Further discussion of these alternatives is 
contained in Section 5.1. - Per ma ne n t as t ro n o rn i c al observatory 
-In-space servicing facility 
Station CJtilization Themes 
-Space tramportation node 
Station utilization themes refers to the 
primary focus of the Station. The primary 
options are: 
-All things to all users 
-Focus on one or  more, but not all,  
objectives. 
-Assembly facility for  space structures 
Further limited disciission of these 
alternatives is contained i l i  Section 4.4 below, 
on inanned spaceflight pi ogram directions. 
E N D N O T E S  
1 .  Doug Lee developed this list of goals from a variety of sources obtained by the SSOTF. Rich 
()'Toole developed the list of goals at the end (of this section which embody a particular 
programmatic implementation. 
2.  This section was developed by Doug Lee. 
3 .  These are described in more detail in  Technicnl and Analvtical Services in  SuDDort of a Space 
Station Oberations Scenarios and Test Case Development Strateak , CSP Associates, January 29 
and February 18, 1987, ( in two volumec). 
4. The options areas were developed by  several members of the panel including Doug Lee, Gran 
Paules, and Rich O'Toole. Bill Pegram supplied material concerning the importance of each area 
and completed the final writing. 
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4.0 STRATEGIC POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS 
by Doug Lee' 
The nature of strategic issues is that they 
affect  many levels of the Space Station 
Program, and they cannot (or should not) be 
resolved without active concurrence from a 
broad range of interests. By their nature, 
strategic policy decisions are made jointly by 
the Program, NASA management, and 
Congress, with the scientific community and 
numerous other participants. Hence i t  is 
necessary that choices be offered for  meeting 
various objectives, and information be 
provided on the impacts of the alternatives 
u.lder consideration. 
Purposes in Atldressinp Strategic Issues 
Some of these issues are unresolved because 
there are alternatives whose consequences 
have not been fully studied, and hence the 
right answer can not yet be determined. For 
the majority, however, the areas of 
uncertainty involve decision factors that are 
external to space station operations. They 
have to do  with such things as the emphasis 
to be placed on competing objectives for  the 
station, as well as alternative means for  
achieving them. 
( 1 )  Outside the SSP. One purpose in 
addressing strategic issues is to 
explain to NASA management and 
policymakers how the decisions 
they make in specific areas will 
affect  space station operations, and 
offer  a range of alternatives (e.g., 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  v e h i c l e s ,  
re im b u rse me n t po 1 ic i es ) where that 
is a suitable response to the issue. 
(2) Inside the SSP. Another purpose 
is to communicate to the space 
station organization as a whole that 
changes are expected to occur in 
the way decisions are made within 
the organization (e.g., cost 
management, centralization of 
strategic control). 
For each of the issues outlined below, an 
attempt has been made to summarize the 
alternatives and to describe the cost and 
other impacts of selecting one alternative 
versus another. In describing the differences 
among alternatives, some clearly appear to be 
desirable or undesirable, while others have 
unclear value. In all cases there are 
important tradeoffs, but the magnitudes of 
the tradeoffs are not currently known, and 
hence there may be no basis as yet for  
preferring one alternative over others. 
Also, choices made in regard to one strategic 
issue affect  t h e  benefits and costs of 
alternatives for  other issues. If priorities 
change in one area, evaluation of alternatives 
on other issues changes (e.g., which "market" 
is emphasized alters the  opt imal  
configuration). 
G e 11 era 1 Co 11 c I u si o n s 
While i t  is difficult  to reduce the strategic 
poi icy issues to  a f e w  s imple  
recommendations, the following list gives at 
least a suggestion of the init iatives tha t  
might taken in order to succeed in the key 
policy areas. The audience for  this section 
is threefold: Congress (the political realm), 
NASA management, and NASA centers. 
The long term importance of 
manned spaceflight in National 
priorities needs to be considered 
explicitly, because the answer will 
have a major impact on Program 
direction, efficiency, and cost. 
There are several issues -- notably 
transportation, subsidy policy, and 
'Section 4.7 was provided by Kevin Barquinero. 
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commercial application of space 
research - -  that need I O  be studied 
further,  and soon 
E f f e c  t i  v e a n  (-1 p r o d  u c  t i ve  
international participatlon will 
depend upon the right procedure5 
and groundrules for  cooperation 
and cost sharing. 
Decisions concerning space station 
construction will hnvtk major 
impacts on station operations. 
Some critical kinds of information 
( e s p e c i a l l y  o p e r a t i o n s  a n d  
supportability cost) need to be 
collected to address policy and 
management issues, and that 
information is not normally 
obtained under present procedures. 
In order to achieve a consensus on 
objectives and funding for the 
station, i t  will be ncicessary to 
offer  alternatiLes to Congress, the 
Ad m in is t ra t io n , the scientific and 
tech n ica 1 communit ies  , and 
commercial interests. 
Good cost management and life 
cycle cost design are  essential to 
success of the Station. 
Some center autonomy must be 
given up  for  the greater good of 
the space station. 
Adoption of some kinds of 
standard business practices and 
business thinking that are not 
normally considered by NASA are 
necessary. 
Although a number of recent commissions 
have reviewed NASA's mission in general 
and the space station in particular (National 
Commission on Space, the Space Sciences 
Board of the National Research Council, the 
Ride Committee, and the American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics). the Space 
Station Program is not well iinderstood 
outside NASA. Better comniunic3tion may 
iii\olve somrthing more of a dialogue 01 
con\ ersation than has lieen characteristic of 
pre\ ious patterns of ini'orrnation flow. 
4 . 1  INTEKPiATIONAI, COOPERATION I N  
S P.4 C E 
The US has expressed a goal of having other 
n:itions participate in the space station 
program as partners. for  purposes of 
international cooperation. As partners, 
Jnpan, Canada, and ESA will contribute 
elements of the station, funds for  operation, 
and will receive some share of station 
resources. R(.nefits to lion-US partners are, 
i n  addition to use of the station, the 
knowledge and experience gained for 
undertaking their own :pace programs. 
Sevei al interrelated olsstacles may hinder 
these international partnerships. Partners are 
concerned that NASA's construction and 
operating costs that will be billed to them 
will be inflated by including non-essential or 
overhead program cost:. Each group also 
demands control over its own activities and 
whatever facilities i t  brings to the station. 
One result is the "National Enclave" 
arrangement, in which each partner carries 
out a di \erse  range of activities within its 
"own" module. By providing the module, the 
partner gets back the in-kind benefits of its 
use. This is  only one possible in-kind 
exchange. but purely barter transactions place 
severe practical limitations on the range of 
alternatives that can be negotiated. 
The  objective in resolvlng this issue is the 
negotiation o f  contractiial agreements that 
will . .stect the interests of all parties 
concer lied. Clearly this requires an equitable 
balance, because advantage to one party 
comes at the expense of mother .  Inefficient 
restrictions, however, can easily reduce the 
totnl benefits of the station below their full 
potential. Thus there is a mutual self- 
interest in making the station as productive 
as possible, so long as all partners gain. 
Each partner's interests have three aspects: 
( I )  what it produces, ( 2 )  what it consumes, 
and ( 3 )  what i t  pays. Although i t  is the net 
result of all three that ultimately determines 
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partner satisfaction, the three can be 
separated in principle and perhaps in 
practice. 
There are several options for  cooperation: 
( 1 )  No International ParticiDation. If 
the coordination and decision costs of 
i n c 1 u d in g in tern at ion a 1 pa r t n e r s o u t we i g h , on 
balance, the benefits from multiple 
participants, then each country should go its 
separate way. Transactions costs in decision 
m a k i n g ,  a n d  o p e r a t i n g  costs  o r  
underutilization resulting from artificial 
restrictions, are real costs and should be 
considered in judging the long term political 
benefits of international partnerships. 
(2 )  Partners as tJsers/Contractors. 
One approach to station management is to 
view the US as the prime contractor, and the 
partners as suppliers and users. The US 
could purchase modules and equipment from 
the partners at  agreed prices to meet jointly- 
determined specifications. Both US and 
foreign agencies could enter this competition. 
Separately, partners could negotiate for  use 
of the station and its various resources. 
Whether a partner preferred to "buy back" 
the same facilities it constructed would 
depend upon the relative benefits and prices 
to the partner. 
To protect against padded bills, the cost 
estimates for  a package of station services 
could be f i rm in advance, or constrained to 
narrow ranges that still create incentives for  
cost control among all parties. Although the 
net effect  for  each non-U.S. partner is likely 
to be a bill (rather than a credit), the bill 
could be modest in size. 
(3 )  Joint \'enture. For complex 
endeavors that contain a substantial amount 
of risk, management of such an enterprise 
can be in the form of a joint venture among 
major partners. Emphasis is then directed at 
deve lop ing  dec is ion  processes and  
organizational structures that will deal with 
problems as they arise, rather than specifying 
all contingencies in advance. I n  contrast to 
the explicit business deals of the partners-as- 
buyers/suppliers mode of negotiation. 
partners would share i n  strategic planning as 
well as long term risk. 
The outcome of such a process is not readily 
predicted, and could include the national 
enclave arrangements that have been 
proposed. A properly structured joint 
venture could also, however, adapt to other 
arrangements if they offered net gains to all 
partners. Current negotiations are attempting 
to allocate resources by developing rules and 
policies that do  not explicitly recognize 
prices, i.e., i n  approximately a barter mode. 
This method can be blended with dollar- 
denominated agreements as desired by the 
partners. 
So met h in g bet we en a n ex p 1 i c i t  p rice / c o s t 
system and an informal balancing process 
needs to be developed for  achieving a 
rational allocation of resources and 
res po n s i b i 1 i t  i e s . s h o u 1 d 
recognize the market-like nature of the 
exchanges of goods and services that must 
occur, and design the contractual agreements 
that will enforce the results of the 
negotiations. 
T h is me c I i  a n ism 
NASA and the partners are capable of 
carrying out these negotiations i n  an effective 
manner, but political ambiguities have 
complicated NASA's position. One problem 
is the question of whether NASA can walk 
away from the table if there are no 
satisfactory offers,  or whether the national 
goal of international participation creates a 
hard constraint. At some point i n  the future,  
joint efforts with additional countries -- 
including a Mars exploration with the USSR 
- -  may become mutually desirable, and an 
effective organizational mechanism for 
facilitating such undertakings will most likely 
need to evolve i n  incremental steps. 
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4.2 TRANSPORTATION 
At present, NASA has no heavy l i f t  
capability other than the Shuttle, and 
conditions since the Challenger accident have 
left the agency with several !rears i n  which 
there will be few scientific or conimercial 
launches even on t h e  Shuttle. The ability to 
plan for  construction and operation of the 
station and to retain effective management 
and control over i t  depends in part on the 
station’s ability to obtain the services of a 
fleet of transportation vehicles. 
Ac~uis i t ion  of a Rlixed Fleet 
Several previous civilian and mi l i ta ry  launch 
vehicle programs have been reinvigorated, 
and expendable launch vehicles (ELVs)  of a 
variety of sizes and shapes could be put into 
operation within the same general time frame 
needed to restore the shuttle to normal 
schedule. Proliferation of vehicles has 
advantages and disadvantages, and there is a 
wide range of possibilities for  who should be 
responsible for  different vehicles and how 
they should be financed. Some of the 
possible alternatives are shown i n  Table 4-1. 
There are a variety of alternative paths 
regarding transportation: 
( I )  Shuttle Initially. PerliaDs ELVs 
Later. This continuation of what is, 
effectively, the current situation, leaves the 
station with constrained transportation to 
construct the station, modest ability to 
service i t ,  and use of o n l y  the highest cost 
(manned) niode. The  assembly schedule w i l l  
be vulnerable to any signifcant events which 
affect  the Shuttle schedule, including urgent 
priority payloads. Mixed fleet options could 
still be developed for  long term support, 
even if i t  is infeasible to obtain E L V s  for 
ea r I y ass e i n  bl y ni i ss i o ns 
( 2 )  Ilired Flcavv Boosters. Several 
contractors have been g i \  e n  permission to 
ni a r  h e  t E L V s 
competitively. The space station could be 
provided with a transportation budget  wi th  
which to pu  rchase t rnnspo r ta t io n ni ee t i n g 
station requirements, especiall! a heavy l i f t  
t h e  i r nied i u 111 - I i 1‘t 
launch vehicle. Other agencies and firms 
might also be interested in this program, but 
NASA could be the lead organization. 
A mix of launch vehicles could be made 
available in this mariner, with lighter and less 
complex vehicles m3re likely to be provided 
by private suppliers. The  problem of 
incompatibility and interchangeability would 
be the most difficult with multiple privately- 
provided launch services. Foreign vehicles, 
both manned and unmanned, are possible 
candidates as well. All combinations 
(including an evolved shuttle, shuttle-derived 
vehicles, and the Titan) should be studied, 
and station designs and operating procedures 
influenced by the results. 
( 3 )  Joint D e \ e l o ~ m e n t  of New Vehiclc. 
NASA,  could undertake to create the catalyst 
for  designing and constructing a Heavy Lift 
Launch Vehicle (t11,LV) or  other vehicle that 
will serve several purposes and require time 
and effort  to realize. The intent would be to 
stimulate interest, channel design funds and 
preside over design decisions, and possibly 
transfer responsibility to another agency or a 
private f i rm when the vehicle or vehicles 
became operational A logical participant i n  
this project might be the Department of 
Defense Air Force, in that both organizations 
appear to have similar requirements. 
IVhile i t  is hard to imagine a private f i rm 
undertaking the rtasearch and development 
task ,  i t  is also t iue that public agencies 
normally attempt such programs with many, 
often conflicting objectives, and thus have 
not been outstandingly effective a t  
controlling costs. Contracting the engineering 
and construction to aerospace firms does not 
necessarily make things better or worse. The 
problem is one of establishing clear 
objectives and constraints acceptable to all 
parties a t  the outset. The  management 
challenge is significant if significant R&D is 
required prior to delivering an operational 
s ys tem. 
Many scientific and commercial activities i n  
space can utilize expendable vehicles just  as 
effectivcl)i and at lower cost than the Shuttle. 
A number of studies are examining whether 
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Vehicle T w e  
Space Shuttle 
Extended Duration 
Shuttle with Advanced 
Solid Rocket Motors 
Shuttle Derived Vehicles 
Heavy Lift  Launch Vehicle 
(HLLV) 
Table 4-1. 
SPACE TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES 
Titan, Jarvis 
Other Expendables 
(Delta, Atlas) 
Foreign 
(Ariane, H- I ) 
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle 
(OMV) 
Rescue and Cargo Return 
Space Tugboat 
Soace Station Purpose Date of A\ailability 
Cargo U p  and Return 1988 
Construction EVA 
Manned Servicing 
Logistics 
TBD TBD 
Same with more capacity TBD 
TBD 
Large Cargo U p  
Logistics Cargo U p  
Small cargo up 
Small cargo up 
Spacecraft servicing 
Crew Rescue 
Small cargo down 
Rendezvous 
Assembly 
TBD 
TBD 
1988 
1987 
1988 
TBD 
TBD 
TBD 
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the space station could use HLLVs  for  
assembly and logistics purposes i n  order to 
save the Shuttle for  manned transportation 
and servicing. Clearly, the US space 
program warrants a niixed fleet of ~eh ic l e s ,  
and the choice is how to get the right mix at 
the lowest cost in delay and resources. 
Editor's note: 
The N A S A  Authorizatioti Act for FI' I Y K S  
t hc followitig luriguage: 
(P .L .  100-147. October 30, 1987) CotitUitiCd 
"Sec. 109. ( a )  I t  is the s e m e  of t h e  Congress 
that the lautrchitig arid serviciiig of the spclcci 
statioti should he accomplished 17.v t he  mo.vt 
cost-effective use of space !rcirirpor,tiitioti 
.s~'stenis, iricludiiig the space .\.huttlr atid 
expendable laurich vehicles. 
( h )  Not later thuti Jatiuar!> I S ,  1988. / he  
Admitiistrator .shall siibniit a prt?liniiriurj~ 
report on the cost -effect i V P  iiso o f  spuce 
transportation systenis f o r  the lautrch of spcicc 
stat iot i e I e nieti t s dur it ig  the d e  ve 1 opt? 2 et i t a t i it 
A d ni i ii is t rut or  s h a I I cot1 .Y id er - - 
operatioti of the .space Ycutmi. Th  e 
"Sec .  116.  
( I )  the potctitial use o f  futurr 
advaticed or heavv l i f t  e x  peridable 
lautich vehicles for purposes  o f  the 
assembly arid operatioti (7 f !he space 
station: 
( 2 )  the use o f  csistitig experidahle 
lautich vehicles o f  th(9 Natiotial 
A e r o n a u t i c s  a t i d  S p a c e  
Adniitiistration. the Departnicvit of 
D e j m  ye, arid the Privali? Secror: 
( 3 )  the reyuirenictit fot. space 
shuttle launches; arid 
( 4 )  the r i s k  of capital l o r i c ~ s  ftoni 
the use of expetidahlc Iiiutich 
vehicles arid the spuce rliuttle. 
( a )  It I T  the Setise of the Corlgteir thur 
the space shuttle I J  a crilical rintrotid resource 
that should be preserved; thut i t  should be 
used pi.imnrilj1 fo r  t h o s ~  niissioiis which 
reyuire ils utiiyuc cupabilitics; arid that a 
d iwrs i  f ietl . famil) ,  01' expetidable lautich 
\,chicliJ.v .should he iricor,wrutcd hj! i isc i i i fo thc 
Natioti's civiliari .rpacr .flight p r o g r a m .  
( h i  T h r  Adniiiiisirator ehall establish a 
progruni  f o r  Inutichitig m!*loads b)! nicatis of 
r.rpciiduhle luutich vi~hi~. les  atid. if available, 
b!, conimerciul laiirich s Irvices. 
( e )  Tho Adniirris,'rator shall take  such 
actioti CIS m a y  he ticc('s.scIry to ensure t hat 
c:rpctidahle 1:zutich whic1e.r or .  if available. 
coni ni cr  c iu 1 1 aut i ch sc~ r 11 r ces ar e o ht a iti cd f o r  
the lautich of the followitig payloads: 
( 1  1 Roetitgeti Satellite ( R O S A T ) ,  
f o r  lautich iti 1 9 9 0 .  
( 2 )  Trackiti;: arid Data Rela!! 
Sulellile ( T D R S ) - F ,  or a platicptiir)~ 
nii3,sioti. 
1 3 )  Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer 
(E'[IL'E), f o r  lautich iti 1 9 9 1 .  
( 4 )  Mars Obrerver, for  lauiich iti 
1 9 9 2 .  
l d )  Thc  Atiniitiistrator shall report to 
the Cotrgrers iiot later thati Jatiuary I S .  1988 
oii the Adniitiistrator's conipliatice with this 
section. atid shall suhniit such report to the 
Coniniittec' o r 1  Coninwrce. Science. arid 
Tratisporratioti of the Senate arid the 
Committee oti Science. Space,  arid Techtiology 
of the House of Represeritatives." 
4.3 C I V I L I A N  CONTROL 
As a consequence of the Challenger accident, 
annual lift capacity has been significantly 
reduced below what had been planned prior 
to the accident. Even though all categories 
of users will suffer,  priority for that limited 
capacity is likely to be heavily influenced by 
the Department of Defense (DoD) 
requirements, leaving NASA-supported 
scientific payloads several years or  more 
behind schedule and commercial payloads 
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encouraged to use other launch vehicles. 
Existing plans call for  the space station to be 
constructed and serviced using only the 
Shuttle. Any unanticipated claims by other 
users on the Shuttle, under these conditions, 
will severely affect  the station. Even if 
alternative launch capacity is introduced, 
uncertainty and schedule disruptions from 
preemption by higher priority payloads will 
directly impact the station. 
Need for Groundrules 
Recently, the DoD requested that 
international agreements not be undertaken 
that would preclude possible future  use of 
the station by the military, but the DoD has 
not stated what the characteristics of those 
uses might be. It is difficult to plan 
efficiently for  the station with this level of 
uncertainty, and a set of groundrules for the 
DoD needs to be worked out that will 
provide suitable assurances to both agencies, 
as well as to any international partners. 
NASA and the Congress have recently taken 
steps to define what the groundrules will be. 
Editor's note: Section 255 of the Defetise 
Authorization Act f o r  FY  8 8 / 8 9  required the  
DoD to  "report or1 the activities plattiled bj! 
the Departnietit o f  De fctise to he cotiducted 
or? or in conjunction with the pernianetitly 
nzarirted space station." T h e  DoD report is  
Poteritial Denartmetit o f  De  f e m c  U.se o f  the 
Perniatientlv Mariried ,Tpace Station, U S .  
Departnierit of Defense. March I ,  1938. 
The space station is nominally a civilian 
program, and it should be strengthened as 
such, but i t  is still possible for  the space 
station to accept the DoD as a user without 
compromising the civilian orientation of the 
program. Accomplishing this will require a 
willingness on the part of the military to 
state the types of uses i t  wishes to preserve 
as options, and a political agreement that 
provides guidance on the share of station 
resources the military can plan to use. 
There are  several options to define and limit 
the DOD role: 
( 1 )  Purchase-of-Services Aereement. 
Several areas can be imagined where the 
military might have an interest. One is man- 
in-space experiments, for  which the crew 
might be military personnel and the R&D 
experiments classified. Another area might 
be earth or  space observation, for  research 
purposes or  for  long term monitoring, 
perhaps requiring secure data transmissions, 
Another area might be experiments in high- 
en erg y physics . 
A services agreement would need to include 
a statement of the types of uses 
contemplated, an expected level of use, and 
guarantees to provide relevant information 
and abide by safety and other standards for 
adverse impacts on the station and its other 
users. Based on its resource requirements, 
the DoD would cover, as would any other 
agency, the base costs plus any incremental 
development and operating costs associated 
with its unique specifications. 
(2 )  N o  Weanons  T e s t i n p  or 
Develonment. I f  a clearly defined boundary 
for acceptable military space station research 
can be developed, then the possibility for 
civilian and military payloads to share the 
station is improved. 
Editor's Note: 
T h e  N A S A  Authorization Act f o r  F Y  1988 
( P . L .  100- 147. October 30. 1987)  states: 
"Sec. 105. N o  civil space station authorized 
urider sectiori l O l ( a ) ( l )  o f  this title nia?) he 
used to ciirrj' or pluce i r i  orhi( auy tiuclear 
weapon or arijv other weapon of niass 
destructioti. to  itistnll unjv such weapori oti atiy 
celestial body. or to statiou ariy such weapon 
iti space iri arij' othrr niatiner. This  civil 
space station nia.11 be used otil,)~ for peaceful 
purp0.se.r. 
(3 )  Can on DOD Share of Resources. 
I n  addition to restrictions on weapons testing, 
an allocation of station resources that would 
allow the DoD to use up to some modest 
share (e.g., 10-30"/0) would assure that the 
program remains a civilian one and,  yet, still 
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serve many Defense purposes. Such a 
program would likely enjoy greater political 
support and have more syntergistic beneficial 
impacts on the US economy. 
Some defined agreement needs to be put i n  
place which spells out  the conditions under 
which both civilian and military users of the 
station will be selected and allowed to 
operate. In order to do  this, the D o n  must 
be willing to state its needs with sufficient 
specificity to provide for  proper planning 
and to meet the conditions of any nationally- 
es ta bl is h ed with 
Space Station partners. 
i n ter na t io na 1 agree me n t s 
4.4 MANNED SPACEFLIGHT PROGRAM 
D1 RECTIONS 
A fundamental  consideration in  the size and 
shape of what will ultimately be the space 
station is the direction of manned space 
research and exploration. For 3 manned 
expedition to Mars, a space station may be 
necessary to conduct the required life science 
research. The  size and shape of this st:ition 
could well be different that a station 
designed as a operational staging base for  a 
Mars mission. I f  a lunar base is on the 
agenda, then a somewhat different station 
(either for  life science research or as a 
staging base) may be called for.  AI the other 
end of the spectrum, an absence of interest 
in manned space research may suggest a 
station operated primarily by remote 
command and perhaps visited occasionally by 
the shuttle. In  between are many synergistic 
combinations that could serve :a mix of 
purposes, some better than others. 
While i t  may be desirable to combine related 
research activities with those of the core 
station, rational evaluation of alternatives 
urges that goals be considered seixirately, 
along with the means for  achieving them. 
One reason is to allow for  changes i n  scope, 
with recognition of the attendant 
consequences. Another reason is to consider 
the impacts of these alternatives on operating 
procedures and costs. 
I f  a subset of market segments is selected, 
rather than the entire spectrum, the station 
can be designed to opt imke performance to 
those users and also reduce costs. The  major 
dimension to this range of alternatives is the 
role of manned space aci ivity. Providing 
safety and life support  flir humans makes 
man--rated vehicles extremely expensive, and 
these costs can be avoided if the manned 
presence is not essential to National goals. A 
great deal of concern has been expressed 
about the possibility t h l t  manned space 
activities will crowd unmanned science out of 
the NASA budget. 
/ i t  the most basic level, th?  purpose uniquely 
served by the space station is man-supported 
space research. To varying degrees, other 
kinds of activities have alternative means for  
serving them, some better on the space 
c,tation and some no better. The  range of 
alternatives, then, reflects the size of the 
manned program, and the number of optional 
(i.e., that could be unmanned) activities that 
are combined with the manned program. 
Table 4-2 provides some additional examples. 
'The principal alternatives are the following: 
( I )  m i p u r p o s e  Facilitv. The  current 
initial operational configiiration (IOC, Block 
I)  incorporates a heterogeneous mix of 
mod u 1 e s , s t r u c t u res, eq u i j) m e n t , and services. 
This approach offers a good deal of 
flexibility for  both immediate use and future  
evolution, but it does so a t  some cost in 
complexity, construction effort ,  and 
overhead. If manned spaceflight is the major 
goal that current expressions indicate, then i t  
should be possible to acquire the necessary 
funding without sacrificirg unmanned space 
research in the process. 
(2 )  S e p a r a t e  P l a t f o r m  P r o g r a m .  
Although there are beneficial interactions 
between platforms and the manned base, the 
two may be independent enough that they 
could be separate programs. Payloads and 
activities that operate within pressurized 
volumes or  must be attached externally to the 
stntion should be examined as one 
interrelated group of activities, and polar and 
co-orbiting payloads and support  activities as 
another. Total life-ciicle costs might be 
similar or  different,  depending upon 
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Table 4-2  
h lANNED SPACE ALTERNATIL'ES 
S t ra t e 
Deep Space Exploration 
(Moon or Mars) 
Space Station (IOC) 
"Skylab" Station (MIR) 
Man- Tended 
with Life Support 
Man-Tended 
without Life Support 
Extended Duration Orbiter 
with Spacelab 
Shuttle and Spacelab 
Rlaior Elements Needed 
L a r g e perm an e n t 1 p m a n n ed base 
Shuttle 
Heavy lift launch vehicle (HLLV) 
Pe r ni a n e n t 1 y manned b a se 
Attached structures 
SI1 u t  t le 
HLLV 
Permanently manned base 
Shuttle 
HLLV 
I n  t e r ni i t  t e n t I y ni a n ne d bas e 
SI1 u t  t le 
Unmanned base 
Sh ut t le 
Shuttle 
Spacelab 
S h u t t le 
Spacelab 
numerous choices to be made, but the costs 
and expected outputs of each program could 
be assessed as separate activities rather than 
being in ex t r ica bl y 1 u m ped together . 
(3) Station Design Baqed on Different 
T r  an sn ort  a t i on c a n  ab i I i t v . From the 
perspective of establishing a permanently 
manned capability as a primary objective, a 
pre-assembled large volume (similar to Skylab 
o r  the USSR MIR)  placed in orbit  by a 
heavy lift vehicle (HLLV) is one means 
under study for  providing manned and man- 
tended services. Attached payloads could be 
added on, or  placed in the platform program, 
according to how the synergies worked. 
Modules provided by international partners 
could also be attached. 
Advantages of this arrangement would be 
reduced assembly time and effort ,  reduced 
EVA in servicing and maintenance, fewer 
STS flights for  assembly and crew rotation, 
and possibly simpler coordination among 
supplier centers,  reduced overhead in 
planning, and processing of user payloads. 
Establishing a permanent base on the moon 
has also been urged as a motivating goal for  
the US space program, to build on the Space 
Station program and serve as an intermediate 
objective in a long-term Mars effort .  These 
advanced exploration cornmitnients do  not 
need to be made right away, but future  
intentions should shape current efforts. A 
major disadvantage to this option is the 
present lack of an HLLV and that its 
development and  demonstration would be 
done at  the same time as the Space Station. 
Thus any schedule or  performance slippage 
in the HLLV program could impact the 
Space Station Program directly, and cost 
overruns in the HLLV program could impact 
the Space Station budget if overall NASA 
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funding is constrained. 
(4) Extended Duration Orbi-. The 
shuttle could remain as the basis for an 
extended manned or  man-tended program, 
with most other activities distributed to polar 
or other suitable platforms. These could be 
large long-term facilities in space, such as 
the Hubble Space Telescope, or smaller 
single-purpose satellites. 
Although many of the activitits now planned 
for  the Station might be accommodated 
iusing an EDO, this approach could affect 
the pace at  which the Nation moves into 
areas of new discovery. An € L O  option 
could delay needed decisionr to pro\ ide 
heavy lift capability and could delay 
opportunities to gain experience  with Ion:; 
duration manned spaceflight. 
4.5 RESOURCE ALLOCATIOU A N D  
SUBSIDY POLICY 
Res o u r ce a 1 location in c 1 u (1 e s re i n i  t )  u r se ni e n t 
(pricing) policy, and the distribution of Space 
Station services to users. A subsidy policy 
allows the question of how much each user 
pays out of its own pocket to be separated 
f rom the question of how the services should 
be priced. The objective is to acconiplirh 
the allocation of resources and subsidies i n  a 
way that most closely approximates the result 
of an efficient market,  without introducing 
the uncertainties uncontrolled markets might 
create. 
Resource Allocation 
"Resources" are the power, manned tending, 
consumables, and other goods and services 
demanded by users. The output of the 
station is the amount of these resources that 
is available to users. "Allocation" refers to 
the distribution of the services lo users, 
whether accomplished by a political process, 
a centralized command system, a peer group 
review process, or a market process. 
Resources consumed for  housekeeping are not 
included in output,  and are therefore part of 
the cost of production. Although resource 
allocation and user selection are  highly 
inter r e 13 t e d , t he i ss u e of resource a1 1 oca t i o n 
as represented here assumes users are selected 
t h r 0 u g ti a n ass o c i a t e d b u1 se p a r a t e process . 
The station produces an enormous range of 
services, as shown in Table 4-3, that may be 
of potential interest to users. Whether a 
small number of these (e.g., power and crew 
time) will dominate all ot iers from a scarcity 
standpoint, or whether most services will be 
consumed independently of each other 
(ceteris paribus), e \ e ry  cervice has its own 
optimal design and level of output,  
depending upon both demand and cost. Thus 
it  is necessary 1.0 know tl-e incremental costs 
of  each type of servic?, along with the 
smounts that each user iniends to consume at 
various prices to the user. 
,Basis for  l lser F e e  Rate5 
In :in ideal ni:irket equilibrium, prices are 
determined by both supply and demand. In 
$:he absence of any revealed demand 
information, prices must be initially based on 
cost. For the purposes at  hand, there is no 
unique cost conccpt that i j  the correct one to 
use in setting prices. Some guidelines, 
however, can help to narrow the range of 
ti isc r e t ion: 
( I )  No price should be below the short 
run incremental cosc of providing the 
good or service. 
(2) No  price shoulcrl be above fully 
allocated cost, until such time as 
revealed demand warrants a higher 
price. 
( 3 )  No price should be below fully 
allocated cost if there is a reasonable 
possibility that an unsubsidized private 
f i rm may be willing to supply the 
service. 
Interpretation of these guidelines depends 
upon the specific meaning of the terms used, 
so the terms are discussed below. 
A s  services are provided and consumed, 
information is obtained 2 bout demand for 
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Table 4-3  
SERVICES POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE T O  STATION USERS 
Service Description and Inputs 
Window 
Trajectory 
Bounded fixed-time periods to be on the station. 
Required path through space or in orbit. 
Volume and Weight Accommodate particular size and shape, including transportation up and 
down, attachment points, rack space. 
On-Orbit  Program Required sequence of on-board activities. 
Consumables Usage of depletable resources such as propellant. 
Orientation Attitude and pointing requirements. 
Altitude Specified height above earth.  
Priority Accommodation or  service in the place of another user 
Power Directly consumed or  indirectly used through other services. 
Crew Time 
(IVA, EVA) 
D i rec t services , in d ire c t through request e d services , 
and indirect through station maintenance. 
Free Flyer Service Transportation, launch, adjustment, repair, communication. 
Attached Payload Tending through EVA or  remote manipulator servicing. 
OMV Communication, remote control, rendezvous. 
MRMS/RMS Remote manipul:ition, normally a n  intermediate service which is derived 
from requested services. 
'Tracking Monitoring location from the ground 
Ephemeris Data 
Status 
Data from star tracking. 
Real-time analysis of health and progress, etc. 
Con t am in at ion Gas, vibration, movement, dust, light, and heat i n  payload environment. 
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Table 4-3 (cont’d). 
S e n i c e  Description arid Inputs 
M icrogravit y 
Move m e 11 t 
Extravehicular 
Suit 
Rendezvous 
Data Collection 
Data Transmission 
Pressurized 
Cooling 
Heating 
Voice Link 
Commnnd Link 
Flexibility 
Res p o n s i ve n es s 
Proprietary Data 
Trash 
Co t i  t i nge n c y 
E rile r ge n cy 
K el iab i I it y 
Level and stability of low-gravity environment. 
Physical pl:icement, removal, positioning by fixed or mobile manipulator 
s y s t ern. 
Human servicing outside modules (not remote). 
Depreciation of EVA suit through upe is variable r1:source cost; rate 
depends upon technology of suit. 
Physical interception of vehicle from high-energy clrbit, coincident orbit, 
or polar orbit. 
Density ( I  ate), volume, and tSpe of user data collection, processing, and 
n nn 15’s is . 
Storage versus communication to ground stations. with extent of real-time 
monitoring and reporting. 
Normal atmospheric environment in pressurized module. 
Thermal rejection of excess heat that must be radiated to maintain 
t e m pe ra t u re t 01 era n ce . 
Add it  ional hex t to ma in t a in te mpera t u re tole rance. 
Ability to communicate directly with on-board crew. 
Ability to control on-board actiL ities from the ground. 
Adaptation of services to suit unexpected user needs 
Lead time needed to adjust  to change i n  user requirvments. 
Security for  sensitive inforniation. 
Disposal of waste materials generated on-or bit. 
Need for  action in real time in response to user payload breakdown, 
ma 1 function , or u n e x pec t ed event . 
Response to system or user equipment failui es that affect  other equipment; 
planning fo r  risk. 
Probabilit) of resource shortage, due either to system malfunction or  
o ve rco ns u m p t i t j  n . 
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each service. Those with excess supply can 
be scaled back or reduced i n  price; those in 
demand can be expanded or the price 
increased. Prices or non-price surrogates 
serve to ration scarce capacity in the short 
run, during which capacity is fixed. 
"Auctions" are one approach to generating a 
market-like process. Capacity should respond 
to demand in the long run if the evidence of 
benefits justifies the costs. 
Short Run.  The  meaning of the 
expression "short run" is that something is 
fixed, and hence there are some costs which 
cannot be avoided. The  shorter the time 
frame,  the more that is fixed and the fewer 
the costs that are included in the price basis. 
Short run incremental cost is the operational 
application of the concept of marginal cost. 
For example, once the space station is in 
operation, it will have some pressurized 
volume attached to it. The  short run then 
excludes all construction, launch, and 
assembly costs for  producing the station, and 
includes costs of payload and crew launch, 
operating cost on orbit, and return costs. 
Operating costs would include heat, light, air, 
and power, all of which could presumably be 
avoided if the payload did not go up. Once 
the payload is up, the avoidable costs become 
fewer, involving only those that could be 
recovered f rom shutting the payload down. 
This suggests that the shortest practical time 
frame for  pricing is a "space available" 
situation: room is available -- on both the 
launch vehicle and the station-- 
which would otherwise go to waste, and 
sufficient time remains to integrate the 
payload. Such circumstances should be rare, 
however, making the relevant costs on which 
to base pricing more inclusive (and therefore 
higher). 
One method for differentiation among users 
might be priority, with level one (top) 
priority getting guaranteed space and 
resources, and level two getting deferrable 
claims on resources but with a lower price. 
Priority would be differentiated by service, 
so users could acquire high priority on some 
services and middle or low on others. Under 
a pricing allocation system, users purchase 
the priorities they desire, while under an 
administrative system the priorities are 
awarded. 
Opportunitv Cost. A more realistic 
intermediate between space-available discount 
prices and fully allocated prices can be based 
on opportunity cost. Here, the value of the 
fixed resource (e.g., volume) depends upon 
how much the "displaced" user with the 
highest willingness-to-pay places on the 
resource. In other words, if someone is 
displaced in order to make room for  another 
payload, how much would it be worth to the 
displaced user to get back on? 
Again, this points up the need to separate 
pricing from subsidies. Once users know 
how much subsidy they will receive, their 
willingness to expend funds from their 
budget (even if it can only be used to buy 
Space Station services) is a valid reflection of 
how much they value the services. Such a 
process begins to generate the missing 
demand information. 
Fullv Allocated Cost. In the long run, 
a viable enterprise should recover all its 
costs, including a return on the initial 
investment. Prices based on fully allocated 
costs would accomplish this, subject to two 
reservations: 
( 1 )  If some users pay less than fully 
allocated cost, other users must pay 
more, in order to recover the full costs. 
(2) Fixed or common costs can be 
allocated in any number of ways, and, 
while some methods seem fairer or more 
accurate than others, usually there are 
several allocators that are  defensible. 
Prices based on fully allocated costs provide 
a valuable starting point for  gauging the 
kinds of users and usages that will be cost- 
beneficial, and future  prices can be adjusted 
in various ways as experience in operations is 
gained. 
4-13  
Subsidy Policy 
Services That Are Priced 
Costs can be traced from inputs through t23 
the services provided to users, but prices 
should be charged as close to the output end 
as possible, namely, the specific things thl? 
user desires. For example, i f  a user wants an 
attached experiment tended once every 
twenty-four hours, the hourly EVA rate fo:- 
a crew scientist is insufficient information 
until the user knows how much time must be 
devoted to the task. Once NASA finds O U I .  
f rom the user exactly wh:it i s  required, an 
"estimate" can be prepared. 
The cost of every service tliat is probided by 
the Station should be known to NASA, and 
price information should be conveyed to the 
user or potential user. b'hether each and 
every service has a separate price depends 
upon how closely tied the consumption of 
various services are to each other. If one 
service (say, volume) in1plit.s ;I fixed rate of 
consumption for  other services (say, transfer 
and installation), then pricing one to include 
the others makes things simpler. If the input 
relationships are not fixed 1e.g , ten minutes 
of installation per cubic fool o f  volume), and 
the cost of the resources is significant, then 
the services should be priced separately. 
On orbit ,  the net quantities of services and 
resources that will be available to users at 
any given time will not be entirely 
predictable. A method for  dealing with this 
beforehand (rather than when a shortage 
occurs) is to assign priorities to users 
beforehand. Users could be given the option 
to purchase both quantity and priority, such 
that low consumption with h igh  priority 
would cost as much as higher quantity and 
lower priority. Such a system would permit 
users to place a value on reliability of 
service, within a given time period, and 
allow the station operator to rlzsolve real-time 
conflicts in ways that reflect user 
preferences. 
incremental cos s, let alone a share of 
developnient cos s. Even i n  the long term. 
the bulk of the ui,ers of NASA's space station 
are likc.ly to be Inrtially subsidized, or fully 
taxpa> Pr-sponsor :d activities, because if a 
sector emerged Ihat could pay "full price" 
and b a s  large enough to occupy the bulk of 
the Space Station, several things would likely 
occur, First, entrepreneurs would develop 
proprosals for  private space stations or 
platfoi ins. Assuming no change in 
coni mer c i a I space po 1 icy , the U . S . govern m e n t 
would react to this new supply and demand 
situation blr off lmding much of the "full 
price" customers to the private stations, 
leaving the NASA space station available foi 
more preliminar) R&D. Distribution of 
subsidies to user categories, then, is a 
reflection of the values of these activities 
(e.g., science, technology, commercial 
development) to the Nation as a whole. 
\\hat the Lser Actuallv P a w .  The 
price of the servlce should not depend on 
who the user is, only on what the user is 
doing. Users, not services, should be 
subsidized. A user may be IOOOh sponsored 
by NASA, but that simply means the user 
buys Station services with NASA money, not 
that the services are free to the user. Once 
a budget is grantec! to a user, the user should 
choose what to buy on the basis of the prices 
for  each sen ice .  Even though the budget is 
designed around a particular user and usage, 
charges against that budget should be based 
on full prices. Whether the user brings all, 
none, or some portion of the funding 
required to accomplish the task, the prices 
faced are the same 
Where the revenues go may also create 
incentives that influence efficiency. Sending 
all external revenues to the Treasury, so as to 
have no effect  on NASA's budget, relieves 
pressures to market aggressively and extract 
maximum revenue (or favor external 
customers). Which set of institutional 
incentives are preferred is a matter of choice. 
At  the time the space station becomes 
operational, i t  is unlikely that there will be 
many users willing to pay even their full 
Distribution of Subsidies. To the extent 
that the resource allocation process does not 
function like a market, the choices are made 
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through a political balancing process. 
Whatever the organizational structure for  
selecting users and allocating resources, 
pricing (or bartering) approaches can 
substitute for  political bargaining. 
Subsidies allow users who would not 
otherwise be able to purchase spaceflight 
services to make claims on usage of the 
station. It is not necessary - -  and, indeed, 
undesirable -- to create subsidies by altering 
prices. The  purpose of prices is to get users 
to internalize the tradeoffs between 
consumption of resources, e.g., between crew 
time (tending) and payload refinement 
(automation, reliability). Even if entirely 
subsidized, allowing a user to make purchases 
based on real prices leads to rational choices. 
A science user, for  example, might receive a 
grant through NASA (Code E, C, or R )  
analogous to a "gift certificate". The  user 
could purchase services, based on such 
characteristics as weight, size, consumption 
patterns, and special requirements. If, i n  
comparing intended usage with prices, the 
user found a way to trade one resource for  
another and have enough left over to enhance 
o r  expand the experiment, then the user 
would have responded to station costs, to the 
advantage of both parties. 
Pricing versus In-kind Allocation 
Two fundamentally different methods exist 
for  allocating resources among users. One 
approach relies on determining prices that 
balance supply and demand (separate from 
subsidies, as discussed above), leaving the 
actual allocation to be an output of the 
process. The outcome will depend upon the 
value each user places on each resource, 
relative to other users and other resources. 
Another approach allocates services and 
resources directly (whether packaged or 
separately), without explicitly recognizing the 
value of the resource (either its cost or its 
benefit to the user) in dollars. 
( 1 )  Pricing. In the ideally functioning 
competitive market, supply and demand 
equilibrium is achieved through the price 
system. Users reveal their benefits by their 
willingness to pay for  the services, relative to 
other opportunities for  consumption; suppliers 
of crifferent outputs bid for  scarce inputs on 
the basis of the revenues that can be earned 
from each output.  In equilibrium, the 
marginal value of each input is the same for 
all activities, and equal to its price. The 
value of the output is measured by the 
willingness to pay of the marginal consumer. 
The Space Station will be produced by a 
public enterprise, and the degree to which 
either the supply side or  the demand side are 
guided by a price system is a matter of 
political choice. Whether all or  none or 
something in between, however, the problem 
to be solved remains the same: consume 
inputs and allocate outputs so as to maximize 
the net benefits to society. To the extent 
that competitive price and cost incentives are 
not desirable or  not feasible, some surrogate 
must be used to make the same consumption 
and production decisions. 
(2 )  Allocation b v  Resource. In-kind 
allocation of resources (e.g., amounts of 
power, volume, servicing time) can produce 
efficient use patterns under some conditions. 
One condition is that consumption of services 
by users is not influenced by price, i.e., 
demand-price elasticity is zero. By and 
large, this is not true; payloads can be 
redesigned -- at some cost -- in response to 
constraints and opportunities in resources. 
Another condition is that users are allowed to 
trade and sell their resources freely. If 
enough trades occur, the "prices" of the 
resources can be stated in some common 
unit, even if not dollars. 
The effectiveness of in-kind resource 
allocation depends in part upon whether or 
not a few resources (power, crew time, data 
transmission) tend to drive all the rest. If a 
few resources dominate, a user with an 
envelope of the critical resources could 
obtain any others that were desired without 
having to compete with other users. These 
non-critical resources are either included in 
the basic package or can be purchased at 
incremental cost, without having to be 
col,Zerned about whether there is sufficient 
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capacity. Similar to price elasticity, this 
condition implies that users canno't readily 
substitute one resource for  another in 
achieving the same ends. 
Editor's note: 
For  additional discussioti of Space Statioti 
pricing policy issues, see Chapter 2 of the 
Paiiel 3 report atid p .  103-104 o f  the 
Suniniary Report . 
Also. as additional background. iiote (hat [ h e  
N A S A  Authorization Act f o r  FY 1988 (P.L , .  
100-147, October 30, 1987)  states thal: 
"Sec. f 0 6 ( a )  T h e  Adniitiistrator is  
directed to  undertake the  cotistructioti of a 
pcrniatienily niantied space stat iori (ho.eiiiaftcr 
referred to as  the "space .station") t o  heconie 
operational in f 9 9 5 .  The space statioir will hi, 
used f o r  the followitig purposes - -  
( I )  the cotiduct o f  scietitific 
experiments, applicatiotis 
experiments. arid ctigitieeritig 
experinients; 
( 2 )  the servicitig. rchahilrtalioii, arid 
cotistructioti of satellite.\ arid space 
vehicles: 
( 3 )  t h e  dcvelopniet i t  arid 
d e  niot i .s t rat iot i coni nic rc ia I 
product.s arid processes; arid 
o f  
( 4 )  the e.stahlishnierit o f  a space 
hase f o r  olhrr civiliair urd  
coniniercial 5pace activiiics .I' 
( h )  T h e  space .rtatiati Jhal l  h(c dtJ1:clopcd 
aiid opcrnled iti a niatitic'r [hut .\.upports other 
scietice atid space activities. 
( c )  I n  order t o  reduce the cost o j  
opcratiotis o j the .space .stotioti aiid it.\ groiiticl 
support .s h (1 I I 
utidertahc the developnietit of such ad1.aticecI 
tcchtrologies as niay he appropricitlr \$,ithiti thc 
lcvel of furiditig authorized i t i  this Act. 
S J ~ S  t c ni , f h e A d ni it i is t ra t o r 
( d )  T h e  Adniitii strator {hal l  ircA to i ia i~e  
portions of the space statloti cotistructed arid 
operated by thc private sector. 
( e )  T h e  .4dmitiistrator shall promote 
rtitertiatiotial cooperatioti i n  ihe space statioti 
program by utidertakitig the development. 
c-onstructioti, arid operatioti of the space 
.itation it i  conjunction wi:h (hut tiot limited 
i o )  ihe Govertznieiits o f  Europe. Japan. atid 
ICariada. 
( f )  T h e  space statiori shall he designed. 
devclopcd. arid opcrated in a niatitier that 
ctiahle cvolutiotiary develc pnietit. 
Sec.  I10 ( a )  The  Adniitiistrator shall set and 
colleci reasotiahle user f$:es f o r  the use arid 
niainferiaiice of the .space station. 
( b )  T h e  Adniitiist.:'ator shall set user 
f e e s  so as to - - 
( I )  promote  the use of the space 
.station cotisistetit with the policy 
set forth in sectioti 106; 
( 2 )  recover lht* costs o f  the use of 
the space station, including 
reasotiahle charges f o r  any 
etihaticenietit rieeded f o r  such use; 
arid 
(31 cotiserve arid e fficietitljv allocate 
the resources o f  the space stutiori. 
( c )  T h e  Adniitiistrator niay. oti a case- 
h?,-case hasis, waive or n iod i f y  such user fees  
wheti iti the ,4a'niitiistrator's judgnierit such 
w n i w  or niodi jicutioti will further the goals 
arid pi18 p m e s  of the Natiotial Arroirautics arid 
Space Act o j  1958. iticludirig-- 
f I i 
or tvigrriceritig htrowlcdge; 
Ihe advaticenient o f  scientific 
( 2 )  rtitertiatiotial cooperatioti; arid 
131 the coniniercial use o f  spaccJ. 
"Sec. I 11. N o  latct' thutr Srpteniher 30. 1988. 
ihe Adniitiislrator shall .subniit a detailed plarr 
jor  collectirig rrinih~~r.rcnictit.s f o r  the 
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utilization of the space station under section 
110. including the services to be offered, the 
methodology and bases by  which prices will 
be charged, arid the estimated revetiues." 
4.6 INITIAL USER MIX 
Which user categories - -  or, more accurately, 
usages - -  to emphasize in the design of the 
space station is analogous to the selection of 
a "market strategy." The  market here is 
construed broadly, to include scientific and 
manned space objectives that will not be 
expected to support themselves financially 
from user revenues, as well as activities that 
may eventually become commercially viable. 
How much these activities are able to claim 
in space station resources depends upon the 
amounts Congress chooses to appropriate, and 
distribution of those amounts to user 
categories. 
Primarv Usage Categories 
A major choice is between two broad sectors 
of "demand": 
Public Goals. Manned space 
exploratiur:, manned spaceflight, 
life science research, astrophysics, 
and  military purposes are  
inherently dependent upon public 
funds,  whatever the magnitudes of 
benefits f rom these activities. 
Commercial Goals. Materials 
processing, space technology, 
manufacturing, earth observation, 
micro gravity research, and 
spacecraft servicing are activities 
which have market potential. The 
benefits may be immediate or  
distant, but most of the activities 
are  likely to need subsidy, at least 
initially. 
No economic market currently exists for  
valuing the relative worth of each of these 
activities (with minor exceptions), and some 
can only be valued through the willingness 
of elected representatives to spend public 
revenues. Nor is there currently much 
information on the costs of serving these 
activities, separately or  together. Thus the 
Nation needs to be explicit about how much 
it is willing to invest in each of these 
activities, and what can be provided in the 
way of expectations. 
Mark et Se  P m en tat i o n A It ern at i ves 
A normal response to market demand is to 
provide a set of initial core services, and 
then revise and expand as knowledge is 
gained about consumers and costs. A 
strategy of offering a wide range of services 
f rom the beginning is motivated either by 
the belief that someone else will get there 
first otherwise, or  that the full range is so 
synergistic that the advantages outweigh the 
risks of failing in some market segments. 
A list of market segments is given in Table 
4-4,  along with the space station components 
each market would be most interested in. 
Listed below are  several different alternatives 
as to which market the initial space station 
might serve and hence what services/ 
capabilities the initial station would possess: 
(1 )  Full Ranee a t  Startun. The station 
can seek to be all things to all people, 
offering a full array of services f rom opening 
day, and later evaluate which activities 
should be retained, spun off ,  o r  dropped. 
This maximizes the number of potential users 
and minimizes the likelihood that there will 
be insufficient interest in working on the 
station to utilize its full capacity. Costs may 
be incurred, as a result, fo r  which there 
turns out to be weak demand. 
(2 )  Li fe  Science and Manned 
Snaceflieht.  If a major motivation for  the 
space station program is manned space 
science and exploration, then an  initial 
orientation toward life sciences would seem 
natural. The  manned base could then 
provide a laboratory for  testing alternative 
ways in which the scope of services might be 
expanded beyond life science. Which 
alternatives get emphasized depends on the 
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Table 4-4. 
M A  K K ET E hl  P” AS I S A LT E R N AT1 V ES 
Market Sevmen t Major Reauire men ts 
Life Science Pressurized volume, partial gravity 
Man rated transportation, sample return 
Manned b a se 
Astrophysics P 1 at f o r in s , attach e d p a y 1 oad s (booms ) 
H ig h data trans miss io n 
Automation , o p p o r t u n is t i c reo r ie n ta t io n 
Inertial pointing 
Earth Observation Polar platforms 
Data t r:i ns ni iss ion 
A u t oina t ion 
Earth pointing 
Material Science 
Manufacturing 
Servicing 
Technology 
Pressurized v o 1 u me, m ic r o g r a v i t I: 
Man  tending and servicing 
Sample return 
Pressurized vo 1 u x r i  e 
Unpressurized attsched volume 
Up and down weight 
Man tending, low gravity 
Man tend in g , robotics 
Extravehicular activity (EVA) 
Orbital maneuvering vehicle, docking 
Manned base, high EVA 
Man rated transportation 
Attached payloads 
L, a r ge structures , :is s e m b 1 y 
Automation and robotics 
Planetary Exploration Large manned base 
(Staging/Assembly ) IJp and down weight 
Man rated transportation 
R.escue/garbage vehicle 
Proprietary Commercial Man tended or manned base (see material science) 
Confidentiality 
Military C‘nspecified; depends upon activities 
Military crew 
Security 
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national consensus regarding program 
directions. 
(3 )  Hard Science and Platforms. An 
emphasis on physical sciences would 
demonstrate a priority toward research, and 
would allow the resources and systems to be 
tested gradually during the station's 
shakedown period. Knowledge would be 
gained from this about the types of services 
and uses that could be most productively 
expanded. Commercial activities might be 
added as operating experience permitted 
reductions in unit costs. 
(4)  Manufacturing Facilitv. A 
commercial orientation could be taken from 
the start, fo r  the purpose of establishing the 
economic market benefits from the station at 
the earliest date. Concern for  international 
competitiveness, productivity, cost reduction, 
and judicious selection of market-valued 
services could create incentives to maintain a 
lean and productive organization. As the 
commercial viability of uses became 
demonstrated, activities could be spun off 
into the private sector, leaving NASA to 
concentrate on research and technology 
development. 
ChoosinP a StartuD Emuhasis 
A sensible way to begin operations on the 
space station is to select a set of services to 
offer  that will be most likely to serve a 
strong market, at a reasonable cost, with the 
least risky technology. Knowledge thus 
gained will help design the means for  serving 
additional markets. Although which market 
or  markets to start with is an open question, 
those scientific and technology experiments 
requiring human intervention would appear 
to be the place to start. 
The Mission Requirements Data Base 
(MRDB) contains useful information on the 
characteristics of potential users and usages. 
It does not address the question of value to 
the user, however, nor alternative means for  
supplying the same demand, so its value for  
prioritizing station usage requires additional 
interpretation. 
Matching S U R R ~ V  and Demand 
The problem of choosing users to best utilize 
Space Station resources and services, and the 
problem of designing the Station itself to best 
serve user needs, are two sides of the same 
problem. This problem can be described as 
matching supply and demand. Demand is the 
benefits users (as a group) derive from use of 
the space station, under alternative 
configurations. Supply is the cost of 
producing various kinds and amounts of 
space station services. The matching is, 
ideally, simultaneous, in that an equilibrium 
is reached without big fluctuations and with 
few iterations. 
In the abstract, the problem can be 
rep res e n t e d by the f a  m i 1 i a r I' s u p p 1 y - de  man d " 
diagram, shown in Figure 4-1. Assume that 
there is one generic output of the station, 
such as if all services are always used in 
fixed proportions to each other. Users are 
arrayed in Figure 4-1 in order of the benefit 
they would receive from each unit of 
consumption, from high unit benefit to low. 
Thus the demand curve shows the marginal 
benefit obtained from each level of output.  
Similarly, the supply curve shows the 
marginal cost of each additional unit of 
production. The optimum production level is 
that level where marginal benefit equals 
marginal cost, making net benefit  (total 
benefits minus total costs) the largest it can 
be. This is called the efficient level of 
output.  In the diagram, net benefits are 
represented by the shaded area,  i.e. below the 
demand curve, above the supply curve,  and 
to the left of the output quantity. 
In the short run, the capacity (element 
configuration) of the space station is fixed, 
and the efficiency problem is to allocate that 
capacity to users so as to maximize net 
benefits as constrained by capacity. In the 
long run, the problem is to evolve the 
configuration of the station to optimize the 
amount and characteristics of space station 
services available. The  short run problem is 
called "utilization," and the long run problem 
is called "investment." 
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Benefit and 
Cost of Xth Unit 
Mar inal Benefit 
of X L  R Unit 
*Mar inal Cost - 
of X L  R Unit 
xth Unit Optimuim 
Quantity 
Station Out ut 
(Gene r icP 
Figure 4-1. Supply and Demand for Station Resources 
Selectine Users Within Categories 
Which users end up  getting on the station is 
a situation with many dimensions. Balances 
must be struck between the various categories 
described above, such as commercial and 
non-commercial users, between military and 
civilian uses, among scientific disciplines, and 
among international partners. The number of 
boundaries or partitions that are established, 
the flexibility or rigidity of those partitions, 
the process for  defining the partitions, and 
the processes for  selecting individual users 
within the partitions, are all questions that 
must be answered in choosing payloads for  
the station. - 
User Categories and Characterist ics 
Two dimensions tend to determine the nature 
of the alternatives. One is the order in 
which the partitions between primary 
categories are applied, e.g., international first 
and discipline second. The  second is the 
balance between political processes versus 
market or  market-like allocation processes. 
In order to make a selection among a group 
of users, i t  is necessary to have a roster of 
candidates that is much larger than the 
number who can actually be served. Such is 
the apparent situation for  the space station. 
The objective is to find that subset of users 
whose total benefits minus total costs is 
collectively larger than any other subset of 
users, within the capacity of the space station 
to supply. 
One approach for  estimatmg usage benefits is 
to group users into categories of like usage 
c(such as Disciplines), separating academic 
research from manufacturing, and astronomy 
from life science. Quotas or shares can be 
:dlocated among the groups, and the lowest 
priority projects in each group compared 
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political (Congress, President, NASA 
managers, or,  if permitted by the political 
system, peer groups) or  market (subsidized or 
not). 
( 1 )  Multilateral User Board. This 
multi-national alternative starts with the 
fewest partitions and relies on political 
negotiation and peer review allocation 
processes. Shares of resources available to 
partners would be determined separately and 
adhered to, but  neither disciplines nor 
resources would be given a priori partitions. 
Payloads could be accepted in whatever order 
and in whatever categories the Board chose, 
so long as the balance was acceptable when 
it came out at  the end.  
User advocacy groups would play a dominant 
role, and their relative strengths would 
depend in part upon the perceived value of 
space research to the group and the 
availability of substitute facilities (e.g., 
ground, or  unmanned).  Advocacy strength 
would also depend upon political access and 
institutional mechanisms for  organizing and 
expressing a common voice. Selection of 
individual users could be accomplished by 
these groups. 
Composition of the Board would be 
representative of the partners’ stakes, and 
would tend to reflect national over other 
types in interests. If the US is the largest 
partner,  to  the extent that no coalition of 
other partners could overrule it, then the 
Board would be US-dominated. Allocations 
to discipline and other categories would be 
influenced by international political pressures, 
and might be difficult  to stabilize. It appears 
difficult  to prevent such a Board from 
engaging in a great deal of posturing, and its 
(desirable) flexibility would not be utilized 
effectively. 
( 2 )  National User Boards. Each 
partner would allocate its station resources 
within pre-negotiated partner shares. 
Disciplinary and other user advocacy groups 
would be partitioned nationally (e.g. by the 
US Space Station Users Board), although they 
m i g h t  r e a c h  i n f o r m a l  a g r e e m e n t s  
internationally (e.g., to trade ”foreign” users). 
Individual users would be selected by the 
user groups, with allocations to user group 
categories determined through national-level 
political processes. Commercial users would 
be one (or perhaps more) user group, as 
would the military. 
(3)  Mixed Subsidized and Unwbsidizetl 
Users. There are two levels of subsidy: 
Space-station-sponsored users, defined to 
mean internal to the space station budget, 
and all other taxpayer-sponsored users, to 
include NASA-sponsored users f rom other 
programs, payloads sponsored by other 
agencies, and DoD payloads. Either 
Congress, NASA, or  space station managers 
could decide how to allocate shares of 
resources to categories of users, in 
consultation with user groups and/or a user 
board, leaving the groups to select individual 
users. 
Any user willing to pay the full cost of their 
usage could receive priority above their place 
as a subsidized user, and ”proprietary” users 
might be accommodated in this manner. 
Caps could still be placed on categories of 
users o r  usages. 
(4)  NASA Selection. Various user 
groups that already exist, will develop 
spontaneously, or  will be established b y  
NASA, can accept and review applications 
for  space station usage and recommend user 
selections to NASA. In most cases, these 
recommendations will be accepted, but  in 
cases of conflict, overall priorities, or  special 
National interest, NASA will make the 
necessary choices. 
Characteristics on Which Selection is Based 
Three extremes help portray the possible 
differences in emphasis in selecting users. 
One extreme is the scientific peer group 
process, generally preferred by NASA 
technical staff .  The  second extreme is a 
political process, whereby station resources 
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and services are divided up along geographic 
and political equity lines. The third extreme 
is a market process that balances the supply 
of resources with the demand for  them 
reflected in willingness to pay. 
Each of these extremes would be a poor 
choice. A pure science strategy might 
produce some good science, but i t  will not 
help the Nation’s economic position and i t  
will become increasingly expensive and, 
hence, tend to favor large scale projects. A 
public agency is necessarily responsive to 
political goals, but i t ,  too. will fail to 
improve overall competitiveness i n  the 
international market. A pure m:irl\et strategy 
is currently unworkable and w i l l  remain so 
without considerable effort  to reduce unit 
costs. Moreover, a subsidized scientific and 
basic research component is a n  essential 
contributor to economic growth as well as 
international prestige. 
User selection is thus a major driver for  
what the space station becomes and what its 
impacts will be. Political criteria should not 
be eliminated, but they should remain a 
minor factor in user selection. Scientific 
merit as judged by scientists should be a 
major determinant,  but market processes need 
to be introduced early on and expanded as 
station operations become routine and the 
configuration evolves. 
Editor’s Note: A nzore extemive ciiscu.c.riott of 
user selectioti is /ouiid in the SSOTF 
Sunmary  Report ( p .  37, 81-82) urid Chaprer 
4 atid Appendix E in the Paticl 3 Repor( .  
4.7  COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE 
SERVICES by Kevin Bar q u i n e r o 
Efforts to encourage and promote commercial 
participation in the Space Station program 
play a key role in the government’s 
involvement in commercializing space 
services. This section discusses the issue 
from two perspectives. First, i t  covers the 
concept of allowing commercial f irms to 
provide services and systems to the Space 
Station program, thereby complementing the 
infrastructure provided by NASA and 
international partners. Second, i t  outlines 
how the Space Station program supports the 
overall role which the government plays in  
private sector space development. 
Cornelementinp N A S A  Provided SDace 
Station I n  cr a s t ru c t u re 
The Space Station prcgram will promote the 
commercial~zation of’ space services by 
providing the opportunity for  private sector 
investment i n  a number of systems and 
services. These in2lude services which 
supplement existint NASA provided 
capabilities, such as communications and data 
nianagemeni:. They also include those 
services which could tie provided entirely b) 
the private sector, such as logistics services, 
payload prozessing, a r d  medical diagnostics. 
Commercial ventures investing Space Station 
systems and services have the potential to 
become successful examples of private sector 
i n  space ventures. Commercial f irms will 
provide focused, clearly defined services to a 
potential market which includes: 
o NASA 
o Other U.S. Government Agencies 
o International Partners 
o Commercial Users 
o Providers of Other Systems or 
Services 
An important issue in determining how 
successful commercial providers of Space 
Station systems and services will be is the 
degree to which the contractual arrangements 
between NASA and the commercial provider 
resemble “business as usual” for  the f i rm.  
The arrangements will dif fer  f rom those 
under traditional NASA procurements. 
Instead of procuring hardware or  software, 
NASA will be entering into business 
arrangements and procuring services, 
something in which the Government as a 
whole does not have a great deal of 
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experience. 
Government Role in Commercial SDace 
DeveloDmen t 
Three primary ways in which NASA's Space 
Station Program contributes to the 
government's role in helping to promote 
commercial space development are: 
o Serving as a "good" customer for 
commercially provided services 
o Promoting the transfer of Space 
Station technology to private sector 
applications 
o Providing the infrastructure for  
commercial space opportunities 
An  important key to facilitating successful 
commercial space development is for  NASA 
to learn how to be a good business customer. 
Under  such an approach NASA would find 
the most qualified provider of selected 
services, negotiate fair  reimbursement, and 
then buy the service, rather than attempting 
to provide all services itself. This would 
allow NASA to concentrate its capital and 
personnel resources on R&D, and leave 
routine, repetitive, and commercially viable 
operations to the private sector. The  ability 
of the government to provide a consistent 
market to commercial ventures, however, is 
the uncertainty and fluctuation in 
government funding levels. 
The utilization of technologies and 
applications developed by the Space Station, 
and space program in general, for  private 
sector applications is a second major area in  
which the Space Station program may 
contribute to the commercialization of space 
services. Strong efforts are underway to 
promote the application of current space 
technologies (e.g. automation and robotics) to 
commercial space and terrestrial applications. 
A historical example of technologies and 
applications developed to support the space 
program which are just beginning to show 
commercial promise is the expendable launch 
vehicle industry. 
A third role which the Space Station program 
may play in promoting the commercialization 
of space is to provide an  infrastructure for  
space development activities. This 
infrastructure is likely to consist of systems 
and facilities such as: 
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t i e s  
including the Space Shuttle, OTV, 
and OMV. 
On-orbit  facilities including the 
Space Station and TDRSS. This 
also includes those commercial 
systems and services which the 
government helps to support (e.8. 
Space Station based commercial 
services , a commercia I I p developed 
space facility, etc.). 
Ground support including facilities 
and assistance to firms entering the 
commercial space field. 
The Space Station program is likely to serve 
m a n y  r o l e s  i n  p r o m o t i n g  t h e  
commercialization of space including an 
opportunity for  investment, a market for  
space services, a source of space technologies, 
and a facility to support  prospective 
commercial space ventures. 
4.8 COhlhlERCIAL MARKETS A N D  
SPINOFFS 
Traditionally, NASA has been a research and 
development organization, as opposed to one 
involved in operations or  commercial 
activities. Major missions in the past were 
approached as large single events, and 
components often were built f rom scratch, 
e i t  he r because project - to - pr o j ec t con t i nu i t  y 
was lost or  was not intended. 
A program that is expected to perform in 
steady-state long term operation requires 
different methods and procedures. With the 
shuttle program, many of these adaptations 
have taken place, especially at  the tactical 
and execution levels, although NASA is still 
working to improve its day-to-day 
operational mode. There are  good examples 
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of how the process can work successfully, 
and certainly NASA should not give up  its 
core capability in operations, nor research. 
The problem is to be able to transition at  
least some activities from research to 
application, and from public to private 
sector, when that would be in the National 
interest. It cannot be forced, and it may not 
occur soon, but  the transition of operations 
to the private sector for  "a version" of the 
Space Station is a clear indication of the 
economic viability of such a venture. As 
part of a transition, the Station may become 
a government-owned contractor-operated 
(COCO) a t  some point in its evolution. Such 
a "handover" should be established as a long- 
range NASA goal. 
Unit Cost Reduction: Down the "Learning 
Curve" 
Designing the station with this potential in 
mind would result in an emphasis on long- 
term testing and refinement to improve 
performance and reduce costs. Not only 
would scientific and research objectives not 
suffer,  they would benefit f rom the 
associated stability and sharing of common 
costs. Specialized commercial space stations 
apd large platforms could evolve from the 
initial manned base as experience proved the 
f eas i b i 1 it y and demonstrated the de man d . 
Current missions, whether research or 
commercially oriented, call for  stable 
continuous operation rather than one-shot 
efforts. An  ideal process would be one in 
which NASA did the initial design and 
construct ion, carr ied the test i ti g and 
development cost burden, denionstraled the 
feasibility and viability of the concept, 
prepared the procedures for  continuous 
operation, and then passed the results to 
another organization. 
Evolution from Research to Cointnercial 
Prod tic t i on 
private purchases of NASA space station 
services (perhaps for  resale with value added) 
to private space stations. 
Public- Private P a r t n e r s h h  
Joint undertakings in which government 
agencies and private i'irms team up to 
achieve common objectives has been 
sometimes successful i i  other countries. 
Private firms expect to obtain technical 
knowledge and expertise that they can apply 
to commercial activities. Public agencies 
achieve research goals and stimulate new 
activities in the private sector. 
Editor's note: 
A t rue  coniniercial space ,zctivit.v is otic which 
is firiaticed hy the willingness-to-pay of 
private .sector buyers arid investors. The  
Prcsiderit's N S D D  (National Space Policy) 
cotttaitis a riun2ht.r of proposals o f  this sort, 
untested at the preserit t ime. T h e y  include a 
private scctor space fac i l i t y  (statiori), 
Spacehah, a Microgravity Research Board. 
frce Extertial Tanks ,  and comnierciai remote 
setisitig (I!. A N D S A T  is  arr esistirrg exaniplc).  
Each of thcse ideas rakes a soniewhat 
di f fereti t  upproach to stimulatitig arid testing 
!he t r a m f e r  o f  research through development 
i r i t o  conzmercially prof ituhlc productiori arid 
services. 
Once the commercial utility of pressurized 
volume and attached payload services are 
established, space station services also could 
be commercialized. This could extl?ntl from 
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5.0 PROGRAhl hIANAGEhlENT ERIPHASIS AREAS 
This chapter consists of eleven parts addressing a variety of areas that received special emphasis 
f rom the Task Force and the Management Integration Panel. 
5.1 OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT  STRUCTURE^ 
This section describes alternatives in a 
variety of areas: the organizational entity 
w h i c h  wil l  o p e r a t e  the  S ta t ion ,  
commercialization of operations, platform 
operations, strategic management and control, 
NASA field center consolidation, and 
STS/Station consolidation. Many of the 
organizational options considered by the 
SSOTF are  presented here for  completeness. 
For a number of reasons including lack of 
t ime the Panel made no effort  to substantiate 
or  reconcile the intuitive analysis of some of 
the options presented in this section. 
5.1.1 Station Operator Organization 
Concerns involved in designing an operator 
organization focus on optimizing pressures 
f rom various interests and creating incentives 
for  desired performance. Some political 
pressures should be transmitted to 
management, while others should be 
defended against. Incentives for  the further 
development and unit cost reduction of 
demonstrated ideas and technology should be 
built in to the operator organization, whereas 
incentives that resist innovation should be 
kept out.  
A space station operator organization can be 
isolated f rom the political process to varying 
degrees, and i t  can be oriented toward 
different  political constituencies. Because the 
station will be publicly funded,  political 
interest groups must be recognized. These 
include scientific user groups, commercial 
users, station supplier contractors, NASA 
centers, and  elected representatives with 
space interests. Most of the pressures created 
by these groups are desirable and necessary, 
to some degree, and the problem is how to 
balance them. 
The options listed below all provide 
government control of operations, but  in 
varying degrees. In contrast, privatization is 
an approach which requires complete change 
from public (NASA) control to private 
(contractor) control, i.e. a facility that is 
contractor owned and operated. For instance, 
a remote Payload Operations Control Center 
(POCC) could conceivably be constructed 
with private funds and be operated for  
profit. This is certainly a viable option in 
some cases but is beyond the scope of this 
paper and will not be addressed. 
The options for  government control are as 
follows: 
(1) NASA Off ice  of ODerations. A 
line organization within NASA charged 
with operating the station would have 
the advantage of starting in the 
mainstream of space station construction 
and policy making, and could draw 
upon an experienced staff .  The 
disadvantages are the vulnerability to 
political wind changes, and the 
ad m i n is t r a t i v e and reg u 1 at o r y over head 
that goes with the normal government 
agency. This Office might be Space 
Station only or  Shuttle as well. 
(2 )  Independent Authoritv. A quasi- 
public agency with an appointed board 
of directors with a management team 
serving at  the discretion of the board 
'This section resulted from contributions by Kevin Barquinero, Bill Brooks, and Doug Lee 
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would have more day-to-day operating 
autonomy than a government line 
agency. Its character would depend in 
part  on the kinds of people appointed 
to the board, and the incentives and 
constraints built inro the agency's 
charter. An example might be the 
Federal Reserve Board or the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. 
(3) Research Institute. A non-profil 
research organization established for the 
sole purpose of operating the space 
station could achieve some autonomy i n  
the research area, but could have 
difficulty in transition i n g research i n  to 
the commercial sector. An example 
might be the French CNES which runs 
the Ariane program. 
A research or  science institute would be 
run by permanent and visiting scientists, 
support  staff ,  and contractors. Funding: 
sources would exercise some general 
guidance, but payload selection and 
operations would be under the control 
of the management of the institute. It:; 
orientation would be scientific, and 
largely free of political and commercial 
pressures. While its scientific 
productivity would probably be high, 
programs leading to more production- 
oriented commercia 1 a p p 1 ica t i o ns c o u lcl 
be less effective. An organization 
staffed primarily by individuals from 
research oriented backgrounds might 
have difficulty coping with the  
complexities of operating in a remote, 
hostile environment over extended 
periods of time. 
(4)  Combinations. An  independent 
authority provides the right setting for 
strong management and isolation from 
political micro manage men t , while a 
research institute offers the best 
arrange men t for  re so 1 ving conflict I, 
within the scientific community 
Hence, a fairly independent organizatiorl 
for  management and operations joined 
with a science institute for  handling the 
research end could provide an ideal 
balance. 
5.1.2 Alternatives for Comtnercial Ownership 
and Operation of Space Station Systems and 
Sc r v i  c c s 
In this context, commercialization is a 
profit - o r ie n ted 3 p proac h to conducting 
businesc; while allowing the government 
( N A S A )  to maintain control. A facility can 
be government owned and contractor 
operate';l by n eans of a competitive 
arrangement. For instance, the Space Station 
Control Center (SSCC) maintenance & 
operations could conceivably be done by a 
conimei-cia1 f i rm while balanced by NASA 
authority . 
Commercializatioii is not a new approach to 
doing business i n  the NASA environment. 
Contractors have performed work at  all 
Program levels m d  in various capacities 
( opera t ions, e rl g i ne e r i ng , ma i n t e nance , 
management support ,  et al) under direct 
NASA supervision and direction. 
Three approaches for  commercialization have 
been identified and briefly are addressed 
below: 
( I )  Facilitv Level. Maintaining and 
operating an  actual "brick and mortar'' 
facility (e.g. SSCC, POCC) 
( 2 )  Center Level. Consolidation 
performed a t  a space center under one 
c o n t r a c t o r  t e a m  ( e . g .  S p a c e  
Transportation System Operation 
Contract at the Johnson Space Center) 
( 3 )  Function Level. Executing a 
specific spe1:ialized process in support 
of Program operations (e.g. Station 
logistics at  the Cape). 
Certain Space Stmition systems and services 
are candidates to be provided by the 
commercial sector. This opportunity will 
allow private companies, in lieu of NASA, to 
provide the initial capital investment 
necessary to con! truct and operate services 
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and systems. Areas of the Space Station with 
commercialization potential range from the 
production and operation of entire facilities, 
such as a platform or laboratory, to more 
focused service oriented operations such as 
communications and medical diagnostics. 
Opportuni t ies  exist for  commercial  
investment in both ground and space 
segments of the Space Station program. 
Commercial involvement and investment in 
the Space Station program is a new initiative 
which poses many difficult questions and 
issues to be addressed by both NASA and 
industry including the following: 
o How will NASA integrate the 
activities of independent companies into 
the overall Space Station operation? 
o What level of business, market, and 
policy risks will commercial f irms (and 
their investors) be willing to accept? 
What steps can NASA take to help 
minimize those risks? 
o How can arrangements be structured 
to ensure that crew safety is not 
compromised? 
o What form should the business 
arrangements between NASA and the 
commercial providers take? 
o How should NASA select which 
commercial f irms will be allowed to 
provide systems or services? 
o What measuie of control should 
NASA maintain over a program for  
which billions of dollars of public funds 
will be spent? 
Regardless of the degree of commercial 
participation, NASA will continue to perform 
program integration functions to ensure both 
program success and safety. Success for  both 
NASA and the private sector will be based 
on equitable sharing of finnncial risks, 
understanding of the concepts, niutually 
beneficial deals, and enabl ing policies or 
procedures. 
5.1.3 Utilization Planning and  Transaction 
Manage men t 
Once users have been selected (at least 
tentatively), a potentially long and complex 
process begins for  scheduling the usage, 
manifesting the payload on the station and 
on transportation, and arranging for  all the 
necessary support  services. Users would like 
this process to be flexible and have few, but 
authoritative, interfaces. The space station 
operator would like to please the users with 
the least cost and disruption to the operator. 
Fragmentation is undesirable f rom both the 
user and the operator perspective. 
Convenience to the user, however, means 
dealing with an organization that is close at 
hand and preferably familiar. Flexibility is 
also always desirable, but i t  comes at some 
cost, and arriving at  the proper tradeoff 
requires weighing user costs and operator 
costs together. Two options for  utilization 
planning are: 
( 1 )  Centralized a t  NASA.  A 
Headquarters organization would receive 
planned operating events by category 
(time critical, routine, etc.) f rom the 
user selection function, along with 
requirements (Form 200) from users. 
Transportation would then be procured 
(STS, ELV),  and a preliminary manifest 
developed. This plan would be refined 
in conjunction with station operations, 
users, and transportation providers. 
(2)  Di s t ri hit t ed to Part 11 e rs / Fu 11 c t ions. 
Manifests would be developed by 
organ i za t io ns rep rese n t ing ope ra t ions, 
transportation, and users, for  each 
partner. Initial resource envelopes 
would be provided to each group, and 
conflicts resolved by a coordinating 
board or committee. 
Initinlly, a centralized process is necessary for 
control, u n t i l  bugs are worked out and a 
store of experience is accumulated that will 
allow coordination and replanning to take 
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place by different organizations in dispersed 
locations. 
Rather than attempting to control o r  even 
participate in a11 tactical (and execution) 
de c is ions , the Stat io 11 operator might choose 
to emphasize control over the process of 
decisionmaking. This might be accomplished 
by intervening in or  nionitoring selected 
transact ions , as they occur , according to 
predetermined rules and guidelines. 
5.1.4 Separate Platform Operations 
As a general management problem, there is 
frequently a tradeoff between economies of 
scope (being able to control a broader range 
of relevant factors) and span of control 
(effective communication between decision 
points and  top management) .  I n  this 
instance, the question is whether the 
synergistic effects of operating the manned 
base and the platforms in the same prograni 
outweigh the management burdens of a more 
complex and disparate program. 
To begin to answer this question, the 
following two key questions must be 
examined in fur ther  detail: 
\\:hat are  the coininon u e r a t i o n s  
possi bi 1 i ties bet ween t 11 ese El e in e 11 t F ?  
The Summary Report  ( p .  60) identified 
a preliminary set of those areas: 
. Co-orbiting platform servicing at  
the manned base 
. Common support services such as 
engineering support ,  transportation 
and logistics services, aiid tracking 
and data relay ser l ices  
. Sonie cornnionality in support 
requirements due to system / O  R U - 
level. commonality 
Do thcqe Dojsi h i  I i  tie5 -u a r r a i i  t 
integration iiito one l a c i l i t l ?  I II 
particular, should both the Spice Station 
Control Center and Platfoi m Control 
C e n t e r  ( a n d  t h e  s u p p o r t i n g  
infrastructure) be integrated into a 
master Control Center for  both the Base 
and Platforms support? Implicit in this 
question is the level of controller work 
required to support the Platform, i.e. 
are  Ph t fo rm operations mostly 
autonomous and require little controller 
monitoring or will i t  require frequent 
control? I f  the answer is the former 
then certain commcn (Manned Base and 
Platform 1 controller positions could be 
candidates for  consolidation as should 
the facilities. I f  the answer is the 
latter, t hen  contr3ller positions and 
facilities should be kept separate. 
The relevant issues are the following: 
. Should the controller function be 
e 1 e nie n t - de  d i cat ed (ad vantage  of 
concentrating on nominal/off- nominal 
operations; superior support  to on-line 
users requiring dedicated support)? 
. Does econoniy of consolidation 
required by this approach exist (though 
construction of facilities may be 
reduced and possibly the division of 
labor, this requirement would also 
demand that a controller be an 
operations expert on both systems and 
consequently would reduce his or  her 
effecti\,eness at the console)? 
At the execution lebel, only the two 
aforementioned requirements are common 
and, therefore, may not  justify consolidation. 
As an initial assessment, i t  seems plausible 
that s u f f i c i e n t 1 y 
in ti e pe 11 de n t o f those in vo 1 vi  n g the manned 
base that greater productivity would occur 
by forming separate programs for  operations. 
The resulting in te~faces  between programs 
would be less difficult than trying to run 
them as a single program. However, given 
the complexity of each element and the 
potential real-time demands for  resource 
u t i  1 i za t io n , the quest io n of consolidation 
should lequile> further study for  conimon 
ope] ations requiiements. 
p 1 ;I t f o r m act i v i t  i cis are  
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5.1.5 Program-Level hlanagement and 
Control 
Success of previous NASA programs has 
depended to a significant extent on having a 
clear mission and strong lines of 
c o m mu n ic a t i o n . Pro b 1 ems have o cc u r r e d 
when the direction was ambiguous and 
authority diffuse.  Steps have been taken in 
response to the Rogers Commission report to 
provide an  increased measure of technical 
oversight at  Headquarters. Establishing a 
management structure that is up to the task 
of running the space station is the current 
challenge. 
NASA has the opportunity to not just  
strengthen its management structure, but to 
use the space station program to construct an 
entirely new management philosophy and 
accompanying set of procedures. Making the 
most of this opportunity will undoubtedly 
cause some stress and strain, but the window 
may not reappear if the present chance is 
missed. 
There are  four  principal options concerning 
the centralization of* control: 
( 1 )  Distributed Propram Control. 
Because most of the technical expertise 
resides at  the centers, technical 
management has also devolved to the 
centers. Joint activities are worked 
through formal and informal interfaces 
among the centers. HQ provides policy 
direction, largely in response to political 
instructions f rom Congress and its 
constituencies, including NASA centers. 
Technical planning at s t ra t eg ic , tact ica I ,  
and execution levels is distributed to 
centers. 
(2)  Strategic Control at HO.  
Sufficient staff technical resources are 
assigned to a HQ support organization 
to provide analysis and evaluation of 
strategic issues. This capability is used 
to address Congress and to give 
direction to the programs, but tactical 
planning is decentralized and program 
control lies with the centers. 
(3) Stratepic and Tactical Control a t  m. Additional resources in support of 
HQ permits tactical planning as well as 
strategic policy and management 
control. Performance of centers on 
tactical implenientation and execution is 
monitored and evaluated by HQ. 
( 4 )  Centralized hlanagement  and 
Prod tic t i o 11. Strategic and tactical 
planning and management reside at  HQ, 
and production is concentrated in a 
single major center, with small support 
centers in distributed locations. The  
bulk of core activities are co-located. 
5.1.6 NASA Field Center Consolidation 
Possible savings or synergies might occur 
f rom consolidating organizations, both 
geographically and functionally. Dispersed 
NASA Centers permit many regions of the 
country to participate in Space activities, but 
also impose administrative coordination and 
management costs on the various programs. 
Some of this burden could be lessened for  
the Space Station by consolidating some 
groups of functions. There are at  least four  
different consolidation options: co-locate 
production and launch facilities, co-locate all 
operations facilities, maintain distributed but 
non-redundant facilities, and maintain 
multiple centers with backup capability. 
The second option is implicitly the issue of 
whether all flight and ground operations 
should be centralized at  KSC. To begin to 
answer this question, the following two key 
questions must be examined in fur ther  detail: 
\\‘hat are those f l ipht  and ground 
one ra t i  011 s f ti n c t i  o ns to be nerf ormed? 
Those include, but are not limited to, 
the following areas: 
. Proposed Space Station Program (SSP) 
functions (e.g. the Space Station Control 
Center, the Platform Control Center,  the 
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Payload Operations Integration Cenler) 
. Existing National Space Transportal ion 
System (NSTS) functions at JSC and 
MSFC (e.g. the Mission Control Center, 
various s i ni u la t it3 ns 
f ac i 1 i t  ies , and s up p o r t person ne 1 ) 
t ra i n i n g n n tl 
What are the benef&s of centralizing? 
Those include, but are not limited to, 
the following: 
. Ease of user integr,ition (e.g. minimize 
number of Progrnm contncts to deal 
w i t h ) 
. Facilitation of end-to-end prelaunch 
checkout activities 
. Economy of certain 1-esources (e.);. 
lower travel costs, potentially higher 
frequency of meetings) 
. Unification of training activities (e.@.. 
co nso 1 ida t ed 1110 de 11 i I I g and s i ti1 u la t io n 
efforts). 
The following are relel ant  issues: 
. Costs of relocating existing NSTS 
f u nc t io ns (ini m ed i a t  e budgetary  
risks/iinpacts to existing and planned 
programs) 
. Disruption to ongoing operations (a 
transition phase for  migrating existing 
NSTS functions would occur possibly 
resulting in a reduced level of 
efficiency). 
. Degree of common NSTS and the 
Space Station operation (as driven by 
Program integration activities and 
interfaces and joint fncility usage 
require m e 11 t s 1. 
With the exception of logistics and payload 
integration, most existing, NSTS and Space 
Station operations are not required to be at  
or near the launch area, i.e., these functions 
appear to be launch pad location 
independent. 'Therefore, the requirement for  
centralizing functions at  KSC appears to be 
1 esse n e d . 
5.1.7 Shuttle/Station Consolidation 
Should the NSTS and Space Station operations 
development and conduct be kept separate or 
should they be combined? Similarities (e.g., 
on-going operations, reusable components) 
be t % e e n t he t L o p rog ra ni s , the i r degree of 
interdependencq, and their distinctness f rom 
other NASA programs, suggests possible 
synergies f rom consolidation. The  principal 
options are the following: 
-Combined Shuttle and Space Station 
0 r g a n i za t io n . 
- Separate A r nis - Length Organ i za t i o n s . 
The advantages and disadvantages of one 
large Program versus two separate programs 
are listed below: 
, Simplification of faciIity/system 
in t e gr a t i o n 
. En ha lice m en t of in t e rde par t me n t a1 
c o m rn u n i c a t i o ns f 1 ow and c o 11 a bora t i o n 
. hlininiizing the duplication of effort .  
Disadvantages: 
. An operational and a developmental 
programs under  one roof (the NSTS 
Program is well-defined and established 
relative to the Space Station Program) 
. A joint Program would constitute 
roughly 2 /3  of NASA's entire budget 
(competition and allocation of funds) 
. Program charters are  inherently 
different and ootentially incompatible, 
i.e., NSTS a r d  Space Station have 
unique user sLpport requirements and 
operational obj ,xt ives  
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. Differing lifecycles, i.e., Space Station 
up  to 30 years 
. International partnership in Space 
Station (different motivation) 
. NSTS for  civil/ military vs. Space 
Station civil only. 
Summary of Impacts Of Combined NSTS/SS 
Or, era t i o n s 
The list of impacts below was developed on 
the basis of a combined NSTSlSS Operations 
Program whose strategic, tactical, and 
execution structure follows the SSOTF 
recommend at  ions reg a r d i n g t h e SS Program 
that are described in the Summary Report. 
User accommodation/integration including 
payload/element integration would all be 
performed at  a consolidated site. Rack 
integration would be done at  DOC or at  
science/technology site. Execution would 
occur via DOCs/telescience. The SSSC and 
POIC would be located at the site. 
that details must be reconstructed in 
any case through ownership of a 
"corporate" responsibility to respond. 
-Much more consistent management 
process and data simplify top-down 
resource allocation decisions and 
monitoring success of efforts 
-Should reduce number of interfaces, 
therefore  decrease organizational 
response time. 
-Reduces reasons for ,  or  opportunities 
for,  ad hoc political (or other) 
intervention once the scarce resources 
are allocated 
-Simplifies users' interfaces significantly 
- Pro vide s " q u i c k e r " response to 
politically-inspired resource allocation 
considerat ions 
-Reduces opportunities for  uncertainty 
to "propagate" and affect  other decisions 
-Simplifies therefore planning process 
Impacts t ha t  Favor Consolidation 
-Symbiosis of techniques among 
sustaining engineering disciplines 
-True retention of "corporate memory" 
through disciplined management and 
data collection 
-"One stop" user shop at consolidated 
location ... especially if at KSC 
- Quick e r response to rem ani f es t i n g 
requirements 
- Log Module 
- Launch Vehicles include KSC- 
launched ELVs, i.e. reduces stress 
on launch vehicle processing 
consistently in long-term routine 
operations processing 
-Accepts reality that true corporate 
memory departs after a few years and 
- Pricing concept decisions 
- Resource reallocation 
-Supports concept of decentralized rack 
integration 
-Continues to enhance opportunities for  
commonal i ty  of hardware  and  
procedures and other aspects of 
supportability 
-Reduces overall annual operations costs 
-Centralizes operations oversight and 
control-checks in operations era when 
activities will become more routine 
-Centralizes training facilities (except 
for  EVA)  
-Separates Space Station crew training 
from Orbiter (pilot) crew training 
allowing professional paths to evolve 
more logically 
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development decisioris 
-Increment management greatly, is 
simplified. All parties work through, or  
at, one site during planning reviews. 
-Better integration of manned 
base/platforms functions where common 
-Avoids unnecessary competitive tension 
between NASA centers 
-Simp 1 if ies inter na t i o n a 1 coo r d i nation ; 
reduces integration costs 
-Significantly improves ability to 
understand and (probably need a study 
to prove this) manage operations costs 
-Allows NASA Centers to focus on new 
development project and programs ... 
becoming a "station user" rather than 
operator 
I m D ac t s t h at Fa vo r Se I) a r a t i  on  
-Separation of "Program Controlled" 
operations discipline with development 
organization---loss of symbiosis 
-Loss of "Program" control over all 
aspects of operations ... attendant loss of 
"ownership" and sense of responsibility 
for  "full" program success 
-Centralization of responsibilities tends 
to broaden responsibilities of individuals 
covering various functional areas ... 
depth of knowledge suffers in any one 
function, i.e. "you pay for  what you 
get". Management challenge is to put  in 
place a process which can quantitatively 
and qualitatively decide how to make 
the tradeoff and when to exercise i t  
- Reduces (el i m i nates ) o p PO r t 11 n i t  ies for 
multiple NASA centers to establish 
unique operations skills 
-Reduces opportunity to use operations 
situations for  enhancing development 
staff skills and for  leaving a sense of 
ownership for  tough engineering 
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-Reduces opportunity to  share 
professional skills required for  
complementary f u n c  ions a t  each NASA 
center, e.g. crew health 
-Doesn't take advantage of existing 
center capabilities aiid facilities 
-Use of a single site vulnerable to 
catastrophe 
-Some functions still must be redundant 
at  other launch site,;, e.g. Vandenburg 
- L os e s 
centers 
" c r e a t i v e t e n s ion " bet w e e n 
-Loses NASA-C'enter sense of 
"ownership" of Space Station manned- 
based elements and support  systems 
-? - 
Perfot.niarice Assessnietit Process 
5.2 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS by Doug Lee 
The  purposes, rationale, and concepts of 
monitoring and assessing performance as a 
management activity have not been 
established as an integral part of the Space 
Station Program, and the issues, benefits, and 
costs of such monitoring need to be 
presented and reviewed. While giving proper 
weight to cost considerations, it is vital that 
costs not be overemphasized to the point that 
performance, safety, or  other outputs are 
sacrificed or  excessively compromised. 
Need for Performance Assessment 
In funding NASA and the space station, 
Congress has expressed a desire to ensure 
that selected categories of costs (e.g., station 
operations) are not excessive, and that 
particular outputs (e.g., unmanned space 
science) are  not slighted. In part, this 
reflects some doubt  about NASA's ability to  
monitor and control costs, and to produce the 
results that have been promised. 
To respond, NASA needs to communicate to 
its sponsors that i t  has the management tools 
that will ensure that its end of the bargain is 
kept. A well-focused cost and performance 
management effor t  would encourage good 
practices and provide useful information to 
Congress. This would require that the Space 
Station Program develop a monitoring system 
that generates timely information on costs 
and performance. Costs should be broken 
down along functional, element, and center 
lines that permit separate estimation of costs 
by these units, to a suitable level of detail. 
Performance measures will be developed that 
allow the Program's progress toward its goals 
to be reasonably assessed. Measures of 
performance can be such things as percentage 
of crew time available for  user tasks (as 
opposed to housekeeping), and the average 
elapsed time from the user's request for  
service to the user's arrival on orbit. 
However, assessment of performance must be 
coupled with incentives for  good 
performance. One useful step is to establish 
performance and cost objectives for  key 
managers. Execution level managers should 
be encouraged to take actions that are within 
their domain while passing information 
upward that pertains to actions needed at 
higher levels. 
Editor's riotc: The  Patic1 believed that while 
the creutiori of appropriate itrcentives is verj? 
importarit. the issue is ver j '  d i f f i cu l t  arid 
coniplicated. F o r  this reasoti. the Pariel did 
tiot attempt atiy getieral treatnierit of this issue 
(such as might appear here) hut rather 
attenipted to deal with it i t i  Jpecif ic contexts. 
For esaniplc. the discussioti o f  operatiom cost 
sharitig anlorig the ititerriaiiorial partriers in 
Seclioti 5.11.3 reflects the belief that the 
coticept o f  "elemerit -uriique" costs is iniportarit 
to niaintaiti iriccritives for cost coritrol. Other 
iriceritiws f o r  how the pat.trict's r.elate to each 
other should also he corrsidered. 
Perform a 11 ce - Cost - Risk Assess m e 11 t 
In many decisions relating to station 
construction and operations, risk or 
uncertainty is an inherent factor. Making 
sound decisions will require an understanding 
of the risks associated with a given course of 
action as i t  is affected by a variety of 
seemingly unrelated considerations such as 
crew safety, operational supportability, 
international and space law, systems designs, 
logistics strategies, and supporting systems 
contingencies. Because the risk cannot be 
completely eliminated, acceptable levels of 
different kinds of risk must be explicitly 
determined and stated. 
The implied performance-cost-risk process 
can be implemented incrementally, and 
experience derived for  guiding subsequent 
directions and emphases. The  kinds of 
information provided should be these: 
-Inputs: Amounts of labor, materials, 
and other resources, categorized by 
function and ordered from direct inputs 
(e.g., direct labor) to indirect 
(overhead). These can be forecasted, 
and used to anticipate needs as well as 
to validate cost estimation methods. 
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-Gross Outputs: 130th intermediate 
outputs (components, structures) and 
final o u t p u t s ( \ o Y u mes , cons u ni a b 1 e s , 
resources, services) can be tracked over 
time. 
-Net Outputs: Sh;iies of outputs used 
up in production arid opelation, such as 
volume occupied by Station equipment, 
operating power cons u ni  p t i o n , crew t i  ni  e 
spent in operation and maintenance, 
etc., yield the net rcsources available to 
users. 
-Rates and Ratios: The value of a 
co m p r e hens i ve perf o r in a n ce ni o n i to r i n g 
system is the ability to relate various 
measures to each other. The most 
obvious of these are unit cost rates, or 
cost - effectiveness 0 t Pie rs 
include utilization rates (per cent 
available that is used), availability rates 
(per cent of intended capacity that is j n  
service ) , prod u c t i v i  t y ( i n p u t s re q u i red 
per unit of output),  and trend paths. 
Some of these can bc. compared against 
extern a 1 ref ere n c e n c1 r n-I s . 
riie as u res . 
Examples might include monitoring of (1)  
actual crew time allocation to determine 
productivity at different activities and 
identify areas for  application of automation; 
(2) levels of effor t  spent on testing and 
verification, at user and NASA sites, to 
reduce overlap and seeA economies; ( 3 1  
ground transport at i o n costs an d re q u i re me n t c 
to determine optimal assembly locations and 
transportation procurement policies; (4 )  
effects of delays, changes in schedules, and 
remanifesting, to evaluate which costs are 
acceptable and which decisions should be 
treated as final; and ( 5 )  evolution options, to 
plan ways to improve operational efficiency 
through redesign. 
Most of the inputs for  performance 
monitoring must come from the data systems 
and analytic tools discussed in Sections 5.3 
through 5.7 which follow Management 
re p o r t s from the perf o r in ;I n c e m o n i to r i n g 
system will be produced at frequent i n t en  als 
for  internal use, and sumninr)' publications 
for wider use generated annually.  
-- PrinciDles of I'crformance Indicator DesiPn 
Con! inuous monitoring and surveillance are 
needed to enst re that costs are in  line with 
achievements, and that trends are in 
favoi able direc ions. Performance monitoring 
is thtt process of relating inputs, outputs, and 
costs to each other in a quantitative system 
that pro \rides manage men t with cur  rent 
information 011 whether the program is 
uorking in a satisfactory way. Major labor 
cost areas are ground personnel i n  operations, 
s us  t a i n i n g en g i nee r i ng , and ad ni in is t ra t ive 
overhead. An objective of performance 
monitoring is to eliminate unnecessary labor, 
improve productivity through more efficient 
procedures and scheduling, and reduce labor 
re qu i re men t s t 11 i'ou g h automat ion . 
A sound perl'ormance monitoring and  
financial nianagc ment system needs to possess 
numerous propel ties that ensure that suitable 
inforniation concinues to be generated, that 
the information is useful, and that i t  gets 
used. There i: some overlap in the list 
below, but a11 the properties are essential. 
The first six certain to the information 
content and structure, and the last five apply 
to the process for generating and maintaining 
the information. 
-Measures Partition a Set. A "partition" 
if a categorization that divides a group 
of items so that no item falls in more 
th in  one caregory (mutually exclusive) 
and every ireni falls in some category 
(eXhaustive). There can be many 
I <.I titions of the same set, and many 
aifferent  levels of detail. For example, 
all services available to users would be 
one set (see Table 4-4),  station elements 
would be another,  and each of these 
could possess a hierarchy of detail. 
-Nesting. - Indicators at  one level should 
be aggregatable into summary measures 
at higher levels, and disaggregatable into 
lower levels cf. detail. Thus the set of 
inciicators for-n a hierarchy, or several 
h iera rch ies. 
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-hlultiDle Perspecti\,es. I t  should be 
possible to view the same activities 
f rom several perspectives, or in relation 
to sever a 1 dim ens ions of p e r f o r ni a n c e. 
-Balance. Each partition should consist 
of categories of approximately equal 
importance or  interest, with respect to 
the persons using that set of measures. 
For example, cost categories at one level 
should be of roughly similar 
magnitudes. 
-Common Interpretation. Indicators 
should be made up of components that 
can be u n a ni b i g u o u s I y and u ni ve rsa 11 y 
defined, and should be designed to be 
interpreted in the most direct and self- 
evident way. 
-Management Control. I t  is desirable 
that each indicator be affected or 
determined by a p r o g r e s s i ve I y s m a I I e r 
number of factors, with increasing 
detail, and that the factors be clearly 
either endogenous (under the control of 
the organization) or exogenous (largely 
determined by factors external to the 
organization). This should be true at a11 
levels, i.e., factors internal to a g i \en  
organization will be external to some of 
its suborganizations. 
-Natural Data Collection. All data 
required for  performance measures 
should be data that are or ought to be 
collected for  other reasons, and the 
point of collection should be the most 
normal or  least disruptive location for  
the collection. One-shot and special 
purpose data collection should be 
minim i zed . 
-Self Correc t i  rig. Internal data 
process i n g p r oc e d u res and o rg a n i za t io n a 1 
transfer and use of the information 
should tend to locate and identify errors 
a n d  a n o m a l i e s .  N u m e r i c a l  
inconsistencies among data itenis can be 
flagged mechanically, and reports should 
be presented in formats that help users 
see outliers. 
-Cumulati\e \'slue Added.  Managers at 
all le\els should find the information 
useful to themselves. Few data need be 
collected solely because higher 
management wants them. First line 
managers should use the information 
about their organizations both for  
control within their domains and for  
articulating external problems to higher 
le \le 1 m a nil ge r s . Much of the 
information useful at  one level will not 
be passed up to higher levels, except i n  
summary form.  
-ParticiDatorv. A wide range of levels, 
interests, and perspectives should be 
in\.olved in the design and refinement 
of the data categories and the 
indicators. The process should be under 
ma nag e nie n t con t ro I ,  but  solicit 
discussion and absorb inputs from many 
sources. 
-Coiitiiitiotis Refinement. No system is 
dexigned correctly the first time and 
conditions change anyway. A standing 
ad \  isory committee should be formed of 
users and suppliers, to continuously 
review and ref ine the  data collection, 
measures, report forms, level of detail, 
and other relevant matters. A good 
deal of experimentation is inevitable. I t  
is essential that this process lead to 
stable impro\ ement,  not random 
fluctuations. Failure to accomplish this 
means that one o r  more of the above 
properties is not being satisfied. 
Most of the properties tend to reinforce each 
other, but ultimately they must all be present 
for  the system to work well and benefit the 
organization. Perhaps i t  goes without saying 
that the process must be fully integrated into 
the organization , t ha t res po ns i b i I i t ies for 
production and maintenance must be clear, 
and that higher levels of management need 
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to support the process as well as use the 
information. 
R ecom m e 11 dation s: 
- Establish a11 operations eialuation 
assessment s y s t e in t h a t in c I u d e s p e r f 'o r man c e 
and cost criteria and provides key facts 
( s t a t u s  and trends) to  all le\els of 
management. The methodology should be 
used to evaluate any proposed appionch to 
conducting and supporting operations as the 
Program develops or modifies opct ations 
capabilities. 
- Develop hierarchically consistent oper ations 
performance indicators at all organizational 
levels. Indicators should measure services 
produced, services and capacity utilized 
(planned vs. actual), input resources 
consumed for  each tS'pe of service produced, 
and unit costs. The indicators w i l l  allow 
investigation of tradeoffs along many 
dimensions, such as shifting from attended 
operation to automated, from pie -planned 
schedules to adaptive control, o r  from low- 
demand high-cost services to high -demand 
low-cost services. See specific suggestions in 
Chapter 2 relative to iniplementation of a 
Performance Assessment System. 
- Develop incentive programs tied to 
perf o r In a n c e -cost in an age ni e i i  t . Est ab 1 is h 
performance and cost objectives for  key 
managers. Consider incenti\ es for  how the 
international partners relate to each other. 
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5.3 OPERATIONS COST RIANAGEhlENT by Doug Lee 
Success of the Space Station will depend 
heavily upon how well the Program is able 
both to design elements and systems so as to 
minimize life-cycle cost for  a given level of 
performance, and to operate the Station so as 
to reduce costs through learning and 
experience. Thus i t  is necessary to inject a 
consciousness of costs into all Program 
decisions, starting with design and 
construction. 
The first section, Challenge and Importance 
of Cost Management, explains why the 
operations cost management challenge in the 
Space Station Program is unprecedented in 
NASA's history. Because this is an area in 
which NASA has not had much experience, 
the second section, Requirements for  
Effective Cost Man age ni e n t , de  v e 1 o ps the 
necessary background. The  final section, 
Implementation of Cost Management 
Planning, describes the recommended steps 
for  the Space Station Program. 
5.3.1 Challenge arid Importance of Cost 
Man age m en t 
Recurring costs first became important in the 
Shuttle program, as manned missions shifted 
from single-event efforts to repeated flights 
of a similar nature. The expectation that 
unit costs would decline with additional 
experience has not yet been achieved with 
the Shuttle, and there are many possible 
factors contributing to this result. Much has 
been learned and put  into practice, much 
remains to be put  into practice, and much 
remains to be learned. 
Several characteristics of the Space Station 
Program add to the difficulty of design and 
operation. Some are common to any large 
organization engaged in a complex task. 
Others are  unique to the specific task or the 
specific organization. All must be addressed 
if satisfactory cost control is to be achieved. 
Long Lifetime. With an expected time 
horizon of over thirty years, operating costs 
will dominate the total cost picture. Even 
when discounted back to present-year dollars, 
operations costs are over half of life-cycle 
costs (LCC). 
User Interactions. The intention is to 
make the Station "user friendly," with short 
lead times for  payload decisions, single point 
of contact for  users, minimum user costs, and 
extensive user involvement in design, 
utilization planning, operations, and 
evolution. Such high quality and open-ended 
service levels tend to be costly, as well as 
hard to estimate beforehand. 
Engineering Inteeration. The Space 
Station will be composed of many complex 
systems and subsystems. Each system and 
element must be integrated with the others, 
e.g., command and communications systems 
must be interwoven with hardware elements 
and life support. Coordination and synthesis 
of these systems requires a great deal of 
consultation and interaction among skilled 
professionals. 
Rlultipurpose Facility. The Station will 
supply multiple services to a diverse array of 
users, whose needs are  only  partially 
understood now and will change in difficult- 
to-predict ways in the future .  There is little 
a priori experience inside o r  outside NASA 
on which to base forecasts of service and 
resource requirements. 
International Partners. Participation by 
several independent nations in the Station 
creates cost management challenges on both 
the development side and the user side: 
- Commonality. Coordination of 
international standards exacerbates 
an already difficult  design 
problem. 
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- DuDlication. I h c h  nation wants to 
increase its knowledge and 
capabilities i n  a11 aspects of space 
research as cluickly as i t  can; 
centralizing functions i n  single 
locations has already met with 
subs t a n t ia 1 resi:, t a nce . 
- Develor~men t and 1 , o t ~ i s t i c ~  
Coo r d i nation. I )ec is io n ma k i ng and 
knowledge transfer are another 
level more difficult ,  hence costly, 
when differ en t govern men t 5, , 
cultures, and languages are 
involLed. 
- Cost Sharing. Shared costs w i l l  be 
suspect unless al l  partners arc 
convinced tha t  cost management i: 
sound and equitable. Effectibe 
cost control incentives need to be 
bu i l t  i n to  tiach pal tner 's  
manage m e 11 t . 
- Utilization Planning. As wi th  
construction and operations, each 
partner desires to gain as much 
independent experience as possible 
in areas of interest and potential 
economic benefit, tending to result 
in inefficient division of labor and 
functions if not properly managed. 
Evolutionarv Decipn. The configuration 
of the Station and the operating systems and 
procedures will need to evolve over time in 
response to advances in technology and user 
demands. It is much easier to gradually 
reduce unit  costs for  the production and 
operation of a static design. 
Commercial Potential. To maintain its 
role as a research and develooment agency, 
proven processes and technologies must be 
spun off into the private sector as they 
become viable. Accomplishing this requires 
-- as the feasibility of conducting various 
activities becomes proven - -  that hardware 
and procedures evolve f rom a research mode 
to a commercial mode. Unit  costs must 
decline correspondingly, at the same time. 
Contiiitiiiif: Rocarch .  There is now and 
will continue to be a major research 
component to Station design and operation, 
and specit'),ing research results and costs in  
advance is diffizult at best. Nonetheless, i t  
is essential to i i  ]prove the Program's ability 
to ani icipate remirch progress and results, 
estimate costs accurately, and create 
incentives to solve research problems 
efficiently and then move them into a 
routine production mode. 
D i ~ p e r ~ e d  ('enters. The Space Station 
will GTdesigned and produced at roughly 
half-a-dozen NASA Centers around the U.S., 
plus some additicnal number of locations i n  
other cguntries. 4t each Center, productiori 
is carried out try a mix of public and 
contracted privatct organizations. From the 
standpoint of efficiency, a single site of 
production and launch and a single producer 
probably would be the least costly, but the 
nation prefers to involve many regions and 
many participants in such major endeavors. 
The Program has identified specific 
developrtlent assignments for  the Centers that 
have the requisite technical expertise. To  the 
extent that distributed production remains the 
norm, the Progr;im must craft  a very 
responsibe management approach to deal with 
the natural autonomy of the Centers, the 
tendency tow 3rd competition and possible 
duplication, and the variety of administrative 
p rac tic es that cu r re n t 1 y ex is t . 
Perf o r in n n ce De in an (is. Per haps more 
than any other public sector agency, NASA 
has extremely high performance expectations 
demanded of it. Safety must be 
uncompromised, often at  very high cost, to 
avoid public outcry. Any and every 
malfunction is :ill too readily apparent and 
immediately visible through the national and 
inter na t i o n a 1 p r e s .  F.0 u t i ne acco m pl ish men t s 
and extended periods of faultless operation 
are never sufficient to outweigh the errors 
and accidents. Revealed flaws often result in 
pol i t ical  mic romanagemen t  tha t  is 
counterproduct ive.  All  of these 
c o n s id e rat io n s c r e a t 4: enormous upward 
pressures o n  costs, and only a highly 
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disciplined organization can exercise effective 
cost management in the face of such 
conflicting demands. 
Each of these potential obstacles is addressed 
in the next sections, to determine the best 
solution to the problem, and to enumerate 
the steps that have been and need to be 
taken to implement the solution. 
5.3.2 Requirements for Effective Cost 
Manage men t 
T o  deal with these challenges, i t  is necessary 
to structure the Program to be flexible and 
adaptive. Ideally, the space station program 
should move up a learning curve, starting 
with the best balance of estimated up-front 
construction costs plus long term operating 
costs, and refine that initial approximation 
toward longer design life and lower unit 
operating and maintenance cost. 
Conditions needed to achieve effective cost 
management can be grouped into four  areas. 
Organizational measures, process controls, and 
analytic tools are described below in this 
section. Financial data requirements and 
performance monitoring objectives are 
described in later sections. 
Organization 
A basic requirement for  cost management is 
an  organizational structure within which the 
cost management function is an integral part. 
As elaborated below, cost management is far  
more than simply auditing, and demands 
much more than simply accounting. Thus 
cost control is not achieved by having a 
normal budgeting and financial reporting unit 
charged with the broader cost management 
function. 
The Cost h l a  11 a pein e II t Fu 11 c t i  o n.  
Effective cost control involves numerous 
routine and non-routine decisions made a t  all 
levels of the organization, with data and 
analyses that are  also drawn from all levels 
of the organization. Hence, cost management 
is dependent upon a complex system of 
information flows and decision points, each 
incorporating incentives that are appropriate 
for  the decisions being made at  that point. 
In private firms, decisions are delegated to 
cost or profit "centers" that are intended to 
permit decisions to be decentralized yet made 
in the interests of the larger organization. 
Thus the challenge to the Space Station 
Program is to create a functional structure 
that includes the necessary components of 
cost management at the appropriate levels 
and in the most suitable units. All aspects of 
the cost management function need to be 
recognized, assigned to an organizational unit, 
and supported by explicit mission statements 
and the necessary human resources. 
Separate Identity for the Spare Statiog 
Program. Cost management cannot begin 
until Space Station funds are separated from 
other NASA programs, at the highest feasible 
level. I t  then becomes the responsibility of 
the Program to achieve its objectives within 
an agreed-upon budget. The  Phillips 
Commission, the Rogers Commission, and the 
Space Station Operations Task Force (SSOTF) 
all strongly recommended this separation of 
identity for each program, along with the 
associated responsibilities. 
With performing Centers working on several 
programs at  once, this separation is hard to 
enforce. I t  must be possible, nonetheless, for 
man age men t ac c o u n t a b i 1 it y to be separate I y 
identifiable for  each major program and 
subprogram. 
Clear Lines of Authority. Not only 
must responsibilities be clear and 
unambiguous, those with responsibility must 
have the authority to take actions that will 
allow their tasks to be achieved, and they 
must have the analytic and information 
resources needed to exercise that authority in 
an enlightened manner. 
This means that responsible organizations 
must be both informed and empowered, 
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whatever their place in the organizational 
hierarchy. 
Process and Procedures for Decisions 
With organizational functions and units as the 
building blocks, processes for  making 
decisions need to be explicitly designed and 
implemented to give cost considerations their 
proper emphasis. This applies whether 
decisions are routine or  special. Decision 
processes include single-purpose task forces 
and broad - purpose c o ni m is s io n s , 
internal change review procedures, ,standard 
operating procedures, management of 
exceptions, pricing and cost assignment 
algorithms and incentives, and forums for  
ne g o t ia t i n g agreements . 
p a n e Is, 
A number of characteristics can be 
considered for  evaluating the desirability and 
effectiveness of such processes: 
Response Time. I t  should be possible 
for  the process to produce a workable 
decision in a timely fashion. Routine 
decisions should be made quickly, yet 
incorporate relevant information, meaning 
that the information - -  including cost -- 
must be readily available. Major evaluations 
of plans and directions will take longer, and 
require deeper and more specialized analysis, 
but such requirements should be anticipated 
and accomplished without imposing delay on 
the Program. 
Decision Level. A fact  that is seldom 
recognized in government is that kicking cost 
approvals to a higher level does not 
necessarily lead to better decisions. I t  may 
slow the rate of expenditure, but it does not 
result in  lower costs. The appropriate level 
is that which encompasses the major 
consequences of the decision, and 
expenditure authority as well as management 
responsibility should reside at t h l t  level. 
Higher management levels need to be able to 
monitor and evaluate decisions at lower 
levels, but not by substituting for  or  
replicating the context that is the optimal 
one. 
Participant?. Each decision should be 
made or  influenced by those having the 
greatest stake i n  its outcome. Most decisions 
have both cost and performance impacts, so 
tl-ose persons having knowledge of the 
performance tratieoffs should also be given 
incentives to address the cost side as well. 
Inform a t i  o n  Su p I, or t .  Sound 
decisionmaking must be based on accurate 
and current information. Procedures for  
a c q u i ring , storing , ret r i e v i n g , and ana 1 y zi n g 
cost management data need to be developed 
a: an integrated system, similar to other 
systems. W i t h  numerous dispersed sources of 
data and numerous dispersed users, the 
design and coordination requirements are 
strenuous. 
Deielonment Phases. Different cost 
considerations and incentives will be relevant 
during each phase of the Station’s life. 
Dluring the Development phase, emphasis will 
tend to be placed on minimizing initial 
design and construction costs rather than life 
cycle costs. Hence, counterbalancing 
incentives are needed. During Space Station 
assembly, ope1 at ing costs will become more 
apparent, but the emphasis will tend to be on 
short term fixes so as to meet schedule 
milestones. During the Operations phase, 
improvements involving sc:veral elements or 
systems will be difficult to implement, and 
thus are unlikely to occur without strong 
supporting doc u mentation. 
Successful cost management is supported by 
analytic tools that permit costs of varying 
scopes to be estimated f rom available data, 
that generate forecasts of cost time profiles 
under alternative scenarios and conditions, 
and that model the tradeoffs between cost 
and performance for  man) critical decisions. 
These analytic tools take time to design, 
develop, test, validate, and place in 
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operation, similar to hardware elements and 
software systems. Efforts to create and 
install these tools should proceed in tandem 
with development of the Station itself. 
An  important reason to develop such tools is 
that it leads to independently replicatible 
results (anyone can go to the model and get 
the same results f rom the same inputs), as 
opposed to repeated "grassroots" budget re- 
estimates. However, to obtain maximum 
return f rom such a tool, it should have a 
number of characteristics. These are 
described in Section 5.4.2. Once developed, 
there should be a single "official" version of 
the model and database, continually refined 
and updated, used as a consistent reference 
for  crosschecking. Model analysis should be 
cited in change requests and other 
documentation. 
The  types of tools used for  short term 
forecasting may be very different f rom those 
appropriate for  long term forecasting (or cost 
estimation). Short term forecasting 
emphasizes short term extrapolations under 
most-likely conditions. It is closely tied to 
current financial data,  and is used to track 
current expenditures and assess deviations 
f rom planned figures. Cost allocation is 
frequently involved for  the purpose of 
breaking aggregates into various functional 
and institutional categories, either because 
the breakdown is an inherently arbitrary 
distinction among overhead expenses, or 
because the detailed data to support  the 
categorization are  not yet available. 
Long term cost forecasting, rather than a 
projection of current data, attempts to model 
the cost object and provide estimates of key 
model coefficients based on historical 
experience with similar programs. Cost 
estimating relationships (CERs) are generally 
derived through a statistical analysis of 
related programs. The statistical analysis is 
used to  derive the coefficients of key 
parameters and these are  then combined with 
estimates of these parameters for  the program 
in question to produce a cost estimate. Some 
other forecasting models are activity driven 
and are  not derived f rom statistical analysis. 
Both short term and long term cost 
forecasting in the Space Station Program 
currently tends to be done in an  ad hoc and 
non-replicatible form.  Existing management 
practices frequently do  not place a high value 
on the collection of cost and schedule data 
that will support either the use of existing 
models or the development of new ones. 
Producing a research facility that is designed 
to operate for  a long time, with continuous 
modifications to procedures and components, 
at  a declining cost over time, is a major 
challenge. In part ,  this is a problem of 
design emphasis, placing high value on 
simplicity, basic reliability, modularity, and 
flexibility for  growth, instead of high- 
perf or m an ce , h ig h 1 y red u nd an t , custom - built , 
one - s h o t devices. 
It is also a problem of increasing initial cost 
to obtain lower long run operating cost. 
Most importantly, the problem is one of 
creating incentives for  such design from the 
start. A t  this point in the space station 
program, steps must be implemented to 
institutionalize the concept of designing to 
life-cycle cost into the next phases of 
engineering and construction. Headquarters 
levels need to create a program requirement 
for  lifetime cost-effectiveness, and the 
mechanisms to enforce it. System-level 
contract proposal instructions must indicate to 
bidders how long term costs will be 
evaluated. Finally, budget constraints on the 
construction phase of the station must result 
in reduced program requirements, not in up- 
f ront  cuts that add to costs later on. 
Evaluation of engineering and operations 
a1 terna t ives must incorporate design, 
construct i o n , 1 a u nc 11, ass em b 1 y , operation , and 
user costs, and explore tradeoffs (initial cost, 
operating cost, net station output) through 
modeling. Models should consider all 
operation and maintenance costs and d o  this 
early in the design phase. The  database 
should be updated continually on the basis of 
improved information. A more detailed 
discussion of cost modeling is contained in 
Section 5.4 below. 
The innovation here is the addition of "life 
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cycle" to the Design-to-('ost process, which 
previously only considered development costs. 
DTLCC is intended to be an iterati\,e 
process, which requires C O O I  dination, common 
ground rules and d:tta, and stiong 
ni a n a ge me n t Cost - des i g n 
tradeoffs must be made continuously, i n  the 
light of experience and forecasts. 
in c e n t 1 v e s . 
5.3.3 Implementation of Cost R.laiiagement 
Planning 
The major components of a cost nianagemenl 
system were outlined above, ;iIong with 
objectives and criteria for  each component. 
In the three areas prec,ei> teti, actions are 
being taken by the Sp:ice Station Program to 
implement a strong c (, s t i n n  n :ige me n t 
capability. Some actions a n d  decisions have 
already been taken. Other efforts are in 
progress, and initial systems or models are 'in 
place. Yet other steps are in various stages 
of form u 1 a t i o n , 
proposal, review, recommendation, and 
commitment. 
c o 11s ide r a t i o n , pro b I e m 
As enumerated and described below, these 
actions are listed i n  order,  within each of the 
three (Organization, Process, and Analysis 
Support) areas, from past to future.  Thus, 
those at  the lower end of each list are more 
tentative than those at the toD. 
O w  an i za t i on Recoin in en tl  a t ias 
Organizational changes consis I of permanent 
reo r g a n i za t i o n of the Pro g ram's ma n age rn e n t 
structure. Included are newly defined 
functions, roles and missions, and 
information flows . 
Desipn and 1mr)lemen t SSOJF Functions 
Structure. In the recommended operations 
concept presented by the Space Station 
Operations Task Force (SSOTF), cost 
management is integrated into the functional 
hierarchy at  the strategic, tactical, and 
execution levels (both for  mature operations 
and for the transition period from 
development to mature  operations).  
Implementntion of the SSOTF operations 
concept will greatly enhance the Program's 
ability to conduct strategic planning and cost 
analysis, :~nd  to exercise management control. 
Further success in  managing costs will 
depend upon th: fidelity with which this 
recommended st xc tu re  is put  into place. 
The  Program management structure 
recomniended by the SSOTF separated the 
operations and de \  elopnient functions to 
provide a countsrbalance to pressures to 
m i n i ni i ,?e u p f r o n 1 D DTSr E e x pen d i t  u res at  
the expense of larger expenditures during 
later years. 
This functional organization provides a 
s t ro n g , the 
upper levels 3f the Program, to 
c o u n te r t a I a n ce the matrix orga n i za t i on at  the 
exec u t io n le ve 1s. 
h ie ra rc h i c a 1 s u pe r s t r IIC t u re at 
Centralize (a t  a single location) 
Su 5 t ai ti ip Eo pin ee ri  n g. The SSOTF 
recommended gr:idual centralization of 
sustaining engineering functions at  KSC, 
commensurate wit$ Program management 
deter ni i n :I t i o n t h a t the correspond i n g space 
systems have reacshed their performance 
maturity. Depot repair activities would 
eventually be 1ocatl:d entirely at  KSC, but 
the analysis and assessments portion of 
sustaining engineering would remain at  the 
Centers where the components were 
developed. Logi'itics support  will be 
transferred to KSC lvithin one year after the 
system or element has been delivered to the 
Program. 
-- Eqtahlish Logistics and Supportability 
Function. A high -level focus is needed 
within the program on logistics and 
supportability concerns, which is being 
implemented in the form of Logistics Support 
Analysis (LSA)  at H Q .  This is consistent 
with the focus on life-cycle costs throughout 
this cost nimagernent section. The RFP for  
the PSC (Program Support Contractor) 
includes LSA among i t s  tasks. 
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Establish A&R A d ~ o c a t c  a t  HO leiel .  
NASA proposes (and the SSOTF concurs) 
establishing a position within tlie Operations 
Division (NASA Headquarters) with 
responsibility for  advocating automation and 
robotics. This position is to ensure tha t  
artificial intelligence and automation receive 
the appropriate emphasis during the 
technology evaluations arid during the efforts 
to prepare for  the operations phase. 
Management Information. Several 
information systems are being designed to 
provide managers with improved cost and 
performance information i n  a timely manner. 
These include T M I S  ( the  Technical 
Man age men t Inform a I ion S185 t e m ) and SS 1 S 
(the Space Station Information System). 
- Recom m end at  i on s (30 11 cc ri i  i 11 6 Process a 11 d 
Procedures for Decision? 
Where numerous decisions must be taken, at 
all levels, in which cost is one of several 
factors, the processes by which decisions are 
made and the incentivcs affecting the 
decision makers are niore important than the 
specific substance of each decision. Having 
a good process in the right place is better 
than having the right answer in  the u'rong 
place. 
lnst i t~ i te  Formal Chance Ilcoiicst Kcview 
and Approval Process. A formal change 
request review and approval process should 
be instituted to evaluate impacts of proposed 
configuration and service changes. Review 
includes impacts on safety, net station 
out pu ts , re1 ia bi I i t y , i n  t e r 11 at io na I ag reeme n t s , 
as well as costs. Requests would be 
submitted by Centers/contractors and 
approved by the Space Station Control Board 
(SSCB), in consultation with other HQ units. 
NASA utilized a formal change request 
review and approval process in Phase B. 
Change requests were reviebved by Level B, 
in conjunction with Headquarters and the 
four  Work Packages. Changes to program 
requirements required approval by the Space 
Station Control Board (SSCB, chaired by the 
Prog r a m D i rector ) . 
Altliougli tlie following description does not 
represent a complete plan for  processing 
change requests, these elements should be 
covered: 
o Use of a model, such as the 
System Design Tradeoff Model 
(SDTM) discussed below, a tool for  
analysis and accounting of the 
niany impacts of such changes, in 
part i c u 1 a r : 
- Lifecycle cost, including 
- N e t  station outputs 
- Size of systems/elements 
- E f f e c t s  o n  o t h e r  
DDTL!E and operations cost 
s > steins / e  I e men t s 
o Evaluation of these and other 
important impacts, e.g. the impact 
on safety,  reliability, and 
i n te r n a t io n a 1 which 
niay be difficult to capture within 
a m o d e l l i n g  f r a m e w o r k .  
Evalua t ion  c r i te r ia  inc lude  
feasibility, user friendliness, and 
cost effectiveness. 
a g r ee in e n ts , 
o Life-cycle cost data should be 
reported i n  levelized annual cost 
(levelized in either constant or  
current year dollars), base year 
LCC, and current year dollar LCC 
te r 111 s. 
Formalize the  Operations Cost 
RIa 11 a g e in e 11 t I' r o c e 5s 
The Task Force concluded t h a t  the Space 
Station Program should adopt an annual 
operations cost estimating process which 
accounts for all  major activities required for 
Space Station operations. 
o All operations costs considered to 
be significant should be identified, 
i n cl ud i n g on -orbit and ground 
facilities, hardware,  support  
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s y s t e m s ,  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  
develop me tit . 
o User costs influenced by Space 
Station policies and procedures 
should also be identified and 
tracked. 
o The cost analysis process should be 
formalized at  the Program 
Requ i remen t s  a n d  Analysis 
(PR&A) level. 
o To facilitate a formal cost 
management process, the Program 
should attempt to eslablish a 
log ica I cons is t e nc y bet ween the 
P r o g r a m  Work B r e a k d o w n  
Structure (\i'BS) and the Unique 
Project Nu m be r ( U P N ) . 
EF ta bI ish Des i p 11 - to - I, i f e - C J' c I e - Cos t 
Process (DTLCC). This would be a 
Headquarters management technique to 
define Space Station sb'steni and element 
designs that minimize the life-cycle costs of 
m e e t i n g  p r e s p e c i f i e d  p e r f o r m a n c e  
require men t s , p r o g ra m 
funding constraints. DTLCC would begin 
d u r i ng the design a nd de  ve lop men t phases 
and iteratively approach the best design as 
information is passed back and forth between 
headquarters, NASA field Centers, and 
contractors. The  process would continue 
until all system/elenient interface and design 
choices have been made. 
g i v e n the a 11 nu a 1 
NASA should require \ i P  and PSC proposers 
to offer an integrated life-cvcle cost 
evaluation process ns part of the design-to- 
cost effort .  This integrated effort  shoi~ld 
reflect an LCC subprocess which permits 
evaluation of the WP unique issues and 
evaluation of system unique changes that cut 
across all areas of Station operations and may 
impact several work packages. 
Contract Inccr~t i ics  and E \ a l u a t i o n .  
NASA should require proposers to suggest an 
incentives and awards schedule based on 
va l ida t ed  p r o t o t y p i n g  of s p e c i f i c  
supportability concepts su:h as the reduction 
i n  IVA maintenance hours across the station 
;is a result of iniprovements proposed for  one 
WP. NASA should direct the PSC to develop 
:I two-tiered concept for aroposal evaluation 
which provides award;  for  contractor 
proposals which may reduce overall 
operations costs but whi1:h may increase a 
particular \VP contract coc,ts. Suggestions by 
one \VP contract may affect  costs and 
performance by another. Contract clauses 
must be drafted to allow t'or such synergism. 
!Supportability and operit ions costs goals 
(bogeys) may be suggected for  each WP 
functional are2 prior to final contract 
nego t in t ions. 
Es t a 1) I i s h Opera t i 011 Cost Bench marks. 
4 n  a r r a y  o f  o r e r a t i o n s  c o s t  
t n r g e ts/ be nc h m n r ks w o u 1 cI be es ta bl is hed for  
teach element and system, to be used to 
(evaluate proposed changes. A process should 
be established for comparing cost projections 
with cost estimates from contractors, at  
scheduled Program milestones, and the results 
reported annually or  as needed. 
Life  C\cle Cost f<eser\e. Without a 
reasonable expectation of funding for  design 
changes, Program managers and their 
contractors can not be expected to diligently 
search fo r  l ife-cycle cost-reducing 
innovations . E!, eca u s e si i; n i f i c a n t operations 
cost reductions are most likely to be achieved 
early in the design process, it is important 
that a life-cycle cost reserve fund  be set 
aside early i n  Phase C / D  to support 
improve me n ts in  des i g n . 
This reserve pool might function as follows. 
The Program Director would allocate 
development funds,  over-and-above initial 
work package allocations, to fund  approved 
life-cycle cost saving DDTGtE investments. 
A n y  work package could propose DDT&E 
investments for  its systems/elements that 
yield projected Station life-cycle cost savings. 
Typical in \  estments might include higher 
efficiency motors (requlring less electrical 
power), lighter componc.nts (requiring less 
launch ca pa b i 1 i t  y ) , a nd higher mean time 
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between failure components (requiring less 
astronaut maintenance and logistical system 
capacity). Proposals for more complicated 
design changes would also be expected. The 
primary criteria would be the degree to 
which total station costs are reduced. Those 
investments with the highest life-cycle payoff 
per dollar invested would be approved and 
funded first. 
- AI t e rii a ti ve C o 11 tract 11 a I hl a n a eein en t 
hlechanisms. Current cost-plus format may 
be suitable for  R&D efforts, but recurring or  
routine cost items should be obtained through 
contracts with different incentives. Some 
alternatives have been explored, and success 
is mixed to date. Distributed projects might 
be managed by HQ SE&I rather than Centers. 
A recent change has been to make Work 
Package managers responsible to H Q  Program 
managers rather than to the Center Directors 
where the Work Packages reside. This 
reorientation will give strategic-level 
managers greatly increased control over costs 
and performance. 
Annual Operations Cost Summary 
ReDort. A regular report  should be prepared 
annually fo r  informing management and 
Congress of historical cost profiles, current 
expenditures against previous estimates, and 
projected costs. These figures will offer  
several types of breakdowns, but not in great 
detail, so as to provide a clear overview of 
how well the Program is succeeding in its 
effor t  to monitor and control costs. 
This cost management report will be closely 
tied to performance measures (output,  
productivity, utilization, etc.) generated by 
the performance monitoring system. 
R ecom me 11 d at i on s 
Sunnort 
Con ce  r n i n P An a I vs is 
Development of tools and procedures is 
necessary to predict operations costs, to 
factor operations cost considerations into the 
design and development process, to encourage 
NASA managers and their contractors to 
actively search for  ways to reduce life-cycle 
costs, and to monitor progress toward 
achieving cost-effective Space Station 
operations. 
Cost Estimation arid Forecasting 
Rlethods. A group of simple estimating and 
forecasting tools should be constructed for  
establishing targets (or benchmarks, or 
"bogeys") and monitoring progress. These 
tools can utilize spreadsheets and other off-  
the-shelf software, until specific needs go 
beyond these capabilities. Emphasis will be 
placed on utilizing data that are  currently 
collected and available through normal 
budgeting and accounting channels. 
NASA has developed, or  is developing a 
number of tools in this area. One such tool, 
an operations cost model, is described in 
detail in Appendix A. 
Software Costs arid Cost Estimation. 
Software is a major cost component,  and one 
that is difficult to estimate. Also, success at  
i ni pro v i n g prod u c t i vi t y through automat ion 
will depend upon the effor t  expended on 
developing and implementing software. 
Recent NASA experience indicates that the 
size and complexity of flight and ground 
software is increasing, and software is 
playing an  important role functionally and 
costwise. It is central to automation, 
robotics, expert  systems, data handling, and 
communications, both on the station and on 
the ground. 
Software cost estimation poses a major 
challenge for  several reasons. Most 
importantly, a11 work packages will use a 
c o ni m o n Soft w a re S u p p o r t E n vir o n m e n t (SS E) 
and the Ada language. Unfortunately,  there 
is no software costing database for  this 
combination of technologies. Therefore,  it is 
necessary to either develop new models or  
modify the existing ones to reflect the unique 
Space Station software characteristics. 
Efforts are being funded to improve software 
cost estimating techniques. Models of the 
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soft w a r e ma in ten a nc e 
process that reflect NASA'$ characteristics are 
needed to facilitate software nianagemerit 
efforts and improve the capability to assez,s 
automation and robotics app1ic:itions. When 
operational, these models will be integrated 
into a life cycle cost model for  the entire 
stat ion. 
de  v e I o p m e n t :and 
Construct System Design TradeolTf 
Model. Implementing the DTC process will 
require the development of a system design 
manngement model thn t calculates each 
system/element's indirect costs. The system 
design model would c.ilculate the  gross 
s ys t e m/ele men t sizes re (1 u i rcd to pro v itie 
prespecified net user services (net of 
house kee p i ng require men t s 1. an d e:; t i mat e t lie 
housekeeping consumption costs for- each 
systeni/element. This en3bles each designer 
to consider the cost impazt of using services 
pro v ided by other systems /e 1 e men t s . 
In Phase B, N 4 S A  Ideveloped j'ery 
preliminary prototype ~ e r s i o n s  of such a 
model, in the System Accounting Model 
(SAM) developed at  JSC and the System 
Integration Model (SIM) developed at JPL. 
The System Design Tradeoff Model is a more 
refined version of these models. Editor's  
note: Thi s  model was itiitiall)) called the 
System Design Managcnietit Model ( S D M M )  
arid later the Sys tem Accouiitirrg Model f like 
the earlier model developed af JSC). S D T M  
is the usage withiii the program in 1988, arid 
references to this model have heen changed 
throughout this report t o  coir f o r m  to this. 
Establish a Performance M o n i t o r i a  
performance monitoring (program diagnostics) 
system should be established to aid managers 
in monitoring production and utilization, as 
well as evaluating costs and cost 
effectiveness. The  system can be 
i ni p 1 e men ted increment a 1 I y , and ex pe r ie lice 
derived for  guiding subsequent directions and 
emphases. 
(Program Diaenostics)- Svstem. A 
and analytic tool,. previously described. The 
activity can be incorporated into an MIS 
system. Management reports f rom the 
performance monitoring system should be 
produced at frequent intervals for  internal 
use, and summary publications for  wider use 
generated annually. 
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5.4 RlODELlNG SPACE STATION COSTS by Robert Shishko 
This section focuses on methods and niodels 
of estimating Space Station costs and on their 
use within the Space Station Program. The 
principal conclusion is that a variety of 
design and policy questions can be addressed 
in a cost-conscious environment only if costs 
can be confidently estimated. While the 
effort  required to build the methods and 
models for  such estimates may be high, the 
payoff to the SSP is signif-icantly higher. 
Appendix A describes a particular operations 
coit  model i n  detail. Appendix €3 describes 
some results from this model t h n t  were 
generated for,  and presented to. the Task  
Force. 
5.1.1 \\'hy hlodel Costs'! 
A life cycle cost model, when properly 
constructed and supported, can provide a 
s ys t e ma t ic 1 ink bet \vee n p rog ra in des i g n and 
operations decisions and policies on the one 
hand and the LCC implications 011 the other. 
Another advantage of using a model arises 
f rom the fact  that the answers one obtains 
are independent of who runs the model-- 
that is, are reproducible by anyone i n  
possession of the same input data. 
An alternative to a cost model is to conduct 
a continual series of "grass roots" estimates. 
Each time a new "what i f"  question was 
raised, a new estimate would have to be 
made. Each change of assumptions voids at 
least parts of the old estimate. Consequently, 
such cost estimating "exercises" have 
transitory value only. Because this process is 
time - co nsu m i ng and the 
number of such exercises that can be 
conducted is i n  reality severely limited. 
Reproducibility is not gunranteed either. 
Even i f  costing assumptions were held 
constant f rom exercise to exercise, those 
interpreting the assu ni p t ions a ncl i n n  k i ng the 
estimates m:iy be different as  organizations 
change over time. 
In bo r - i n tens i ve , 
One-time cost exercises do have value in two 
ways. They may provide a way of validating 
a cost model (or its 
they may provide 
special insights into 
p a rani et e rs ) , a n d s e c o n d , 
the cost modeler with 
the true sources of costs. 
5.4.2 Characteristics of a Useful hlodel 
All models are not created equal. There are 
a number of \'cry desirable characteristics 
that determine the long-run usefulness of a 
model. These are described below. 
blore often than not, models are developed 
and used for a particular project or study 
and then are discarded. Generally, this 
occurs because a model tailored for  one 
purpose or study is unable to address a 
different,  though related, issue. Space 
Station cost models should be able to address 
a number of cost issues and support a 
number of applications. Some of these 
applications might include: ( I )  supporting 
design-to-life cycle cost studies, (2) aiding 
intern a t i o n a 1 cost s ha r i n g negotiations , ( 3 )  
supporting pricing policies, (4) helping 
budget preparers, ( 5 )  performing operations 
cost risk assessments, and (6) evaluating 
con t r a c t o r est i i n  a t es . 
These applications will occur during Phase 
CiD,  and some will continue into Phase E. 
I t  will be necessary to have the appropriate 
interfaces so that each Space Station 
organization will be able to extract the 
particular data i t  needs, but there is a clear 
benefit to having a single high-level cost 
model off of which the entire program 
ope ra t es . 
A second desirable characteristic is that of 
t ra  nspa r e n c y - - tha t  is , al go r i t h ins, 
parameters, supporting data, and inner 
workings of Space Station cost models should 
no+ be hidden from the user. The clear 
the 
benefit of this is in the trac.eabilit\, of the 
model’s results. Not e \  e r>one  ma! agree 
mith the results, but at  least l hey  know hou 
they were der i \ed .  
Tr:insparencj also aids i n  the \aliilation 
ptocess. It is ensier foi  :i model to be 
accepted \ \hen its tlocu~nentntron is complete 
and open fo r  comment. P r o ~ ~ r i e t a r y  models 
often suffer  f rom a lack of credibilit) 
because of a lack of transparenc).  
I I s c r Fr i c 11 d 1 i I I  c s F 
User friend I iness. cle:irl!~ a des irabl t’ 
characteristic to a new user. ir; often used  to 
desct-ibe models thnt are  not. \ \ ’ l int  is user- 
friendly to one person may be :I niglitmnre to 
ano t lie r . It o t iv i t lis t:i nd i ti g t h is a b  u s e d  t t’i-ni, 
Space Station cost models should contain on-  
line help and definitions, should be menu- 
dri\.en ~ , h e r e  possible, ha\-e a clear logical 
structure, come equipped with clear 
documentation, and should require only a 
few, da1.s training f o r  the first-time user. 
The  model should be furnished with a 
complete default  or  baseline case so that 
users with narrow specialized interests should 
be able to use the aspect(s) of the model of 
interest \rritliout having to specify other 
as 11 e c ts . 
One aspect of user friendliness is portability, 
such t l i n t  i t  is possible to inst:~ll o r  :iccess the 
ni od el \r- i  t 11 ni in  i m II m eq u ir, m e II t , cost , :ind 
hookup effort ,  so t1i:it i t  c311 be widely uscd 
fo r  analysis. The  ideal is comp:itible I’C- 
based software, o r  time-share if the code 
be c o nies too 1 a rge . 
G ro \\, t Ii f’o te n t i 31 
I t  is likely that as the Space Station program 
nioi’es f rom Phase C/D to P h x e  I:, O U I -  
understanding of costs will impr-o\ e. This 
can be expected because of improvements in 
the quality of data and our  untlei-standing of 
the underlying processes. Space Station cost 
models should be designed to mal..e data and 
a Igor i t 11 m u pda t i ng routine . 
A growth potenti:ll also nieans that the 
appropi inte scars and  placeholders be 
a c a i I :i b 1 e to 3 x 0  m 11 iod a t e new Space S ta t ion 
hardware elements . TI) is ca pab i 1 it y s hou I d 
allow tlie user to def ine alternative 
e\ olutionary growtli paths f o r  the Station 
itself. 
H espo ti F i 
Iiesyonsivcncss of a :nodel is a measure of its 
power to distinguish Imong different  options. 
This is probably tlie most important of tlic 
characteristics discussed. Spnce Station cost 
models should fore8nost  be respoi1sii.e to 
changes  i n  tlie Sp:ice Stntion d e s i g n - t h a t  is, 
to changes  i n  the numbel- of characteristics 
of its su l : sy t en i s  and coniponents. l h e  
modcls should :ilso be sensitive to alternati1.e 
operations concepts, 2nd  to d i f f e ren t  logistics 
po I i c ie s and structures during the opera t ions 
phase. The  models should have the 
capability to model c~evelopnient-opPrations 
cost tradeoffs. 
I t  is possible that ch:inges in  the design or  
operations concepts d o  not give rise to great 
changes in costs, but  instead act to alter the 
value of  Stntion operacions. This  may occur, 
for  example, if a design o r  operations 
concept change decreases the amount of 
:ivailable on-orbit  creiw time. Space Station 
cost niodelz. should quantify such value 
cliangcs along with projected cost changes. 
5.4.3 hlotleliiig Life Cycle Cost 
The Y.  ice Station is intended to be a multi- 
P L I ~ ~ L J J ~ ?  facility whose operational life may 
extend well into the 21st century.  M’hile is 
may be difficult  to say exactly how long the 
Station will remain a productive component 
ot’ NASA’s long-term program, it is 
instructive to note that the Air Force’s B-52s 
have been acti\.e for  more than 35 years, and 
the Navy’s Forrestal-class carriers with life- 
extending improvements will have been 
active for  over 50 years by the t ime they are 
retired. I t  is therefore very likely that the 
Space Station we build in the 1990s will last 
fo r  decades bcfoi-e i t  too is deactivated. 
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While the appropriate concept of cost for  
decision purposes is always life cycle cost, 
that is, the total cost of a project, as opposed 
to development cost, the importance of this 
distinction will clearly depend on the re1atii.e 
magnitude of development and operations 
costs, the two constituents of life cycle cost, 
i n  the project under consideration. 111 the 
past, cost modeling for  space systems has 
largely focused on the development costs. 
Such a focus would be inappropriate for  
Space Station, since over the time horizon 
envisioned for  Space Station, operations costs 
represent more than half of the LCC, even 
when those costs are  discounted. 
The ability to estimate Space Station 
operations costs systematically is an  important 
part of doing LCC analysis. Without this 
ability, NASA would be severely hampered 
i n  determining what design and operations 
tradeoffs to make. I n  short, it would not be 
possible to determine the minimum amount 
of resources needed for  the Space Station 
Program (SSP) to provide a given level of 
capability to users. 
Congress has expressed concern over Space 
Station operations costs on several occasions- 
- for  example in a letter to Administrator 
Fletcher f rom the Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on Space Science and 
Applications in June 1986. That letter urged 
NASA to "emphasize the reduction of 
operations costs" for  Space Station, and to 
expedite "the development of an operations 
(cost) model" so that appropriate tradeoffs 
can be made now. 
For these reasons, the Space Station cost 
model must be a life cycle cost model. 
Supporting this niodel may be models of 
development or  operations costs, or  particular 
elements of costs, e.g. software costs. Work 
within the Program to develop this 
comprehensive Space Station cost niodel is 
still in its early stages. Modeling of 
particular components, e.g. software costs, is 
not much fur ther  along. These tools were 
therefore not available to aid the Task Force 
in their work. 
Fo r t u na te 1 y , the  situ at  i o n regard in g 
operations costs was brighter. As described 
below i n  part IV, both Rockwell and the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory briefed the Task Force 
on their respective cost models, and the JPL 
model beca me the on 1 y co 111 p re he 11 s i ve mod e 1 
used by the Task Force. 
Because of this use, the remainder of this 
section will focus solely on the use of an 
operations cost model. Appendix A focuses 
on MESSOC in particular and Appendix B 
describes an application of MESSOC to a 
Task Force issue. 
5.4.4 Integration of an Operations Cost 
hlodel into the Space Station Program 
As noted earlier, the Space Station operations 
cost niodel for  the SSP should be capable of 
sup port i n g a p p 1 i c a t i o 11s. These 
applications will naturally shift  as the 
program moves from Phase C / D  into Phase 
E. It is useful at this point to describe i n  
some more detail how the operations cost 
model fits into the SSP. This description is 
divided into two parts: ( 1 )  maintaining the 
fidelity of the model and associated 
databases, and (2) using the model in a 
coordinated nianner across the SSP's 
inter r e 1 a t e d de  c is ion process e s . 
sever a 1 
hlai 11 t ai 11 i I i f  the Cost hlodel 
A proposed process for  maintaining the 
operations cost model and  other models is 
described in Figure 5-1. Inputs to the 
process are specific data f rom a variety of 
sources, while the outputs are updated model 
software and databases to be used in 
conjunction with the model. The  process 
should be facilitated by the use of the 
Tech n ica 1 and M a nage m e n t Information 
Systeni (TMIS). 
The heart of the process is conducted by a 
Space Station Program Model Maintenance 
Organization (SSMMO). Its j ob  is to ensure 
the quality of not only the operations cost 
model, but of all the SSP high-level cost 
management models. (This function could be 
extended to engineering and other 
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management models as well.) To accorliplish 
this, the SSR4MO updates source codes to 
ensure that algorithms reflect the current 
program,  receives and implements  
(appropriate) suggestions from model users, 
maintains copies of key SSP databases such 
as the Engineering Data  Base (EDD), and  
updates as needed other databases on \I hich 
the operations cost model niay depend. 
A t  such regular periods ar  niay be deemed 
appropriate, the SShIhIO promulgates new 
source codes and associated databases. For 
example, the operations cost model may be 
updated every six months a t  first, and then 
annually as Phase E approaches. The 
associated databases may be updated every 
month at  first, and then quarterly. 
Dissemination of both source codes and 
databases could naturnlly be done through 
TM IS. 
The placement of the SSMMO, while 
independent of the process, is an important 
management issue. The SSP-wide and 
technical nature of the SSMMO function 
suggests that i t  i n i t i a l l y  belongs in Level I I .  
I t  is recommended that i t  be located there 
\v i t  h i 11 the Pro g r a ni Require men t s a 11 d 
Assess ni e n t ( P R s( .4 ) organ i za t i o n to f a c i 1 i t  a t  e 
a strong analytic c:ipability. 
U F i ii e. t ti e Or, era t i  o 11 F Cos t Rlo d el 
The relationship of different operations cost 
model uses during Phase C/D is shown in 
Figure 5 - 2 .  I n  a sense,  i t  is an elaboration 
of the NASA portion of the MESSOC User 
Groups box in Figure 5-1. To  describe the 
relationships in  a few sentences tends to 
understate the complexity of the processes, 
but the figure alone is insufficient as well. 
The Level I1 Design-to-LCC process would 
integrate costs (DDT&E and operations) with 
the engineering and technical decision- 
making at  the system level. The Level I11 
Design-to-LCC process integrates costs with 
the engineering a nd tec hn ica 1 dec is i o 11 - 
making at  the subsystem level. At both 
Levels, operations cost estimates (expected 
values and distributions) are  passed to the 
budget and cost risk estimation process. The 
budget and cost risk processes are naturally 
linked vertically in the Program Operating 
Plan (POP). 
The Level I I  Design-to-LCC also operates 
directly i n  the Operations Concept Review 
process. Should the Station design change in 
1 esponse to LCC considel ations, the 
ope1 :ition\ concept should be recertified 
ag:iinst the changes. Similarly, if the 
operations concept should change due to 
some exogenous factor,  then the Design-to- 
LCC process should alter the Station design 
req u ire m e n t s a nd ope r a t io n s cost estimates . 
The policy analysis process at Level I may 
address a variety of issues during Phase C/D.  
A I mos t ce r ta i 11 1 y , these s hou Id i nc 1 u d e Stat ion 
pricing options and international cost sharing 
options. U S .  proposals for  international cost 
sharing should be analyzed--that is, have 
their budgetary effects estimated using the 
operations cost model--before placing them 
o 11 the ne got i a t i  on t a b le; si 111 i la r I y , partner 
proposals should be evaluated for  their 
budget a r y i m p1 ica t i o 11s. T I1 e i i i  t e r na t io iia 1 
negotiating process is expected to converge 
011 a particular operations management 
scheme and operations cost sharing 
mechanism. As this occurs, there should be 
feedback to the Operations Concept Review 
process, the top-level budget and cost risk 
estimation process, and the price setting 
process as well. 
Lastly, the operations cost model can be used 
to determine data useful to the U.S. Station 
price setting process. What pricing policies 
emerge f’rom this process will bear directly 
on how much of the Station’s operations costs 
will be paid by (lion-NASA) users. This 
information also needs to be passed to the 
budget process. 
During Phase E,  some of these processes will 
undergo a transmutation. The Level I1 
Design-to-LCC process niay be absorbed by 
a Level I operations organization that 
concentrates on the growth and evolution of 
the Station. The operations cost implications 
of alternntive evolutionary paths can be 
addressed by the operations cost model 
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through the policy arlalysis process. In that 
process, the Level 111 organizations that dealt 
with LCC will probably still be needed to 
develop detailed data on proposed new 
hardware elements. Once such a new 
element is approved, the budget and risk 
estimation process conies into play at all 
1 eve 1 s . 
The international negotiating process during 
Phase E is likely to be less intense to the 
extent is 
successful. There may be a need, however, 
to adjust  the operations cost sharing 
arrangements as t rue costs become evident 
and Station growth is considered. The 
operations cost model can be used to evaluate 
proposed changes in the cost sharing 
agreements . 
t lia t manage men t - by - e xce p t ion 
5.4.5 Assessment of Alternati\e Operations 
Cost hlodels 
The Space Station Operations Task Force was 
briefed by Rockwell International Space 
Station Systems Di\ ision. Rockwell has 
developed a collection of interdependent on- 
line simulations and programs. Together 
these generate operations costs in a variety of 
forms. Their  approach was described as 
"mission-driven"--that is, given a set of 
mission payloads to the Station, what are the 
up-weight transportation requirements, 
g r o u n d  requi rements ,  and on-orb i t  
requirements precisely needed to support that 
set. It was evident that Rockwell had done 
much to improve the Mission Requirements 
Data Base (MRDB) to support their approach, 
and to demonstrate the role of their approach 
in evaluating different user charge policy 
options, growth scenarios, and potential 
Station productivity en ha nce me n t s. 
The Task Force was also briefed by JPL (Jet 
Pro p u 1 s i o n mod e 1, 
MESSOC (Model for  Estimating Space Station 
Operations Costs). This model has been 
developed under funding from Level I and 
previously f rom Level B. MESSOC is an  
"activity-driven'' model. In brief, MESSOC 
asks what activities are programmed for  each 
year; activities may be classed as 
L a b o r a to r y ) o n the i r 
m i ss io tis / p a y 1 on d s , t r a n s po r t a t i o n , and ground 
support. MESSOC then calculates what those 
activities cost, a n d  how much is still available 
for  additional activities or as a reserve. The 
JPL presentation included examples of how 
the model could be used to investigate 
a 1 t e r na t i ve m a i n t e n a n c e po 1 ic i e s and t ra i n i n g 
policies. 
The Task Force noted certain similarities and 
differences i n  the two approaches. Both 
appro a c 11 e s re c o g n i ze t 11 a t transport at ion to 
the Station will be about half of the annual 
operations costs, and that the budget impact 
of Space Station is not the same as the 
operations costs. Both approaches evidence 
a common heritage in modeling spares, and 
both approaches could be used to evaluate 
ce r t a in  product i v i t  y en 11 a n ce in e n t s s uc 11 as 
automation :ind robotics. Lastly, both 
approaches could support  a Design-to-LCC 
process. 
The differences tend to reside in the details 
of the models, but two stand out.  First, 
K o c k we 1 1's a p p r o a c h re 12 res e n t s a c o 11 e c t i o n 
of models and programs, whose relationship 
to each other is not wholly recognizable, 
while the MESSOC approach is a single 
integrated program under a common user 
interface that deals with the core Station, 
platforms, and ground support .  Second, the 
Rockwell approach does not give the same 
de t a i I e d a p p r o a c 11 to g r o u n d s up p o r t activities 
as does MESSOC. 
5.4.6 Rlodel Recoin rneiida t ions 
The SSOTF recommended that IvlESSOC be 
adopted as t he h i g h - 1 e ve 1 Space Stat ion 
operations cost model. I n  addition to the 
reasons discussed above, MESSOC has a high 
degree of transportability across the SSP and 
Io w e r train in  g requirements for  first - ti me 
users. Most important, the SSOTF believed 
that MESSOC will meet the requirements set 
out earlier in this section, once development 
is completed. This recommendation is not in 
any way meant to preclude the use of other 
c o n t r:i c tor - de ve 1 oped ope r a t ions cos t in o d e Is 
and programs for  specific studies. 
Support i n g reco ni 111 e nda t io tis . 
Panel makes the f o l l o ~  ing additio11:il 
recom 111 e n da  t i 011 s: 
t h is ge 11 era 1 
1.  Continued MESSOC Development. 
M ESSOC should be supported into Phase 
E.  
2.  System Design Modcl. The SSP shoulc' 
de  v e Io 13 a s y s t e i i i  cl es i !;ti t rade o f f nio d e I 
( S D T M )  to model l i k  cycle costs and 
performance. l'liis iiiodel should lx; 
coi1ip:itible with MESSOC SO that t l i f .  
rep rese t i  t a t i o ti of ope I' a t  i o n s costs i i i  t h i:; 
s ys te 111 ~ C C O U  II t i 11 g model reflect 1; 
MESSOC results. A \,alidation plan f o r  
both models needs to be established and  
executed. 
3 .  Databases. Both models need accurats? 
d n t n  to  be of vnlue in the cost 
m:i ria ge me i i  t 13 1-0 cess , W 11 i le they i n n  y 
require d3tn in  a sp?cific format,  the 
databases off of ivliich MESSOC am3 
SDTM run should not exic,t 
independentl\~ of the rest of the SSI'. 
Instead, the hlESSOC or  SDTP4 
databases should  be I-eflections of well- 
e s t a b 1 i s 11 e d , w .' I 1  - 1x1 a i  n t a I 11 e d 
progranimritic d:itab:iser; that represetit 
the state of the SSP. The  key databases 
f o r  MESSOC include the following: 
( a )  1,opictics &Dport A n a l ~ s ~  
Report (LSARj, .  This databrii,e 
contains the det:iiled data necessai y 
to establish and run an integrated 
logistics system. I t  must be viev+.ed 
as one of the highest priority 
ope  I a t io tis - o r i e 11 t ed d a t a b  a ses 
within the SSP, and should be 
placed 111 s e t \  ice as soon 3s 
pi actical. The maintenance of the 
LSAK is logically the responsibility 
of the SSI' Logistics Operations 
Center (LOC). 
( b )  Rlis'iioii lieauireinerits D a h  
Base ( h l R D B ) .  This database 
contains detailed (data on proposi:d 
user pa l  loads and servicing events. 
I t  is the recornmendation of tl i is  
Tash € o r c e  that the MRDH be 
continut.d, and that i t  be expanded 
by ad(iing data  elements that 
\vould i n n k e  the estimation of user 
integrnt ion a n d  logistics costs inore 
accurat  ?. The maintenance of the 
M R D B  in  the long run is logically 
the rejpo~isibil i ty of the User 
Supper. Organization (USO). 
( c )  Q s t  n o d  Content Database 
(C'CDIrl. l 'his database does not 
fot-niaIIy exist at the present time. 
I t  is tlie Operations Task Force's 
recoiiir,iendntion that i t  be 
est a bl i: hed and 1113 in t a ined t 11 rough 
a t  leas1 Phase C/D. This database 
a I Io w s I h e system a t i c i de 11 t i  f i c a t ion 
of all flight and ground elements 
:ind facilities in the SSP along u.ith 
their associated DDTSrE costs. 
Certain operations parameters for 
g r o u n ci f ac i I i t  ies 
Mrould be available as well, 
providing the logical link between 
their I )DT&E and operations costs. 
This catabase could be initialized 
with data f rom the Cost 
Assess m e 11 t Activity reported i n  
J a n u a r y  1987. Its maintenance 3s 
tlie SSP changes and matures is 
logically the responsibility of the 
Level I 1  Program Control Group 
( I'CC :I. 
e 1 e men t s and 
((1) &igiiicering Data Base (EDB) .  
This  tlatnbnse cont:iins basic mass, 
vo 1 u ti1 e ,  a n d 
r e l a t e d  m a s s  p r o p e r t i e s  
info r i 11 a t io 11. The  ma i 11 t e na nce of 
the EDB is logically the 
responsibility of the Level 11 SE&I 
o rg a 11 i za t i o n . 
cent e r - of- g r a\  i t  y , 
International partners should be 
required to contribute to these 
databases. This recommendation is 
(1 b v i o us 1 y no t i  - co n t ro ve rs i a 1 for  the 
EDB, but some data in the other 
databases might be considered 
proprietar) or  sensitive, and thus iiiiglit 
he excluded. In  particular, the CCDB 
iniglit contain only content data fo r  the 
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international partners. I n  any case, 
appropriate safeguards could be build i n  
to prevent unauthorized disclosure of 
sensitive data to the other p:Irtners. 
4. Standards should be established for 
analytic studies invol\ ing ( I  ) LCC 
trades during Phase C/D,  and (2)  
Station growth or e\olution during 
Phase E. I t  is not tlie intention to list 
those standards i n  this report, but on ly  
to suggest some examples. The benefit 
to the SSP is that tlie cost management 
process can be made more rational Lvhen 
the alternatives for  the Station are 
presented in a consistent manner with a 
consistent set of groundrules. 
One useful standard might be that all 
LCC studies involving a change i n  the 
Station baseline design or content be 
required to report results i n  ternis of 
the net present discounted value of such 
a change using a SSP-:igreed discount 
rate. This Lbould  allow an  easier 
ranking of such changes g i \  en the 
funding constraints the SSP ir, likely to 
face. A standard for  growth studies 
might be that all anallses of the 
operations costs for  new elements or 
hardware be required to subinit a 
MESSOC-conipat ible database. That 
would mean, for  example, a list of 
proposed ORUs along w i t h  reliability 
and  xi1 a in t a inn b i 1 i t  y data. 
5 .  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l  S u p p o r t  
Recommendations. A Space Station 
Model Maintenance Organizat ion 
(SSMMO) should be established, whose 
function is not only to ensure the 
quality of the operations cost model, 
but of all high-level cost management 
mod el s. i n t e r f aces 
between the suppliers of data to the 
models and the SSMMO should be 
established. This includes not only the 
various Level 111 organizations, but the 
respo 11 sib I e intern a t io na 1 o rga n i za t i o n s as 
well, for  example, ESTEC. Additional 
interfaces need to be established 
The a p p 1-0 print e 
between the SSMMO a n d  the model 
users. 
Second, within the SSP there needs to 
be es t :I b I is 11 e d a p p r op r i 3 t e in e c 11 a n j s 111 s 
to ensuie that when LCC trades are 
made ,  tlie budget p~ocess  responds 
accoidingly. For example, suppose that 
a proposed change i n  one of the 
Station’s subs)stems or i n  a giound 
facilit) is made and justified on the 
basis of a LCC savings. The change 
requires an upfront investment, which 
is to be recovered during operations. If 
the funds are allocated to implement the 
c 11 a n ge , then t 11 e budget process s h o u 1 d 
decrement the outyear operations 
budgets of the appropriate organization 
accoiding to the projections of the LCC 
annllsis used to justify the investment. 
This requires a n  enormous amount of 
b u dg e t a n d sufficient 
attention i n  the annual budget process 
to the out)rears. I t  also requires a 
ca p:i b i I i t y to s 11 rend opera t io n s cos t 
projections to ninjor SSP funding 
categories. I t  is therefore recommended 
t h a t  a linkage between operations cost 
projections a n d  budget U P N s  (or group 
of UI’Ns) be established as  a part of the 
cost m a n a ge iiie n t process . 
d i sc i p 1 i n  e, 
Appendix A provides a detniled description 
of MESSOC. Appendix B contains a model 
analysis generated for ,  and presented to, the 
Task  Force. This study examines the 
minimization of life cycle cost with respect 
to the repair i n  orbit of electrical and 
e le c tr o n i c Units 
(OR u s ) . 
Orbit a I Rep  lace me n t 
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5 . 5  K l S K  hIANAGEhlENT/SAFETY b y  Williani Pegranl'  
Risk has two common, and  related meanings. 
The f i r s t  is tlie possibility tha t  outcoines may  
differ f rom their expected value. This is the 
economist's definition of risk, and is useful 
for  explaining a wide variety of economic 
activity. Most individuals are  risk-nverse i n  
most aspects of their personal l i \  es: t h e y  buy 
insurance and they demand (and receive) 
higher return f rom stocks tlinn f rom bonds 
since the former a re  more r i sky .  In some 
\vab.s, hourever they are  risk-seeking; hence 
the desire to gamble. 
One might argue t1i:it a public sector agency 
such  i s  N A S A  would  be r isk-averst :  as  \\,ell 
fo r  :i couple of reasons. First, if intli\ iduals 
:i re risk - a verse in t 11 e i r 13 e rso n a1 in vest me 1'1 t 
d e c  is i o 11 s,  t h e y  si m i I n I 1  y m ig 11 t h n  ve t lit, sn ni e 
11 references t 11 e i r p u b 1 i c 
in  ves tnie tit decisions and age  nc ies ni i g li t 
therefore reflect this. Second, the coninion 
conception of the incentives of public sector 
m:inagers ("bureaucrnts") is one of risk 
a \,o i da lice . 
i n  co 1 I e c t i \.e, 
Since NASA presumably faces a risk-return 
tradeoff in t h a t  higher returns are  
accomp:inied by  greater risk, it might 
therefore be interesting to examine the 
projects NASA selects and  rejects in terms of 
their Dercei\ed risk a n d  retutii and  hoic thrs 
squares with tlie public's 
minagers '  risk preferences. 
approach taken here is quite 
relates to a second meaning 
o u t c onies . 
and NASA 
1 lowever, the 
d iff e re i i  t a 11 d 
of tisk. bad 
111 this context, I isk man:igement generally 
n e a n s  minimiiing bad outcomes, not 
uncertainty. Risk mana!;enient in NASA 
genei :illy does not assess the tradeoffs 
between minim 17ntion of uncertainty and 
p rog 1-2 III / n i  i ss io i i  be ne f i t . 
The past and current N \SA approach to 
S?ace Station ric>l, is a coinbination of four  
a 13 11 r 133 c ti ec: 
1 ) 1Jlind optimism 
2)  h4aint:iin optimism in o rde r  to 
co 11 t rol s I i 13 page 
3) Deal \ + p i t h  unfa\,ornble event! after 
they OCCUI- 
4 )  Plan for  uncertainty: anal) ze 
con t i nge n c I e s (cur r e n I too Is i t i  the safety 
arex are failure niocle effect  analyses, 
hazard anLilyses, critical itenis lists, 
problem reporting and corrective 
a c t i o n ) , p u r c ti a se "i tis 11 r a n c e", m e c li a n i sni 
that yields improved I isk information as 
time progr csses. "In< urance" should be 
interpreted i n  3 broad generic way. I t  
includes redundant systems, alternati \e 
ways to achieve an objective, and 
fin:inci,il contracts should a loss occur. 
The  analysis presented below reflects x n  economic perspective. Because this perspective 
is unfamiliar to many within NASA, the arguments are presented in greater detail than if 
presented to other economists. Despite this, some of the arguments may  still seem somewhat 
curious. There has also been no attempt to update th i s  section, Lvritten in May 1987. If this were 
to be attempted, the place to begin might be with the following: 
1 .  post-Chnllen~er  Evaluation cLSD:ice Shuttle Risk Assessment and hfanagement, Prepared 
b y  the Committee on Shuttle Criticality Re\,ie\v and Hazard  Analysis Audit of tlie Aeronautics and  
Space Engineering Hoard, National .!%cndeIiiy Press. January 1988. 
2. Feynnian, Richard 1'. " A n  Outsider's Inside View of the Challenger Inquiry", Phj~sics 
Today ,  February 1988, p. 2 6 - 3 7 ,  
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Recommendation: e f f ec t i  ve m a n ne r 
The  Space Station Program should plan for  
u nce r t a in t y , purchase " i ns u r a nce" ( i n t e r p re t e d 
in a broad way), and utilize mechanisms that 
yield improved risk information over time. 
NASA should develop new tools to 
acco m p 1 ish t h is . 
The remainder of this section will address 
three different kinds of risk: safety, cost, and 
performance. The  Appendix summarizes a 
model for  assessing reliability resulting from 
different levels of redundancy. 
5.5.1 Safety Risk 
There are several generic issues in NASA 
risk management that span most NASA 
pro g r a ni s: 
-What is NASA's objective with regard 
to safety? 
-What organizational structure promotes 
this objective? 
-What role should quantitative 
pro ba b i 1 it y assessments p la y ? 
These are  discussed in the sections below. 
What is NASA's Obiective with Regard to 
Sa f e t v ? 
Zero risk (perfect safety) is unattainable, and 
therefore is not a sensible goal. From an 
economic perspective, there are at least three 
possible goals: 
1 )  Attain the "efficient" Icvel of safety. 
i.e. the marginal cost of a life saved 
equals the "value of a life". 
2) Attain any particular level of across- 
the-board safety in a cost-effective 
manner,  i.e. at  least cost. 
3 )  Attain any particular level of safety 
in a particular activity in a cost- 
There niay be additional considerations- 
po 1 i t  i cal , mora I ,  re 1 i g i o us - - t ha t a re relevant , 
but analytically not much can be said about 
these. 
In evaluating the first objective, it should be 
noted that NASA must face,  explicitly or 
implicitly, the question of "How safe? How 
much is enough?" The  first  objective 
provides a mechanism to answer that 
question. But this framework requires that 
one be able to "value of a life". Economists 
generally believe that this question should be 
answered in terms of "willingness to pay" 
rather than "human capital" ( ia lue  of 
foregone earnings). 'They also assert that the 
way to determine "u,illingness to pay" is to 
look at the choices people make regarding 
prevention of injury or  death.  
The choices people make regarding 
prevention of injury or  death indicate that a 
single number for  "value of life" is not used 
to decide on safety risks. Instead, risk- 
acceptance by individuals seems to vary by 
factors such as voluntariness of exposure, 
f ani i 1 ia r i t y , control , ca t as t ro p h ic pot en t ial , 
equity, and level of knowledge (see Slovic). 
Similarly, the cost per life saved resulting 
from various kinds of government regulation 
(see Morrall) also varies considerably, and 
this niay or  may not reflect systematic 
pr e f e  re nces co nc e r 11 i n g type of r is k . 
The interpretation of these choices made by 
people i n  their ordinary lives and by 
government reg u 1 a t o rs is i ni po r ta n t . 
Spending different amounts in different areas 
to save a life is not necessarily irrational, or 
an indication that none of the three 
obiectiver lirted above are achieved. On the 
other hnnd, the efficient), notion is r'acuous 
if one attributes, without other evidence, any 
set of choices to differences in willingness to 
pay. A s  with any theory, it must have 
predictive power; one must be able to 
generalize beyond the data used to develop 
the model. 
For these reasons, a "global" answer to "Mow 
much is enough" may be difficult  to provide. 
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Howeier ,  i t  may  be possible to attain a 
consensus on more limited questions. \ V i t h i n  
a sufficiently restricted class of safety threat, 
i t  is reasonable to suppose that cost- 
effectiveness would be generally desii ed. 
For example, the questioli could become one 
of the most cost-effecti ie to achie\e  a 
particular level of astr onaut safety. Vi i s  
mould include decisions to build a CERV, 
recogniiing thnt NASA w o u l d  be fotced 1 ~ y  
public opinion to utilize 3 ( ' I  R V  ( i f  one 
existed) or a n  eMer gencl shuttle flight u n d e r  
some s i t ua t ions. 
-rile cost - e ffcc t i ve II ess c r i t 1: r i (1 n is :it ta i 11 e d 
\vhen the following condition is satisfied: the 
inst or "marginal" doll:ir of each sn fe t ) .  
expend it  u re con t I- i b (1 te e q u:i I1 y to 
astronaut safety. This niaxiniizes sal'et) t 01- 
any given level of expenditui-e. Thus if the 
marginal condition isn't s:ttisfied. i t  \vould be 
t heo ret ic a l l  y to  i-ca I I oca t e 
expenditures and increasc safety. 
s ho u 1 d 
poss i b le 
K eco ni ni e n d a t i o 11: 
NASA expenditures o n  astronaut safety 
should be Cost-effectiLre, i.e. safety 
expend i t  u r es s h o u I d c o 11 t I- i b u t e e q un l  1 y to 
safety, Deviations from this rule bear the 
burden of proof in shou~ing  that the 
de  vi a t i  o n so c i e t ,y's 
willingness to p a l .  
is c o n s i s t e n t \v i t h 
\\'I1 at 
This Obiec t i~c?  
Orea 11 i za t i orial S u i  c t 11 re Pro  in o I= 
There are at least fivc. options that are 
possible candidates for cost-effective 
achievement of safety. The Space Station 
program curiently does not consider the role 
that economic incentives can piny i n  
increasing safety. Optioris 2, 3, arid 4 below 
are specifically designed to incorpointe 
economic incentives h o n e \  er 
( I )  General Decision Rules 
Because of the multitude of decisions 
regarding safety, i t  is possible that in  
order to economiI:e on information 
processing costs, that the best 
managemeiit approach is to deLelop 
general  d e  cision rules that result in 
good appr iximations to the "marginal 
condition" stated above (all expenditures 
contribute equally to safety a t  the 
maigin). Deviations to these decision 
I d e s  should be nnnlyzed i n  terms of the 
cost -effect I veness rule. 
'The n:iture of these rules is unknown at 
the prescn' time. R L I ~ C S  such as  critical 
items h a \  ing triple redundancy, or 
iiiec 11 :i 11 ic:i i t  e 111 s des i g n ed f o r  loads 
' I'B I) g rea t e r t ti:\ n a n t iz i pa t ed d u r i ng 
use, may o r  m:iy not be satisf-actory as 
general ru  cs. 
(2) Desigii/ Performance Specifications 
(e.g. General  Decision Kules) but 
Incentives f o r  Contractors or h'ork 
Packages To  Do Better 
Dr. Fletcher testified i n  ear ly  1987 that 
NASA w;is studying the addition of 
SRQ&A ii1centiL.e awards to contracts. 
NASA niay want to use design 
spec i f ica t  ions bu t  p e r f o r m a n c e  
specificatitins a re  generally more cost- 
e f fec t i ve . 
(3 )  No Explicit Design/Perforninnce 
Spec if icat ions 
Option A: Alloc:ite Safety Threats as a 
Kesource 
Under  t h i s  alternative, safety threats are 
treated likl: all other resources in a "cost 
m :I 11 nge m e n t" a p p roac ti. U nde r this 
appi  oach, a subsystem designer is given 
a cost "bogey" and a n  allocation of 
resources. Increases i n  resource usage 
are charg$:d at the marginal cost of 
these resources and decreases are 
credited to the subsystem. 
Allocation of safety threats may be 
difficult to sell politically since it gives 
the impression that a subsystem has a 
"right" to threaten safety u p  to its 
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allocation. This is exactly the same 
probleni that marketable permits have in 
environmental regulation: a "right to 
pollute". However, there has been 
growing acceptance of this device by 
environmental groups, and thus there is 
some hope for  the analogous concept 
for  NASA. 
Option B: Safety Ratings for  
Subs\,stenis and Payloads with Dollar 
Fines or  Rewards or  Other Incentives to 
I ni p ro v e Safe t y 
This "safety tax" is similar to the 
allocation of safety threats. The 
standard analysis of a permits vs. a tax 
scheme is that they :ire both 
economically efficient b u t  result i n  
d iff e rent pe r ni i t 
scheme fixes quantity but leaves cost 
uncertain. The tax scheme fixes the 
per unit charge, but leaves the quantity 
uncertain (left up to the subsystem 
responding to the tax). Which is 
preferable depends on what uncertainty 
one is more comfortable L v i t h .  I n  either 
case, of course, one c:in adjust the 
permit or  tax level so that the 
differences over time between these 
approaches becomes less stark. 
u n cer t a i n t y . Th e 
Based on the above, an allocation 
scheme may be better for  NASA 
because NASA niay be more 
comfortable with fixing the safety level 
("quantity") and leaving the cost 
uncertain. However, because risks are 
only projected, one is only controlling 
the level of projected risks, not the 
actual level. 
(4) LiLibility 
As an alternative to payment of a tax 
based on the estimated safety threat, in 
which payment occurs whether or not 
an accident results, one can use a 
liability system in which paynient only 
occurs if there is an accident. 
Responsibility for  accident costs will 
lex1 the designer/operator to make 
decisions that result in the "right" level 
of safety. 
Such a system might lead subsystem or 
payload designers to seek insurance to 
cover the large liability that might 
result. In such a case, the insurance 
preniiunis would function like a safety 
tax, reflecting the projected degree of 
hazard that the subsystem or  payload 
contributes. Since NASA self-insures, 
a liability system only achieves the 
desired objective if the internal safety 
evaluation done by NASA functions like 
a safety tax (i.e. payment, or other 
incenti\es to better one's safety 
e va I u a  t io t i ) .  
( 5 )  Centralized Evaluation of Safety 
A 1 t e rna t i ves 
Some may be uncomfortable with 
alternatives 3 and 4 bec:iuse they 
decentralize the safety process and rely 
on economic incentives of those 
responsible for  the subsystem or payload 
to maintain safety levels. One 
alternative is to centralize the evaluation 
of safety. 
There may be a technical reason for  
centralized evaluation as well. 
Dece ntrnl ized solutions (such as the 
permit or  tax scheme) depend on a 
decomposition i n  which interactive 
effects between subsys tem are not 
important. This niay not be true for  
safety, i n  which the effect  of a failure 
i n  one subsystem niay depend on the 
state of another subsystem. 
\+'hat is necessary for  cost-effective 
c e n t 1-3 1i zed safe t y m a  nag e me n t is 
evaluation of safety threats across the 
organization with resources devoted to 
areas where they will be most effective. 
The danger is that such a "command 
and control" centralized regulation of 
safety will not provide incentives for  
increasing safety beyond the constraint. 
Such incentives are necessary because 
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the ct: 11 t ra I i ze d sa f e  t y 111 a 11 age me 11 t g I o u p 
\vi11 not h a \  e the information regat ding 
poss i 11 I e improvements to sa i'e t y . 
Reco III me  ndat io n: 
NASA should seriously examine the use of 
economic incentives to improve safety. f o r  
example, contract incentives to do better than 
a safety standard,  21 safety tax or  allocation 
of safety threats, or  a liability system. 
All f ive options require the qunntitative 
assessments of risks. They  dif'fer in the 
extent to which th is  quantitative a s e w n e n t  
becomes 3 1 ow e r - 1 eve 1 f u 11 c t I o n . A I t  e r n  at i ve 
one (general decision I ules) uses qunntitatice 
analysis to develop these rule(; but then 
subsequent decisions :ire n ~ a d e  without a 
q u a n t i t a t i c e The other 
alternatives employ quantitati\ e assessments 
routinely in  decisions. 
asses? i i i  en  t . 
R ec o m me nda t ion : 
The  entity ultimately responsil)le fo r  risk 
assessment should be outside of the space 
station program. This  enti ty (e.g. a NASA or 
nianned-flight safety office) m a y  do the 
entire assessment or  audi t  tlie assessiiient 
performed by  the program office. 
\\ 'hat Role Should Ouantitati\e A s s e s s m e n t s  
PI a v ? 
Q u a n t i tat i ve risk assess me n t s a re gene r a 11 y 
not used in NASA. l lowever,  their use is 
now standard practice in regulatory agencies, 
partly due  to executive orders. MorraIl 
(1086) lists a number of regulations fo r  
which quantitative risk assessmeiits have  been 
i m d e .  
There have been a number of recent 
re  c o ni me 11 d a t i o 11 s that NASA use q u :I n t i t  a t i  Y e 
assessments to :I greater tie3rt.e. For 
example, the Aerosp:ice Srife1.y Ad \  isory 
Panel Annual Report  for  1086 (February 
1987) suggests their use be increased: 
"Criteri:i for  quinti tative risk 
assess IIIL' 11 t a ncl t' N 1) 1 ic i t d e  f i  11 it ion 
of the operating constraints to 
which the waiver i: subject are  not 
explicitly requireti by NASA's 
s a f e t y g u i d e  1 i lies . 
Althougli the Panel is quite aware 
of tlie pro's and cc1ii's of trying to 
e s t  a b  1 i s h  o r  
"probability" of failure, we believe 
a morc realistic quantitative 
assessment of the critical hazards 
is crucial to overall risk 
man age m e n t ." ( p . ' 7  3 - 7 4)  
p r o g  r a m 
"1  i k e I i h o o d "  
Ilowever, rcflecting NASA's traditional 
sl,epticism to\\ 3rd quant i ta t ive risk 
amssments ,  the receni draf t  "Risk Factor 
A ssesi nic n t - - F hl t A ,'C 1 L C r i t i cal i t  y Cat e gory 
1, 1K Rank ing  Process", Off ice  of Safety 
R eli a bi 1 i t y , and Qua I it p 
Assui ance, Code QD, NASA Headquarters, 
proposes an :issessnieni scheme without the 
use of probabilities. 
Ma i n t a i nab i 1 i t  y , 
'l'liis appi-oni-h rates a safety risk along a 
number of dimension:; that are correlated 
with safety 1-isk. Thiii niay be useful as a 
rough screening device but it has several 
problems f o r  f iner decisions. First, the 
ratings are based on the connection between 
the rated ciirnension and  safety in the 
abstract (or :i sample of cases) rather than in 
the particular risk being rated. Second, the 
ratings weight a11 factors equally. 
The  value of qu:intitative safety risk 
assessments is primalily as a method of 
attacking safety problems in a structured 
\vay. A quaiititatice framework makes 
nssumptions explicit ai;d focuses attention on 
tlie :issuniptions o r  parameter values that 
most affect  the analysis. Such a framework 
nlso provides a basis fc,r discussion; different 
analj,sts can determine where they agree and 
dis:igree, and  thus focus their attention on 
areas on which they disagree and which most 
affect  the annlysis. Suzh  focused attention is 
important for  improvement of the reliability 
of the estimate ove r  time; resources can be 
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important for  improvement of the reliability 
of the estimate over time; resources can be 
devoted to asce r t a i n i ng fu r  t 11 er  in for mat ion 
regarding key assumptions or  parameters. 
Recommendation: 
Quantitative safety risk assessments should be 
utilized in order to address safety problems 
in a structured wa) .  
Although it is common practice in regulatory 
agencies to employ conservati\'e (worst case) 
assumptions in these analyses, this is not 
appropriate for  regulatory agencies or for 
NASA. As discussed by Nichols and 
Zeckhauser (l986), use of conservative 
assumptions may lead to two problems: 
-Continual exaggeration of risks is 
likely to lead policy makers to discount 
estimates. Their discounting is likely to 
be crude, thus yielding poor estimates 
of overall risk. 
-The degree of exaggeration is likely to 
differ  across risks. This occurs for  a 
number of reasons: 
-Sometimes the risk is estimated 
based on the worst example tested. 
In these cases, the degree of bias 
will rise with the number tested. 
-Conservatism is less likely to be 
used for  the risks that are believed 
to be best understood. Thus the 
great e r the perceived u n ce r t a i n t y 
about a given effect ,  the more 
likely it is to be overestimated. 
With different  degrees of conservatism 
(exagge ra t ion ) ,  cos t - e f f ec t ive  sa fe ty  
management is not possible. 
Recommendation: 
Quantitative safety risk estiniates should 
present expected-value estimates of morbidity 
and mortality, rather than using conservative 
assumptions. 
Quantitatibe decision models are also 
appropriate for  analysis of general decision 
rules for  cases in which a izariety of variables 
interact. An example would be a rule 
requiring triple redundancy for  critical 
systems as the standard of reliability. In 
order to determine whether this rule is 
superior to other approaches, it is necessary 
to understand the factors that affect  the 
reliability of such s)stems. A partial list of 
these factors would be: 
- the reliability of an individual unit 
- the degree of redundancy and whether 
the s5,stem is restorable 
-the length of time between scheduled 
Shuttle flights that could bring up spare 
parts 
- the degree of on orbit  sparing 
-the probability of Shuttle unavailability 
-the length of time required for  an 
emergency shuttle flight 
- the length of time between failure of 
an item and placement of a spare in the 
Shuttle for  launch to orbit 
Recommend at ion: 
NASA should utilize quantitative decision 
models to analyze safety decision rules. 
One of the popular conceptions after the 
Challenger accident was that NASA had 
become lax based on past successes. The 
Feynman appendix to the Rogers Commission 
Report  argued that revision of shuttle risk 
assessnients was done in a faulty way. 
Restrictions were weakened over time based 
on the results of previous flights rather than 
viewing these flights as favorable draws from 
na t u re. E ve n w o rse , d is t u r b i n g experience 
from previous flights was ignored, as long as 
the rocket worked. 
However, successful performance in flights 
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provides valuable information to revise risk 
assessments and operations procedures. 
Reco mni e n d a t io n : 
NASA should utilize actual flight experience 
to revise risk assessments and  operations 
procedures. However, such re \  isions must be 
done with care, with an untlerstanditlg of the 
stat  is t ica 1 processes t ha t g e ne r a t e s u cce ss f u 1 
f 1 ig ti t ex pe rie n ce . 
5 . 5 . 2  Cost Risk  
There are two major generic cost risks i n  t h e  
s p x e  station program. l ' he  fii-st is tha t  the 
space station :is a "pionecr project" is likel!, 
to develop cost overruns. 'The secoiid is tha'; 
special cnre i n u s t  be taken Y O  control total 
lif'ecycle costs of the program, rather than 
just  DDTLeE costs or  the costs of particular 
components. These risks, and  possible 
remedies, are  discussed i n  the sections below. 
The SDace Station as a Pioneer Proiect 
"Pioneer" projects such nuclear plants, the 
space shuttle, and  the space station generally 
involve considerable cost risk (see Quirk and 
Terasawa). Analysis of cost growth in Army 
weapon systems by Terasawa and in Air 
Force weapon systems by Pegrani suggests 
that cost growth tends to occur a t  particulcir 
points i n  the procurement process, i.e. at the 
t ime of production approv:il. Before this 
p e r i od , cost est i mat e s ex h i 11 it s t a b i 1 i t  y beca 11 se 
cost growth during th is  period would 
endanger the success of the proposed system 
versus possible competitc.)rs. Furthermore,  
low estimates during this period can not be 
rejected as unreasonable because of the h i g h  
degree of uncertainty involved. Cost growth 
occurs at  the time of production approval for 
a number of reasons. Subsequent cost growth 
might come out of contractor's profits. Also, 
the production approval process typically 
entails analysis of cost estimates by additiornl 
groups nor closely identified with the 
proposed system and thus u'liose estimates 
may be more objective. 
The recent escalacion of space station cost 
estimates f rom $E: billion to approximately 
$ 1  3- 14 billion should therefore not be too 
surprising. The  source of these higher 
estimates is alco consistent with tlie 
e x p In ti :11: ions s ys t e ins. 
Contr:ictors and tile Level C centers (u.1iich 
function some w Iia t like con t rac to rs to 
k I e a d q u z.1 r t e rs ) f o r 
m u c h  c'f the rec2nt escalation. I lowever, 
independent ana lys t s ,  such as f rom the NASA 
ConiptrolIci-'s Office, have also tuken a 
c:ireful look at cost at  this point. Indeed, 
their estimates reportedly \vere even liighcr 
t h a n  the S 13- 13 Iiillion number.  
g i \'E n f o r  \vea p o t i  
ti :I v e be e n res 11 o t i  s i b 1 e 
~- Coritro1 of  Total Lifecycle Costs 
Theie  a re  t \ to  1 articular aspects i n  ~ h i c h  
contiol of to tn l  lifecycle costs of the station 
is difficult. The  first I S  th. i t  t h c r e  a re  
numerous spac; station design and  
de \  elnpment decisions that present :i tradeoff 
b e m e e n  DDI'ScE and operations costs. 
Dur ing  the DDI'&E phases, DDT&E costs 
h a \ e  nioie visibility and  are  more 
contiollable than operations costs. For  both 
of these reasons, there is a natutal  tendenc) 
to attempt in the DDTStE phases to control 
DDTcYtE costs, rather than total Iifec) cle 
costs Given tliat DDT&E and  operations 
costs often trade o f f ,  these decisions may not 
be made in a u a y  that minimizes lifecycle 
costs. 
The second difficulty in controlling lifecycle 
costs is tlie tendency fo r  subsystems 
designers, facin(: DDT& E or  lifecycle cost 
cotistr:iiiits for  tlieir subsystems, to ignore the 
indir-t.:t costs they impose. I n  p:irticul:ir, 
the). .ire likely to overcome resources for  
which they d o  not pay the full cost. If such 
h o u s t. keep i ng c o tis u ti1 p t io t i  is e x c ess i ve , the 
staticin will havc to be larger (and thus more 
costly) than otherwise need be, in order to 
meet given user performance constraints. 
Cost Risk Reme& 
There are a varlet)' of strategies to deal with 
this cost risk: 
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1 .  Contract incentives--JPL has studied, 
in a limited fashion, the use of 
incentives to control costs. 
2. Pricing incentives--As discussed in 
the pricing section of the Panel 3 
report, use of a cost-based pricing 
scheme provides an incentive for  the 
escalation, since i t  results in higher 
prices, decreases demand (and thus 
po 1 i t  i c a I support  ) . How ever , a 1 though 
the pricing panel report does not 
i n d i ca t e t h is, de ni a n d - bas e d p r i c i n g a 1 so 
p r o vide s cos t - con t r o 1 
since reduced costs lead to more net 
revenue for  the go ver n men t . 
program to control costs. cos t  
in c e n t i v e s f o r 
3. International cost allocation 
The current MOU adheres to the 
principle that costs are best controlled if 
they are allocated to whoever is i n  the 
best position to control them. Thus 
each partner is responsible for the 
DDT&E costs of providing their 
element, and the actual costs incurred 
do  not affect  the utilization share of the 
partner. Thus there is the appropriate 
incentive to niininlize DDT&E costs. 
However, mininiization of life cycle 
costs is the appropriate objective, and 
thus partners are  also given 
responsibility for  pnrtnei- specif-ic ops 
costs. Although there are obviously 
other reasons for  the MOU provision 
that partners will receive utilization in 
their lab (except that the U.S. gets 
approximately 50?b of the ESA and 
Japanese labs in addition to their own),  
it lessens the possibility that the cost- 
minimization objective would lead a 
partner to shirk on performance. 
costs, such as the cost of resources 
consumed that are produced by other 
subs y s t enis. 
R ecomnie n da t io n : 
To deal with the sizable cost risk of the 
space station, NASA should employ contract, 
pricing, and international cost allocation 
incentives as well as a cost management 
a p p roac h that considers i nd i rec t 1 if ec yc 1 e 
costs, i n  order to control lifecycle costs. 
5.5.3 Performance Hisk 
Tradeoffs exist, both in terms of technical 
fe asi b i 1 i t y prefer en ces , 
between nominal performance levels and the 
probability that these levels will be obtained. 
On the feasibility side, one can increase the 
probability of success with redundant 
systems; if one holds cost constant, the 
addition of these systems lowers the nominal 
pc r form a lice lev e 1. Si in i In r 1 y , lo we r c h a n ces 
of mission success may  be acceptable for  
mor e a i n  b i t  i o us 111 i ss i o n s . 
and statio ii  / user 
The SSOTF believes that the Program is 
characterized by an undesirable lack of 
redundancy in a number of key areas (see 
chart on next page). Some sacrifices in 
nominal performance to assure greater 
confidence in meeting lower performance 
levels ai-e therefore warranted. These items 
are discussed in more detail in the Panel 1 
report. The transportation issue is probably 
the most important of these. One way to 
examine this is through historical data 
(presented in Table 5-1) on failures in 
u n ma 11 n ed ci v i I ia n la u n c lies to g eos t a t io na r y 
orbit and delays i n  shuttle launches. 
Delavs i n  Shuttle Launches 
4.  Cost Ma n a ge men t A p p roach 
A cost management approach for  the 
Space Station program must require that 
lifecycle costs be used i n  making 
pro g r a in de c i s ions . F u r t h e r m o r e, these 
lifecycle costs must include all indirect 
Delays in shuttle launches also provide useful 
data on performance risk. The length of the 
delay is dependent on which schedule is 
being used--e.g. one could show a delay of 
3 years for the first launch. The delays 
shown in Table 5-2 attempt to capture the 
5-39 
TABLE 5 - 1  I 
, 
1 CIVILIAN I<t \UNCt IES TO GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT (1963-October 1985) 
FAILLJIiE CLASSIFICt\T ION 
BEFORE ORBIT A K M  SATEL1,ITE TOTAL VEIIICLES 
5 '6 5 147 
Source: Surles ( 1  985) 
TABLE 5-2 
DELAYS IN SHIJTTLE LAUNCII'ES D I J E  TO OPERATICINS 
FLIGHT ACTUAL LAUNCH D E L A Y  FLIGHT ACTUAL LAUNCE1 
(MONTH/YR) ( DA )'SI (MONTH/YII I 
') STS- 1 4/8 I '- 
STS - 2 11/81 :i 4 
STS- 3 3/82 0 
STS-4 6/82 0 
STS-5 11/82 0 
S'I S-6 4/83 7-1 
STS-7 6/83 9 
SI  S-8 8/83 26 
SI s-9 11/83 59 
4 1 - U (  10) 2/84 5 
4 1 - C ( l l )  4/84 2 
4 1 - D( 12)  8/84 6 
41 -G( 13) 10/84 4 
Source: JSC 19413, September 1080. 
51-A(14) 
51-C(15) 
5 1 -D( 16) 
51 -B(  17)  
51-G(18) 
51-F(19) 
5 1 - I(20) 
51 - J ( 2  1 )  
61 -A(?2) 
61 -R(23)  
6 1 -C(24 j 
51 -L(25) 
11/84 
1/85 
4/85 
4/85 
6/85 
7/85 
8/85 
10/85 
10/85 
11/85 
1 /86 
1 /86 
DELAY 
(DAYS) 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
17 
3 
0 
0 
0 
25 
6 
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delays "from operations". Eve n t 11 is 
definition is ambiguous, for  some would 
argue that replacement of shuttle tiles isn't 
an operational delay since it reflects the fact 
that the shuttle wasn't "operational". Table 
5-2  neglects such distinctions and tries to 
capture the delays in the last part of the 
process. 
The data is taken from JSC 19413. These 
reflect the delays occurring Lvithin 
approximately 60 days of a scheduled launch 
date. The KSC and Lockheed sources cited in 
the references show somewhat different 
delays. The KSC press release reflects delays 
in publicly-announced launch dates (i.e. the 
originally scheduled launch date as shown in 
the press kit for  each flight). The Lockheed 
data reflects delays following arrival on dock 
nt KSC. The differences between the JSC 
and KSC data occur only i n  five flights, as 
shown below: 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JSC AND KSC 
DOCUMENTS IN LAUNCH DELAYS 
NUMBER O F  DAYS DELAY I N  LAUNCH 
JSC KSC 
STS-7 9 0 
STS-8 26 0 
STS-9 59 1 MONTH 
STS-41C ( 1 1 )  2 0 
STS-41G (13) 4 0 
Role of Iriteriiatioilal Partners i n  
Perf or in an ce His k 
Finally, the role of the international partners 
in providing essential needed capability, 
additional capability, or  redundant capability, 
needs to be assessed. Currently, the partners 
provide additional capability or in some 
cases, redundant capability. (The Canadian 
contribution is essential but could be 
procured directly f rom the contractor without 
the involvement of the go\  ernment of 
Canada.) Howe\>er,  operations cost sharing 
kvitliout transfer of funds can only be 
r easo na b 1 y acco ni p I ish ed by la u n ch of either 
US payloads or  station logistics by the 
internationals. If  this launch responsibility is 
developed by the internationals without a 
corresponding US responsibility, the US is 
somewhat vulnerable to international 
w i t  11 d ra wa 1. 
As explained above, the program implicitly 
chooses an overall level of performance and 
re 1 i n  b i 1 i t  y through dec is ions concerning u n it 
reliability, on orbit sparing, choices with 
respect to specific technologies (e.g. PV vs. 
solar d>rnamic), etc. These decisions 
collectively will result in a probability 
distribution over the level of net user station 
:i va i I n b i l  i t y .  
AI  1 oca t i  o 11 of Perf o r ti1 a 11 ce Ii is k t h rough 
I< esou rce AI I oca t i o 11 
There are in addition resource allocation 
policies that affect  how this aggregate 
u n c e r t a in t y perf o r ni a nce is 
allocated among users. There are four  main 
issues: 
con c e r n i n g 
I .  W i l l  priorities be decided i n  advance 
or  in realtiine operations? 
The Panels were divided on this issue. 
Panel 1, quite rightly, argued that the best 
info r ni a t ion con c e r n i n g w h ic 11 pay lo ads c o u 1 d 
benefit f rom availnble resources would be 
available in real time operations. Panel 3 
would agree, but argued that priorities should 
be decided early enough so that payload (and 
system if station systems are allocated 
resources with priority) design could occur 
against a known level of priority, and that 
the potential benefits f rom optimizing design 
in this fashion exceed those from being able 
to optimize i n  real-time, once designs are 
fixed. 
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The  traditional way is fo r  priorities to 
be assigned to categories of users, or  
particular payloads. PaIiel 3 argued that 
priorities should be asc,igned to resources 
with payloads allowed to choose the priorit!, 
level desired fo r  each resource. This permits 
a payload to have differing amounts of 
different priorities of the same resource, or  
different priorities aCro!jS resources. This 
permits much greater f,exibility in design 
and operations than assig,nment of  priorities 
to users/payloads. Since high prior t!' 
resources will be more desired. opting for  
lower priority will enable payloads to sccure 
more of a given resour-ce. 'The user, at any  
point, may relinquish t l i r~ug l i  trade or  snle 
resources (together with attached priority) 
assigned to him. The iiser is in the Iwst 
posit ion to nia k e these ci e c i 5, io n s . 
3 .  What level (of rated capacity) should 
be allocated? 
The  Panels were less clear on this issue. 
Some sentiment was expressed fllr 
underbooking to avoid the hnssle from trying 
to schedule everything to the hilt (e.g. the 
extensive replanning that would result f rom 
the ripple effects of :i "small" change). 
However, given that some pa>zload demand 
m a y  not materialize, or  the fact  that the 
system may function at  times at  rated 
capacity, such a n  underbooking policy mc,y 
1 e a v e res o u rc e s a v a i la b 1 e. W h a t  pro c e d u 1- e 
will be used to allocate these available 
resources? Overbooking was attractive 10 
rciiiie within the SSOTF, and appears to be a 
tic. t t e r w lie ti 
combined with a prespecified bumping rule 
(issue # 1  above). 
a 1 tern a t i ve , p:i r t j c u I :i r I y 
4.  Should this system :ipply to station 
systems as well as user payloads? 
Although Panel 3 w a s  silent on this 
point, the resources allocated to station use 
should also have a priority --all  of the statio i 
resources need not be of the highest priorit) .  
(This is increasingly true tlie more narrow 
the time period b y  which the resource is 
defined; much station housekeeping can be 
dcla)ed fo r  some period of time.) 3 he 
station w i l l  wai t to reserve margins foi itwlf 
through the pr ority scheme so that mascive 
chan!:es i n  mrnifests o r  tinielines do  not 
occui through small  changes in payload 
requ i I e men t s 
Recoiiiniendatic n: 
PI io1 1 ties for  space station resource use 
shoul.1 be decided i n  advance. Station 
s\steiiis, a? \vel as user payloads, should be 
able to self-select resources of differ cnt 
prioi ity. Resources should be overbooked. 
S U h l h I A K \  OF KECORlhIENDATIONS 
liecotiimeniintion: The  Space Station Program 
should pl:in lor  uncertainty, purchase 
"insui aiice" (interpreted in a broad way),  and 
u t  i I i zc' niecha ni: nis that yield improved r is k 
inforination o~ er  time. NASA should 
develop new tools to accomplish this. 
R eco m ni e 11 d a t i o n: N A S A  expenditures on 
astronaut safety should be cost-effective, i.e. 
safe t 1' e x pe t i  d it u res s h o u 1 d contribute equa 11 y 
to safety. Deviations f rom this rule bear the 
burden of proof in showing that the 
deviation is consistent with society's 
willingness to pay. 
Re c o 111 m e nd a t io 11: NASA sh o u Id serious 1 y 
examine the use' of economic incentives to 
improve safety, fo r  example, contract 
incentives to do better than a safety stand:ird, 
a sa fe  tas  or  ailocation of safety threats, or  
a lia: " i t y  s)'stenl. 
Reco n i  iiie ntia t io 1 <: The  entity u I t i  nia t el y 
responsible for  risk assessment should be 
outsicit. of the space station program. ?'his 
entity (e.g. a NASA o r  manned-flight safety 
office) may  do the entire assessment o r  audit 
tlie assessment performed by the program 
office.  
Reco i n  ni end a t io n ,  Q u n n t i ta ti ve safety risk 
assessnients should be utilized i n  order to 
addres: safety prlblenis in a structured way. 
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Recommendation: Quantitative safety risk 
estimates expect e d - va 1 u e 
estimates of morbidity and mortality, rather 
than us i n g con se r va t i v e a s s u 111 p t i o n s . 
s h o u 1 d pres e n t 
R e  c o m ni e n d n t ion: ut i I i ze 
q u a n t i t a t i ve d ec is ion i n  ode Is to a n a 1 y ze s:i fe  t y 
decision rules. 
N A SA s h o u 1 d 
Recommendation: NASA should utilize actual 
flight experience to re\  ise risk assessments 
and operations procedures. Howe\,er, such 
revisions must be done with care, with an  
understanding of the statistical processes that 
generate successful flight experience. 
Recommendation: To  deal \vith the sizable 
cost risk of the space station, NASA should 
em ?lo y con t rac t , pricing , a nd inter na t io nal 
cost a i :xat ion incentives to control life-cycle 
costs. 
Recommendation: All space station resources 
should be allocated to users and station 
systems with a priority that defines how 
resources will be allocated should available 
supply be less than the allotted amount. 
Margins should not exist or be withheld for  
this purpose. 
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5.6 F1 I A NC I. 
Fiiiaiicial Management 
JAGEMENT by Johanna Gunderson and Doug Lee' 
As the Station is designed, constructed, and 
operated, it is increasingly important to be 
able to obtain cost information that is not 
only detailed, but  focused on the cost 
tradeoffs that will allow unit operating costs 
to be reduced over time. The  types of 
tradeoffs include crew operating labor versus 
hardware investment (automation), crew time 
versus software development labor, capital 
versus operating cost, reliability versus 
spares, and scars versus modification. If the 
Station is to grow f rom a modest base, in 
response to future  demand as i t  becomes 
known, then the need for  functional cost 
data is vital. 
All financial management systems exist 
primarily to provide the appropriate levels of 
management with the information required to 
make the best decisions possible. As in most 
large organizations, NASA managers are held 
responsible for  their decisions both internally 
and externally. The management tools that 
comprise the f i na nc i a 1 man age m e n t systems 
must provide them with the products 
required to support  and  explain those 
decisions. 
External Reuuirements for Financial 
h1 a ti a e e in en t 
Some  e x t e r n a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  h a v e  
fundamentally shaped the Agency's financial 
management practices through the design and 
utilization of NASA's accounting and 
budgeting systems. These include: 
- Provision of information to inform 
the Federal budgetary process 
(appropriations) in general and 
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  o v e r s i g h t  
(authorization) in particular. 
Practices must conform to 
standards established by legislative 
and  executive directives, e.g., 
Co ng r e s  io n a 1 budget cy c 1 e and 
report i n g require men ts (monthly , 
annually, other) that  compare 
actual with planned expenditures 
and accomplishments . 
- Requirements to relate technical 
performance to expenditures, in 
specific areas, e.g., automation and 
robotics, spares, cost sharing, 
pricing policy. 
In addition to the external requirements 
which support  the construction and 
management of the Agency's budget, other 
requests are made to support  the 
authorization process. The  Congressional 
oversight of the technical content of NASA 
programs frequently results in requirements 
for  the Agency to provide financial 
information on topics of special interest to 
individual legislators, such as the planned 
expenditures for  automation and robotics. 
In tern al Rea u ire in e t i  t s and Fu n c t i on s 
While external requirements have had a 
powerful influence on the structure of 
NASA's financial systems, internal needs 
generate the most significant requirements. 
With the numerous organizations in  NASA, 
and many levels of management,  there are  
ninny informational needs which must be 
met by a single accounting and information 
system. Each user must get the right items 
in the most useful form.  Ideally, these can 
be aggregated upward, while deleting detail. 
- Planning. NASA has a five-year 
horizon within which planning can 
take place but,  as with many large 
Federal programs, long range 
planning often gets too little 
attention because of short term 
funding conflicts. Planning also 
encompasses the use of cost 
information fo r  pricing, cost 
'Doug Lee wrote this section, essentially condensing a longer paper by Jo Gunderson. 
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Finnilcia1 Managenzent 
sharing, and other policy analysis. 
Perf o r in a 11 c e h& 11 ape in e 11 t . The 
relationship of cost, schedule, and 
performance (as stated i n  terms of 
q u a n t i f i a b l e  m e a s u r e s  of  
accomplishments) data should 
allow each level of management to 
identify problems, develop plans to 
correct problems, and assess 1 he 
likelihood of accomplishing tasks 
p l a n n e d  i n  t h e  base l ine  
requirements, cost, and schedule. 
It is here that fiscal and 
perform an c e  re 
linked to function, product, or 
organization. Within most major 
programs, all levels of nianagenient 
review their perform a n ce ag a i ns t 
planned technical, cost, and 
schedule milestones on 3 monthly 
basis. 
a c c o 1.1 n t ab i I i t  y 
As the authority or  responsibilities 
vary,  so will the requirements for  
aggregation or  disaggregation of 
the data. The lowest level of 
collected data should not be 
automatically provided to the top 
level of management. The 
financial nian:igement system and 
control structure should be set up 
to provide the Program Manager 
with the appropriate indicators of 
trends rather than a compendium 
of unevaluatecl information. 
Distribution aiidControl of Fun&. 
T h e  Comptrol ler  and  the  
Headquarters Program Office must 
ensure that the initial distributions 
of funds comply with the 
appropriation and authorization 
r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  b u t  t h e  
res p o ns i b i 1 i t  y for  the ass i g n nil2 n t 
of fur ther  controls should be 
delegated along with the technical 
responsibility, f rom one level of 
management to  the next. This is 
t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  f i s c a l  
responsibility. Funds nre 
dis t r ibuted by the NASA 
Comptroller to Unique Project 
Numbers (UPN),  and all funding 
code:, must be established in the 
Agency Wide Coding Structure 
( A  W( 2 S) . Distribution must 
c o m p l y  w i t h  a d d i t i o n a l  
a p p r ( ) p r i a t ions and author i za t i o n 
instriictions. Fiscal management 
should be delegated to the same 
level as technical responsibility 
(holding fiscal controls a t  higher 
level:; does not work). 
Man;] managers mistakenly believe 
that they are able to gain 
additional insight into, or  control 
of ,  the performance of the work 
only through the assignment of 
additional funds controls and 
through the distribution of funds 
at  t h x e  lower levels. 
Audit Capability. Official 
finar,cial management records 
provide an archive of cost 
in format ion  to trace past 
performance and costs, as needed. 
It gives a last resort accountability, 
and :t baseline for  interpretation of 
financial data. The audit 
capability is one measure of fiscal 
accountability that must be 
supported through documented 
financial  records, bu t  the 
accounting systems are  only one 
aspect of the audit  capability. The 
archrved information must also 
include sufficient data on the 
program baseline to allow ex post 
interpretation of the financial data. 
The  archives should include 
presmtation materials, special 
analyses, working papers, etc., to 
be of maximum benefit to those 
attempting to understand what 
occurred in  the past. 
These four  functions are  related and are a 
part of the cyclical process of financial 
management, tis illustrated in Figure 5-3. 
Each level in the management hierarchy 
parti:ipates in the execution of these four  
func Lions, althcugh their specific involvement 
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depends on the authority delegated to their 
respecti\ e organizations. 
Tools for  Financial hlai iapeinea  
Because the agency is composed of field 
c e n t e r s  w h i c h  o p e r a t e  r e l a t i \  e l y  
independently, the full array of tools 
n v:i i la b 1 e to provide f i na nc i a 1 ni n n n !;e i n  e n t is 
rather btoad. The standards for  ai*counting 
a n d  budgeting systems are established by the 
Comptroller and each of the Centers must 
obtnin approval for  their systems. The 
NASA Comptroller has estnblished a n  Agency 
\\'ide Coding Structure which must be used 
i n  all aspects of financial management. Most 
managers deal with only a subset of the f u l l  
set of codes and controls uti l i ied.  Among 
the tools available for  financial management 
within NASA, the following will be used to 
s u p p o r t ope rat ions cost in ana g e ni e n t . 
- UniQue Project Numbers (IJPNs).  
The UPN must be used in budget 
formulation, and i t  allows anyone 
in the agency to readily identify 
the general content and associated 
cost f rom standard reports and 
ni a nage ni e n t doc u i n  e n t s. 
The Headquarters ( I  1Q) Program 
O f f i c e  w o r k s  w i t h  t h e  
Coin p t ro 1 I e r's staff to est a bl i s h the 
U P N  structure for  the program at 
the three or  five digit level. I t  is 
then left to the HQ Program 
Office to either assign additional 
digits or  to allow the implementing 
organization to assign those digits. 
This delegation of fiscal control 
should be consistent with the 
management  delegat ions of 
authority, because the LJPN also 
must serve as the control and 
reporting mechanism for the 
i in p le m e  ii t i  n g o rg a n i z:i t i o n . 
Centers sometime make use of the 
last four  digits of the nine-digit 
code to identify support contractors 
a nd faci 1 i t  i es . 
Costs are accrued i n  the ci'nter and 
agency accounting systems against 
these IJPNs.  ('ontractors may or 
may not be required to provide 
their cost accruals against the 
expanded nine digit coding 
structure. Irl those instances 
where the clintractor is not 
required to report monthly expense 
data i t  the lowest level of detail, 
the office with technical and 
budgetary responsibility is required 
to provide an assessment of the 
reported cost a x r u a l s  against the 
funds obligated for  the contract. 
A major contract will, genei ally, 
either report against the most 
detailed funding controls or 
provide another mechanism for 
s up po r t in  g the NASA inn n :i g e rs' 
requixement to cross-map the 
costs. 
- Form 533. NASA has established 
the Form 533 as a standard tool 
f o r  con t r ac tua l  cos t  a n d  
performance rep0 r t i ng . Monthly 
and quarterly reports must be 
c o m p l e t e d  f o r  c o s t  a n d  
perf o I' 111 a n ce information , re 1 a t  i ve 
to the Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) negotiated for  that contract. 
I n  addition to internal corporate 
a c co u 11 t in  g s y s t e ins, the con t ra c t o r 
wil l  establish a Performance 
hleas u r e ni e n t Svs t e ni that is used 
to relate and report performance 
to 1he Government,  against 
parameters specified in the 
contract. The 533P format is 
utilized for  these reports. 
- Sciiecluling and  hloni tor ing 
Svstem. Beyond the standard 
agency mechanisms for  cost 
accru:il, there are a variety of 
management tools used to provide 
a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  to  
de c i s io n in a k e r s . There is gene r a11 y 
a separate scheduling system which 
is used to identify and track 
critical progranimatic milestones. 
Although some of these systenis 
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also offer  a capability to 
incorporate resources analysis, they 
are rarely used to link schedule 
ac c o m p 1 ish m e n t w i t h costs because 
cost information is often neither 
developed nor aggregated at  the 
same levels as the critical path 
ni i 1 est o nes . 
- Est i m a t i  n t! Each 
program also makes use of 
estimating tools and models which 
help them to estimate the cost of 
new tasks or  the impact of 
changes to an established program. 
A model's ability to provide a 
decisionmaker with a relatively 
rapid response to "what if" 
questions that require the 
correlation of many variables can 
be invaluable. Unfortunately,  the 
quality of the model is ultimately 
determined by the quality of the 
data that are provided to develop 
and update its algorithms. 
Stand a r d man age m e n t practices 
frequently do  not place a very 
high value on the collection of 
cost and schedule data that will 
support  either the use of existing 
models or the development of new 
ones. 
hlodel s .  
The Space Station Program has 
already developed a model to help 
perform engineering trades by 
projecting the lifecycle cost 
impacts of those changes to flight 
hardware or  ground systems. If 
the Program intends to continue to 
make use of this model, it is 
imperative that either the required 
data are made available to update 
the model or  the resources are 
provided to modify the model. 
- I in D rove m e n t of 
Man ape m e n t Too 1 s 
E I i s t i 11 Q Fi i i  an c i a I 
The financial management systems and 
practices employed by the agency provide 
the flexibility and the capacity to support  
cost control efforts,  but  several additional 
steps can be taken to optimize the type and 
quantity of information provided to the 
Space Station Program. The  program has 
both a \Vork Breakdown Structure and a 
Unique Project Number (funds control) 
system which need not be mirror images of 
each other. The  WBS is developed to 
describe, organize, and manage the tasks that 
are to be performed by either the prime 
contractors or  the Center institutions while 
the UPN structure is created to manage the 
finances of the Program and to support  any 
e x t e r n a I I y imposed report in  g require m e n t s . 
B y  structuring the two sets of tool to 
complement one another,  the program can 
increase the amount of information available 
to its managers. 
Unique Project Numbers may be assigned on 
the basis of the following criteria: 
Relative size of the cost center. 
(small costs can be combined, even 
if unlike) 
Importance on the critical path. 
(critical elements call for  careful 
monitoring) 
Distribution of Organizational 
activity. (dispersed projects need 
greater control) 
Existence of externally imposed 
reporting requirements. (e.g., OMB, 
GAO) 
Requirements for  pricing, cost 
sharing, performance, etc. (assure 
taxpayers money is well spent) 
The WBS which the program has baselined 
for the development phase of the program is 
organized by both end item and subsystem to 
support requirements to aggregate data in 
either format,  across the work packages. The 
supporting development (non-prime) portions 
of the WBS have not been established to 
support  a similar ability to provide a 
functional aggregation across the program. 
There are also substantial discrepancies in the 
significance and level of detail addressed at 
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comparable levels of the supporting 
development WBS. The progrnnl can enhance 
its analytical capabilities by reexamining its 
use of both of these tools and restructuring 
them to better support operations cost 
m a n :ig e ni e n t . 
Financial management occur!; a t  each of 
strategic, tactical, a n d  execution le\els, i n  
d i f f  e rent proportions depend i n  g 11 pion the 
function. The types of skills requireti and 
levels of effort  need to be delineatecl for 
each function, and described specifically for 
the strategic and tactical levels. Roles and 
res po n s i b i I i t  ies for  f in  a n c ial man age men t 
need to be allocated among the Centers and 
H Q o rga 11 i za t io ns , w it  h r eco ni ni e n (:led s u lip0 r t 
s t:i f f  i n g p I a n s. A re co m ni e n d t.d d is t r i b u t io n 
of' responsibilities is provided i n  Figure 5 -4 .  
C u r I-e n t organ iza t ional structure and pattern 
of nominal HQ management combined with 
field center execution have created a number 
of problems from the standpoint of financial 
ni a na g e men t: 
M a t r i x so met i ni es 
makes i t  difficult to trace lines of 
authority. Both effort  and control 
are widely distributed, not 
n ecessa r i 1 y i n co nso 11 :in ce . 
m a n age ni e n t 
Institutional planning at the 
tactical and execution levels has 
be en s e p a ra t e d f ro  m 1 ) r o g r a n i  n i  a t i c 
p la n 11 i 11 g . For ex a ni p 1 e,  se pa ra t e 
planning cycles and  orgnnizations 
may be used to support R&D 
(program m a t ic ) , of 
facilities (bricks and mortar), and 
R e s e a r c h  a n d  P r o g r a m  
Management (Center personnel and 
maintenance) budgets The result 
often is a lack of responsibility for  
the consequences of decisions and 
con f I i c t ins t i t u t io na I 
versus programmatic o rg a n i za t io n s . 
Long range program phnning  is 
not well served by splitting these 
res  p o n s  i b i 1 i t  i es t he 
co 11:) t r u c t io n 
between 
\Y i t h i n 
institutions. 
Center cclntracts and agreements 
are often written around skill 
types and levels of effort ,  rather 
than program specific tasks to be 
a c c o m p 1 is Ii e d . These me c ha n isms 
do  not generate information that 
can readily be used for  program 
or iented cost management or 
performance evaluation. I t  may be 
11 ec essa r y to superimpose pro j e c t - 
b y  - p ro j ec t reporting s y s te nis or 
1; e p a r a t e s c he d u 1 e s . 
IPrograni Office imposition of more 
levels of funds distribution 
controls and detailed reporting 
requirerner\ts has not necessarily 
enhanced  cost  cont ro l  o r  
performance visibility, Instead, 
h igher  ndininistrntive costs and 
increased potential for  overruns 
have resulted. 
The Space Station Program and relevant 
i ns t i t u t i ons should: 
Redefine the functional structure for  
operations, establishi~ig a WBS related to 
costs and outputs. Dvsign the funds control 
structure t o  complemcnt the WBS. Develop 
other management tools (a financial 
management system i: only one of an array 
of tools) to specifically interact with one 
a not her. 
Rethinh the organizational structure. 
Structur-e organizatioris to better support 
delegations of authority through a clearly 
understood chain of command. Staff each 
level with a n  appropriate mix of technical 
and business management personnel. Utilize 
personnel prrformancc reviews to enhance 
the responsiveness of projects to the 
program . 
Provide a n  alternative focal point for  long 
range planning which will work with the 
financial management processes. Reliance on 
a budgetary process taxed by immediate 
problems and institutionally divided by 
appropriations categories has proved 
unsatisfactory. 
Explore use of other contractual 
arrangements. Use of incentive fees has 
yielded mixed reviews to date. Follow-on 
operations era  contracts may be more 
effective if handled as subcontracts to a 
tactical level integration contract. 
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5.7 INFORMATION RlANAGEhIENT b y  Doug Lee 
A n  essential character of the Space Station, 
both manned base and platforms, is its nearly 
total dependence on efficient and effective 
d :i t a I1 a nd 1 i n g and i n form a t ion ni :i nag e me n t . 
TI1 is ke y fea t u r e was co 11 s idc red t h ro u g ho u t 
the SSOTF deliberations. A task force 
objective was to assure that the design and 
de\  elopinent of end-to-end communications 
and data systems consider the full range of 
user and station system operations for  both 
the development and the mature operations 
phases. The general consensus was that the 
Prograni must formalize its approach to 
integrated i n f or ni a t i o n resource m a nag e ni e n t . 
Chapter IV of the SSOTF Suniniary Report 
includes two summary sections relevant here: 
SSlS as a system, and the genernl topic of 
de \ e lop i ng t 11 ose tu o sum mar y re po r t 
sect io [is, the recon1 menda t io 11 s 1 is ted a t the 
end of this section emerged. 
m n nage rile n t inform at ion s 4 stems . I I 1  
Inforrnation h f a n a ~ e m e n  t T a ~ k s  and 
A I) D roa c h es 
Space station operations will encompass a 
complex range of functions, carried on by at 
least six separate NASA centers, plus the 
station itself, and three international partners. 
Coordination among these producers and 
users must be both efficient and flexible. 
Operations management will require 
info r ma t io n cost , 
scheduling, and other databases in order to 
assess and improve performance of the 
station and its support facilities. The SSOTF 
re co ni mended Functions Structure des c r i be s 
a complex flow of information between 
related functions and between levels of 
management. For this to create order rather 
than ch3os requires that standards be 
imposed, that databases be controlled for  
u pd n t i n g , and that co mnio n inform a tio n be 
consistent f rom one location to another. 
f rom e II g i n  e e r i n g , 
B e f o r e  d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  P a n e l ' s  
recommendations, this section will describe 
man a g e in e n t objectives , t y p e s of de c i s ions , 
principles of MIS design, pragmatic tests, and 
two examples of information problems. 
R la II age in e II t Ob i e c t i ves 
General purposes to be achieved in the 
management of information resources can be 
described in terms of efficiency, autonomy, 
and sequencing. 
Efficiency. Overall, to produce 
the most valuable output (space 
station resources) for  the resources 
(inputs) consumed. 
Autonomy. Each decision should 
be made at  the lowest level that 
can encompass the relevant factors. 
Sequencing. Decisions should be 
made in a sequence that permits 
the results of one decision to 
become the assumptions for  the 
next. 
Tv B e s of  De c i si o n s . 
o Plannine. Identify problems, 
generate alternatives, estimate 
impacts of alternatives, and 
evaluate impacts. 
o hlanaeement. Seek organizational 
efficiency through monitoring 
activities, identifying cost vs. 
per formance  t radeoffs ,  and  
evaluating input levels within a 
cost-effective ness framework . 
PrinciDIes of hllS Design 
o Targeted Information. Information 
should flow to those organizations, 
levels, and individuals possessing 
the authority to act upon the 
information . 
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Pragmatic Tests 
o S c r e e n e d  I n f o r r n a t i o ~ l .  
U n n e c e s s a r y i 11 1 o r ni a t  i o n 
(irrelevant, excessive detail) should 
be filtered out. 
o _Organized Information. Rele \ an t  
i n f o r ma t io n s hou 1 d 11 e d i g es t ed , 
structured, and presented so as to 
provide the most revealing insights 
with respect to hO\xi well the 
function is being performed 
(perf o r ma nce ni ens u re.,). 
o account in^ C o I! s i  s t e n  c y . 
Accounting frameworks (e.g., costs, 
inputs, outputs) should be mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive; detail 
brea k ou t s s ho u Id f i t  w i t  1.1 in high e r 
categories (nest ing);  several 
comprehensive s ys tern !i ma y ap p 1 y 
to the same items, t?:1ch s)$stem 
having the required pmperties but 
not necessarily across a l l  systems at 
all levels (relational). 
o U ~ w a r d  Flow. So 1 ut  ions t 0 
problems (decisions, or pioposed 
decisions) should flow upward, 
along with other information 
needed for  hi g he r - lev e I dec is ions . 
o Downward F l o ~ t .  Policies, 
constraints, and solutions to 
higher-level problerns should flow 
downward, to be embodied as 
assu m p t io 11s and t rad eo l'f i n c e n t i v es 
for  lower decisions. 
o Incentives. Managers should have 
reward incentives (e.g , bonuses) to 
use the inforination for  the benefit 
of the organization 3s 3 whole, and 
its objectives. 
o hlariaqeineilt Control. K eY 
databases used jointly by several 
activities or  by nianagtsment should 
be controlled as to hou they are 
modified and updated. 
o Is the procesc; producing decisions 
at an acceptal)le rate, and decisions 
t h a t  hold up over time? 
o Is the procecs itself efficient,  in 
that time and effor t  costs are 
reasonable, and the quality of the 
decisions i: high from the 
standpoint of maximizing benefits 
from the stat ion resources? 
o Are there alternative decision 
strategies that ought to be tried? 
Cu;iinnlc: Swtern versus Element 
-___ Controls. A system provides a single group 
o f  functions (e.g., power, data transmission) 
at many locations, while a n  element provides 
multiple functions at ;I single location (e.g., 
a laboratory). Generating cost and associated 
performance data on both (or more) 
dimensions is likely tc, be a heavy burden, 
and also unnecessary. In selecting which 
dimensions to emphasize, or  take as the 
p r i m ;ir y s t r u : t u r e, the fo  11 owing guide I i lies 
are proposed: 
o Production-Driven Costs. To the 
extent that costs of a system are a 
consequence of the hardware, 
software, labor, procedures, and 
other input choices made in the 
production of' the output (power, 
life suppoi t, comniunications), 
ni:inagement controls should be 
or i e n t ed to 3rd the system . 
o ConPuin~tioii-Driveii Costs. To the 
extent that costs are  driven by the 
ways in which the outputs are 
consumed, particularly if a single 
activity places variable loads on 
several systems, controls should be 
el emen t - or i e n t ed . 
\t'here both apply (e.g., communications) both 
ci i ni ens ions need to be ma in t a i n e d . 
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E x a  in e I e :  hli  11 i in i z a  t i  o 11 o f  
Hou sek eeei np Resou rce Cons ti m e t ion. I n 
order to preserve the greatest amount of 
resources  f o r  users ,  housekeeping  
consumption has to be carefully balanced 
against the needs of users. Ideally, the 
margin:il cost of reducing the consumption of 
a resource for  housekeeping should be the 
same as the value of the resource to the user 
thnt places the highest \ d u e  on having 
another unit. The marginal cost of reduction 
should also be the same for  all station 
f u n c t ions requ i r i n g t h n t reso u r c e. 
If, say, one kilowatt hour of pouer  for  air 
conditioning could be saved by spending $50, 
and the same could saved on data 
transmission fo r  $200, while the marginal 
user  lues the power at $100, then data 
transmission should use more power and air 
conditioning less. 
K E C 0 I h I END A TI 0 N S 
1 .  Establish oDerations requirements for 
RllS (le*. A statement of the requirements 
for Station operations should lie prepared, as 
input to the design and construction of the 
T M IS (Tech n ic a 1 M anage in e n t Info r in a t io n 
System), SSIS, and SSE (Software Support 
E n v i ro nine n t ) systems . Req u i re me tits sh o u Id 
identify information flows, key databases, 
and mechanisms for  controlling databases 
(ICDs. or  Interface Control Documents), 
based on  the functions tree produced by the 
SSOTF, and assuming the participation by 
several centers and partners. 
2.  Establish a sinple architect for SSIS 
and ThlIS. Data and information 
management will be critical in the Operations 
Era.  The  technicril architecture of both the 
SSIS and TMlS must be consistent and 
complementary since real-time data obtained 
during operations will be the source of 
planning data and information for  the pre- 
execution and post - u t il i za t ion anal ys is 
periods. A single architect for both systems 
is the ideal but a jointly managed effort  is 
absolutely critical to assure the appropriate 
synergy between the two systems. Both must 
provide for compatibility to software systems 
such as the onboard Data Management 
System (DMS) and the ground-based 
operations support  centers such as the SSCC 
and the POIC. 
3. Provide optimum data svstem 
t ra n s p a re 11 c v to u cj e rs . T h  is re com menda t ion 
embodies a number of important corollary 
recommend a t i on s re 1 ated to s ys tern 
transparency and user flexibility which are 
summarized here and reemphasized in the 
Special Topics section of the Task Force 
S u i n  m a r y Report: 
(a) Close the TDRSS w o u n d  coverage 
m. Having less than 100°/o coverage 
for  any real-time ground-to-onorbit 
activity adds a long-term planning and 
scheduling burden to most user activities 
and routine operations activities. The 
opportunity cost over time can be 
significant and the planning process will 
be unnecessarily constrained. A life- 
cycle cost study of various options to 
close the zone-of-exclusion should be 
conducted and should consider a number 
of Space Station user and operations 
scenarios. 
( b )  Consider the use of a varietv of 
space - to - g roil ntl  co In m 11 11 ica t ion I i 11 k 5:. 
This recommendation stresses the 
p o t  e n t i a  1 c o m m u n i c a t i o ns  
developments clearly underway in the 
private sector and by organizations 
within the international partnership. 
Within the next decade a number of 
space-to-space and space-to-ground 
capabilities will move into operational 
status and the Space Station should be 
prepared to exploit them. The  ability to 
move large volumes of data and 
information from point-to-point on the 
ground will be relatively limitless and 
inexpensive. The  Program should search 
for  every opportunity to assure that 
links between the Station and the 
ground are not limited by lack of 
foresight which gives fair  thought to 
f o r  
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these future  possibilities. The Station 
s\'stenis, such as the DhlS and the  on-  
board t rnc k i 11 f: 
systems, and related ground support 
sl'sterns should be scarred with such 
e \  olution in mind. 
coin ni u n i ca t io ns and 
(c) Consider the u s e o f  a variety of  
ground-based data I z i d l i i i p  seri ices. 
During Task Force de1iber:itions and  
review of operations scenarios i t  became 
clear tha t  the operations concept should 
be designed to support the explosive 
growth of data and inforination need:; 
i n  the fu ture .  The  prior 
recommendat ion focused on de\,eloping 
the data handling links to accommodate 
this expansion. This reconimendntiori 
suggests providing similar access to  
cost - e f fec t i ve , co m me rc' i a 1 I b p  a va i In b 1 c' 
g 1-0 u n d  - based cl a t:i 11 ;I 11 d I i 11 g fac i I i t  i es 
l ' h e  objective would be to bring as 
much of the d:ita to the ground with 
I i m i ted preprocess i ng :I nd al low the user 
o r i n t e r n a  t io na I pa r t ne r to " p u r c hase" 
t lie most cos t-cf fec t i1.e ground 
processing at whateler  facility they 
choose to. This Lvould free NASA's 
owned and managed d:ita facilities to be 
used for  the safety related and 
operation a I I y t i  nie - c I- i t i ca 1 d a t a needs . 
4.  Co 11 si (i e r on era t i  o n s :I 11 ti ti t i  I i za t i o 11 
dtrririp. TRllS design e f forb .  During the 
TMlS design effor t  the follo\ving should be 
ma j or cons ide ra t io 11s: the i mpleme n ta t ion of 
Assembly Pliase and Mature Phase Utilization 
a n d  Operations scenarios; the provision of 
stundardized CAD/CA M/CAE//CA I file 
formats or  translation procedures; and, the 
f u I I use o f re I a t  i o n a 1 d n t :i bas t: ilia ii:i ge me n t 
concepts fo r  all applications and opernt ionnl 
i n t e r faces. Th e De ve 1 o p m e 11 t 1'11 :i se I' r o g r a ni 
should provide formally t'or the proper 
delivery to NASA of all  engineering 
d a tab as es f r o  ni De 1; e 1 o p m e 11 t 1' h ns e 
contractors. These will be the basis for long- 
term configuration management and for  
continued operational use in sustaining 
engineering efforts. 
5.  ldcritifv and nro,ide for Propram 
control of k e v  databases. Conduct a study 
w h i c h id en t i  f ies en g i n eer i n g a nd opera t io na I 
databases which will ultimately be established 
as reference databases fo r  operations planning 
and execution. The  study should identify 
databases to be developed and used by 
con t ra c tors d 11 r ing the  en g i ne e r i n g 
dcvelopnient phises and which will be 
essentinl to long- 1 erm sustaining engineering, 
system maintenance, and logistics support 
such as CAD/C \M/CAE/CAI files. The  
study should examine all functional users of 
these databases. Idevelop illustrative uses of 
the datahases in the conduct of operations, 
define configurat on control mechanisms, and 
recommend what organization should be 
assigneil the data administrator function and 
t ti e h a n do ve r p rocess f rom en g i nee r i n g 
de ve Io piii e n t to ope ra t io ns pro g ra rn ni n na ge rs . 
6 .  Deielop a telescience scenario to 
g ti i t l  e a II d t cs t on era t i on al coricep ts. 
Establish a refei ence end-to-end telescience 
scenaI io(s) and evaluation methodology 
against which information systems designs 
and i n fo  r ni a t i  o n resource manage ni en t 
concepts can be assessed as the development 
phnse progresses and as technology evolution 
studies are conducted. The  scenario(s) should 
include evaluatiori ci iter-ia and support  the 
assessment of end-to-end command, control, 
and data flow requirements for  systems 
de \  elopeIs, station users, station system 
operators, and operations planners. All 
aspects of TMIS, SSIS, and SAIS should be 
consi4 ed i n  this process. 
7 .  Produce an Annual  J r ~ f o r ~ ~ i a t i o ~ l  
I < C W I J I . C C ~ S  hlarlaiiement Plan. To assist in 
the folmal iebiew of such efforts the 
Pi ogr a m  should provide an Information 
Resourccs Management Plan which includes: 
(a) Identification of key program 
information sources, 
( b ) A c co u n t :i b i I i t y and res p o n s i b i 1 i t  y 
for  t he program control led information 
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and databases that are essential for  
operations and that indicate the 
assignment with end-to-end functional 
flows and nianagenient control points, 
(c) Provision of a process and 
schedule for  t r a 11s fer  r i 11 g or adapting 
p r o  g r a m  - d e  v e l o p e d  e ng  in e e  r i n g 
d a t a bas es to the o rg:i n i za t ions 
responsible for  operations support, 
(d) Identification of all non-program- 
controlled databases, that is. those 
requiring program level agreements for 
access and long-term support, and 
(e) Plans for  the "knowledge-capture" 
essential to development of expert 
systems. 
The Program should update the Plan annually 
as part of the Program Plan update process. 
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Peg ra ni 
liARD\\’ARE AND SOFT\\’AHE S\’STERlS DESIGN ISSUES by Joe Joyce and William 
One of the main reasons to crcate the SSOTF 
at this point i n  the Spnce Station Program is 
t h e i ni p o r t a n ce cons id e r i t i  g 
oper:itions during the design and de\  elopment 
phase of the program. One of the tashs of 
the SSOTF was therefore to considcr chnnges 
i n  the proposed Space Stntion dcsign that 
might be beneficial git e n  operational 
cons id era t io n s . 
of careful 1 y 
In the fall of 1986, the It.aderdiip of the 
SSOTF was faced with an important decision. 
The  Task Force had just keen formed and 
the work of the panels wa\ .just beginning. 
5 Phase C / D  draf t  RFPi;, one for  the 
Program Support Contract and one for each 
of the 4 Work Packages, were to be relensed 
for  public review in late November with 
comments due  in December. Should the 
Task Force review the RFPs? Would such a 
review interfere with the main wrork of the 
T a s k  Force? On what basis could the SSOTF 
review these, given that its u’ork had just 
begun? The  SSOTF decided that due to the 
importance of design decisions, t h a t  a 
significant review of the RFPs would occur. 
To interfere with the other work of the 
panels as little as possible, each of the panels 
formed a group of reviewers to develop 
comments. These were then integrated by 
representatives of each of the panels and 
discussed with the SSOTF leadership. This 
process resulted in two outputs: 
-A  viewgraph presentat ion to the 
Associate Administrator for  Space 
Station on December 17. 1986 on major 
concerns with the RFPs, and 
-Detailed changes to specific portions of 
the RFPs. 
Both of these were sent to the Chairmen of 
the Source Evaluation Boards for  their use in 
revision of the RI-Ps. \\.hen the RFPs were 
redrafted for  an internal NASA review in  
Januar!. 1987, the SSOTF reviewed these and 
sub m i t  t e d detailed comments as we 11. 
5.8.1 K F P  Issues Presented to the Associate 
Ad i n  i II i s t r a  tor for Space Stat  ion 
This section \ \ i l l  siimmarize tlie major  issues, 
as  prescnted on December 17th. This 
preyentation identified a number of RFP  
policy mues--fot each, the presentation 
identified the R F P  status of tlie issue. the 
SSOTF c o n c e r r ,  and  the  SSOTF 
recommendation for  resolution of the issue. 
The major issues identified in this 
present :i t ion we re the f o I Io w i n g: 
-Operations r3les and missions 
-Program Support Contractor role 
- L i f e  c y c l e  c o s t s  i n c l u d i n g  
s u 11 port ab  i 1 i t  y con c e r n s 
-Logistics support 
- I n t e g r a t e d t r:i n s i t i  o n p 1 a n n in g 
- A u to ma t io n :I nd robotics p 1 a n n i ng 
-Purchase of second copies 
-Operations concept verification 
- I n t e rac t i ve inform at ion s y s te nis 
-RFP  deliverables 
These an’ discussell in turn below. The 
presentation concluded that the draft  KFPs 
did not present an integrated operations 
Joe Joyce coordinated the SSOTF effort  to develop c~oniments c l n  the RFPs (viewgraphs 
plus detailed suggested changes) and provided input into the non-RFP dzsign issues section. Bill 
Pegram wrote the chapter based on this input. 
1 
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concept. The SSOTF therefore recommended 
that NASA redraft  the five RFPs before 
releasing to potential bidders. 
Operations Roles and hlissions 
The SSOTF stated that their recommendations 
for  assignment of operations and utilization 
roles and responsibilities might differ from 
that assumed in the RFPs, and that the RFPs 
should therefore state that the roles in the 
R F P  were to be assumed for  bidding 
purposes only. 
Proprarn Support  Contractor Role 
The presentation listed a number of cases 
uhe re  the R F P  Statement of Work language 
implied that the Program Support Contractor 
would have a directive role. The 
presentation recommended that the PSC be in 
a supportive role to NASA, rather than a 
directive one. 
Life Cvcle Costs Including Supportabilitv 
Con ce r 11 s 
The presentation stated that the RFPs did not 
require the contractor to propose an approach 
to control life cycle cost, nor did they 
i nd ica t e the c u r r e n t program 
approach. The  SSOTF recommended that 
NASA use the responses to the R F P  as a 
guide in implementing the program approach 
to life cycle cost, thereby tapping the wealth 
of contractor experience with cost 
management. Because of the wealth of 
thinking that had been done on these topics 
for  Levels I and 11, the presentation proposed 
specific language for  inclusion in all 5 RFPs: 
c 1 e a r 1 y 
-"The appropriate concept of cost 
in Space Station program decisions 
is life-cycle cost which is the cost 
of developing, building, and 
operating the station, where all 
costs are adjusted for inflation and 
appropriately discounted . Ide a 11 y , 
costs born by other parties, such 
as other parts of NASA or  non- 
N A S A  u s e r s ,  s h o u l d  be  
incorporated as well, although in 
some instances the program may 
have to make decisions based on 
space station costs alone. 
-The program recognizes the 
i in po r t a nce of providing i n ce n t i ves 
to program participants to 
minimize life cycle costs to the 
entire station. One way to do  this 
is to levy LCC bogeys on 
ind iv idua l  work packages/  
e 1 em en t s /s u b s y s t ems and provide 
incentives for  these components to 
achieve a lower LCC. The LCC 
resulting from any of these 
co m pone n t s m us t consider the 
consumption of resources provided 
by other components and the 
marginal cost of these resources. 
-The Space Station program has 
developed a number of models that 
may be useful in controlling LCC. 
These include the System 
Accounting Model (SAM), the 
System Integration Model (SIM) 
and MESSOC. The program has 
recently developed a cost 
management process which is 
described in JSC 30470, Program 
Cos t  M a n a g e m e n t  P rocess  
Requirements. 
-The contractor should evaluate 
current program approaches to 
controlling LCC and propose 
niodifications if necessary. This 
should address control of LCC 
within a particular work package 
and across work packages. The 
approach should explicitly consider 
ground support  and launch/return 
requirements as well as impacts on 
key operations parameters such as 
on-orbit  manpower availability, 
The responses will be given due 
weight in the evaluation process 
and may  be adopted for  use across 
the program." 
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The SSOTF believed that the treatment of 
logistics in the RFPs was inadequate i n  
general. Among the deficiencies noted in 
the presentation were a lack of consistency 
in logistics planning across tlie four  worh 
packages, failure to request critical logistics 
documentation, and t ha t log is t ics p 1 a n s 
critical to evaluation and selection are not 
requested until 90 days after a\\r:ird. The 
pi csentation recommended that the WP RFPs 
be modified as necessary to incor1)orate the 
integrated logistics planning as defined i n  
JSC 30000 and 30207. 
I 11 t cgra t ed Trail s i  t i  oil PI a ii 11 i 11 g 
The presentation noted that \i‘orh Package 3 
M ;IS the only \VP to reques t  a n  Operntions 
7 iansition Plan. The p r ese 11 t :i t io n 
recommended that the PSC provide a 
transition program to phase-in and qualify a n  
O&M contractor, and develop a Space Station 
Tt:insition Plan. Work Packages 1 ,  2, and 4 
should do the planning necessary to turn over 
their work package responsibilities to an 
operations contractor and should submit a n  
Operations Transition Plan. 
Automation and Robotics Plaiiriiiig 
The presentation stated that while the RFPs  
requested that contractors submit A&[< 
concepts, the RFPs provide no cle?r method 
for evaluating such concepts nor providc a 
clear indication that NASA is willing t o  pay 
for such concepts i f  they are not requiied to 
pro! ide basic operational capabilit,. 7 he 
SSOT F recommended that con t rac t I:, rs s u bin it  
;I plan for  iiiiplementation of A & R  concepts 
u hicli should suggest knowledge base 
requirements necessary for  development of 
the ultimate concept, the desigrl strategy 
given the knowledge base, and approaches to 
piotot lping and \alidating the concept over 
time. In addition, the contract should 
suggest an incentive/awards schedule based 
on successfully developing and validating 
pioof of concept. 
The presentation noted tliat the RFPs made 
no mention of the possibilities of buying a 
cecond or more copies of any element, 
c ubsystem, or long-lead component. The 
SSOTF was  concerned t h a t  the loss of key 
station components a t  certain points during 
(he  assembly phase could jeopardize the 
entire program, and that continuing planning 
f’or growth and evolution may indicate a need 
(or additional elements aiid/or subsystems at  
:I time when the prime cotitractors are still i n  
place. The SSOTF recornmended that the 
RFPs require the proposers to suggest 
contract language and nc gotinting strategies 
which allow NASA to order second or  more 
Eopies. The object i \e  uould be to establish 
tlie optimal points during the contract for  
ord?ring the components given certain 
11 r o g r n m r i sk  :I nci p I n t i  t i  i n g assumptions. 
(&era t i  o 11 s Co 11 c e D t Veri f i c a t i o 11 
The presentation stated that the RFPs 
provided no support  for  verification of 
operations concept .  The  SSOTF 
recommended that the PSC support  Level 11 
in de\elopment and management of an 
Operations Concept verification program with 
nia nag e me n t , e ng i ne e r i n g , operations and user 
participation. I t  further recommended that 
the U’ork Package contractors support the 
operations concept verification program with 
personnel, pro tot ypes, and tes tbeds. 
1 1 1  te rac t i \ e 111 for in a t  io 11 S\ stern Assess in e 11 t 
The presentation statelj that the RFPs 
provided no support for  user assessments of 
information systems design and performance 
a n d  no  specification of rapid-prototyping of 
SSlS elements and neiworking of Space 
Station Program and user testbeds needed for 
i n  t e r a c t i ve The SSOTF 
recomniended that the PSC support  Level I1 
responsibility for  planning, coordinating, 
conducting, and reporting interactive 
eLaluation by designated user groups and for 
management of the capability to perform 
them. The SSOTF reclimmended that the 
a s s e ss ni e n t s 
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Work Package contractors provide network 
interface to systems prototypes, interface 
simulators, and other elements and support 
ass e ss in e n t s . 
Del i IJerables 
The presentation stated that the RFPs 
de 1 i vera b 1 e s were in co m p 1 et e and inconsistent . 
The SSOTF recommended that the RFPs 
separately list all contract deliverables and 
descriptions, and that they establish a 
standard set of operations data requirements. 
The  PSC and  Work Package 2 RFPs were 
noted as especially deficient. However, the 
presentation noted that there were collective 
deficiencies for  all WP RFPs: 
-The DR descriptions which were 
provided d o  not reflect a common 
approach for  collecting operations 
re la t ed inform at i o n (e. g . v a r i o u s t i t  I e s , 
content and format among WPs) 
-The DRs d o  not reflect an integrated 
schedule against a common operations 
implementation plan. Operational need 
dates fo r  integrating operations products 
do  not appear to have been established. 
-In general, the descriptions provided 
for  the content within the operations 
DRs are extremely broad in scope and 
as such it  is impossible to anticipate 
either the contractor's interpretation or 
the government's intention. 
-The operations DRs frequently did not 
cite applicable references to orient the 
contractor properly to existing program 
documentation. 
-The processing requirements in the 
DRs reflect a confusing variety of 
descriptions of the media desired (e.g. 
paper copy, electronic, fiche, etc.) for  
contractor presentation. 
One area that the Panel examined, but did 
not present to the Associate Administrator, 
was the use of contracting strategies to 
constrain life cycle costs. This topic was not 
presented for  a number of reasons: 
-The topic is quite complex and the 
time available to comment on the RFPs 
was very limited. The  Panel did not 
believe it understood the issues 
thorough 1 y e no u g h to recommend 
c ha n g es . 
-Some of the possible changes involved 
restructuring the procurements in a 
massive way that was not practicable 
given the time constraints 
-Some issues could be addressed during 
contract negotiations following award of 
the RFPs and were thus best deferred 
The analysis of these incentive aspects is 
contained i n  an unpublished paper "RFP 
In c e n t iv e s: I nc e n t i v e s for  Cons t r a in i ng Life - 
Cycle Cost" by Bill  Gates of JPL, December 
5 ,  1986. 
5.8.2 Additional Design Issues Addressed b y  
the SSOTF 
Following the review of the RFPs, the 
SSOTF continued to address design issues. In 
addition to those described above, the 
principal issues were as follows: 
Corn moil al i t v 
The advantages of commonality are many: 
i II t e r c 11 a n g ea b i I i t  y , ens i e r m a i n t e n a n c e,  1 e s s 
training required, smaller spare parts 
inventory, generally less design and 
engineering effort ,  and lower production 
costs. The disadvantage of common 
standards is the restriction placed on design, 
the coordination or  promulgation effort  in 
generating compliance, and the both initial 
and continuing effor t  needed to select 
appropriate standards. 
Poorly designed standards obviously can have 
a negative impact, in forcing design into 
inefficient forms and increasing costs of 
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design, production, and operation. Also. the 
initial effort  of designing and disseminating 
standards is considerable. 
Commonality alternatives pertain to the deplh 
to  w h i c h  s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  app l i e s .  
Microcomputers, for  example, may be 
compatible in that they can read the sanie 
size diskette, t hey  use the sanie operntjng 
commands ("eniulatoi s"), they uge the Sanle 
operating system at the subroutine level ( I B M  
compatibles), or  they use the% sanie haIdwaie 
("clones"). Standardization of parts can lie 
limited to a few major interfaces o r  carried 
to the lowest level of nut<, and bolts. 
For the space station, a set of commonnlity 
s t a nd a r d s has a 1 re ad y be I: n de ve 1 oped . b 11 t 
they have been declared "reference" rathcr 
than "mandatory". Compliance is thus  
optional. The  alternative is to place the 
burden of evidence on the entity seeking a 
waiver f rom the standards. 
One example of the need for  common and 
interchangeable interfaces for  user payloads 
within the Space Station Program is power 
distribution. AC distribution is the approved 
concept for  the U S .  modules, whereas ES.4 
and Japan have chosen DC p0wc.r 
distribution. A likely result is variable 
i n te r f aces, and 
maintenance procedures. Conversion 
equipment will be required to install a US 
experiment in the ESA and/or  JEM module. 
Also different  procedures for  verification, 
qualification, and hazards protection will k'e 
required. 
train i ng re q u i rem en t s , 
Launch Vehicle Flexibility 
A mixed fleet of launch vehicles w:ts 
recommended for  space ti ansportat ion. The 
use of ELVs, as a part o f  this mixed fleet, 
will complicate design. An envelope cf 
design requirements should be developed (See 
1st Logistics Symposium a t  MSFC, week of 
March 19, 1987). Compatibility with a 
mixed fleet of launch vehicle shrouds, 
environment, g-loadings, and vibration is 
unknown. The  Titan IV will provide 
conditions close to the STS. However, i t  is 
still being designed. There is no Heavy Lift  
Launch Vehicle. 
Although the S7S is capable of delivering a 
significant anioiint of weight to low earth 
oibi t ,  i t  is c3nstrained to downweight 
limitations of less than half of the upweight. 
Etiilor r riotc: Thr, rtalcntctit \vu\ huscd or1 t h e  
S T S  capnhilitv l i t  t l icj  iinic of ihc  Ta\h Forccj, 
i . c .  p i  i o )  t o  ilir iticr caicd do)tvtweigl i t  
cripiihilici~ o f  tile STS rrrtd ihcl rrtcrea\cd 
i i p w ( , i p l i t  ciipahi ' i t  I '  o f  the Advartccd Solid 
RocXc~i Alofor ( A  SI< 11). The program may be 
Ieduced to l o w  er  than desirable science 
return capabilit!i since STS flights will be 
concerned with logistics support. The SSP 
should initiate a study to define and design 
a down weight man a ge me n t s ps t e m . 
I, o g i c t i c 'i hl  od 11 I C .  
There must be easy launch pad access to the 
pressurized logistics module for support of 
life science. NSTS middeck lockers are 
limited in the size of animal they can support 
to about 350 grams. Larger animals must be 
housed in the pressurized logistics module. 
Also, power and ECLSS s y s t e m  must be 
maintained to support these animals. The 
support equipment and ORUs must also 
accessible and repaired. 
Pov er 
Discussions of resource allocation seem to 
focus on the steady state value of resources, 
principally power. In reality, both the 
supply and the demand for  power will be 
variable. The supply of power will vary 
with the position of the Space Station and 
wi th  the maintenance status of the power 
system. On the demand side, startup 
transient power demand of payloads is a key 
issue. There will probably be power demand 
spikes prior to reaching steady state. Cooling 
requirenients may also peak in response to 
the start u p  spike, and a built-in thermal 
sink may be needed. Allocation of resources 
and associated tirneliness must consider these 
characteristics. 
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Communications 
The SSOTF recommended that the core 
station and platforms have redundant Ku-  
band antennas since a single point failure in 
the communications cannot be tolerated. 
Therefore,  NASA should provide an alternate 
communications path via an S-band link. 
This could also provide for  eventual 
interoperability with the internationals' data 
relay satellites. 
Crew Environment 
Past flight experience and a phenomenon 
known as the "tight building syndrome" 
support the need for  sophisticated sensors 
(monitoring system) linked to the health 
maintenance facility. The SSP should 
develop procedures, equipment and cleaners 
to do  routine maintenance and cleaning. 
There is need for  NASA to assign a single 
organization with responsibility for  the end- 
to-end architecture of the SSIS. This 
organization will be responsible for  
accumulating and reconciling all SSIS 
requirements. Implementation of the SSIS 
will include evaluation and input from user 
groups. At  present the SSIS will be 
developed through a combination of efforts 
of several NASA organizations as follows: 
Code S 
Code T 
Code E 
Data Management and C&T 
systems 
S p a c e - t o - g r o u n d  R F  
connectivity through the 
Space Network and ground 
data transmission through the 
N A S A  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  
(NASCOM) and the Program 
Suppor t  Communica t ions  
Network (PSCN) 
User end-item facilities for  
payload control and data 
processing 
This split implementation of the end-to-end 
SSIS could discourage and delay the effective 
use of this critical Space Station Operational 
system. 
Supportability 
Like the Shuttle, but unlike most previous 
NASA missions, the Space Station must be 
designed to be operated and maintained over 
a long period of time. If the initial 
development phase fails to produce hardware 
and software that can easily be supported and 
upgraded, operations costs will be extremely 
high as major systems are replaced during 
operations. 
Elements and equipment should be designed 
to be easily maintained and supported at 
reasonable cost. 
- Design modular components with 
common interfaces to facilitate 
isolation of problems and ease of 
replacement. Maintain stock of 
spares in resource nodes. 
- Build in robustness and redundancy 
so as to minimize requirements for 
maintenance. 
- Reduce on-orbit complexity so that 
problems can be diagnosed and 
repaired as failures occur. 
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I n  1984 Congress mandated the Space Station 
Program emphasize Automation Sr Robotics 
(A&R).  Since that time, the use of 
automated systems and robotic hardware to 
increase operational capabilities and decrease 
life cycle costs on-board the Space Station 
has been looked at extensivel!. The SSOTF’ 
agrees that this is and will be an important 
area for  fur ther  study. Because of this 
importance, an  automation and robotics 
subpanel was formed within the SSOTF. 
Autorn a t ’  1011 
The SSOTF Summary report acknowledges 
the importance of studying further the use of 
automation and, i n  particular, the 
identification of systems that should be 
automated on the init ial  Station either 
because they are vital to all phases of the 
Program and or  because adding them later 
would be extremely difficult or  prohibitively 
expensive. While several studies have 
covered the use of automation of on-board 
systems i n  general, there needs to be a more 
specific list of systems that should be 
automated on the initial Station and a 
determination of the cost savings to be 
accomplished by this automation Some 
possible applications that should be examined 
from a cost/benefit standpoint are as 
follows:1 
-Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery 
-Subsystem Monitoring 
-Fault Diagnosis 
- Recon f ig u r a t ion 
- SI1 o r t Term Plan n i n  g and Sc I1 ed u 1 i n g 
-Resource Management 
-Performance Management 
- T ra in i ng 
- Ma i n te na n ce 
\?any of these applications would not be 
candidates for  incorporation on the initial 
!$tation, however, they could certainly be 
considered as cnndidates Tor evolution. 
,4 requirement to operate the Space Station i n  
:i nian-tended mode for long periods of time 
~xould  create a necessit) for  a degree of 
nutomation more extensive than that 
envisioned for  the init icil  manned Station. 
Automation and/or ground control of seveinl 
Station systems ~ o u l d  be required to support 
the Station during the periods when it will be 
II n man ned . 
The Task Force also feels that not enough 
attention has been paid to the automation of 
ground based systems (other than such design 
:)‘stems as CAI>/CAE)  where the life c lc le  
cost savings to the Program could be more 
zignificant than those associated with on- 
board automation. I n  addition to possible 
cost savings, ground systems can be used as 
;L test bed for on-board s3stenis a t  a low risk 
to the Station. Since the use of such 
capabilities must be proven to be trustworthy 
prior to their installation on the Station, their 
use on the ground would not only improve 
ground capabilities but would also provide a 
prototype to build confidence in the de3ign 
of the software which niny migrate to the 
Space Station. 
Existing automation studies tend to stress 
autonomy of the Station, i.e. independence 
from the ground. However, increased Station 
autonomy should be treatvd not as an end in  
itself but on ly  :is a nieans to relieve the on- 
board crew of tedious, repetitive or 
dangerous tasks  and/or  as a means of saving 
costs of‘ operating the Station. Several 
functions pel formed by the Operations 
h4anagement System (OMS) on the ground 
could be migrated to the Station, however, 
this migration must be looked at  very 
carefully to assure that i t  results in cost 
sa?\ ings and increased performance. Also, 
studies are needed to  determine the 
effectiveness and incre ised performance 
which might result from the migration of 
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some of the on-board functions to the 
ground (e.g. ground control of near vicinity 
vehicles or  mobile Station Systems). 
While i t  may not be vital, or  even desirable, 
to design in a high percentage of automated 
systems before the Station experience base 
indicates a need for  such, or  before trust in 
the automated systems can be established, i t  
is vital to start building a knowledge base 
which can be used to build automation 
capability for  both on-board and ground 
systems. For this reason, the inclusion of 
automation studies in the Phase C/D 
contracts is very important. Figure 5 - 5  
shows a plan for  the use of design 
requirements to capture system knowledge 
which can be used to develop automated 
systems in several areas.2 In addition, the 
Operations Groups of the NASA Automation 
and Robotics Panel makes the following 
statement on this subject3: 
"The development of the system 
knowledge base is the central, most 
critical technology development 
area. This is because it interacts 
w i th  the  most  impor t an t  
subsystems and influences the 
operation of all aspects of 
intelligent, autonomous systems. 
Knowledge base development for  
dynamic,  large-scale systems, 
especially for  space systems, such 
as the Space Station, is still an 
uncharted area. For application 
domains with existing operational 
human expertise, it is usually the 
most difficult  development area to 
accomplish satisfactorily. For the 
Space Station, presently without 
such expertise, it is the most 
important and urgent research and 
development area requiring careful 
planning far  into the future.  
This process must start during the 
design phase, where the final 
design represents a first baseline 
set of factual information from 
which factual knowledge for  the 
system knowledge base can be 
extracted. The  knowledge base 
can be completed with heuristic 
knowledge obtained in the usual 
manner--by a question and answer 
process from humans at  a later 
time. Of immediate concern, 
therefore, are the development of 
( I )  a mechanism for  capturing and 
storing relevant design information 
in machine readable format  and 
(2) techniques for  extracting 
operational knowledge for  the 
system knowledge base from this 
design inform at i o n .I' 
Design knowledge capture requires a strong 
operations people involvement along with a 
design knowledge capture system. Operations 
personnel must take responsibility for  capture 
of the correct information since they are the 
people who need the information for  future  
operations and sustaining engineering. 
Automation of the operation of hardware and 
software will be an important part of the 
Space Station Program and studies should be 
encouraged, perhaps even incentivised (award 
fees, etc.) in the Phase C/D contracts. 
Robotics 
In the study of Space Station operations, it 
will be important to encourage the Phase 
C/D contractors to place emphasis on the 
possibility of using robotic hardware (e.g. 
light weight arms, "smart" end effectors, etc.) 
to relieve the crew of tasks that are  better 
done by such hardware. Such tasks are those 
that are dangerous such as handling 
hazardous materials, or  those that are 
extremely fatiguing such as long EVAs. The 
use of mobile robotic arms, operated from a 
Station module could also alleviate the 
necessity for  long periods of unproductive 
crew time associated with EVA activities, 
such as breathing conditioning, donning and 
doffing suits, etc. Such use could also save 
some of the time and costs associated with 
suit reconditioning. As with all mobile 
hardware, safety considerations will be 
paramount in the decision to use robotic 
technology. Caution must be exercised in 
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both the design and operations stages of this 
technology. The Space Operations and 
Support Systems Panel of the SSOTF looked 
a t  the use of the Flight Telerobotic Servicer 
(FTS) which is a part of the Space Station 
Program plans. Table 5-3 presents the 
description of the FTS and suggestions for  
development that were developed by that 
panel and presented to the SSOTF. 
The suggestions made with respect to the 
FTS should be applied to all sophisticated 
robotic hardware to ensure that i t  will be 
used with confidence once i t  is built. 
As with automation, more consideration 
should be given to the use of robotic 
technologies for  use in Space Station ground 
operations. Such systems are already used in 
manufacturing and in the handling of 
hazardous materials and their application to 
Space Station ground system operations to 
relieve ground crews of dangerous and 
tedious jobs should be expanded. This 
would, most likely, result in sizable benefits 
to the program for  the costs involved. I n  
addition, ground hardware can be used as a 
test bed for  potential on-board systems to 
ensure their safe operation and to build 
confidence in their capabilities. 
Automation of operating Space Station 
systems, both on the ground and on-board, 
and the use of robotic hardware to relieve 
crews of tedious and/or dangerous tasks, 
should be a vital aspect of the Space Station 
design studies. Decisions must be made as 
soon as possible on which systems must be 
automated on the initial Station, on which 
robotic technologies are required early and 
on the hooks and scars which must be added 
to the initial Station design to allow the 
addition of further A&R during the 
evolution phases of the Program. In order to 
facilitate such decisions, the Phase C /D 
design efforts must include studies of A&R 
systems from an operational and life cycle 
cost basis. 
Re c o m m e 11 dation s 
As part of its efforts to plan for  advanced 
automation, the SSOTF recommends that the 
Space Station Program: 
( 1 )  Provide Work Package managers and 
Phase C/D contractors with guidelines 
for  defining and maintaining Program- 
based "knowledge capture" databases as 
they make primary design decisions. 
(2) Initiate prototype ground-based and 
on-orbit expert systems development 
using life-cycle cost methods for  
evaluating options. 
( 3 )  Require Phase C / D  contractors to 
submit an Automation and Robotics 
Plan. The Plan should propose 
know 1 edge b a s e re qu ire m e n ts necessary 
for  development of the ultimate 
concept, design strategy given the K.B., 
and approaches to prototyping and 
validating the concept over time. 
(4) Require contractors to suggest 
incentive and award schedules based on 
success f u I I y develop i n g and v a 1 id at i n g 
proof of concept. The  schedule will 
consider potential life-cycle cost 
benefits including those which may 
accrue across the station by broad-based 
application to multiple systems and 
modules, as well as opportunities for  
developing and retaining Station and 
system evolutionary paths. 
( 5 )  During the development and 
operations phases the Program should 
prepare ASrR Advocacy Plans. As a 
starting point, the  projected levels of 
operational performance for  major 
functional areas should be evaluated 
against the life-cycle costs and the 
associated risks. The plans should be 
proactive in the use of A&R to enhance 
long-term operational productivity. 
System scarring for  longer term 
technological evolution should be 
highlighted for  Program management 
decisions. 
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FLIGIIT TELEROBOTIC SERVTCER 
OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND 
The Flight Telerobotic Servicer is being 
implemented as a multipurpose too! to reduce 
and/or  complement crew EVA during 
assembly, maintenance and servicing. Tasks 
planned for  execution by the FTS are also 
designed to be accomplished by EVA.  
K E Y  T E L E R O B O T I C  S E R V I C E R  
DEVELOPMENT KEQUIKEMENTS 
-Ground Rules (absolute requirements) 
( I )  Crew safety--complies with Space 
Station rules and standards for critical 
and liazardous systems. 
(2) Critical Space Station ha rdware  
safety - - com p 1 ies S t a t i  o n 
rules for critical and liaznrdous s! stems. 
wit ti Spnc e 
( 3 )  FTS must fail safe and fail 
recover ab 1 e 
-Constraints (desirable to have but trade 
study results may change options) 
( I )  Teleoperation and limited supervised 
a ut o n o m y operation mod e s . 
(2) FTS operable f rom NSTS, Mobile 
Se r v i c in g bay 
manipulator, and the OMV. 
Ce n t e r , s e r v i c i n g 
( 3 )  Use standard Space Station 
interfaces. 
- Function 
( I )  Specific functions will be allocated 
to SS FTS facilities during P h x e  B. 
( 2 )  FTS provides dexterous manipulation 
cap a b i 1 i t  y a 1 tern a t i v e. 
equipped with suitable end effectors. 
E V A L U A T I O N  O F  F L I G H T  
TELEROBOTIC SERVIC’ER 
-DeveIopment of the FTS builds on industry 
ex per ie n ce an d t h e a1 ire ad y demonstrated 
systems within the nuclear industry (as a 
result the risk is not so much with delivery 
of a useful system but with the degree of 
ope ratio na I by f i rs t 
e 1 em en t la u n c h ) . 
f I e x i b i I i t y a va i lab le 
- A  combina t ion  of  NSTS f l igh t  
demonstrations and siniulations are to be 
used to baseline FTS capabilities and safe, 
reliable, and efficient operations. 
-The development risks are considered to be 
manageable provided appropriate flight 
d e n i  o n s t r a t ion s and s i m u la t io ns are con d uc t ed 
and the EVA capability to perform FTS tasks 
is also available. 
-The FTS Phase B study effort  is to be 
initiated in lhe same time frame as other 
Space Station elements are beginning Phase 
C/D (this will necessitate close coordination 
among Work Packages 1 0  insure FTS designs 
are successfully integrated into the SS 
Program). 
( 3 )  Some functional capabilit! overlaps 
between the EVA crewman equipped 
with suitable tools and the FTS 
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(6) In the area of onboard operations 
auto mat ion , the Pro g rani s h o u 1 d 
establish fixed procedures and 
predetermined decision rules that permit 
maximum operation with minimum on- 
orbit crew intervention. 
-Use ground control for  selection 
among pre-programmed automated 
procedures. Use of robotics 
technology where applicable. 
-Facilitate crew intervention by 
means of computerized diagnostics 
a n d  e a s i l y  i m p l e m e n t e d  
instructions. 
(7 )  With respect to the FTS, 
-The Program should aggressively 
pursue development to establish 
capability in place early, consistent 
with safe, reliable and efficient 
operations. The  FTS offers 
significant potential to the Space 
Station Program to reduce and/or  
complement crew EVA activities 
during assembly, maintenance and 
servicing activities. 
-The Space Station operations 
organization should participate in 
and maintain appropriate oversight 
involvement during the FTS Phase 
B systems definition effort  in order 
to identify FTS operational 
functions which would provide 
significant enhancement of the 
Station’s productivity, influence the 
operational character of the FTS 
and develop the FTS operational 
concept. 
-The Space Station Program 
develop men t efforts o t h e r than the 
FTS should accomniodate the FTS 
Phase B and C /D contracts and 
schedule offset to the extent 
required to ensure successful 
integration of the FTS into the SS 
Program. 
(8) Continue the Automation and 
Robotics Panel (ARP).  NASA has taken 
several steps to ensure that artificial 
intelligence and the automation of 
ground control functions receive the 
appropriate priority. A group of 
outside experts was organized by NASA 
to evaluate automation in the Space 
Station Program. This group, called the 
Automation and Robotics Panel (ARP),  
identified current and future  expected 
artificial intelligence and automation 
tech no 1 o g i es and ass esse d their 
applicability to the Space Station 
Program. In addition, the ARP 
reviewed the work package and Program 
Support Contractor RFPs. 
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Documentation R e a u i r e n m t  17 Keuorts of S t m e  Stntion Prosiniii Phase B Contractors, Draft  3, 
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Automation and  Robotics Panel, Californil  Since Institute, University of California at  San Diego 
at  the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, hlarch 20, 1087, p. 12. 
5-70 
Evolut iori 
5.10 EVOLUTION by Karen Brender 
One of the major goals of the Space Station 
program is to design and build an initial 
Station that is capable of evolving as 
requirements for  use of the Station change 
and as technologies become available to 
enable lower operations costs, higher 
productivity and increased performance. 
Both the manned base and the platforms 
must be capable of growth in order to 
accommodate increasing numbers of users 
who will, most likely, have increased 
resource requirements as the user hardware 
and the zero g experience base evolves (e.g. 
materials processing moves from research to 
production requiring larger amounts of 
power). 
The SSOTF Summary Report presents a 
concept for  Space Station Operations i n  the 
mature operations phase (i.e. prior to any 
major growth in resources). The functions in 
the evolution category during this phase are 
those of planning and scheduling for  
evolution, although the possibility exists for  
some phase A/B studies during this time 
frame. Both systems and operations planning 
must be accomplished to assure an 
evolut ionary program which meets 
requirements, is workable, is within the 
budget constraints and does not preclude any 
viable evolutionary path. In any evolution 
planning the planners must always be aware 
that the benefits of evolving the Space 
Station are to increase capabilities available 
to the user communities. 
Evolution Planning 
Planning for  growth and evolution includes 
the provision of scars for  possible future  
alternatives, which can be handled in several 
ways: 
-Build in hardware components that 
permit future  growth in a wide range of 
possible directions. Preserve future  
options by scarring, to the extent that 
allowing for  uncertain alternatives is less 
costly than making future  modifications. 
- C o n s i d e r  p o s s i b l e  g r o w t h  
configurations, but  accommodate only 
those that appear very likely or will be 
precluded by specific designs. 
-Adapt the station to  growth as it 
occurs. 
Another important aspect of evolutionary 
planning before and during the mature 
operations phase is planning for  the use of 
automation as an  aid to productivity and to 
lower life cycle costs and the use of robotics 
to relieve the on-board crew of tasks that are 
better done by robotic hardware. One of the 
functions of this aspect of planning is to 
decide what types of automation should be 
on the initial Station because they are vital to 
all phases and/or because adding them at a 
later time would be prohibitively difficult or 
expensive. Another planning function would 
be to determine initiatives for  A&R. A&R 
is discussed more fully in Section 5.9 above. 
Evolution PlaiininP Process 
The functional structure for  "Evolutionary 
Planning" is shown in the SSOTF Summary 
Report ,  along with the necessary inputs into 
the planning process and the flow of output 
to other functional processes. Evolution 
planning will be accomplished under the 
direction of the Strategic Plans and Programs 
Division at Level I .  All major Strategic 
functional groupings will feed inputs, such as 
historical data and results f rom independent 
analyses, to the planning process. The 
planning process would then determine other 
factors which will affect  the policy 
determined to be appropriate for  evolving the 
station. Determination of the extent and 
direction of evolution and growth will come 
from both strategic and tactical functional 
areas. 
These areas include: 
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G e ne ra I operations po 1 i c !i 
Transportation policy and  planning 
LJtilization policy and planning - 
particularly in the arena of 
marketing to both commercial and 
no n - c o m m e r c i a 1 sect o r s t o i n c r e as e 
S t a t i o 11 u t i 1 i z a ti o n 
User Priorities 
I n t e r na t io n a 1 pol ic i e s 
Budget projections 
User 
projected user requ i rem i t  11 t s , e tc . 
require men ts, p : ~  I' t ic u In 1-1 y 
Ongoing studies such a>  those on 
Space Station design a n d  those on 
use of commercial elernents and 
s e r v ices 
The  evolution planning function provides 
feedback to the other strategic level areas 
and to the required tactical plann ing areas. 
Of vital importance is the flow of 
i n fo r m a t i o 11 fro ni t ti i s plan n i n g f u n  c t ion t o 
the SEStl planning functions and the 
operations i n  t eg r a t i o n The 
transportation and utilization policy 2nd 
budget feedback loops must be est:iblished 
early in the planning processec so that 
information flow in both directions is 
accomplished prior to the actual hardware 
phase of the Space Station program. 
The most vital aspect of eLolutionary 
planning i n  the DDTSrE phase of the Space 
Station Program is assuring that the initial 
Station is designed in such a way that i t  does 
not preclude growth in systems. resouices 
and operational capability. Specifically, 
evolution planning must establish M l i n t  hooks 
(to allow software add-ons a n d  change out) 
and scars (to allow system capability inci ease) 
are necessary to accomplish evolution without 
a severe increase in life cycle costs. 
f u n c t i o n . 
Specific functions of the evolutionary 
planning category include but are not limited 
to the following: 
o Analysis of current and projected 
S t a t i o n  s y s l e m s ,  c u s t o m e r  
requirements, ::oak, and policies 
(has both strategic and tactical 
asp e c t s ) . 
o Analysis of all strategic plans and 
policies to determine the direction 
and extent of !evolution (has both 
s t r a t P g i c a n d t :: c t i ca I asp e c t s ) . 
o De te rmine  design impacts ,  
particularly hooks and scars on the 
"current St:itioii" at any phase of 
the Program, to allow for  further 
evolution (has both strategic and 
tactical aspects). 
o Establish plans for  the use of 
automation a n d  robotics as an aid 
to oilerations. 
o Set up  a performance assessrllent/ 
cost assessment system to identify 
opportun i ties/req uirements fo r  
automation anti evolution paths 
o Perform life cycle cost studies to 
guide planning for  effective 
evolution at the lowest costs to the 
Program . 
o Manage Space Station System 
growth and evolution programs. 
Evolution ODtions 
There are optional ways to achieve evolution 
of both the manned base and the platforms, 
as well as phasing of Space Station operations 
functions such as marketing, pricing, 
information systems, etc Some of the major 
impacts of the optional ways to grow/phase 
can be shown here (many operations options 
are covered in the Suminary Report  and the 
other panel reports); however, much more 
work needs to be done on the operational 
impacts of choosing cerlain evolution paths. 
( 1 )  &stems Evolution - Platforms. 
Ecolution of the platforms can be 
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accomplished in two ways. First, existing 
platforms can be "grown" - -  that is, 
expanded to increase resource capability and 
accommodate more users. Or,  conversely, 
platforms can be replicated so that growth is 
accomplished by providing additional 
platforms. The  option recommended by the 
Space Operations Support Systems Panel of 
the SSOTF is that of replication. This option 
was considered to be more "user friendly" for  
diverse users than the expansion of a single 
platform. 
IMPACT: The  major operational impact 
of this approach to growth is increased 
requirements on the transportation 
system(s) for  launch and particularly for  
servicing of "niore" platforms. Increased 
re q u i rem en t s for  s e r v ic i n g w o u Id a Is0 
increase the use of the OMVs resulting 
in a probable increase in the number of 
OMVs. An additional impact would be 
in the increase in  competition for  
common systems such as conimunication 
links. 
The  impacts, to the Space Station 
Program, to operations cost and to 
transportation systems, of adding more 
platforms have not been fully 
determined and fur ther  study is 
suggested. 
( 2 )  Systems Evolution - Manned Base. 
The evolution of the manned base can be 
accomplished in one or  more of the following 
ways: 
(a) Adding resources, elements and 
structure to the existing manned base. This 
evolutionary path requires that scars be 
added to the initial Station. If  scars are not 
added (e.g. size the alpha joint to 
accommodate larger power systems) the on- 
orbit  change out and integration to 
accomplish the growth may be operationally 
impossible and/or prohibitively expensive. 
Scar requirements are still under study, 
however, the following is a list of some of 
the primary systems requiring growth scars: 
Alpha Joint (Electrical) 
Radiator Joint (Mechanical & Fluid 
Transfer ) 
Power Management and Distribution 
Thermal Distribution 
Guidance and Control 
E le men t Docking Ca pa b i 1 i t  y 
Hea I t h Maintenance Fac i 1 it y 
0 per at i o  n s Man age men t System 
TDRSS Antenna Mounts 
IMPACT: Growing the Station i n  a 
"more of the same" manner will require 
add i t  i o n a1 i n 
logistics, crew habitat, maintenance. etc. 
opera t i o na 1 cap ab  i 1 it y 
(b)  Change out systems (software and 
hardware) as new technologies become 
a vai 1 a ble t h a t w i 11 inc rease productivity 
and/or lower operational costs. A key area 
of technology upgrade will be i n  automation 
of systems where such automation can 
accomplish the above objectives. Some 
hooks and scars may be required on the 
initial station to allow addition of new 
technologies. 
IMPACT: Operational impacts of 
providing new technologies such as 
automation should be only i n  the 
positive direction; e.g. the creation of 
more crew time for  users, reduction of 
costs of operating ground systems 
and/or the increase of onboard 
productivity (work capacity) lfowever, 
care must be taken that the program 
does not automate for  the "sake of 
automation". More study of actual 
requirements is necessary. 
(c) Branching to a second (or more) 
Station with a different  utilization purpose, 
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e.g. a transportation node and ;I "quiet" 
microgravity station. The 1985 Space St:ttioi: 
E \  olution Workshop found that branching i: 
likely to be a major evolution node 
IMPACTS: Operation31 impacts are t h e  
same as those of Option (a),  however. 
this option will ha\(: ;I more severe 
i m pac t on the t ran 5 po r t a t ion systems . 
Preliminary studies of the impacts to 
transportation system due to evolution and 
grouth  were done b l  the \Yolk Package 2 
Phase B contractors. 
(3 )  Ground Svstcinc; EIolutioii 
Evolution of ground systcnis will be as vital 
to the Program as the e\olution of the on-  
board systems to increase performance a n d  
louer  life cycle costs. Past programs h a \ e  
been somewhat  lax in the e\olution of the 
ground systems to upgrade their capabilities 
and to take advantage of new technologies. 
Increased capabilities on the Station will 
r equ i r e  increased  capabi l i t i es  and  
performance on the ground. Evolution 
planning must include requirements to build 
ground sof tuare  systems ( i n  which the 
technologies are changing rapidly) for  ease of 
upgrade, for  growth in capability and for  
transportability. 
Ground systems can also be used as a 
test bed for  the automation of on-board 
systems. Since the use of such techniques as 
Knowledge Based Systems must be proven to 
be trustworthy prior to their installation on 
the Station, their use on the ground would 
not only improve ground capabilities but 
would also provide a prototype for testing 
software that may later migrate to the 
manned base or the platforms. 
Opera t i  o 11 a I Ph as i 11 g 
The following paragraphs list some suggested 
phasing of evolutionary capability/direction 
for  certain operational functions. The 
suggestions are from the reports written by 
Panels 1 and 3 of the SSOTF. 
o Platforms should grnvitate from 
Station owned and operated to 
being owned and operated directly 
by tlie users (or b y  private firms 
which would provide commercial 
platforin services to the uyers). 
The inlpact of this would be to 
shift program costs from tlie 
Station to the user. However, 
centralized control of common 
systems (for  which all users 
competi:) such as OMV use, 
s e r \  i ; i n g  f l i g h t s  a n d  
commuiications links w i l l  still be 
re q u i ret 1. 
o Several functions performed by the 
Opera t i o ns S y s t e m 
(OMS) can be migrated from the 
Ground to Onboard, however, this 
m i gr a t ion must be care f u 1 1 y stud i ed 
to asSure that costs are lowered and 
efficiency increased before i t  takes 
place. Also, studies are needed to 
de t e r m i ne tlie effective ness of 
in i g r a t i n g so me on - board f u nc t io ns 
to thc: ground where such 
migration would result i n  savings 
a n d /  o r i n c rea sed perf or in a nce (e .g . 
ground control of near vicinity 
vehicles or mobile Station systems). 
M ana g e men t 
o A particular pricing policy was not 
recoin m ended , however , whet her 
the pricing policy elicits responses 
that are useful in determining how 
the Station should grow or  evolve 
was used as an evaluation criteria 
for  policies by the pricing subpanel 
of Panel 3 .  See Space Station 
Operations Task Force Panel 3 
Report  User Development and 
Integration, December 1987, p. 2-  
18, 2-38, 2-41. 
o Marketiiig to the commercial sector 
should probably evolve from an 
operation that is a contract from a 
government office to a profit 
making , e n te r p r is e 
with a share of the Station 
resource;. This could impact 
independent 
5-74 
Evolut ioti 
evolution direction if  the policy 
sets up an increasing share of the 
resources to the commercial sector. 
o Utilization planning should start as 
a centralized function for  both 
manned base and platforms but the 
possibility exists to migrate this 
function to distributed and 
e \gent u a 1 I y to independent p 1 ann i n  g 
for  different user entities. 
Su in rn ar v 
The Space Station, by Program goal, will be 
capable of evolving over time. This 
evolution must be planned along the lines 
dictated by policy and budget to obtain the 
maximum increase in user capability at the 
lowest possible life cycle costs. To 
accomplish that objective the evolution 
planning function of the operations concept 
niust be a part of all phases of the Space 
Station Program from DDT&E and 
operational maturity through actual Station 
growth. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Proceedings of the Space Station Evolution Workshop Hilton National Conference Center, 
Williamsburn. Virginia, Office of Space Station, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, September 
I O -  13, 1985. Proceedings of the SDace Station Evolution WorkshoD. Willinmsbura. Virainia, Office 
of Space Station, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC, July 29-August I ,  1986, page ix .  
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5.1 1 INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL 1'ARTNI:KS I N  OPERATIONS AND UTILIZATION 
The Panel devoted considerable effort  to the 
analysis of the challenges posed b y  the 
inter  national ch:iracter of the Sp3i.e Station 
Program. This work is described in this 
section. The f i r s t  pa r t  is n high level, 
so me w ha t abstract an a 1 y s  is of p :i r t n e rs h i p 
options. The  next section describes the  
i n t e r n a t i o n  a 1 o p t i  o n 
recommended by the SSOTF. The third 
section discusses international operations cost 
sharing, and the fourth,  the implications of 
the SSOTF proposed utilization scheme for  SS 
users and module outfitters. 
ni a n  a g e  m e  n t 
5.1 1 . 1  SPACE STATION "PARTNERSHIP" 
OPTIONS by Richard O'Toole 
I II  troduc tiori 
As the United States plans for  the 
development of an international Space 
Station, there are many options available for 
how to structure our relationship with the 
potential partners (Japan, ESA, and Canada).  
I n  a generic sense these relationships may be 
thought of as forming a continuum from a 
full joint venture at  one extreme to a n  
owner-user relationship at the other extreme. 
Complicating the situation even further is the 
fact tha t  within the overall structure of the 
agreements bet ween countries the re are 
numerous specific dimensions ivhich may 
vary  from the central philosophy. Just a few 
of these dimensions include: technology 
transfer, legal regime, utilization rights, cost 
obligations, and 0per:itions policy. Thus, 
v,hile a potential participant may desire to be 
a "full" partner with its implied benefits of 
technology transfer, it may be less willing to 
accept the risk sharing resy)onsibilities of that 
arra t i  gemen t .  
In order to illustrate thls complex set of 
possibilities, 1 hree generic types of 
international agreements will be discussed: 
f u 11 part ne rs h i p , part n ersh i p 
(franchise), and contractual agreements. The 
act u n I re I at i o ns h i p a rn o n I; the in tern a t io n a 1 
participants will, of cour:e, be a product of 
negotiation which incorporates political as 
well as technical factors. Thus,  after 
(1 iscu ss i t i  g these generic inter na t io n a1 options , 
which were deliberately chosen to illustrate 
rhe wide spectrum of possibilities, a 
2referred option will be discussed which 
'1 t t en1 p t s to b 1 e n d  the t e c h n i c a 1, e c o n o m i c , 
and political constraints into a wbrkable 
solution. 
1 i m i t  ed 
5.1 1 .I . 1  Alternative Generic Partnership 
Arrange m e 11 t s 
Full Par  tners h i D 
The title "Full Partnership" is used here to 
convey the concept of a true joint venture 
with participants sharing in all aspects of the 
program for  an extended duration. In this 
case, partners should be prepared to commit 
themselves to the long-term success of a free 
world Space Station and to plan for  
continued cooperation and cost sharing of 
space exploration. The key factors in 
creating such a full partnership is that the 
participants must share a common goal and 
have a commitment to a long term 
relationship. 
Given that there has been a decision to form 
a full partnership or joint  venture there are 
two very different legal structures which 
might be employed. The  first type of 
relationship could be implemented through a 
set of contracts, much like the way American 
a u t o m o b i l e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  p u r c h a s e  
components f rom foreign manufacturers. As 
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a theoretical matter, this is possible with the 
Space Station and would give the U.S. the 
greatest potential for  retaining virtually 
complete control. As a practical matter, 
however, preparing a comprehensive contract 
specifying the precise prices, quantities and 
conditions of delivery of items under each of 
all possible circumstances is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible. Given the 
lifetime of the Space Station and the many 
technological uncertainties, it is either too 
costly or impossible to conceive of all 
possible circumstances, much less what 
prices, quantities and conditions of delivery 
should apply in each case. 
As an alternative, international involvement 
could be structured by the establishment of 
a common enterprise. This type of 
organization, through a pre-determined 
governance and management mechanism, can 
deal with actual situations as they arise from 
time to time. Adaptive, sequential decision- 
making processes substitute for  massive one- 
time agreement to deal with all possible 
cases, many of which may never arise. On 
the other hand, shared governance and 
management may result in decisions contrary 
to American interests. 
Between the extremes of a comprehensive 
contract and a common enterprise there are 
many possible compromises. The contract 
could deliberately be kept incomplete and 
allow for a sophisticated arbitration 
procedure between the partners to govern 
unp lanned- fo r  s i tuat ions.  Certain 
components could be wholly-owned by the 
U.S. and others owned by the common 
enterprise. Alternatively the contracts 
approach could be used in one phase of the 
Space Station program and a common 
enterprise in another. In the discussion 
which follows the emphasis will be placed on 
the common enterprise approach for the 
following reasons: 1 )  the complexity and 
uncertainty involving the development of the 
Space Station makes the contracting approach 
very difficult to implement, 2) the nature of 
the participants being sovereign nations also 
makes contracting inappropriate, and 3) for  
illustrative purposes it is useful to construct 
a "pure" full  partnership case. 
A. Organizing a Full Partnership 
In establishing a partnership for  a common 
enterprise there are a set of issues which 
must be addressed. At the highest level there 
are nine such issues which are briefly 
discussed below: 
1. Objectives, Scope and Limitations of 
Activities 
Whereas for most private partnerships the 
objectives and scope of the venture are 
relatively easy to agree upon, this is not the 
case for  the Space Station. Each participant 
is looking not only at  commercial returns, 
but also at  scientific and political dividends 
as well. Moreover, the attainment of one 
participant's goals may be directly contrary to 
the interests of another participant. In  view 
of this, i t  is essential for the Space Station 
participants to define the technical objectives 
of the partnership rather than just abstract 
goals. The  participant's conflicting goals 
would, in the give and take of negotiations 
with other participants, be translated to 
agreed upon technical specifications. 
Agreement on the limitations in scope for the 
Station will be a key issue in any partnership. 
The participants will need to specify what 
kinds of activities will be permitted to be 
carried out on the Space Station. Are any 
kinds of experiments, military or non- 
military, to be prohibited? T h e  partners also 
need to determine if they are granting any 
exclusive franchise to the common enterprise 
which will preclude their right to similar 
activities in an independent mode. 
2. Participants 
Although i t  is currently contemplated that 
the participants would be the United States, 
Japan, Canada, and the European Space 
Agency per se, consideration should be given 
to the possibility that eventually an 
alternative mode of participation would be 
desirable. For instance, in the steady state 
operations phase, instead of the U.S. being a 
direct participant, the entity which 
participates on behalf of the United States 
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could be a quasi-public corporation. 
A determination will have to be made on the 
ways U.S. industry should become involved 
with the Space Station program. In addition 
to simple purchases of services, industry may 
seek to become providers of services through 
franchises or  Joint Endeavor Agreements. 
3 .  Governance and Control 
The issue of governance and control IS basic 
to any common enterprise. I t  is in the 
interest of each partner to make sure: the 
venture is efficiently managed, i t  is safe, the 
partner receives its fair  share of tht: benefits, 
and that the venture responds to the partners 
long-term space strategy. The governance 
and control mechanisms are key instruments 
to protecting these interests. 
While the character and magnitude of each 
participant's role in the Space Station is 
likely to be dependent on its actual technical 
and financial contributions to the program, 
legalistic devices are also significant. These 
devices fall into three major categories. First, 
management of day-to-day activities in the 
enterprise. Second, voting mechanisnis can 
be designed to give control to a single 
participant while still protecting the rights of 
the other participants. Third,  the enterprise 
can be structured so that it is dependent on 
the U S .  for some critical element or service. 
In the case of the Space Station, the issue of 
control is especially difficult because the U.S. 
will be a dominant partner in ternis of 
investment and use while the other 
participants will seek strong protection of 
their rights in the enterprise. As a practical 
matter there are three possible ways to 
resolve this dilemma: consensus approaches 
with a fallback to U.S. decision making and 
an appeal process, weighted voting 
mechanisms, and special majorities. 
4. Tactical and Execution Management 
In "dominant parent" private joint ventures, 
boards of directors are largely cerenionial. 
Strategic and tactical decijions are made by 
representatives of the dominant partner either 
within the joint  venture or at  the parent 
organization. In the ctise of the Space 
Station, system operation could range from 
the extremes of national enclaves (elements 
operated independently oilboard and on the 
ground) to fully integrated onboard 
operations with centralized ground operations. 
The final choice of preferable mode in this 
case must balance the U.S. desire for  control 
:o ensure safety and efficiency against the 
other partners' desires to participate in the 
loperational phase of the !,ystenis. 
5 .  Dispute Resolution 
A well defined mechanism must be 
established for resolving disputes which will 
inevitably arise among the international 
part ne rs . me c ha n is ms 
which keep decision making at  the lowest 
practical levels will facilitate efficient 
operations. The alternative is that every 
dispute elevates up to the highest 
international decision making body which 
will mean long delays and a cumbersome 
operations management process. 
S t r e n m 1 in ed appeal 
6. Financial Obligations 
The  partnership agreement will have to 
specify: the nature of the capital contribution 
to the venture (in this case the elements, lab 
equipment, platforms, etc.), the timing and 
manner of making the contributions, and the 
obligations o f  each partner during the 
operations phase. 
7 .  "Ownership" and Specification of Rights & 
Duties 
Ownership in the Space Station partnership 
relates to the station as a whole, elements in 
the Station and to the services (i.e. resources) 
it provides. Many alternative variations on 
how ownership is handled are  possible within 
this framework. At  one extreme, the 
partners could hold an undivided interest in 
the Station as a whole, the relative amount of 
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which would determine allocations of each 
measurable type of Space Station service. 
At  the other extreme, each partner could 
“own“ the element provided to the venture 
in some way. Once the top level agreements 
are niade on ownership the secondary issues 
of payload selection, pricing, and scheduling 
must also be addressed as part of each 
partner’s rights or benefits. 
Each partner will also have to accept certain 
obligations or duties as part of the 
partnership. These duties relate to allocation 
of liability, provision of support facilities by 
each partner and the requirement to abide by 
certain technical specifications which will 
permit the Station to be integrated as a 
system. 
8. Transferability, New Partners & 
Termination 
In time, additional countries or private 
entities may wish to become involved in 
Space Station activities. These new 
participants may simply enter into agreements 
with one or more of the initial participants 
for  the purchase of specific resources. In 
this case they would have no direct 
relationship with any of the other initial 
participants and would have none of their 
rights and duties. The  other possibility is 
that they seek to purchase all or part of the 
interest of the initial participant in the Space 
Station partnership. 
The initial partners would be less concerned 
with the sale of Space Station services than 
with the transfer of an interest in the Space 
Station itself. Nevertheless, even in this case 
a limitation may need to be included. For 
instance, the U.S. may want to limit its 
partners f rom selling services to certain 
countries. 
Withdrawal of a participant f rom the 
partnership is more difficult than in a 
conventional private joint venture even if its 
interest is transferred to existing participants. 
Valuing the initial participant’s share in the 
venture would be extremely difficult and 
may, in fact, be costly if the partner wanted 
to remove its element. 
Two other issues which are  important to the 
formation of a sound partnership are: I )  can 
partners be expelled for  breaches of 
obligations and what happens to the elements 
supplied by them, and 2) what is the length 
of time intended for  this partnership? 
9. Choice of Substantive Law 
The  parties will need to decide what 
substantive law should govern their 
relationship with each other and with the 
Space Station and its personnel. As a 
practical matter, the choice is unlikely to 
prove a problem with the current 
participants, since they all have significant 
experience in working together, including 
some experience in cooperative space 
projects. 
B. Characteristics of a Full Partnership 
1. Premise 
Carried to its logical extreme a true full 
partnership would give all the partners an  
undivided share in all aspects of the Space 
Station venture. This share would typically 
be determined by the contribution of the 
given partner to the overall investment in the 
facilities (both ground and fl ight)  associated 
with the program. All operations costs, risks 
and benefits would be shared in this same 
proportion. In effect everything is pooled by 
the partners and shared in proportion to their 
interest in the venture. 
2. Structure 
Such a venture is more likely to be successful 
if there is an  agreement among the partners 
on a common set of goals and  priorities. In 
a private joint venture the goal is usually to 
earn profits. This goal is common to all the 
participants and the venture is structured 
around that objective. For the Space Station 
the goals and objectives are  much more 
complex to define. Each participant is 
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seeking to perform scientific research, 
commercial research, develop its abilities in 
space infrastructure development and achieve 
political goals at the same time. The  fact 
that these goals are  in conflict for  the 
potential Space Station partners will evidence 
itself in the hardware negotiations. 
Duplication of certain types of facilities, 
unique partner requirements for  certain 
facilities, desire for  non-cenf ralized control 
are  some of the manifestations of a 
divergence in objectives. A full partnership 
needs a long term commitment to at least a 
reconcilable and  consistent set of goals. 
3. Management and  Control 
The  participation of the partners in the 
management of the Station would be through 
an  international "corporate board of directors" 
with predetermined voting percentages. This 
board would safeguard the objectives of the 
partnership over the objectives of the 
individual members. A common set of rules 
would be established fo r  all partners which 
guarantees equitable access to the cooperative 
elements fo r  all partners. This type of 
management is easiest to implement when the 
partners are  nearly equal in the venture since 
there is no need to negotiate complex voting 
schemes. A problem does arise, however, 
with dominant partners as is the case of the 
Space Station. The  legitimate rights of the 
dominant partner (in terms of investment) 
must be balanced against the need fo r  the 
other partners to protect their rights when 
they could be outvoted if management 
control is proportional to investment share. 
This problem can be handled by utilizing 
"special ma j or i t i e s " which re q u ire differ  en t 
voting majorities for  specific types of 
decisions. For example, even if the 
dominant partner had an  80% investment 
share and 80% of the votes in management 
decision making, some important issues could 
require 90Yn or  unanimity for  passage. Issues 
of this nature might include decisions 
affecting new partners, reallocation of 
resources among partners, and  other issues of 
strategic importance. 
4. Operating Costs 
There are  a number of ways to share 
operating costs among the partners, including: 
pooling all costs and distributing by share, 
distributing functions and  let the partners 
incur the associate'l costs, accepting cost 
responsibilities assctciated with pieces of 
hardware, and Combinations of the above 
options. Any of thi:se approaches might be 
negotiated among the partners, but  there are  
differences in the implications fo r  cost 
efficiency and management. As a general 
principle it is desir:ible to have the partner 
who designs and builds the equipment be 
responsible for  its 3perations costs as well. 
This arrangement internalizes the incentives 
to develop hardware systems which are  life 
cycle cost effective. The  U.S., as a majority 
partner, has an  important stake in providing 
the proper operations cost incentives since we 
will be bearing somewhere between 67% and 
80% of operating costs. 
There are  gains to be made in terms of 
efficiency by ha5ing a full partnership 
arrangement. By specializing in certain types 
of facilities it is possible for  the partners to 
save both investment costs and  operating 
costs while also keeping compatible payloads 
co-located. This concept of specialization 
has been termed functional allocation within 
the program and is highly consistent with the 
concept of a full p:irtnership. 
Thus, in the partnership example one 
representative mode of operation would be to 
functionally allocate responsibilities to each 
of the laboratories (e.g., life sciences, 
material sciences, technology experiments). 
As owners with an undivided interest in the 
labs per se, the partners would share the use 
of the facilities in proportion to their 
investment shares in the program. In this 
manner savings would be achieved in non- 
duplication of equipment. I t  is also worth 
noting that in a private sector, profit- 
oriented full partnership there would 
probably not be so much duplication of 
DDT&E among the partners as there is likely 
to be in the Space Station. In other words, 
competitive pressiires would force the 
partners to eliminate this unnecessary expense 
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f rom their venture. T h e  added costs of 
duplicating design, development and testing 
in multiple countries for  platforms, modules, 
training facilities, operating centers, etc., is 
substantial. 
making premature commitments. 
c. Uncertainties and risks are shared among 
the partners 
d .  Functional allocation can be implemented 
to achieve economies of specialization. 
5 .  "0 w n e r s h i p " 
The  Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) 
describes the ownership of the elements as it 
relates to ownership and control. The MOUs 
describe the resources that accrue to each 
partner due to their participation. A partner 
with a 20°/0 share "of the Station" would have 
a claim on 20% of the kilowatt hours, IVA 
hours, EVA hours, etc., reserved for users. 
Allocations for  housekeeping resources would 
be negotiated among the partners in advance 
and come off of gross resource availability. 
Partners would not be forced to stay within 
the envelope of their allocation at  all points 
in time, but rather to utilize a maximum set 
of resources over a time period such as one 
year. In addition, the allocation of resources 
based on investment shares would permit the 
partners to barter resources among each other 
to more nearly match their demands for  
services during a particular period. 
Over time additional resources will be 
identified which are valuable to the partners 
and shares will have to be allocated in the 
same proportion as investment shares. In 
this arrangement it is still possible for  
scientists f rom different countries to pool 
their resources within a particular discipline. 
As each partner allocates its share of use 
resources among its using groups (e.g., 
astrophysics, material science, life science, 
technology experiments, etc.) the scientists 
who receive allocations f rom each partner 
country can then pool their resources for  
cooperative experiments. 
6. Advantages of a Full Partnership 
a. In theory it could be the most cooperative 
form of long term venture. 
b. It establishes processes to deal with 
unknown events of the future  which avoids 
e. Numerous successful models exist in the 
private sector. 
f. It retains U.S. majority partner status. 
g. It ensures full utilization of the Station 
early. 
h. Benefits, costs, authority are all shared on 
the basis of a simple sharing formula (usually 
investment shares in the venture). 
7. Disadvantages of a Full Partnership 
a.  It requires the formation of an 
international management organization 
distinct f rom any partner.  
b. It works effectively only as long as all the 
partners share common goals and objectives. 
c. It can imply complex accounting 
requirements although there are ways to 
avoid most of it. 
d. It  can reduce the majority partner's 
flexibility to grow, add controversial users 
(e.g., DOD), and set policies. 
e. It increases coordination and integration 
effort  and costs. 
f .  It may increase technology transfer to 
competitive trading nations. 
Limited PartnershiDs o r  Franchise  
Agreements 
1. Premise 
Unlike a full partnership o r  a joint  venture 
a new management entity is not created to 
form a franchise arrangement. Usually an 
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agreement is formed betMseen a parent 
organization (or dominant partner i n  terms of 
investment) and a franchisee (junior partner 
in terms of investment). Such organizations 
arise i n  cases where the success or failure of 
the two parties are not as cloc;ely linked as 
in the full partnership. Ne\  ertheless. the 
agreement typically includes incentives for 
both parties to promote each other's success. 
2. Structure 
Franchises tend to allocate costs, risks, 
benefits, and control much differently than 
in a full partnership. The n1:ljority partner 
often provides the knowledgr, services, or 
product in return for  paymen!. Usually the 
failure to perform on the part of the 
franchisee does not  lead to a failure on the 
part of the parent. I n  the case of the Space 
Station the analogy would be to a national 
e nc 1 a v e type of i n t e r n a t i o n a I p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
where the international parlners bring 
laboratories to  the Station which they want to 
operate in a distributed fashion from the core 
Station. They would need to secure services 
from the U.S. in order to run their element 
for  which they could either offer  payment in 
currency or  in bartered use of their 
laboratory facilities. 
3. Management and Control 
The  management and control of the Station 
from the U.S. perspective would be quite 
different in this case. As majority partner 
the U S .  would retain total control over the 
operations management system. Agreements 
would be negotiated which established certain 
specifications on the enclave laboratories and 
limited their performance i n  real time 
situations, but they would have considerable 
control beyond the Inboratoq bulkhead. I n  
the extreme case users within the laboratory 
enclave would be integrated and controlled 
solely by the element with no Station user 
integration function. Crew operations would 
be element dedicated. Obviously, there are 
compromise positions on the level of 
autonomy given to the franchised laboratory. 
One could imagine :in integrated on-board 
operations system coupled with a ground 
operations system wl- ich is element specific 
through element dedicated POCCs. 
4. Operations Costs 
As explained earlier, in a franchise 
agreement the links te tween  the success and 
failure of the two parties is not so close as in 
the full partnershii) case. A franchise 
operator would expeot to have a more well 
defined set of obligations and benefits 
expressed in the agreement. On the cost 
side, the franchisee o r  limited partner would 
expect to Pay a fixed fee or  percentage fee 
(gross or net basis) i n  return for  the services 
it receives It would certainly be possible in 
concept to also have bartering arrangement 
in this form of international participation. 
But instead of a percentage share of the 
operat ions cost responsibilities the franchisee 
would expect to negotiate a fixed share of its 
laboratory in return for  a fixed set of 
station resources. Such a quid pro quo 
should be resisted on the part of the U S .  
since the risks and uncertainties are still very 
much present in this case, they are just 
distributed differently.  In return for  
offering fixed terms to the partners as 
franchise operators, the U.S. should expect to 
be compensated in terms of a higher fee  for  
hook-up or  in a larger share of bartered 
volume i n  the enclave. 
5. Ownership 
The ownership of e x h  element in the Space 
Station would remi in  with the providing 
partner. The U.S. would retain ownership of 
the core station and its laboratory while the 
intern at i o n a 1 partners w o u 1 d own their 
laboratories. Station resources would be 
owned by the U S .  and sold to the partners 
either for monerary considerations or 
bartered volume. The  franchise operators 
would expect cerlain guarantees on the 
quantities of services they would receive 
from the U.S. Resource use would not 
necessarily be in a fixed proportion across all 
the resources. An  international partner may 
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determine his needs to be heavily biased 
towards power with relatively little need for  
EVA hours, and will thus negotiate for  a set 
of resources which matches those needs. 
6. Advantages of a Fvanchise Arrangement 
a. The U.S. would maintain total control 
of the Space Station. 
b. The  risks to the U.S. of failure of 
the international laboratories would be 
reduced. 
c. Technology transfer would be 
reduced. 
7. Disadvantages of Franchise Arrangements 
a .  Safety might be compromised by lack 
of an integrated Station safety and 
operation system. 
b. The  higher fees which are warranted 
by the reduced risk of the franchisee 
would be hard to negotiate politically. 
c. Very little specialization (functional 
allocation) would occur, increasing costs. 
d .  The  U.S. risks an unfair resource 
distribution if i t  guarantees user 
resources to anyone. 
e. Accommodations in enclave labs will 
probably not be user friendly to US.  
pay 1 oads . 
f .  The  international participants will 
press for  management influence far  
beyond what their contribution and risk 
bearing warrants. 
E 1 em en t De ve I o D m e n t ,' Us e Con tracts 
1. Premise 
An  extreme approach to dealing with the 
potential international partners would be to 
separate the development and operational 
phases of the program. Elements could be 
developed and turned over to the US.  for  
operation. Compensation for  the 
development of the elements could be in 
terms of specific agreements for  use of the 
US.  station for  a limited period of time. 
The "partners" benefit in this arrangement by 
getting a very specific commitment with 
limited risk while the U.S. benefits by 
gaining total control over the operations of 
the Space Station. 
2. Structure 
When significant divergence exists between 
potential partners on the goals for  a project, 
the willingness to bear risk, and the 
commitment to the project in terms of either 
duration or  resources i t  may make sense to 
deal with the internationals more as long- 
term users than as partners. The U.S. would 
still negotiate bilateral agreements with each 
country in the "partnership", but this case 
would truly be a US.  Space Station with 
international participation. The U.S. would 
provide certain services in return for 
compensation which could be in the form of 
bartered laboratory volume, ELV launches 
or monetary transfers. Some cooperation 
would still occur at  the scientific level for  
specific experiments, but  this would be a 
more arms length venture than in either of 
the other two cases already described. 
3 .  Management and Control 
The U.S. would retain ownership, 
jurisdiction, control and management of the 
Space Station and its evolutionary path. It is 
not anticipated that under this arrangement 
the internationals would participate in the top 
level management decisions. As long as the 
US.  abided by its "contract" it could make 
unilateral policy decisions. A participant 
(commercial f i rm or  international entity) 
could bring its element to the station and 
operate it under terms agreed to beforehand. 
Execution level operations would be 
consistent with a "one commander" 
management structure. 
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and other management complexities 
necessitated by sharing control. 
4.  Operations Costs 
Developers of elements brought to the Space 
Station in this mode would not be expected 
to share station operations costs. They would 
pay negotiated fees for  hooking up to the 
station and for  services consumed, but these 
fees need not bear any direct relationship to 
costs. Innovative agreements could be 
negotiated which allow participants to bring 
elements to the station, operate then with 
U.S. provided utilities fo r  some period like 
five years a t  reduced resource fees, then 
ownership of that element could revert to the 
U S .  for  its use for  the remainder of the 
station lifetime. Many arrangements are  
possible, but the key elements of partnership 
are avoided -- sharing the uncertainty of 
risk. costs and benefits. 
e. It directly links international element 
investment to the benefits (in terms of cash 
or  resources) they receive. 
f .  It would sharply curtail technology 
transfer. 
7. Disadvantages of Contractual Arrangements 
a. It may necessitate fixed contractual 
agreements before enough is known to justify 
such commitments - -  increasing U.S. risk. 
b, Greater risk and uncertainty concerning 
riet user resources is borne by the US.  
instead of shared by the partnership. 
c .  It undermines the conccpt of a f ree  world 
collaborative space effor t .  
5. Ownership 
As mentioned above the ownership of the 
station as a whole would remain with the 
US. ,  but some limited forms of element 
ownership by international participants could 
be negotiated for  specific periods of time. 
I n  return for  developing a robotic servicer, 
for  instance, the Canadians could be 
compensated with volume and other services 
i n  the U S .  laboratory for  a specific period of 
time. The  nature of the barter would be 
more specific than in the partnership case 
and for  a limited duration. 
6. Advantages of a Contractual Arrangement 
a. It gives maximum flexibility and authority 
to the U S .  in managing and operating the 
station. 
b. It may simplify the utilization and 
accounting record keeping for  resources and 
costs. 
c. Crew safety is enhanced through the 
integrated flight and ground operations. 
d .  I t  eliminates the need for  voting schemes 
5 .1  1.1.2 Recommended Iaternatioiial MOU 
l’osi tion 
!3ve r v i e w 
In order to achieve agreement with the 
international partners it appears that a 
compromise position will have to be reached 
which combines attributes of both the full 
partnership and franchise approaches. These 
compromises should stop short of granting 
(concessions which significantly add to the 
US. cost, system risk, U S .  user 
(dissatisfaction with the station, o r  in any way 
(compromise astronaut safety. Within these 
‘constraints there are compromise positions 
which will increase the prospects for  
agreement while still achieving US.  goals. 
Suace Station Partnershit, Structure 
The space station venture can be structured 
as a partnership, but not one in which the 
partners have an undivided interest in the 
hardware and software systems. For political 
reasons ESA and Japan want to have a major 
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presence in  the laboratories they supply to 
the program. By collecting the volume to 
which each would be entitled in a full 
partnership approach into a single laboratory 
it is possible to achieve the significant 
presence they desire. 
For example, suppose that for  illustrative 
purposes it is assumed that the investments 
of each partner are: U S .  $12 B, ESA $2.5 B, 
Japan $2 B, and Canada $0.5 B. The  relative 
percentage shares of each partner then would 
be approximately: U.S. 'iOo/o, ESA 15%, Japan 
12%, and Canada 3%. In the full partnership 
case the partners would be entitled to this 
same percentage of each laboratory's volume. 
If all the labs were the same size the 
equivalent volume in a single lab would be 
three times these figures (e.g. 45%0 for ESA). 
Of course, ESA would only be entitled to 
15"/0 of the other user resources. The 
international partners will likely press for at  
least 50% of the volume in the lab they 
supply so it retains an identity as "their" lab. 
This compromise can be handled by 
proportionally adjusting the allocation of all 
other resources to match the reduction in lab 
volume supplied to the U.S. as barter 
compensation. In the illustrative example 
used above ESA would want to increase their 
share of lab space from 45% to 50% in one 
lab or f rom 15% to 16.7% overall. This 
"extra" lab space means they are only 
su pp  1 y i ng the U . S. appro x i rn a t e 1 y 90°/o 
(0.15/0.167) of the volume warranted by the 
relative investments. Thus,  the ESA share of 
other resources would be reduced to 13.5% 
(0.15 x 0.9) instead of the 15% share 
originally planned. Differences in the size of 
the laboratories would add a slight amount of 
complexity to the calculations, but the 
process would be the same. This 
proportional adjustment clearly ignores the 
relative values of the resources, but as long 
the deviations f rom the investment shares are 
not too great, the loss is relatively small 
compared to ease of calculating the resources 
of each partner. Other physical units than 
volume could be used in the same manner 
without any  loss in applicability. One 
obvious possibility would be rack space in 
the lab modules since standardized racks are 
in the current designs for  each lab. The U.S. 
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can choose the units of measure which results 
in the greatest allocation of resources to U.S. 
users and push that view in the negotiations. 
Management arid Control 
As a dominant partner in terms of 
investment (70% in the example above), the 
U.S. has a legitimate basis fo r  expecting to 
exert management control over the operations 
phase of the program. On  the other hand, 
the partners need to have some means to 
protect their rights since they would be 
outvoted in all disputes if voting is 
proportional to investment or use. The  
negotiations have moved to a concept where 
there would be consensus decision making in 
the high level international bodies with 
appeal mechanisms which ultimately leave the 
U.S. with final control. T h e  danger in this 
approach is that routine decisions are 
constantly appealed to higher level boards 
which slows down the management process of 
the station. T h e  current status of the 
negotiations are that there three top level 
boards: the Multilateral Control Board 
(MCB), the Station Operations Panel (SOP), 
and the User Operations Panel (UOP). These 
boards and panels integrate the high level 
plans of the partners to eliminate overlaps 
and inconsistencies, but there is nothing in 
the MOUs about how these plans are 
implemented at  the tactical level. Thus, the 
MOUs are flexible enough to adapt to a n  
integrated tactical flight and ground 
operations system, but this could be made an 
explicit intent of the U.S. 
ODerations Costs 
One of the concerns of all the partners is 
that they not have to share in the operations 
cost inefficiency of any of the other partners. 
This concern can be accommodated by 
dividing all operations cost into two main 
categories: element specific costs and common 
costs. Element specific costs such as 
sustaining engineering are  identified to a 
specific piece of hardware or software. It 
makes sense from an incentives point of view 
to hold the element provider responsible for 
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such costs since having that responsibility 
niay affect the design with respect to 
reliability and maintainability. All common 
costs would be shared by the partners in the 
same proportion as user resources are 
allocated. The  "shares" of comniori costs 
allocated to each partner can be politically 
determined in the negotiation process, but 
indirectly they may be related to the 
investment shares as a measure of whether 
the shares are equitable. 
From a practical standpoint the transportation 
costs of launching crew, logistic supplies and 
payloads is such a large component of 
operation costs that the partners will have to 
share this function if major currency 
transfers are to be avoided. If each partner 
does share this transportation mass in 
proportion to their utilization share, a major 
risk a n d  uncertainty in the progr:im is also 
spread among the partners in  a n  equitable 
manner. In  addition, by sharing in physical 
units the political difficulty of comparing the 
launch "pricing policy" of the partners is 
avoided. 
OwnershiD 
As a concession to forming the international 
partnership the volume entitlements of each 
partner could be co-located into the 
laboratory they provide. In this type of 
arrangement the ownership of each element 
would have a strong identity with the 
provider. As a result, there would be an 
ESA lab, a U.S. lab and a Japanese lab, but 
their use could still be shared for very 
specialized needs or for  scientific discipline 
experiments where the scientists pool their 
resources. 
Given the investments planned by each 
partner and the relative sizes of the 
laboratories it is possible to make a rough 
estimate of how the laboratory volume in 
each lab would be distributed among the 
partners. As a rough approximation the 
relative volume of the ESA and Japanese 
laboratories are 80% and 65% of the 1J.S. 
laboratory. One possible distribution of lab 
space would be to have both ESA and Japan 
take 50% of the volume i n  the labs they 
provide. Canada would gct the use of 3% of 
each laboratory while the U.S. would get the 
use of its lab (less Canadz's 3%) and 47% of 
the other Inbs. The  relative volume figures 
are shown belOW. 
P A R T N E R  LAB VOLUME ALLOCATIONS 
Partner Lab Volume 
1J.S. 67.4 ?h 
€SA 16.3 
JPN 13.3 
C A N  3.0 
The allocation of 50°/n of the ESA and 
Japanese labs for their use is a useful 
mechanism for them to have a major 
presence in the elements they provide, but it 
must also pass the tesc of whether i t  is 
equitable from the perspzctive of investment 
shares. Suppose for example, three levels of 
investment in DDT&E ale  considered for  the 
U.S. of $8R. $10 B, and $12 B with 
investments ksy ESA, Japan, and Canada 
assumed fixed at $2.5 B ,  $1.5 B, and $0.5 B 
respectively. Then thc relative shares of 
each partner are shown in the chart  below 
for each level of U.S. investment. 
PARTNER INVEST'MENT SHARES 
Partner 1J.S. Investment 
$ 8 B  $ ] O B  $ 1 2 B  
U.S. 64 O/o 69 O/o 73 VI0 
ESA 20 17 15 
JPN 12 10 9 
CAN 4 3 3 
From this chart i t  is clear that the "political" 
allocation of lab volume is quite close to the 
investment share corresponding to $1 0 billion 
for the U.S. For larger U.S. investment 
levels the "political allocation" is less 
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desireable f rom the U S .  perspective, but it 
does appear to be a reasonable negotiating 
position. 
Other resources could also be allocated to the 
partners in proportion to their investment 
shares, but the negotiations appear to be 
heading towards a policy which is not tied to 
such a difficult  to measure concept as 
investment. Station power is a good example 
to use for  illustration because i t  is an 
important resource and has many 
c o ni p 1 exit i e s in m a k in g e q u i t a b I e a 11 oca t i o n s . 
One proposal which has been proposed is to 
negotiate housekeeping allocations for  all 
elements off the gross power system. The 
remaining "user power" would then be 
allocated to the partners in the following 
manner: U.S. attached payloads - 20%, ESA 
internal payloads - 12.8%, Japanese internal 
payloads - 12.8%, U.S. internal payloads - 
25.6%, and Canadian internal payloads - 3%. 
The net result of this type of allocation is 
that the U.S. would have approximately 71% 
of the user power, which once again is 
approximately consistent with the expected 
investment shares. 
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L 1 
5.1 1.2.1 Management (Strategic Letel 
Su m mar y ) 
The "Level A Operations Managcnient 
Concept for  the Space Station System" (or, 
Ope rat io ns 0 hqc)  
provided an initial baseline for  operations 
management planning. The  OMC is not on ly  
a NASA document,  but is in an informal 
sense an international one, both by virtue of 
its subject matter and by the involvement of 
all partners in its formulation. As part of 
its charter to recommend changes to and 
implementation plans for  the OMC, the 
Operations Task Force must also evolve the 
OMC's approach to international participation 
in Space Station operations. 
M a n age 111 e n t C o  n ce 11 t , 
The long term, international, and multi- 
discipline nature of the Space Station 
program led to the notion of the three-tiered 
management structure described i n  the OMC. 
I t  was envisioned that strategic. tactical, and 
execution levels would be required to 
adequately plan and implement Space Station 
operations. The  purpose of this section is to 
further define a recommended management 
structure based on the more detailed picture 
of operations described in this document and 
on the current state of discussions with CSA, 
Japan, and Canada. 
At the strategic level is a strategic operations 
management group, hereafter ret'erred by its 
MO U - p ro posed Mu It i 1 a tera 1 
Coordination Board (MCB). I ts  responsibility 
is to set policy for  Space Station System 
operation and use in accord with memoranda 
labe I ,  the 
3f understanding among the partners. 
Initiall>, this strategic level group shall be 
chaired by  NASA.  Incllided i n  its area of 
purvievr for policy niaE ing are utilization 
p 1 a n n i n g , resou rce a I Ioca t io n guidelines , 
recom men da t io n s o 11 e vol u t io n , operations 
cost allocation and funding, user market 
research, and public information services. 
The O T F  agrees with tlle position that the 
NASA will be responsible fo r  the 
development of overall Space Station 
evolution concepts and that each partner will 
establish independent user resource allocation 
and pricing policies as suits his situation 
(MOU Article 13). The  O T F  recommends 
that the U.S. and its partners separately 
allocate utilization resources, at the highest 
level, along Wines of cliscipline. This is 
intended to facilitate resource reallocation at 
the lowest managenienl level by foqtering 
close coordination among users with similar 
interests. 
Supporting the MCB in strategic level 
planning are a Systems Operations Panel and 
a User Operations Panel. The  System 
Operations Panel (SOP), chaired by NASA, is 
recommended as an oversight panel that 
periodically meets to establish policy 
regarding the allocation of resources to 
systems operations (e.g. fo r  maintenance, 
ref u r b ish me n t , re place nien t , et  c . ) , all oca t io n 
of shared operations cost, and srstems 
management of the Stat ion manned base and 
Platforms. As envisaged in the current draft  
MOU's, the SOP is charged with two 
author;  'ng documents. These are the 
0pera:':ns Management Plan and the annual 
Composite Operations Plan (COP). In 
parallel, the User Operations Panel (UOP) is 
charged with oversight of utilization 
activities, including resolution of strategic- 
level conflicts among partners' utilization 
plans. The two documents authorized by the 
LJOP are the Utilization Management Plan 
and the annual Composite Utilization Plan 
(CUP). 
These documents potentially imply a level of 
autonomy of each partners' systems 
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operations planning inconsistent with the 
recommendations of the OTF.  The 
recommended concept calls for  integrated 
user and systems payload manifesting, a more 
interactive process than is implied in the 
current M O U  drafts. The  recommended 
approach is to have an international tactical 
level operations control board concur in (i.e., 
accept as "doable") the Composite Operations 
Plan (COP) and the Composite Utilization 
Plan (CUP). The C U P  may be expanded to 
cover the COP requirements as well, 
eliminating the need to reconcile two 
documents. These should be published on an 
annual basis and cover a five year period of 
operations. Editor's note: The MOUs riow 
specify a requirenierit f o r  a coordiriatcd 
Operatioris-Utili~atioii Plarz (COUP) .  
No issue is taken with the idea that the 
Multilateral Coordination Board (MCB) would 
be chaired by the Head of NASA's Space 
Station Program Office to establish overall 
operations objectives and policy. Nor did 
the SSOTF disagree with the position that 
conflicts that could not be resolved by the 
SOP or  the UOP be referred to the MCB for  
final resolution. Japan has suggested that the 
SOP and UOP be combined in one entity. 
This may be a sensible grouping, but  the 
program should be guided in this decision by 
the desires of the user community.  
The  O T F  does not recommend additional 
international boards or  panels a t  the strategic 
level over what is proposed in the current 
MOUs and  IGAs. At the strategic level it 
recommends that a US-only board be 
established that will represent the users for  
the US share of the Station resources to the 
international User Operations Panel (UOP). 
This board, the Space Station Utilization 
Board (SSUB) will be NASA organized and 
run. The  O T F  recommends that each of the 
other partners d o  the same. 
Essentially, the role of the MCB (and SOP 
and UOP) is to integrate the strategic level 
policy goals of the partners to produce long 
term ( 5  years and  up)  plans. These plans 
should contain utilization, budget, schedule, 
and capability requirements as well as plans 
for  new development. 
However, the one area where a potential 
issue could occur would be the amount of 
executional (realtime) involvement of these 
boards and panels and the levels at  which 
this board would control the tactical manifest 
for  the station and platforms. The  current 
MOU drafts are silent on most tactical and 
execution level management issues, leaving 
them to be worked out in due course by the 
MCB. The  OTF emphasizes that the real 
time decisions must be made by the 
executing organizations at  the lowest level to 
ensure a safe operation. The  MCB, UOP, 
and SOP should provide policy level guidance 
to tactical operations management. The 
substantive issue, then, is the form and 
nature of international participation at the 
tactical level. 
5.11.2.2 Governance and Control (Tactical 
Level Summary) 
Policies set at  the strategic level are 
implemented by a tactical level of 
management, which in many cases will 
develop the background fo r  strategic level 
policy decisions. This tactical level of 
management is the primary detailed planning 
level for  the Space Station Program. It is an 
integrated activity and functions in nonreal- 
time. Tactical level management is 
responsible for  Space Station operations 
planning and integration, including logistics 
management, support  for  launch vehicle 
manifest development, cost and financial 
management, resource allocation, safety, 
training, and user market analysis. Nonreal- 
time activities of the space systems operations 
and user operations support  functions, such 
as sustaining engineering and user payload 
and space systems integration respectively, 
are performed at  this level. 
The whole character of Space Station 
operations hinges on the nature of the bridge 
between strategic level plans and their 
execution. Four options are  considered 
below for  this very crucial issue of tactical 
level management: 
1 )  One option is creation of a 
distributed tactical management function. 
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Each partner produces plans for  the 
operations and maintenance of its hardware. 
These plans are used by the SOP to develop 
a Composite Operations Plan. As a strategic 
level body, however, the SOP can only 
effectively perform a review and approval 
function, implying a large degree of systems 
autonomy and low integration requirements at 
the tactical level. Crew and systems safety 
requirements, as well as severe constraints on 
Station resources such as transportation to 
orbit  and manpower, make distributed 
tactical management untenable. Subdivision 
of resources across modules as well as across 
discipline temoves flexibility and adds to 
re source res e r ve requirement:; . 
2) A second option is to create an 
international Tactical Operations Control 
Board, chaired by NASA and consisting of 
collocated personnel from all partners. This 
Board would develop integrated plans for  
approval by the MCB/UOP/SOP. However, 
the integration job  will be more detailed and 
more complex than could be achieved by a 
control board alone. A tactical integration 
staff must generate the integrated manifests 
for  each mission increment and cargo plan. 
3 )  A third option is an international 
operations management organization staffed 
by all partners but  independent of each of 
them. Utilization and systems planning and 
control would be performed by this group. 
It would receive direction and funding from 
the MCB and would contract with each 
partner's space operations agencies to obtain 
the execution level support  it requires. 
Groups of Space Station users manifested at  
the strategic level would work directly with 
this organization, which would provide them 
with payload managers who would provide 
the users with an interface to various 
executing organization. The option comes 
closer to meeting the identified requirement 
for  integrated systems monitoring and 
control, assuming that direct lines of control 
over executing entities exist. None of the 
four  partners, however, are able to provide a 
separate operations staff required by this 
option. 
4) A fourth option, and the one 
recommended by the SSOTF, is a centralized 
operations managenient at the tactical level in 
which integration of the many activities 
necessary to safely operate and utilize the 
Space Station Systchm are brought together 
under one head. The centralized 
management should consist of personnel from 
all partners; it would be multinational rather 
than independent, m d  would be headed by 
NASA.  The station and platform operations 
would be controlled by an internationally 
staffed Tactical Operations Control Board 
(TOCB) chaired by NASA that would control 
the tactical plans and the manifest of 
payloads and syt;tems at  the mission 
increment (45 day) level involving all aspects 
of the station arid platform operations. 
Platform and manned base planning are 
coordinated at  this level during preparation 
and execution of ph t fo rm launches to ensure 
necessary integrated scheduling of common 
facilities. 
The executing organizations will report 
directly to the tactical operations manager 
(international executing agents will do  so in 
accordance with MCB operations plans). 
Major operations facilities would be 
inter na t io nall y staffed.  Such international 
staffing could be specialized within these 
facilities, for  example in dedicated floor 
space in the SSPF for  JEM experiment 
processing. 
In accordance with this option, the OTF 
also suggests that a Investigators Working 
Group ( IWG)  of manifested users f rom all 
partners be establlshed for  each 45 day 
increment of station operation. This group 
would work with the tactical level operations 
management organii ation in the development 
of the baseline tactical manifest, and with 
the POIC' for the execution of payload 
operations . 
This strong recommendation will, if 
implemented, require significant changes, as 
shown i n  the later sections, to the 
International MOUIi and IGAs and to the 
Operations Management Concept. While it is 
important to keep the MOU's at  a high level, 
a clear and conci8;e statement describing 
integrated tactical operations is necessary. 
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The Space Station Program should consider 
staffing its tactical level operations 
organization with ESA, Japan, and Canada’s 
operations personnel early in phase C/D. 
The O T F  recommends a strong user 
operations support  group be established at the 
tactical level to support the user integration 
activities that must occur during and after 
the station manifesting process. This activity 
must be closely coupled with the activities in 
the logistics, sustaining engineering, and 
systems operations groups. It should be 
guided by polices set by the UOP, the SSUB 
and other groups of this nature that are 
established by the partners. The real-time 
organizational element of this activity is the 
Payload Operations Integration Center. The 
user operations support function would 
integrate both the launch, station and 
platform packages. While the O T F  
recommends a marketing group for  the US, 
no international involvement is recommended 
and it is assumed that each partner will 
perform marketing in his country(ies) 
independently. 
Likewise, the O T F  recommends continuing 
strong engineering and logistics support by 
each of the partners. Specifically, each of 
the partners should establish an Engineering 
Support Center o r  centers (ESC) which will 
provide near realtime support for  the Space 
Station Support  Center and for  the Platform 
Support Center.  In the U.S.,  the O T F  
envisions each development phase work 
package center hosting an ESC. Thus,  while 
real time systems monitoring and control of 
the manned base (and, separately, of the 
platforms), is centralized, engineering 
expertise is distributed. Centralization of the 
engineering activities will also be required 
for  solving technical problems that include 
more than one element. A centralized 
logistics activity will be required also at  the 
tactical level to coordinate all of the partners 
logistics needs for  their elements. This 
coordination activity will organize the STS 
and any ELV logistics manifests. 
5.1 1.2.3 Operational Philosophy (Executional 
level summary) 
Execution-level operations groups execute the 
plans and directives issued to them from the 
tactical level. Separate groups carry out the 
real-time functions of Space Station manned 
base and platform operations, except during 
platform interactions with the manned base. 
These real time functions are space systems 
operations and user operations support, such 
as trajectory management and user resource 
tracking respectively. Logistics operations 
and prelaunch/post landing operations for  the 
manned base and platforms are primarily 
execution level activities. While all these 
activities are integrated at  the tactical level, 
execution-level operations activities can be 
dispersed geographically among several 
separate groups. 
User ODerations SuDDort 
User operations support  at  the execution level 
is managed through the Payload Operations 
Integration Center (POIC). This Operations 
Center recommended by the O T F  has the 
primary function of supporting the Space 
Station users in the operation of their 
experiment. Together with the SSSC, the 
POIC hosts the implementation of the 
baselined tactical manifest. Thus, the POIC 
works with the SSSC, according to the 
directives of tactical user integration 
management, to meet the execution needs of 
the manifested users (primarily through the 
IWG). Activities conducted in the POIC 
include the rescheduling of user experiments 
because of any anomalies in the station or  
user equipment. The  POIC is a service 
center for  users in that it assures that, for  
instance, command capability is properly 
routed for  experiments that are to be 
operated in a telescience mode. It will 
answer routine questions and make sure that 
the users are kept informed regarding the 
latest schedules and space systems status. 
The POIC is the locus of crew activity 
planning, again using systems operations 
requirements provided from the SSSC. 
The O T F  concept acknowledges the users’ 
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expressed desire to organize themselves, 
where possible, along discipline lines. Also. 
the O T F  recognizes that the international 
partners may want to organize along other 
lines and if so, then the POIC would work 
with potentially different  types of user 
structures such as a Regional Operations 
Center (ROC). Since the recommended 
resource allocation scheme is by discipline, 
partners operating ROCs will likely have to 
, structure them to function internally along 
I discipline lines. 
SDace Systems ODerations 
Space systems operations is a combination of 
on-orbit and ground activities that ensure the 
safety and integrity of the station and crew. 
Ground based systems monitoring and control 
would be conducted f rom the SSSC with 
international partner and work package 
support  f rom Element Support Centers 
(ESCs). U.S. platform systems operations 
would be from the Platform Mission 
Operations Center,  while ESA’s polar 
platform and M T F F  will be controlled from 
a European facility. Onboard crew would 
carry out the systems operations such as 
rendezvous, maintenance, repair, servicing, 
appropriate training, etc. The ESCs would 
be decentralized and  would also support  the 
nonreal time sustaining engineering activities. 
The  day to day control of the station would 
be f rom the SSSC, which would be 
responsible for  emergency response to 
anomalous events that might occur on the 
station. The  space systems operations 
activities would include resource monitoring 
and allocation, trajectory and rendezvous 
planning and execution, maintenance and 
servicing planning, communications control, 
training, and crew activity planning. When 
Station systems housekeeping requirements 
change, the SSSC would report  these to 
tactical operations management, which would 
in turn inform the MCB on its appraisal of 
policy impacts. 
Crew Training and Selection involves both 
space systems operations and user operations 
support. The O T F  strongly recommends a 
unified crew concept wherein 3 crew 
commander is identified at the start of a 
crew team’s training perlod. The crew 
commander, appointed by NASA,  would 
periodically assess the readiness of the crew 
as a team and would be in charge of their 
day to day activities such as training, 
assignment of functions, public appearances, 
etc. A team is considered to be one half of 
the total onboard crew capacity and would 
serve alternating shifts with the other team. 
The team is formed when the training 
commences (up to three years prior to 
launch). Training in payload operations 
would be conducted by the user as negotiated 
with NASA,  while the Station program would 
conduct training on facility- class user support 
equipment as well as Station systems. The  
crew commander would give the final go on 
crew readiness prior to their rotational period 
on orbit. The  commander would also have 
the authority to abort a crew rotation period 
and request tha t  the team be returned to the 
ground. lnternational crew members would 
be expected to be resident :it NASA facilities 
(except for  some training at  other partners’ 
facilities) and under the direction of the 
team commander for  the duration of the 
training period and while on orbit. If the 
crew member is to serve on another rotation, 
then they would be reassigned to another 
team for  training for  that mission increment. 
This training is expected to require up  to 
eighteen months. 
The O T F  recommends that the ground crew 
that has trained with a specific crew team be 
a s igned  to that team until all of the team 
becomes acclimated to the on-orbit  conditions 
or for  a minimum of two weeks. Under  this 
scheme a new team would be place on-orbit 
every 45 days. The  overall station chief 
would be the commander that was on station 
when the new team arrived. 
The O T F  fur ther  recommends that NASA 
make the selection of the Space Station 
astronauts and that it also make the selection 
of‘ specific team fo r  a rotational period. 
Safety is the driving factor in this 
consideration. It is considered essential by 
knowledgeable astronauts that the crew be 
responsive to the team commander and to a 
single organization (ultimately, tactical 
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operations management). Allocation of crew 
according to negotiated agreements would be 
a mandatory consideration in the selection of 
an astronaut cadre and of specific teams. 
The  O T F  recommends that the partners 
screen and submit crew member candidates 
following the same screening process used by 
NASA. The  basis for  this recommendation is 
for  the safety and integrity of the station and 
crews. 
Logistics Operations 
The O T F  embraced a philosophy of 
independence with regard to the logistics 
system of the international partners at  the 
executional level of management. Wherever 
possible the recommended Logistics System 
and its operation attempted to allow for  
independent partner operations. Integration 
of independent ELV logistic support  by the 
partners to the station could pose an issue 
when considering the proposal of a single 
logistics system. The  O T F  held discussions 
with the international partners and factored 
into this proposal their desires. However, 
several items that could raise issues were 
identified. One was the proposal of a single 
inventory system for  the onorbit space station 
and ground support  facilities. A Logistics 
Operations Center would be established to 
enable the unification of the logistics 
operations. An  unified logistics system 
would result in such items as a common 
barcoding system etc. Resolution of this 
i tem will probably be critical to the onboard 
management of spares and logistical items. 
A n o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  i s sue  i s  t h e  
recommendation of a centralized inventory 
storage location in order to ensure that 
critical spares are  available at all times to be 
ready to be shipped to the station. The 
centralized storage and repair is also coupled 
with the need to recertify the flight readiness 
of ORUs that have been returned to the 
ground for  repair. This recertification 
process will need to be common to all 
partners to ensure the safety and integrity of 
the station. A central training capability will 
be required to train the crew on the onboard 
activities associated with the processing of 
logistics items. This training must be 
stressed to minimize oversubscription of the 
transportation system. 
A key, and doubtless controversial, 
recommendation in the logistics area is to 
employ a single contractor for  support  of a 
given end - to -end , mod u 1 e - to - mod u le system 
such as the ECLSS. As with the desirability 
of identical hardware across modules 
discussed below, the partners will not readily 
subscribe to having other nations' contractors 
responsible for  support  to systems within 
their modules. In the U.S., this notion also 
runs up against technology transfer 
restrictions. Even so, recognizing the 
operational efficiency of integrated systems 
management, the O T F  recommends that 
NASA and its partners explore the 
possibilities of identical hardware and single 
supporting contractors for  systems operating 
across modules. The  final decisions should 
be life cycle cost based to the extent feasible 
given the various international partner 
objectives. 
Su s t ai n in e En P i n ee ri n p 
Sustaining engineering is envisioned as the 
configuration control function of Space 
Station operations, that of maintaining the 
as-designed functional performance of space 
s ps t e ms . D is t r i b u t ed s u s t a in in g en g i nee r i n g 
is recommended, with major design functions 
performed at  engineering support  centers. 
Partners' ESCs perform real-time or  near 
real-time functions at  the request and 
direction of the SSSC. A centralized 
sustaining engineering organization would be 
charged with configuration control, 
maintaining data  relevant to systems design 
ahd performance. Editor's note: The  SSOTF 
recomniertdation that eventually the sustaining 
engineering function be centralized is ?tot 
inconsisteiit with ~ ~ n l e  functions being 
centralized eurly on. Both it and the 
distributed ESCs would work with the SSSC 
in failure and anomaly analysis, and with the 
evolution and growth organization as a 
principal resource for  their planning. The 
current MOU drafts allocate to each partner 
the for  "ma i n t a i n in g the 
functional performance" of its hardware 
res p o ns i b i 1 i t y 
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its hardware (Article 9.1.a). Thus,  while on- 
board systems monitoring and control must 
be centralized in the SSSC, sustaining 
engineering functions for  each partner's 
hardware may, and likely will be, performed 
in their own locations. 
P r e 1 a u n c h / Po s t I a n d i n e 0 De r a t ions  
The O T F  is proposing an execution level 
prelaunch/postlanding concept that is 
comprised of two specific activity areas based 
on a recommendation to allow user racks to 
be shipped to various sites. One is the 
launch site responsibilities, the second is 
geographically dispersed Science and 
Technology Centers certified to perform 
payload-to-rack integration of user hardware. 
Decentralization depends  upon the 
establishment of Science and Technology 
Centers  (STCs) where  in tegra t ion /  
deintegration of station hcirdware would 
occur. T o  reduce the international 
integration activity at the launch site, the 
approval of international STCs would have to 
be established. Certification (of these centers 
would be by NASA. The use of STCs also 
imply that an integrated package could be 
launched possibly on an international ELV. 
The O T F  strongly recommends that NASA 
must certify for  flight anything that is to be 
shipped to the Station. Certification of 
foreign launch sites for  station payloads and 
logistics shipments could be an issue with 
ESA and Japan. Hardware deslined for  the 
station that does not come through an STC 
would have to be integrated and deintegrated 
at  the launch site, regardless of the point of 
origin. In this case the launch site would be 
responsible for  all of the safety and 
verifications checks. The OTE' recognizes the 
need for  this capability at the launch site to 
support both for  the internationals. The 
implications of the STC concept are 
significant and must be pursued as soon as 
possible to assure proper implementation by 
First Element Launch. 
Accompanying this assignment of operations 
responsibilities are hardware implications. 
The U.S. should explore with our partners 
the use of identical user accommodation 
hardware across modules o r  assume the 
burden of outfittin: its portion of the ESA 
and Japanese modu es. 
"OwnershiD" or Beriefits to Partners 
Resource Iltilization. The  approach for 
dividing utilization resources among the 
partners currently i i  the draf t  MOUs is by a 
negotiated fiat ,  allowing Europe and Japan to 
take their share of resources in their modules 
while securing for  the U.S. and Canada a 
percentage of use,- accommodations (rack 
space) in those modules. Access to all 
modules by Europe and  Japan is preserved 
through the  1- ar te r  process; user 
accommodation or  other utilization resources 
owned by them t an  be traded for  user 
accommoclations in the other modules. W i t h  
this approach, operations costs can be 
allocated in a variety of ways. 
The  Space Station F'rogram has yet to define 
the set of resources to be shared among the 
partners and priced to the users. This is due 
in part to the lack of detailed prescience of 
user activity; while it is known with relative 
certainty that crew manhours and electrical 
power will be demanded and must be 
allocated, it is not possible at  this early date 
to foresee all areas in which scarcity will 
force users to compete or  cooperate. The 
program is currently funding work to 
identify resources and ways to track o r  meter 
their use. 
As identified in the Panel 3 report, an 
appropriate pricing policy for  resources is a 
function of policy goals. Possible goals are 
cost recovery, efficient use of resources, and 
promotion of favored activities such as 
promising commercial development. This 
panel believes that the focus of Space Station 
pricing policy should be on achieving 
efficient use of Space Station resources, 
communicating to experiment designers the 
relative scarcity of resources and influencing 
their experiment designs accordingly. The 
concept of marketing priority classifications 
for  resources as well as the resources 
themselves, to payload designers and operators 
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is a useful one and should be employed. By 
assigning or  selling priorities, timeframes 
become resources, and by discriminating 
users by urgency of demand, this too is 
allocated more efficiently. This will allow 
users and payload manifest developers to take 
advantage of the flexibility in time of some 
users to accommodate both time critical and 
late arriving users. 
A more controversial question is who is 
responsible for  pricing within NASA; should 
the Space Station operations organization be 
the resource broker,  or  should blocks of 
resources be allocated to other NASA offices 
which represent NASA users. Since at  the 
highest level, resources are allocated to 
partners, a coordinated, international pricing 
policy would be difficult  to achieve, and 
probably not even desirable. 
Payload Selection. Payload selection 
will be performed by each partner in 
accordance with their allocation of Space 
Station resources. Panel 3 recommended that 
within the U.S., a Space Station Users Board 
(SSUB) should serve to coordinate the U.S. 
input  to the international User Operations 
Panel (UOP) which will produce an 
international strategic-level target manifest. 
Chaired by the NASA Deputy Administrator, 
the SSUB would be comprised of the NASA 
Associate Administrators for  Space Station, 
Space Science and Applications, Aeronautics 
and Space Technology, and Commercial 
Programs, as well as equivalent level 
representatives of other potential user entities 
within and without the U.S. government. 
Appropriate representatives of the SSUB and 
the Space Station Level I utilization office 
will carry this U.S. utilization plan in to the 
UOP, on which the U.S. membership will be 
headed by the Director of the Space Station 
Level I Utilization office. 
Scheduling. Payload and systems 
operations scheduling is the responsibility of 
a tactical level integration office and 
approved by the Tactical Operations Control 
Board (TOCB). Receiving strategic level 
target user manifests and systems operations 
plans f rom the U O P  and SOP respectively, 
the TOCB generates tactical level target 
manifests and baseline manifests. The  Space 
Station Support Center (SSSC), Payload 
Operations Integration Center (POIC) and 
various ground operations organizations 
provide tactical planning support  and 
implementation of approved plans. 
Crew Selection. The O T F  recommends 
the concept of integrated crew operation, as 
opposed to one in which crew members are 
assigned to certain Space Station Program 
Elements, primarily laboratory modules. The 
integrated crew concept emerges as the only 
sensible approach given STS-based crew 
rotation constraints, manpower requirements 
for critical activities such as EVA,  efficient 
crew utilization in the face of extensive 
housekeeping re qu ire m e n t s , and consideration 
of crew and Station safety. In addition, the 
integrated crew concept is compatible with 
the notion that provision of Station crew is a 
privilege of partnership. Draft  MOU policy 
states that each partner supplies crew 
members in accordance with its utilization 
share. 
The integrated crew concept identifies 
differing crew types, not by element, but by 
pre d o ni in a n t function. The  recommend e d 
crew concept identifies Station operators, 
Station Scientists, and Payload Scientists. 
These differ  primarily in the amount of 
specialized training received, on systems 
operation and maintenance or  on payload 
operation and maintenance. However, much 
of the training is common, and for  
significant periods of time a given increment 
crew trains together to work as a team, 
partly to determine overall mission suitability. 
This leads to requirements for  both 
centralized and distributed training, with 
distributed training early in the training cycle 
and centralized as the launch date 
approaches. Common systems training is 
centralized a t  JSC, while high-fidelity 
simulators will exist at each partner’s 
facilities for  both crews and ground based 
users. Training systems and schedules will 
be established to optimize the amount of 
traveling required of crew complements in 
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training. 
The  integrated crew concept also calls for 
one crew member from each four  person 
shift to serve as Station commander. The 
commanders are selected from either the 
Station Operator or Station Scientist cadres, 
and thus spends most of on-orbit hours 
performing systems or payload operations 
tasks. His or her j ob  as Station commander 
is primarily to give direction in safety and 
contingency related matters. 
Each partner nominates persons to serve as 
Station crew. NASA selects f rom among this 
pool of nominees those who meet the 
qualifications to be Station astronauts, and 
will select specific crew complements for  
each increment. 
Onerntioris Oblipations 
O w  ra t i o 11 s Cost S h a r i ne .  Operations 
cost sharing arrangements have been 
discussed at  length, in spite of the lack of 
good operations cost estimates, to arrive at  
the approach currently extant in  the draft  
international MOUs. This approach proceeds 
as follows: 
First, operations functions must be identified 
at  a sufficiently low level of detail as to 
permit meaningful discussion. Second, 
functions must be categorized as either 
element-specific o r  common; the former are 
those which can clearly be allocated to a 
specific flight element provided by a partner, 
while the latter support the Station as a 
whole and cannot be allocated on a clear, 
non-arbitrary basis. Then, these functions 
and their associated costs must be allocated to 
partners according to their hardware 
contributions. The  costs of common jobs are 
allocated to partners according to allocation 
of utilization resources regardless of who 
performs the work (many will be done 
jointly). This will likely result in some 
transfer of funds across partners, but 
considerably less than under other options. 
Cost sharing is discussed in more detail in 
Section 5.1 1.3. 
Risk Sharing, Risk sharing is 
seemingly best implemented by a general 
philosophy of cross-waiver of liability. This 
is consistent with the alignment of 
performance and financial responsibility for 
operations functions. A number of aspects 
of international law should be studied to 
assure a clear understanding of this area. 
Transnortation. Transportation of crew 
and non-user material to and from orbit is 
most effectively allocated in terms of 
responsibility for delivery of some portion of 
total mass rather than dollars or number of 
launches. Of the STS capacity allocated to 
Space Station, each partner will receive rights 
to a fixed portion for  housekeeping 
requirements, and a percentage of user 
capacity, for both of which they will pay the 
going rate for STS s e n i c e s  (The mass of the 
logistics module elements must come off the 
top). Communications and tracking services 
will be allocated in the same fashion. 
By contrast, allocation of transportation 
responsibilities, as opposed to rights, should 
be allocated among partners to correct any 
imbalance among common cost responsi- 
bilities. The program’s upcoming logistics 
studies, to be done in parallel with our 
partners, should address the partners’ launch 
and return systems and the new hardware 
required from all partners to employ them in 
Station operations. 
HousekeeDinP Reauirements. Effective 
utilization of Station resources requires that 
“housekeeping” allocations be set for  each 
systems and module on the Station. This will 
yield the highest feasible level of Station 
resources as utilization resources; those 
available for  user activity. The  international 
MOUs should contain a provision which 
penalizes any partner whose systems 
requirements for  Station resources exceeds a 
negotiated house keep irig allocation. The 
Space Station Program should develop a 
forum in which international housekeeping 
allocations can be negotiated and established 
early i n  the detailed design phase. 
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i . l l . 3  INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS COST SHARING by Greg Williams 
Editor's note: Sectioti 5.11 is based 
oti the negotiations atid MOUs as 
they existed in the spritig of 1987. 
The  authors riote that nianj' o f  the 
issues identified here h a w  heen 
resolved in subsequcrit riegotiat ioris 
arid MOUs.  T h e  reader .should 
refer to the latest versioiis of the 
MOUs for curretit Program 
positions. 
The  basic dilemma for  the international 
negotiators is to find a mechanism for 
sharing Space Station operations costs that 
meets three basic criteria. First, one partner 
should not have to subsidize another's use of 
the Station--that is, each partner should pay 
a "fair" share. Whether that share should be 
based on investment or utilization 
complicates the definition of "fair", but is in 
principle a separate issue. 
Second, the allocation of operations 
responsibilities should be in accord with an 
axiom of incentives management that 
financial accountability be aligned with 
performance responsibility as closely as 
possible. Thus engineering and cost 
responsibility for a given hardware 
maintenance should reside with the same 
partner, preferably with the one who 
designed and built it. This criterion is 
complicated by the desire of the international 
partners to have "meaningful" operations 
responsibilities within in the SSP. 
Third,  the international partners desire to 
minimize the transfer of funds among 
partners. Instead, they wish to have an 
allocation of operations responsibilities 
sufficiently large to cover their share of the 
operations cost burden. This requires a 
careful and imaginative distribution of work, 
since the center of gravity of operations jobs 
will be within the U.S. The partners 
including the U.S. desire to minimize the 
accounting and bookkeeping requirements 
associated with the operations cost sharing 
plan. 
The "fair share" principle suggests that each 
partner ought to benefit in proportion to 
what i t  contributes to the partnership. 
Ideally, then, if benefits could be expressed 
as utilization resources and contributions 
expressed as the sum of development and 
operations costs (life cycle cost) of the Space 
Station System, each partner should be 
entitled to a percentage of utilization 
resources equal to the contributed percentage 
of Station life cycle cost. Early thinking on 
this issue led to the position that, because 
operations costs were so uncertain, the 
partners would base utilization rights on 
estimated development cost contributions 
only. Operations costs would be borne by 
the partners based on utilization rights, 
possibly through operations functions 
performed. The result is that life cycle costs 
are addressed in the cost and utilization 
sharing proposals even though total life cycle 
cost is not the basis for  utilization shares 
determination. 
The use of development cost as the basis of 
determining utilization rights, or shares, fell 
into disfavor and was finally dropped for  
two major reasons. One was the uncertainty 
over what was to be included in investment 
and over the cost estimates of the included 
items. The second was the army of lawyers 
and accountants that such a basis would 
necessitate. Development costs incurred b y  
the partners remain influential, however, in 
that subsequent proposals are evaluated in 
part on the basis of whether the U S .  is 
better o r  worse o f f  than under previous, 
development cost based proposals. 
The approach for  dividing utilization 
resources among the partners currently in the 
draft  MOUs is by a negotiated fiat ,  allowing 
Europe and Japan to take their share of 
resources in their modules while securing for 
the US.  and Canada a percentage of user 
accommodations (rack space) in those 
modules. Access to all modules by Europe 
and Japan is preserved through the barter 
process; user accommodation o r  other 
utilization resources owned by them can be 
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traded for  user accommodations in the other 
modules. With this approach, operations 
costs can be allocated in a varicty of ways. 
5.1 1.3.1 Cost Sharing Options 
The range of possible options m:iy be thought 
of i n  terms of the volume of funds flows 
among the partners. The options considered 
were: 
I .  Vest in one organization Station 
operations responsibility and allocate the cost 
of operations based on allocation of 
utilization resources. Each partner 
contributes a portion of the budget of this 
organization, which has license to go 
anywhere to get the job done i n  the most 
cost-effective manner.  (Per haps employing 
the concept of using contractors from each 
partner for  work valued the same a5 the 
partner’s cost allocation). The potential for  
the largest flow of funds is re;Jresented by 
this option. 
2. Assign operations jobs  to each 
partner and the financial respclnsibility for 
performing those jobs. Here we might 
assume that jobs are perfectly a!located such 
that no flow of funds across partners is 
required; the value of the work each 
performs is equal to the portion of operations 
cost responsibility based on its utilization 
share. 
3 .  Categorize jobs as either element- 
specific or  common; the former are those 
which can clearly be allocated to a specific 
flight element provided by a partner, while 
the latter support  the Station as a whole and 
cannot be allocated on a clear, non-arbitrary 
basis. Allocate to partners the jobs and 
associated costs according to the partner 
hardware contributions. The costs of 
common jobs are allocated to partners 
according to the allocation of utilization 
resources regnrdless of who performs the  
work (many w i l l  be done .jointly). These 
should be predicted, not actual costs, so that 
the responsible partner bears the costs or 
benefits of overruns or  underruns in 
performance of the function. This option 
b i l l  likely result in some transfer of funds 
across partners, but considerably less than 
under option I .  
Were the Space Station to be organized along 
the lines of a corporation or  general 
partnership, option 1 might be intuitively 
attractive. 1 lowever, Ihis option provides no 
direct incentives for  systems designers to 
factor life cycle cost implications into their 
hardware designs. Th  2 largest percentage of 
operations cost for  any given piece of 
hardware is paid by t’ie largest partner, not 
the partner who built it. I n  addition, each 
partner has expressed certain goals for  its 
role in Space Station. Some, such as future  
autonomous space operations, tend to 
preclude a homogeneous organization possible 
under a corporate o r  general partnership 
structure. Option 1 ilso requires visibility 
into each partner’s technical and financial 
operations to which none will readily commit. 
Option #? directly satisfies the management 
incentives constraint in the operations era. A 
first cut distribution would be to assign to 
each partner the engineering and financial 
responsibility for  sustaining the functional 
p e r f o r m a n c e of t he h :I r d w a re they p r ov id e,  
which will also set up design and 
development incentivm. However, many 
operations functions support the Space Station 
as a whole rather than separately identifiable 
partners’ contributions These functions will 
be performed by one or  more of the 
partners, but the cost, in accordance with the 
stated principle, ought to be allocated among 
a11 the partners since al l  benefit. Option #2 
does not pro\’ide the flexibility required to 
match centralized conduct of common 
functions with distributed financial 
responsibility. Option # 3 ,  therefore, best 
f o 1 Io ws the I:, r i nc i p I e w i t  h i n the constraints . 
The U.S. draf t  MOU does not specify i n  
detail the mechanism by which annual 
operations costs are  to be shared. I t  does 
suggest that operations responsibilities and 
associated coSts can be distributed among the 
partners. To the extent that the costs of 
such distributed activilies do  not correspond 
to cost sliarl? responsibilities, compensating 
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cash payments are  required by the MOU. 
The U.S. draf t  MOU does specify percentage 
allocations of Station user resources among 
the partners. Because these allocations are 
percentages of net Station resources, the risks 
to each partner's users associated with Station 
performance is proportional to that partner's 
allocation. No partner is promised an 
absolute level of user resources. 
ESA has suggested that Station operations 
activities be divided into those that are 
common to the Station, whose costs are 
shared according to partner allocations, and 
those that are to be borne individually by 
each partner. Along with this, each partner 
bears the cost risk associated with any 
operations activity it performs--that is, each 
partner absorbs his own cost overruns and 
benefits f rom his own savings. This applies 
to operations functions regardless of whether 
they are considered common or partner- 
specific. 
The cost risk of each common function falls 
on the partners performing i t  because each 
partner is credited with the predicted cost, 
not the actual cost, of the common activity. 
If a partner accepts responsibility for  more 
common activities, its credit for  common 
costs increases. Only if a partner does not or 
cannot agree to carry out sufficient common 
operations functions to defray his share of 
common costs will that partner be required to 
make cash payments to those partners who 
cover more than their share. 
The  U.S. has generally accepted this position, 
but there remains the problem of sorting out 
a division of operations activities and 
associated costs that meets the above three 
criteria. The Model for  Estimation of Space 
Station Operations Costs (MESSOC) was used 
by JPL to analyze the implications of several 
different operations scenarios and three 
different specific mechanisms on the sharing 
of costs. See Appendix A for  a description 
of MESSOC. 
MESSOC is able to determine logistics costs 
by hardware element, training costs by crew 
type, and flight ops and engineering support 
costs by facility. Without this capability, it 
would be difficult to separate common costs 
f rom those that are partner-specific. Without 
this delineation, it would be impossible to 
analyze the general proposals now being 
negotiated. 
The cost of performance of the common cost 
functions may run in the neighborhood of 
one hundred and fifty million dollars 
annually. Yet, most of these functions will 
be performed in the United States, especially 
if the strong, centralized role of the U S .  
advocated by the O T F  is adopted. We thus 
run headlong into the policy constraint of 
minimizing the transfer of funds between 
partners. The  functions that can be 
delegated to the other partners are relatively 
few. The  largest single "big ticket" item in 
the operation of the Space Station is 
transportation to and from orbit. The initial 
conclusion is that the incorporation of 
partner ELVs into mature Station operations 
can alleviate the need fo r  large cash 
payments by the partners to defray the large 
launch costs associated with STS support of 
the Station's systems and crew. 
These partner launches must consist primarily 
of Station core logistics--that is, spares and 
consumables. This implies a distributed 
logistics system with its attendant 
management complexities. The  required 
partner launch rates are complex but 
understandable functions of the launch 
vehicle capabilities, the cost sharing 
percentages, and other physical parameters. 
It is therefore imperative that multiple launch 
and return systems, especially those provided 
by ESA and Japan, be included as part of 
the Space Station System. 
Another conclusion of the MESSOC analysis 
is that the housekeeping logistics 
specifications for  each partner's systems are 
very important under certain cost sharing 
mechanisms. 
The third principal conclusion is that a 
distributed logistics resupply system with 
both U.S. and partner launch vehicles has 
several important development phase 
implications. For the U.S., two are 
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important: (1) an OMV may be required to 
rendezvous with and dock ELV payloads; and 
(2)  appropriate navigation, guidance, 
communication, and docking equipment must 
be in place to accept these EL'V payloads. 
For the partners the implications are more 
profound. They will need to supply launch 
vehicles, and develop the appropriate logistics 
processing facilities. If NASDA uses the 
JELM, no new program elements are needed 
by Japan, but ESA will need to develop and 
procure new canisters for  launching their 
share of Station supplies. 
If these new canisters are developed, it 
appears advantageous to also consider their 
use as a destruction-upon-reentry waste 
disposal system for  non-toxic materials. This 
would significantly relieve STS downweight 
requirements. Such a concept could also alter 
the development programs of the three 
largest partners. 
A detailed analysis of these conclusions is 
provided in "Sharing Space Station Operations 
Costs", by Robert  Shishko and Jeffrey L. 
Smith, JPL D-4564, Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, June 24, 1987. 
5.1 1.3.2 Operations Cost Classification 
If option #3 is to be pursued, it remains to 
classify the jobs as partner-unique or 
common. Two sets of data exist for  
estimates of Space Station "mature I operations 
costs. One is MESSOC, which contains 
twenty interrelated algorithms which model 
key operations functions. A description of 
MESSOC and a cost classification scheme 
based on its results is presented in Appendix 
A .  Also see the Shishko and Smith paper 
referenced above. As is stated at  the 
conclusion of that paper, an operations cost 
model is the more useful medium of 
discussion of operations cost sharing among 
the partners, once the model is sufficiently 
mature. 
The other data set is a "grassroots" estimate 
built up  from budget submissions of the 
various NASA centers as part of the 
program's cost assessment exercise in the 
winter of 1986-87. This estimate was based 
(with varying degrees of success) on the 
program's Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), 
which is in turn the product of two years of 
effort  in defining operations functions. The 
development of an accepted set of operations 
functions is still in progress; the O T F  efforts 
should add significantly to this effort .  A 
third set of operations functions was 
developed for  the purpose of international 
discussions by Dan Eiland. This set is 
crosswalked with the others in Table 5-4 
(No attempt to collect operations cost 
estimates by this set of functions was made 
by the SSOTF). 
The following matrix (Table 5 - 5 )  classifies 
functions using the cost assessment data set 
and functions description. The  Space Station 
Program's Operations Management Concept 
and  subsequent work identify seven major 
groups of operations functions which form 
the structure of the operations cost data set. 
These are space systems operations, user 
operations support, prelaunch/postlanding 
operations, integrated logistics support, 
information systems operations, product 
assurance, and operations management and 
integration. The characterization of some 
functions within these groups as element- 
unique or common depends on the level of 
activity at  which it occurs; strategic, tactical 
or execution. Thus each function is 
classified as unique or common for each level 
of activity. 
The Panel also examined a more detailed task 
listing from the cost assessment data set with 
a labeling of specific tasks as element-unique 
or common. In gmerat ing the split, 
guidelines based on the structure of the 
budget submission and on draf t  international 
MOUs were employed. One such guideline 
is the use of "prime" and "non-prime" 
categories in the cost assessment data to help 
in some areas to distinguish between 
element-unique and common costs. The 
notion here is that prime costs are associated 
with the orbital hardware contributions of 
the US. ,  while non-prime costs consist 
largely of operations Infrastructure which 
supports the orbital hardware. Thus,  in the 
information systems category, prime software 
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TABLE 5-4: CROSSWALK O F  OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS/COST CATEGORIES 
User Integration 
Utilization Planning 
User/SS Engineering 
Integration 
User Operations Integration 
Implementation 
Assessment / 
Accommodation/ 
Integration 
POIC 
SS User Requirements 
MESSOC CATEGORY D. BLAND MATRIX CATEGORY 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ - - -  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - - - - - -  
Customer Integration 
Operations 
11.11 Strategic Utilization Planning 
111.9 Strategic Support  t o  Users 
11.5.1 Payload to  SS Engineering Integration 
11.5.3 Payload to Element Engineering Integration 
111.3.1 Payload to  Element Sustaining Engineering 
111.3.3 Payload to  SS Sustaining Engineering 
11.4 Integration of Users with SS Operations 
11.5.2 Payload to  SS Operations Integration 
11.5.4 Payload to  Element Operations Integration 
111.3.2 Payload t o  Element Sustaining Engineering 
111.3.4 Payload to  SS Sustaining Operations 
11.3 Capability for User Interface 
111.2 Perform User Operations 
11.1 Generic Mission Requirements 
Space Systems Operations 
Systems Operations Centers Engineering Support Center 1.3 Maintain Ground Support  Facilities 
Maintenance & Support 
Operations Preparation 
Mission Operations Flight Planning 
Planning & Manifest 
Development 
Flight Design & 
Requirements 
Procedure 
Development & 
Training 
Mission Operations 
Sustaining Engineering 
Prelaunch & Postlanding 
Operations 
Training Operations 
Flight Implementation 
1.4 
11.4 
Flight & Ground Support  Operations 
Integration of Users with SS Operations 
1.1 Maintain SS Orbital S ta tus  
1.3 Maintain Ground Support  Facilities 
11.4 
1.2 
11.2 
111.2 
Integration of Users with SS Operations 
Crew Training for  System Operations 
Crew Training for Generic User Operations 
Crew Training for Specifc User Operations 
1.1 Maintain SS Orbital  S ta tus  
1.3 Maintain Ground Support  Facilities 
1.4 
111.2 Perform User Operations 
Flight & Ground Support  Operations 
Work Package Sustaining 1.5 Sustaining Enginnering 
Engineering 
Element Processing 1.7 System Prelaunch/Postlanding Processing 
11.7 User Prelaunch/Postlanding Capability 
111.5 User Prelaunch/Postlanding Processing 
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Table 5-4 (cont.)  
WBS/UPN CATEGORY 
_..__~~._____~------- 
Integrated Logistics Support  
Spares Flight Equi;2nient Spares 1.6.2 SS System Spares 
11.6.2 User System Spares 
111.4.2 User Spares Requirements 
Intermediate & Depot Repair Other  Logistics 
Ground Trmsportat ion 
& Handling 
Maintenance Doc~imentat ion,  
Databases 
Inventory Manngernent 
G round Support Eqir i pmen t 
Maintenance & Support  
1.6.1 System Consumables 
I1 6 1 Usel Consumables 
111 4.1 User Consumables Requirements 
Customer Lagistics & 
Maintenance 
Information Systems 
Software Support  
Environment (SSE) 
SSE & Technical 1.10 SSE Interface 
Managemerlt Information 11.10 SSE User Interface 
System (TMIS) 111.8 SSE Manifested User Interface 
1.9 TMrS Interface 
11.9 TMKS User Interface 
111.7 TMIS Manifested User Interface 
Da ta  Hand ing & I 8  SSIS Interface 
C om mu n 1 cat 1 on I1 8 SSIli User Interface 
111 6 SSIS Manifested User Interface 
(Distributed across other  
categories) 
(Distributed across other Product Assurance 
categories) 
Operations Management & 
Integration 
Integration Managenient & 1.4 Flight & Ground Support  Operations 
1.11 SS Program Strategic Managemnt 
11.4 
111.4.3 User Logistics Requirements 
Integration of Users with SS Operations 
Research & Program Management 
(R&PM) Allowances 
Flight Crew P a y  & 1.2 Crew for System Operations 
NSTS Launches NSTS/ELV Launches I.6.3,4 NSTS/ELV System Requirements 
II.6.3,4 NSTS/ELV Generic User Requirements 
III.4.4,5 NSTS/ELV Specific User Requirements 
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OCATION OF FUNCTION COSTS: ELEMENT-UNIQUE (U)  OR COMMON(C) 
STRATEGIC 
U 
FUNCTION 
User Integration 
Utilization Planning X 
User Integration Pln 
User/Station Eng. Int. Imp 
User Ops Integration Imp1 
Assess/ A ccom /I n t eg Plans 
POIC 
SS User Requirements 
Space Systems Operations 
Systems Ops Centers 
sssc 
ESC’s 
Simulator/Training 
Operations Preparation 
Mission Ops Plng & h4anf Dev 
Mission Design & Req Dev 
Procedures Dev & Training 
Mission Operations 
Sustaining Engineering 
Prelaunch/Postlanding Ops 
Integrated Logistics Support 
Supply Support (Spares) 
Other logistics 
Information Systems 
TMIS 
SSE 
SSlS 
Product Assurance 
Ops Mgmt & Integ 
STS Launches 
Comm & Tracking 
R&PM (CS Manpower) 
X 
X 
X 
X 
C 
X 
X 
X 
TACTICAL 
U 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
C 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
EXECUTION 
U 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
C 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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ta3ks are classified as element-unique while 
non-prime software tasks are clnssificd as 
common. W o r k  package prime manngement 
costs are element-unique, while non-prime 
ni a nag e men t costs a re com nio n . 
A second guideline is the draf t  hlOU 
position on allocation of utilization resources. 
The platforms are considered to operate 
separately from the manned base at the 
tactical and execution levels, thercfore most 
platform operations costs are element-unique. 
The extension of this logic to the servicing 
facility, MSC, FTS, and attached payload 
accommodations is less clear. W h  le part of 
the manned base, ESA and Canada d o  not 
have a priori shares in their u3e. In this 
p res e n t a t ion , t heir associated ope r a t i  o n s costs 
are considered element-unique. 
Taking an aggregate view, the splits among 
the ma jo r  operations func t iona l  &,roup'; 31-e 
explained below. 
U t i 1 i za t i on P la n n i 11 e,. Us e r I n tee. r a t io n 
Planning. and Space Station User 
Reauirements can just as easily reside i n  the 
Ops Management and Integration category. 
These are prinlarily partner-uniqur activities 
at the strategic level with a common tactical 
management required for  integration by the 
T B D  U . S . / i n t e r n a t i o n a l  u t i l i z a t i o n  
organization. The  engineering and operations 
i n t e g r a t ion imp 1 em en t a t i o n f u n c t io ns are the 
"nuts and bolts" services the progranl provides 
to the users. The recommended user 
accommodation approach is to have a 
centralized manifesting of users onto the 
Station, a decentralized integration of users' 
payloads into its assigned element, and 
c e n t r a 1 i ze d us e r ope ratio n s man a g e rn e n t . The 
technical engineering integration is thus an 
element unique function. W i t h  a centralized 
management of systems operations and user 
scheduling, user operations integration costs 
are unavoidably common costs. (These 
should be directly chargeable to users, if the 
accepted pricing policy permits/reyuires i t . )  
Smce  Svstem Operations. W i t h  the 
exception of sustaining engineering and 
specialized real-time or  near re:il-time 
engineering support (ESCs) to specific 
hard wa re e I en1 en t s , s pac r: systems operations 
are by definition an area of common cost, 
because i t  supports the entire Space Station 
Complex (pl:it forms, hclwever, are treated 
separately per the MOUs). This is true at all 
three levels of operations, except where no 
strategic level activity is required. For 
example, the integrated crew concept implies 
a common cost classification for  crew 
train i n g , s i nce many t r:i in in g ac t i v i t  ies a re 
geared toward developing crew teams and on 
operation of common sy: tems. 
Pre 1 a it n (=ti li Post la n (1 i ne. ODerations 
consicts prim:iriIy of processing of the 
logistics elements to rejupply the Station. 
Given the nature of the processing flow and 
the data description of it. it is not possible to 
report separately that activity which supports 
i n  d i v id u a1 e! e in en t s from that w h ic h supports 
common systems and crew. Not included in 
common coyts a re  the prelaunch/postlanding 
processing of user payloads. 
Integrated LoRistics SupDort is readily 
divisible into hardware spares and other 
logistics support. The former is partner- 
unique, while the latter is best captured as a 
common cost to the partnership. 
I n form a t i on Svs t e ni s req u ired to support 
operations and utilization have costs which 
benefit the partnership as a whole. The 
maintenance of specific computer hardware 
and software systems ma! be delegated to the 
providing partner, but the operation is by 
nature a common cost activity. 
Prod II c t A ss u r a n (2 is genera 11 y 
ident; '3d with the provider of the hardware 
o r  soL ..vare system to be issured. An overall 
safety managenlent responsibility, however, is 
a management comnion cost that may be 
shared. 
OD e r a t io n s M a n a g e n I e n t a n d In t e R r a t i o n 
will  have both partner-unique and common 
elements. Tactical Operations Control Board 
:Ictivities. for  example, niight be a common 
cost, while the manpower supplied to user 
and operations integration functions might be 
i'inanced by the partner of' system or element 
orig in. 
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TransDortation of cre-w and non-user 
material to and from orbit is most effectively 
allocated in terms of responsibility for  
delivery of some portion of total mass. Of 
the STS capacity allocated to Space Station, 
each partner will receive rights to a fixed 
portion for  housekeeping requirements, and 
a percentage of the available user capacity. 
The partners will pay the going rate for STS 
services. 
Communications and Trackinp Services 
will be allocated and charged in the same 
fashion. 
The  function categories employed in the 
operations cost model MESSOC (see 
Appendix A) follow fairly closely those in 
the program's budgeting Work Breakdown 
Structure. The  assumptions used in these two 
data sources should be aligned to ensure 
comparability of their results. The OTF 
recommends that the operations cost model 
be used as the medium for discussion among 
the partners on operations cost sharing. This 
will serve to provide a consistency of data 
and analyses not characteristic of budget- 
driven grassroots estimates. Perhaps more 
importantly, the use of a model will lend 
support to the principle that when operations 
cost sharing occurs by functionally allocating 
different jobs on the basis of cost 
equivalence (rather than cost sharing by 
sharing of the job) ,  the sharing is done on 
the basis of a cost estimate which is 
independent of which partner will perform 
the job  rather than sharing on the basis of 
actual cost determined after the fact .  
5.1 1.3.3 Implications of Proposed Utilization 
Sharing Scheme For Space Station Users and 
Module Outfi t t ing 
The current U.S position on utilization rights 
and operations costs allocates the cost of 
maintaining the power, ECLSS, DMS and 
other subsystems to the U.S. since the U.S. 
provides them. This could result in 
inequities since the outputs of these are used 
by all partner's hardware. It is on this basis 
of the U.S. provision of these "common 
systems" that the U S .  claims the rights to a 
percentage of the user accommodations in the 
European and Japanese supplied laboratory 
module as part of the negotiated fiat 
allocation of utilization rights. 
Such an arrangement, which leaves the U.S. 
as the only partner supplying a laboratory 
which has its users spread across the Space 
Station from the start, has both potential 
benefits and costs for  the U.S. The  benefit, 
which is rarely mentioned, is that the US.  is 
in a more diversified position than the other 
partners and thus is less subject to the 
variation in performance associated with any 
one laboratory. The cost, which tends to 
receive attention, has two components. 
First, the SSOTF recommended operations 
concept states that laboratory element 
providers will perform the engineering 
integration of payloads manifested in their 
elements. Therefore,  about half of U.S. users 
will be manifested in the ESA or Japanese 
elements. This may impose cost and 
inconvenience burdens those users. How 
great these burdens will be depends on a )  
whether or not ESA and/or  Japan perform 
integration activities a t  KSC o r  in their home 
facilities and b) the need fo r  users to make 
use of the high fidelity module simulators 
which each partner currently plans to build 
on its own soil. Currently, Japan's preferred 
option is to perform experiment integration 
in Japan with some functional verification at 
KSC. If the high-fidelity simulator of the 
JEM is built in Japan as planned, users may 
likely want to make use of it. 
Second, the U.S. has not reached agreement 
with ESA and Japan on common laboratory 
hardware for  user accommodation. Nor is 
there clear definition of or agreement on 
common user interfaces, interoperability, 
functional equivalency, and other such 
abstractions from truly common, identical 
hardware. This limits the flexibility of users 
and user operations support  personnel for 
shifting payloads among modules in the 
manifesting process. Furthermore,  all U.S. 
users may be burdened since some payload 
development may occur prior to knowledge 
Ititernaticnal Operatioris Cost Sharing 
of which lab a user will be integrated into, 
and this uncertainty about location may 
affect  payload development. 
A potential outcome of international, 
technical level discussions is that ESA arid 
Japan may not agree to common user 
accommodation hardware.  Rather,  ESA arid 
Japan representatives to OTF discussions have 
said their agencies will build their elements 
to meet US.  outfitting requirements. This 
approach must be carefully managed 
throughout the program engineering phase, 
otherwise the U.S. may find it necessary to 
outfi t  the portion of the ESA and Japanese 
modules allocated to it. Thus,  the U.S. may 
be able to achieve a situation of common 
user accommodation hardware all modults. 
ESA and Japan may, however, not be willi-ng 
to agree to such a US.  role in development 
of their hardware. Technology transfer 
constraints will likely exi‘it on such a scherne 
as well. 
The range of possible schemes are: 
1 )  A single contractor is used to build 
all the outfitting and system interfa.ce 
hardware fo r  a given system across all the 
partners’ laboratories. Identical hardware is 
thus assured. 
2)  Each partner contracts separately to 
provide the systems and system interfaces for  
its allocated portion of the  laboratory 
elements. The  U.S. outfits its lab plus its 
portion of the €SA and Japanese laboratories. 
Identical hardware is assured for  U.S. users. 
3)  All partners agree to strict 
commonality requirements. A user requiring 
a generic laborafory capability can thus f i t  in 
any laboratory module with no changes 
required to his payload. 
4) The thiee laboratory modules have 
non-common tser  accommodations; the 
magnitude of clianges to user payloads, and 
the cost of those changes, required by the 
manifesting process increases with the degree 
of departure from commonality. 
The first is the ideal, but  is unlikely given 
the technology transfer issues. It should be 
the subject of discussion within the program 
and with the partners. The  fourth is quite 
likely and the least user-friendly. The 
second and third are  possible, but neither is 
secured by the current level of agreement, 
even informall), among the partners. T h e  
second would require additional U.S. funds to 
accomplish. This option of having the U.S. 
outfit a portion of the ESA and Japanese 
laboratory modules should be broached with 
them. Such a suggestion should not come as 
a complete surprise, but rather be presented 
as a logical extension of the idea of 
providing hardware fo r  the outfitting of each 
others’ modules appearing in past drafts of 
agency-to-agency MOUs (not in the current 
draf t  since it was part  of the now defunct 
notion of facility-class generic equipment).  
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Appendix A 
hIESSOC 
Robert  Shishko 
The MESSOC Space Station operations cost 
model estimates operations costs and net 
Station outputs, given the Station 
configuration, mission description, and 
overall program policies. The heart of the 
model is the integrated formulas, equations 
and databases used in making the 
calculations. T o  ensure a degree of 
consistency across model runs, these will be 
baselined by the Space Station Program. 
However, the model is designed to provide 
the user the flexibility to consider alternative 
Station configurat ions and  mission 
descriptions. Therefore,  the model contains 
both databases that are easily altered by the 
user and databases that are less easy to alter. 
The easy to change data describes the Station 
under investigation. In particular, the model 
users establish what the Station configuration 
is over time, what operations are being 
conducted aboard the Station over time, and 
what overall Space Station program and 
policy variables are in effect .  The internal 
model databases, that are less easily altered 
by the model user, supply the detailed 
technical and cost data. 
To  produce cost estimates that are sensitive 
to changes in the Space Station scenario, 
operations cost estimates are built up from 
the lowest level of data that it is practical 
and possible to collect. As a result, 
operations cost estimates can be affected by 
changes down to the component level. 
Building cost estimates f rom the component 
level also provides a natural way to assess the 
costs and benefits of development phase 
decisions such as commonality in the Station’s 
design. 
Cost categories were selected to have specific 
links to the Unique Project Number (UPN)  
budgeting system and Space Station Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS). They cover a 
generic set of operations functions and 
activities and are therefore meaningful across 
Work Packages and Station systems/elements. 
Identical functions or  activities are  costed 
using the same formulas and equations, even 
though they may occur in different Work 
Packages or  systems/elements. Costs can be 
summed to calculate annual operations costs 
over the Station lifetime for  user selected 
Space Station scenarios. Considerable detail 
is also available within the 20 cost categories. 
MESSOC provides the user with the ability to 
test the effect  of changes in the design, 
operations, and policies of the Space Station 
on both estimated operations costs and 
intermediate Station outputs. These 
intermediate outputs include crew time 
available to users, on-line availability of 
critical Station equipment,  and user-dedicated 
payload mass to orbit. Operations cost 
estimates alone are not sufficient to address 
key design and operations issues. These 
estimates must be tied to useful measures of 
Station output in order to establish the 
proper balance between cost and 
effectiveness. 
The heart of MESSOC is a set of integrated 
algorithms and equations, which for  
expositional purposes can be divided into 
nine blocks - -  six cost blocks and three 
intermediate output blocks. Cost blocks pass 
calculated variables to each other as well as 
to the output blocks. In this way the 
operations costs and outputs are  linked. 
Inputs to the algorithms come from two 
sources--those variables entered or  edited by 
the model user directly on the screens, and 
those data contained in the many databases 
supporting MESSOC. Variables entered from 
the screens create a Space Station scenario. 
In constructing a scenario, the model user 
essentially tells the algorithms what the 
Station configuration is over time, what 
operations are being conducted aboard the 
Station over time, and what overall Space 
A- 1 
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Station program and policy variables are i n  
effect .  Station growth over timv is clearly a 
key determinant of post-IOC operations costs. 
From a Space Station scenario, the algorithms 
and equations in the six cost blocks calculate 
costs in 20 separate categories. These costs, 
when summed, give total operations costs i n  
a given year. The calculations are performed 
for  each year of the Station’s operational life, 
taking into account changes in its 
configurat ion,  on-orbi t  and  ground 
operations, as well as certain other 
intertemporal variables. Because of the 
nature of the algorithms, considerable detail 
is also available within the 20 cost categories 
and three intermediate output categories for  
each year. 
In its present version, MESSOC contains 
algorithms for  17  of the 20 cost categories. 
In brief, the 17 algorithms cover the 
planning and execution of tasks associated 
with sustaining and operating t h e  basic 
Station elements, while the remaining three 
a I g or i t h m s in t e g r a t io n 
activities, customer logistics, and the 
operation of the communications and data 
handling infrastructure. These a l~or i thn i s  are 
currently being developed. 
cover custom e r 
MESSOC software is written in Turbo Pascal, 
and is designed to run on an IDM or 
compatible PC with 640k R,4M.  The 
program is user-friendly in so far  as minimal 
training is required to use it, and “help 
screens” are  available at  user decision points. 
The key assumptions are cataloged and can 
be displayed, but  the main quantitative 
databases are hidden from the casual user so 
as to retain some consistency across model 
applications. 
Cost Categories in MESSOC 
The cost categories in MESSOC were selected 
to have specific links to the budgeting system 
and the Space Station Program Work 
Breakdown Structure (WBS). These categories 
cover a generic set of operations functions 
and activities in the WBS, and therefore are 
meaningful across Work Packages (WPs). In 
this way, identical functions or activities are 
costed using the s:rme algorithms and 
equations, and are dhplayed together even 
though they may occur within different WPs 
(or be non-WP activiiies). It was further 
decided early i n  the development of MESSOC 
that i t  would not be practical. or  even 
feasible, to devise an equi t ion for 
activity. The MESSOC cost 
contain related WBS operations 
though these elements may not 
separately. 
Table A - l  shows MESSOC’s 
categories. 
each WBS 
categories 
elements, 
be costed 
20 cost 
Table A -  I .  hlESSOC Cost Categories 
1.  
2. 
3. 
4.  
5 .  
6. 
7 .  
8. 
9. 
IO. 
1 1 .  
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
Space  Stat ion Cont ro l  Cen te r  
(SSCC)/Engineering Support Center 
(ESC) maintenance and support  
Training operations 
Flight design and planning 
Flight implementation 
W P s u s t a i ni n g e np, ineer i n g 
Software Support Environment (SSE), 
TMIS, and information system support 
Maintenance documentation, databases, 
procedures, and analyses 
Inventory man age men t 
Ground transportation, handling, and 
storage 
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) 
maintenance and support  
Interniediate/depot level repair 
F1 ight equipmen t spares 
Element processing/reprocessing 
Consumables 
NSTS/ E LV launch services 
Integration management and institutional 
support 
Flight crew pay and allowances 
Customer integra t ion operations 
Customer logislics and payload 
maintenance 
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s / d a t a  h a n d l i n g  
infrastructure 
To some, the absence (of on-orbit  functions 
from these categories may seem to be an 
oversight, but a moment’s thought leads to 
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the realization that no money changes hands 
on-orbit; all resources are bought and paid 
for  "on the ground." On-orbit  time 
utilization is extremely important for  
operations effectiveness, however, and this is 
discussed later when the algorithms for  crew 
time are described. 
A "crosswalk" between the 20 cost categories 
and the WBS is built directly into the 
MESSOC software. Indeed, all data items 
required to construct a Space Station 
scenario, as well as all MESSOC outputs, are 
defined within the software, and may be 
displayed on the screen directly. 
MESSOC Structure and Databass  
As mentioned earlier, the heart of MESSOC 
is the set of cost and intermediate output 
algorithms. Alone, these algorithms would 
be inaccessible to the user, and would be 
useless without accurate data. The algorithms 
are therefore supported by an extensive user- 
interface program and a collection of 
databases. 
The  user interface allows the user to 
construct a Space Station scenario by editing 
a set of program and crew factors, and two 
spreadsheets, called the configuration profile 
and the operations profile. The  configuration 
profile allows the user to describe the Station 
in terms of hardware elements that physically 
make up  the on-orbit  Station over the period 
of time fo r  which cost estimates are desired. 
The operations profile allows the user to 
represent the overall structure of on-orbit 
and ground operations over the same period. 
A macro-view of MESSOC's architecture is 
shown in Figure A-1. 
(1 )  S u ~ ~ o r t i n e  Databases. The 
configuration profile is supported by 
several logistics databases that contain 
detailed information on each orbital 
replacement unit (ORU) contained in 
each hardware element. This 
information covers on-orbit and ground 
maintenance characteristics such as 
mean time between failure (MTBF), 
how each failed ORU is to be treated, 
who will maintain i t ,  how long each 
maintenance task (both scheduled and 
unscheduled) will take, what parts 
might be used to effect  repair, as well 
as data on weight and price. 
The configuration profile is also 
supported by a database of physical 
information on each hardware element 
such as overall mass and frontal areas. 
A separate database contains data on 
sustaining engineering parameters that 
can be linked to outside models of 
DDT&E costs. 
The operations profile is supported by 
several distinct databases. A training 
database provides the link between the 
flight crew, ground personnel, and 
launch site personnel requirements and 
training operations. The 1970 Jacchia 
model is used to represent atmospheric 
density in calculating drag forces on the 
Station. A major ground facility 
data base pro v ides de  t a i I ed inform at ion 
on each such center,  and a mission 
characteristics database provides detail 
on several sets of potential Station 
experiments and payloads. 
These databases are  not intended as 
replacements for  existing engineering, 
logistics, and training databases, but as 
copies of them. Consequently, to 
produce cost estimates that reflect the 
most current Space Station program, 
these databases must be maintained in 
a timely fashion. This is facilitated by 
the fact  that they are stored in the 
widely-available dBase III+ format.  
MESSOC's Aleorithms and ( 2 )  
Eauations. MESSOC's algorithms and 
equations are based on the principle 
that costs can be causally related to 
program decisions on Station design, 
configuration, operations, and logistics 
policies. It was strongly felt that 
greater Station complexity, activity 
rates, and/or  Station size should give 
rise to greater estimated operations costs 
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in a systematic way. Further,  to the 
extent that the many options could be 
anticipated, MESSOC was designed to 
handle a variety of policies. For 
example, when properly used, MESSOC 
ought to be able to recognize the 
implications of shifting an activity from 
the Station to a ground facility. 
To  produce cost estimates that are 
causally related to program decisions, 
four  qualities were built into MESSOC’s 
algorithms and equations. First, 
wherever possible, operations costs are 
built up from the lowest level of data 
that were practical to obtain. As a 
result, a change in design of a 
subsystem that affects the number or 
characteristics of its ORUs,  for  
example, will result in a different 
estimate of operations costs. This 
provides a very natural way of treating 
the operations cost effects of 
commonality in the Station’s design. 
Second, algorithms and equations were 
linked to each other so that calculations 
made in one block of equations would 
be passed to another when needed. For 
example, an increase in the frequency 
of logistics resupply flights to the 
Stat ion acts  d i rec t ly  i n  the  
processing/reprocessing algorithm to 
increase those estimated costs, and acts 
indirectly to increase flight design costs 
and launch site training costs as well. 
As another example, MESSOC can be 
used to determine the effect  on training 
costs of not only design changes that 
increase the need for  EVA, but also of 
changing operations policies regarding 
EVA safety. This is possible because of 
the linked nature of the cost drivers 
and the detail built into the training 
and logistics algorithms. 
Third,  as previously argued, operations 
cost estimates alone are not sufficient to 
address key design and operations 
issues. For example, a change in a 
subsystem design or operations policy 
might have very little effect  on 
operations costs, but might significantly 
increase on-orbit maintenance time. 
Unless this were known, the wrong 
decision might be made. Consequently, 
MESSOC was designed to calculate 
several measures of intermediate 
outputs--net crew time available to 
users, subsystem or  component 
availability, and net user payloads to 
orbit--at the same time it calculates 
costs, and to d o  so by using data passed 
f rom the cost algorithms. A conceptual 
view of how MESSOC’s cost and 
intermediate output blocks are  related in 
shown in Figure A-2. 
Last, the MESSOC software incorporates 
several logical checks to ensure the 
appropriate timing of costs. For 
example, i t  recognizes that training for  
proximity operations using the Station 
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) is 
not needed until the period just  before 
it is placed on-orbit. 
MESSOC’s algorithms and equations 
calculate costs deterministically or  as 
expected values. As a result, it is quite 
likely that actual operations costs will 
differ f rom the MESSOC estimate in 
any year since actual costs tend to be 
stochastic. It is possible, through the 
judicious manipulation of the MESSOC 
databases, to obtain a range of 
operations cost estimates, should the 
user desire to do so. 
(3) Disnlaved Outwts.  MESSOC 
computes operations costs in 17 cost 
categories a t  present for  each year of 
the scenario created by the user. 
MESSOC provides color graphics 
displays of cost outputs, as well as a 
summary report on costs, key input 
variables, and intermediate output 
measures for  that scenario. The 
summary report also displays discounted 
and undiscounted cost totals. The user 
can request more detail for  each cost 
category, and can obtain detailed annual 
breakdowns of how flight crews spend 
their on-orbit time, availability and 
stockout probabilities for  critical 
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subsvstems and components, and net 
user payloads to orbit. 
A.2 Interpretation of MESSOC Results 
A number of very important points must be 
made in discussing MESSOC results. It is 
useful to review some of them at this point. 
Mature ODerations 
First, MESSOC estimates are intended to 
cover the period of mature Station operations 
only. The  assumption of mature operations 
carries with it a host of occasionally 
unrecognized characteristics. For example, 
all major ground facilities have been built. 
Their initial outfitting has been completed 
and checked out; software programs have 
been verified, and  the initial complement of 
personnel have been trained. The Station's 
ORUs are performing with the reliability of 
an operational system, and so on. 
MESSOC recognizes, however, that when 
more sustaining resources are bought in the 
period before mature operations, operations 
cost estimates are  lower in the first few years 
of mature operations. For example, if the 
initial provisioning of spares was greater than 
required by mature operations, MESSOC's 
annual spares replacement cost estimates will 
initially be lower than in the long run. In 
effect, MESSOC allows the SSP to live off its 
initial investment fo r  a while. MESSOC can 
do this because initial amounts of sustaining 
resources, such as spares and trained crews, 
are inputs to the model controlled by the 
user. 
ODerations Scenarios and  Cost Drivers 
MESSOC estimates are  dependent on the 
specific operations scenario used. Each run 
is, in essence, a "what-if" experiment. To 
obtain useful estimates for  the SSP requires 
the involvement of high-level SSP managers 
to define what the appropriate operations 
scenarios are. To the extent that there is no 
single dominating operations scenario, there 
is no single "correct" operations cost estimate. 
However, in the operations scenarios that 
have been considered to date, at least 60 
percent of the annual Space Station 
operations cost are  attributable to four  cost 
categories. These are  (1) launch services, (2) 
Work Package sustaining engineering, ( 3 )  
logistics, and (4) program management. 
MESSOC estimates fo r  some of these costs 
depend on a few variables, but for  others 
like logistics, the cost estimates depend on 
several thousand variables. It is possible 
though to discuss the principal cost drivers 
for  each of these categories in more general 
terms. 
Launch services demanded in a given year 
depend on the requirements generated by the 
planned exchange of user payloads, the 
logistics mass to orbit, and crew turnover 
policies. The logistics mass to orbit, in turn,  
depends on the need for  spares and 
consumables, and on  the payload capabilities 
of the launch vehicles when used in 
conjunction with the Space Station's logistics 
carriers and  pallets. The  need for  spares and 
consumables depends ultimately on the 
Station's design characteristics. 
Work Package sustaining engineering covers 
the correction of any flight hardware and 
software anomalies identified during mature 
operations, as well as normal performance 
enhancements and  on-going integration. The  
cost of this work depends ultimately on the 
complexity and initial capability of the flight 
hardware. 
Logistics costs depend on the Station's design 
characteristics, in particular,-on the MTBFs 
at the O R U  level. Logistics costs also 
depend strongly on the logistics policies in 
effect for  the Space Station. These logistics 
policies include such issues as where ORU 
repairs are  to be done, how much quality 
assurance and testing are  needed, and which, 
if any, ORUs  should be changed out  before 
a failure. 
Program management costs are  driven by the 
size and management complexity of the SSP. 
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International participation adds to this 
complexity. 
Onerations Cost Uncertainties 
MESSOC estimates represent the expected 
value cost and performance outcomes. This 
is particularly important to note for  the 
logistics portions of the model, which are 
representing highly stochastic cost elements. 
Operations cost uncertainties can be divided 
into two kinds--real uncerminty and 
statistical uncertainty. Real uncertainty arises 
when we do not know what value a variable 
will take and do not understand its 
underlying probability distribution. Statistical 
uncertainty--sometimes called simply "risk"- 
-arises when we do not know what value a 
variable will take, but its underlying 
probability distribution is well-understood, 
The  SSP must come to grips with both. 
The  distinction is well-illustrated in the case 
of Space Station flight hardware spares and 
repair costs, both of which depend on actual 
on-orbit failures. The MESSOC expected 
value estimates of these costs depend directly 
on the MTBFs for  the Station's (ORUS. At  
the present time, these MTBFs are subject to 
real uncertainty since no actual operations 
experience or on-orbit testing has been done. 
If the actual MTBFs h e r e  to turn out to be 
only half of the current predictions, then 
expected spares and repair costs would about 
double. Even if the current predictions of 
MTBFs are correct, actual failures are 
stochastic. The  SSP could have a "bad year" 
in which failures are much higher than 
expected, along with spares and repair costs. 
Both kinds of uncertainty could affect 
operations costs in another way. Either 
MTBF predictions that were in retrospect too 
high, or a bad year could result in a 
requirement for  additicinal (above plan) STS 
launches to resupply thr: Station. This would 
be a discontinuous and significant increase 
in operations costs. 
The  SSP must be able to perform cost 
uncertainty iissessmentii. To do this, an 
independent critical review of the variables 
and scenarios used in the operations cost 
model is needed. A cost uncertainty 
assessment using MESSOC should also 
examine the associated uncertainties in the 
inter mediate outputs . 
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Appendix B 
APPLICATION OF MESSOC TO THE REPAIR-IN-ORBIT (RIO) ISSUE 
by Robert Shishko 
Panel Two of the Task  Force asked JPL to assist them in determining the efficacy of repairing ORUs 
in-orbit as part of an overall maintenance strategy. Such an analysis involves asking (1) what ORUs 
can be repaired ill-orbit given human limitations, and (2) given that repair-iri-orbit is feasible, under 
what circumstances does it make sense to do so. The latter question is essent,ially one of life cycle cost 
(LCC) since the answer depends on a complex tradeoff of various resources, each of which has value 
and therefore should not be wasted. 
JPL undertook such an analysis for the Stat,ion’s electrical and electronic ORUs. These ORUs were 
singled out because they are a significant part, of the investment in the Station, they are crucial to the 
proper functioning of nearly all of the Station’s subsystems, and it was felt that repair-in-orbit was 
feasible a high percentage of the time. 
MESSOC was used as the primary “engine of analysis” since it could not only estimate the operations 
cost implications of repair-in-orbit, but could quantify the crewhour and transportation implications as 
well. However, the DDT&E cost implications, which are outside of MESSOC, required a one-time effort 
to quantify. It is important to understand that without (lata on the DDT&E cost of Station resources, 
a LCC analysis of this kind is not possible. In other words, a model like the System Design Tradcoff 
Model (SDTM) is essential. 
What Tradeoffs Are Involved? 
Adding a repair-in-orbit capability for the Station’s electrical and electronic ORUs is not a costless 
endeavor. Additional generic and specialized test eqnipment must be bought and installed, 
maintenance documentation must be expanded, astronauts must be trained to do repair-in-orbit, and 
additional space allocated to temporary storage. These involve both upfront DDT&E costs as well as 
annual operations costs. 
With a repair-in-orbit capability, astronauts will be doing less remove-and-replace maintenance and 
more remove, repair-and-replace (or remove, replace-and-repair) maintenance. The total amount of 
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time spent on Station maintenance is lery likely to increase, depending on how milch longer it takes to 
actually complete the repair tasks. Crew time spent O I I  maintenance could have been used to operate 
payloads. I f  crew time is as restricted as some liavc argued, then it  must be Iiighly valued in any 
analysis. 
Offsetting the  additional crew time required is the reduced weight of ORUs and other parts that must 
be brought down and returned to the Station. Since transportation to orbit is both costly and 
constrained, any weight savings should be highly valiied as well. Indeed, the JPL analysis showed 
that the optimal amount of repair-in-orbit capability Idepends almost mtirely on the relative “prices”, 
i.e., value prr u n i t ,  of crew time, transportation to orbit, and pressurizcd volume. The analysis leading 
to this conclusion is presented belon using as little iiiatheinatics as possible. I t  is ,I prototypc for many 
possible LCC analyses. 
Minimizing the LCC Function 
Choosing the optimal amount of repair-iii-orlit for c,lectrical and electronic ORUs analytically involves 
taking the first derivative of the L(‘C function with re:jpcct to the repair-in-orbit probability, RIO, and 
setting the resulting function eqiial to zero. Solving for RIO then results in the LCC-minimizing 
policy, if the appropriate second-order conditions hold. Mathematically, if LCC is the life cycle cost 
function, then this process can be written as: 
were Xi,t is the ith activity or resoiirce at time t ,  I is the investment. cost function, C, is the annual 
operations cost function, t is time measured from the start of Phaw E, and r is the annual real 
discount rate. 
for t = 1, . . .  ,T 
In the above equation, the product of the related partial derivatives can be considered as a “price” 
times a “quantity.n The first term represents the impact on costs of a change in the ith activity or 
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resource level, i.e., a “price” per unit of change. The second term represents the amount of activity or 
resource change per unit change in RIO, i.e., a “quantity.” These prices and quantities need to be 
evaluated both for initial investment costs and recurring operations costs. 
As mentioned above, MESSOC was used to estimate the partial derivatives with respect to RIO for the 
operations component of LCC. A one-time effort was  necessary to estimate the initial investment 
implications of increasing the Station’s repair-in-orbit capability. These estimates were then converted 
into the needed partial derivatives with respect to RIO. 
For one key resource, pressurized volume, a non-linear function was needed to estimate the changing 
initial Station requirement when RIO was increased. To  perform more repair-in-orbit, certain generic 
and specialized test equipment would be needed, along with additional work and storage volume. 
Because pressurized volume is a scarce resource on the Station, the amount needed must be carefully 
estimated and valued against other resources. The function representing this volumetric requirement 
had to have several mathematical characteristics, namely: 
(1) V(RI0) = 0 when RIO = 0; 
(2) V’(RI0) > 0; and 
(3) lim V(RI0)  = 00 as RIO + 1. 
The function chosen for the analysis was: 
V(RI0) = Vo tan ((5) RIO) 
where Vo = 17.833. This function meets the mathematical requirements, and appeared valid for RIO 
roughly between 0.25 and 0.90. The constant, Vo, was selected to pass the function through a 
preselected point. 
Results with Current Estimates 
Tables B-1 and B-2 set out the resulting non-zero partial derivatives necessary to complete the analysis. 
Both tables work roughly the same way. To the left is a list of activities or resources likely to be 
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affected by doing repair-in-orbit, followed by t,he column of “prices” , a column of estimated “quantity” 
derivatives, and a column showing thc product. Note that some quantities increase and others decrease 
its RIO is made larger. The t,ot,al of the “product” column is the net additional initial investrnent cost 
per unit of RIO (Table 13-1) or the net additional annual operations costs per unil, of RIO (Table B-2). 
Taking the net present value of these costs yields a function of RIO, which is to he set equal to  zero 
arid solved for the optimal RIO. 
Some clarifying comments on Tables H-I  and B-2 are needed before moving to the solution. A “price” 
of $l.OO/unit in either table niraris that the “quantity” has been estiniated i n  rnillions of FY85 dollars. 
This would naturally be expected using MESSOC. The “prices” of wvight-to-orbit, pressurized volunie, 
and IVA have been taken from the System Accounting Model (SAM) as published in the Space Station 
Cost Management Process Recluirernents document (JSC 30470--Decerriber 30, 1986). 
The logistics--cost, weight, and IV,4--implications of repairing electrical and electronic ORUs in-orbit 
were estimated by MESSOC. ‘These OILUs made up 223 of the 1065 ORUs in MESSOC’s data base. 
The MESSOC results are dependent on a host of individual assumptions about these OltUs. For 
example, if the mean-time-between-failure data were incorrect, then the estimated partial derivatives, 
on which this analysis depends, would be incorrect as well. There is no substitute for good data.’ 
EVA does not appear in the list of activities in Table B-2 because the way maintcunance of EVA ORUs 
was conducted, no additional EVA w a s  demanded. Those electrical and eleclronic ORUs requiring EVA 
were removed and replaced, just as they would be without a repair-in orbit capability. They might be 
repaired-in-orbit, but that would be accomplished using IVA. Kepaired ORUs were placed i n  
temporary pressurized storage until the next EVA cycle or until external storage w a s  available, 
whichever came last. An alternative maintenance approach might reduce storage requirements, but 
increase some other resource. This would have to be evaluated using the same method as this analysis. 
‘The Operations Task Forcc would like to thank Mr. Robert, Hill (KSC/SS-LSO) for 
identifying the test equipment and tool requirements, determining which electrical and electronic ORUs 
could potentially be repaired iii-orbit, and estimating the maintenance l,ime required to do so. Without 
these data, the JPL analysis would not have been possible. 
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Table B-1. Additional Initial Investment Costs Per Unit of RIO 
(In millions of FY85$) 
Resource or 
Activity, X. 
170 
“Product” a x i , O  aRIO “Quantity”, -
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Equipment Purchase $1.00/unit 0.833 units $0.833 
Equipment Launch 3.62 1 /Klb 0.30167 Klbs 1.092 
Initial Spare l.OO/unit -9.70 units -9.700 
Initial Training 1 .OO/unit 0.15 units 0.150 
Maintenance Docum I.OO/unit 1.167 units 1.167 
Pressurized Volume 0.056/cuft-yr V’( 1tIO)T 0.056 + 0.056V‘( RI0 )T  
TOTAL -6.458 + 0.056 V’(RI0)T 
2 Note: V’(RI0) = 28.012 ( 1  + tan (1.57 ItIO)), and T is the time horizon for operations costs, set in 
this analysis at 15 years. 
Table B-2. Additional Annual Operations Costs Per Unit of RIO 
(In millions of FY85$) 
Resource or 
Activity, X. 
bt 
“Product” axi,t ’“ “Quantity”, - aRIO “Price”, ___ ax;,, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Spares/Reprs/Trans $1.00/unit -14.267units $-14.267 
Spares Launch 3.621/KIb -6.300 Klbs -22.810 
Training 1 .OO/unit 1.667 units 1.667 
Maintenance Docum 1 .OO/unit 0.117 units 0.117 
IV A O.O206/crewhr 344.58 crewhrs 7.098 
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Having made these comments, t h e  results can be brought into focus. The optimal RIO probability, 
designated RIO*, is obtained by solving the following eqriatiori: 
where Ihe term in the large parerit lieses serves to discount T yrars of opcrat ions cost savings. The 
equation yields RIO* = 0.79 when T=15 years and the annual discount ratr is 10 percent. This valuc 
suggests a strong case can be made for providing a repair-in-orbit capability for clrctrical and electronic 
ORUs. It is easy to verify that this solution represents at least a local mininium of LCC since 
v”(RIo*)>o. 
Sensitivity of the R,esults 
The SAM pricrs represent very important decision paramcters. Tlicby are the long run marginal cost 
per unit of their respective activities or resources. Economists sometimes use the terms “shadow price” 
or “opportunity cost” to express thr. same idea. Ignoring the implicit price o f  these resources results i n  
a Station that has less value to its iisers. Ultirriately, 1 he rrsult is a Station with no value to users. 
IIowever, the current implicit, prices assigned by SAM to activities and resources may not be correct. 
Some of them may be off by an order of magnitude in fact, because the data used to derived them is 
woefully out-of-date. The implicit I’rice of weight-to-orbit in SAM is S3621/11), which is calculated on 
the basis of STS performance and cost. This implicit price is probably the best of the SAM estimates 
because it is based on actual txperiencc.. It is probably accurate to within 20 percent. But for IVA and 
pressurized volume, there is considerably more uncertainty. 
If  the SAM implicit price for IVA w c w  five times higher--not an unreasonable supposition--then the 
additional annual operations costs mould be positive, not negative as shown i n  ‘Table B-2. In that case, 
no repair-in-orbit would be optimal. Further, even at hwer levels of thc, IVA iniplicit price, repair-in- 
orbit should be sharply curtailed or vlirninated. Figure B-1 shows how the optimal RIO varies with the 
implicit price of IVA. Three different discount rates arc’ shown indicating its rffect as well. The higher 
the discount rate, the less future operations cost savings arc valued against current DDT&E costs. At 
the SAM IVA irnplicit price of roughly $20,600/crewhorrr and a discount rate of 10 percent, the 
optimal RIO is the 0.79 figure calciil,%ted above. 
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Figure B-2 shows how the optimal RIO varies with the implicit price of pressurized volume, holding 
the IVA implicit price a t  its SAM value. Again, the discount rate exerts a strong influence. Given the 
uncertainty in both implicit prices, it is reasonable to ask what combinations of the two implicit prices 
conspire to make repair-in-orbit uneconomic. That question is answered in Figure B-3, which shows 
the boundary condition between economic repair-in-orbit and iineconomic repair-in-orbit. Inside the 
triangle, the optimal RIO is posit,ive; outside, all maintenance on electrical and electronic ORUs should 
be remove-and-replace. 
The triangle covers a wide range of implicit prices, and therefore suggests that even with uncertain 
SAM prices, some repair-in-orbit looks economic. Note too that the current combination of SAM 
implicit prices is well inside the boundary. 
Concluding Observations on the Analysis 
The results of the above analysis confirm the Operation Task Force Panel T w o  conclusion with regard 
to repair-in-orbit, namely that a repair-in-orbit capability would be economic for certain classes of 
ORUs. To  make such a capability feasible from an operations point of view, the SSP would have to 
commit additional resources during the Station’s development phase. These resources include 
additional initial training, maint,enance documentation, on-Station test equipment, and pressurized 
volume to be used as a work and storage place. In return, the LCC of the Station is expected to be 
lower. 
What such an approach requires goes beyond the usual Optimal Repair Level Analysis (ORLA). It 
requires a systematic identification of the detailed failure modes and probabilities for those ORUs that 
are candidates for repair-in-orbit. It also suggests that to do the proper analysis on these detailed data, 
it is important that a few crucial variables be particularly accurate. The calculation of RIOt above 
was highly dependent on the estimates of required pressurized volume, spares weight-to-orbit, spares 
and repair requirements, IVA crewhours for maintenance, and the respective implicit prices for these 
resources. Populating SDTM and MESSOC with accurate data sets so that these crucial quantities can 
be confidently estimated would yield an extremely high payoff for the SSP. 
How much repair-in-orbit should be done has other than economic dimensions. Such repairs would be 
done by astronauts and they might have strong opinions about spending a couple of hundred additional 
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hours a year repairing circuit boards and the like. Somi, may view this i t s  an ~~iiiiecessary diversion 
from their main task, while others may take a certain amount of enjoyinrrit i n  keeping the Station in  
“shipshape.” At the least, some study of this aspect of opcrations should be made. 
‘The calculation of RIO* above was predicated on a Star ion with an unrlianging configuration and 
operations scenario. Growth of the Station was not considered. The effwt of Station growth would be 
to alter the partial derivatives in Tables B-l and B-2. I n  particular, such growth would likely mean 
increased maintenance time, spares weight-to-orbit, and pressurized volume reqiiirernents per unit of 
RIO. Flirt hermore, when such growl h occurred would matter since net present values need to be 
calculated. MESSOC coiiltl have handled a growth sceriario, and would have produced the necessary 
partial derivatives for each year of operations, but such a rc~fincrnent w.is not done <tt this time. 
Lastly,  tlic 
value of tlic Station. T h i s  refinement was also not made. It is unlikely that the optimal RIO w a s  
affected by this decision. 
function should technically have inclutled decorrirriissioriirig costs net of any salvage 
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